


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Myers, Phillip Van Ness, 1846-1937.

Ancient history for colleges and high schools



GENERAL VIEW OF OLYMPIA: A RECONSTRUCTION. (From Boetticher's *Olympia*) — Frontispiece.

A
HISTORY OF GREECE

FOR
COLLEGES AND HIGH SCHOOLS.

BY
PHILIP VAN NESS MYERS, L.H.D.,
AUTHOR OF "OUTLINES OF ANCIENT HISTORY," "MEDIEVAL AND MODERN HISTORY,"
"A GENERAL HISTORY," AND "ROME: ITS RISE AND FALL."



BOSTON, U.S.A., AND LONDON:
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PREFACE.

THIS work, although written on the lines which I drew in my *Eastern Nations and Greece*, is practically a new book. The sketch of Greek affairs in the earlier volume is compressed into about two hundred pages; the present narrative fills over five hundred. The book is intended for more mature readers than those for whom the work named was written, yet I think it will be found adapted to even the earlier classes of the high school course. In writing it, I have kept steadily in view the original design, and have aimed to give prominence to the permanent elements only of Greek history. Particularly have I exercised care not to overload the book with those details which confuse without informing the mind, and which obstruct instead of helping forward the narrative.

In the proper connections I have indicated the import for Greek history of the recent archæological discoveries on Greek soil, and have traced the development of the Athenian constitution in the new light afforded by the lately found Aristotelian treatise. In Part Sixth, in special chapters devoted to art, literature, philosophy, and social life among the ancient Greeks, place has been found for matter that could not well be introduced in earlier chapters without breaking, in what seemed an undesirable way, the continuity of the political narrative.

Besides the list of books given after each chapter throughout the work, a short bibliography in which, for the convenience of the reader, the books are classified by periods and subjects, has been appended to the volume. The footnotes throughout the book will direct the student to some of the most important of the original authorities.

The book will be found liberally furnished with maps and cuts interpretative of the text. Several of the colored maps have been based on the charts accompanying Freeman's *Historical Geography of Europe*; others have been reproduced from Johnston's *Classical Atlas*.

A considerable number of the illustrations have been engraved from photographs; the others have been taken from Baumeister's *Denkmaeler des klassischen Altertums*, Boetticher's *Olympia*, Jaeger's *Weltgeschichte*, and other authentic sources.

My last words must be words of grateful acknowledgment to the scholars and friends who have aided me in my task. To Dr. W. W. Goodwin I am under particular obligation for his kindness in giving me his opinion on several points of special difficulty; to Dr. George W. Botsford I am deeply indebted for reading the proofs of the chapters covering Spartan and Athenian constitutional matters; also to my friends and colleagues, Prof. Wayland R. Benedict and Dr. Frederick L. Schoenle I owe special thanks, to the former for helpful suggestions touching different phases of Greek Philosophy, and to the latter for valuable hints on matters concerning Greek Literature.

(NOTE. — The footnote references throughout the book to Grote's History are invariably to the edition of 1888, published in ten volumes.)

P. V. N. M.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.



PART FIRST.

HELLAS BEFORE THE PERSIAN WARS.

(FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO 500 B.C.)



CHAPTER I.

THE LAND AND THE RACE.

Hellas.—The ancient people whom we call Greeks called themselves Hellenes and their land Hellas. But this term “Hellas” as used by the ancient Greeks embraced much more than modern Greece. “Wherever were Hellenes there was Hellas.” Thus the name included not only Greece proper and the islands of the adjoining seas, but also the Hellenic cities in Asia Minor, in Southern Italy, and in Sicily, besides many other Grecian settlements scattered up and down the Mediterranean and along the shores of the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Euxine.

Yet Greece proper was the real home land of the Hellenes, the land in which they believed themselves to be indigenous, and which was the actual centre of Greek life and culture. Consequently it will be necessary for us to gain at least some slight knowledge of the divisions and physical features of this country, before passing to the history of the peoples themselves.

The Divisions of Greece.—Long arms of the sea divide the Grecian peninsula into three parts, called Northern, Central, and

Southern Greece. The southern portion, joined to the mainland by the Isthmus of Corinth and now generally known as the Morea, was called by the ancients the Peloponnesus, that is, "the Island of Pelops," from its fabled colonizer.

Northern Greece included the ancient districts of Thessaly and Epirus. Thessaly consists mainly of a large and beautiful valley, walled in on all sides by rugged mountains. This land-locked basin seems to have once formed a great lake, which was drained by the opening, probably through the agency of an earthquake, of a deep fissure in the mountain range on the side towards the Ægean. A portion of this gorge forms what was known as the Vale of Tempe, a spot celebrated far and wide for the mingled beauty and grandeur of its scenery. This cleft, through which the waters of the interior plain still find their way to the Ægean, affords the only practicable northern pass into the Thessalian valley from the side of the sea. Thessaly nourished great herds of horses in its luxuriant meadows, and during all periods of Greek history the military strength of the Thessalians consisted mainly in their splendid cavalry. The land was rich in story and song, and some of the earliest recollections of the historic Greeks respecting the exploits of their forefathers were connected with the harbors, mountains, and other local features of the country. From one of its ancient ports, Iolcos, the Argonauts are said to have sailed in search of the Golden Fleece.

The district of Epirus stretched along the Ionian Sea on the west. In the gloomy recesses of its forests of oak was situated the renowned Dodonean oracle of Zeus. The inhabitants of this district, though undoubtedly related to the Greeks, lagged behind their kinsmen in culture, and never played any important part in Greek history.

The most important divisions of Central Greece were Acarnania, Ætolia, Phocis, Bœotia, Attica, and Megaris. Of these districts Phocis deserves particular mention, chiefly for the reason that within its borders was Delphi, the renowned seat of an oracle of Apollo. This was the common religious hearth of the Hellenic race.

Bœotia was a badly drained land, overhung by a fog-laden atmosphere, which it is thought tended to make the inhabitants heavy and dull. The Bœotians were certainly regarded by their neighbors as stupid and gross. The chief city of the district was Thebes, which acted an important, though for the most part neither very brilliant nor creditable part, in the drama of Greek life. Yet round this city clustered many of those legends of the heroic age of the Greeks which came to form the basis of some of the masterpieces of the dramatic poets of later times.

Attica was the region which formed the setting of the brilliant city of Athens. Its soil, in striking contrast to the deep, fat soil of Bœotia, is thin and poor, while the air is singularly clear and transparent, giving to all objects, such as hills and temples, remarkable sharpness of outline and clearness of feature. The Attic land, as we shall learn, was the central point of Grecian history.

The chief districts of Southern Greece were Corinthia, Arcadia, Achaia, Argolis, Laconia, Messenia, and Elis.

The main part of Corinthia formed the Isthmus uniting the Peloponnesus to continental Greece. Its chief city was Corinth, the gateway of the peninsula.

Arcadia, sometimes called "the Switzerland of the Peloponnesus," formed the heart of the peninsula. This region consists of broken uplands shut in from the surrounding coast-plains by irregular mountain walls. The inhabitants of this region, because thus isolated, were, in the general intellectual movement of the Greek race, left far behind the dwellers in the more accessible and favored portions of Greece. It is the rough country-like manners of the Arcadians that has given the term "Arcadian" its meaning of pastoral artlessness and rusticity.

Achaia was a strip of land lying upon the Corinthian Gulf. Its cities did not take any active part in the affairs of Greece until the most brilliant period of her history was past. They then formed the heart of an important confederacy known as the Achæan league.




Fig. 1. VIEW OF THE ATTIC PLAINS, WITH A GLIMPSE OF THE ACROPOLIS OF ATHENS. (From Oscar Jäger's *Weltiges. hichte.*)

Argolis formed a tongue of land jutting out into the Ægean. This region is noted as the home of an early prehistoric culture, and holds to-day the remains of cities — Tiryns and Mycenæ — the kings of which built great palaces, possessed vast treasures in gold and silver, and held wide sway long before Athens had made for herself a place in history. Almost every nook and corner of the land was alive with legends of the heroes of the Greek fore-time. The chief city of the region during the historic period was Argos.

Laconia, or Lacedæmon, embraced a considerable part of the southern portion of the Peloponnesus. A prominent feature of the physical geography of this region is a deep river valley, — the valley of the Eurotas, — from whence arose the descriptive name, “Hollow Lacedæmon.” This district was ruled by the city of Sparta, the great rival of Athens.

Messenia was a rich and fruitful region lying to the west of Laconia. It nourished a vigorous race, who in early times carried on a stubborn struggle with the Spartans, by whom they were finally overpowered.

Elis, a district on the western side of the Peloponnesus, is chiefly noted as the consecrated land which held Olympia, the great assembling place of the Greeks on the occasion of the celebration of the most famous of their national festivals — the so-called Olympic games.

The Mountains of Greece. — The Olympian and Cambunian mountains form a lofty wall along a considerable reach of the northern frontier of Greece, shutting out at once the cold winds and hostile races of the north. Branching off at right angles to the Cambunian mountains, is the Pindus range, which runs between Thessaly and Epirus, and then continues on through Central Greece. This mountain system corresponds in a general way to that of Italy. Thus the Cambunian and Olympian ranges correspond to the Alps, which guard the northern frontier of the Italian peninsula, while the Pindus range answers to the Apennines.

The culminating point of the Olympian ridge is Mount Olympus, the most celebrated mountain of Greece. It is only 9750 feet in height, but the ancient Greeks thought it the highest mountain in the world, and believed that its cloudy summit was the assembling place of the gods.

South of Mount Olympus, close by the sea, are Ossa and Pelion, celebrated in fable as the mountains which the giants, in their war against the gods, piled one upon the other in order to scale Olympus.

Mounts Parnassus, Helicon, and Cithæron form in Central Greece a continuation of the Pindus range. The first two were believed to be favorite haunts of the Muses, and on the slopes of the last, Dionysus and his attendant satyrs are said to have held their revels. A deep cleft in Parnassus was the site of the celebrated Delphian oracle of Apollo. Parnassus was the Mount Ararat of Grecian legend, for upon this mountain it was that Deucalion, the Greek Noah, and his wife Pyrrha, whom alone the great flood sent by Zeus had spared, issued from the ark, in which they had been preserved, to repopulate the land.

In Attica, near Athens, are Hymettus, celebrated for its honey; Pentelicus, renowned for its marbles; and Parnes, noted for its wines.

The Peloponnesus is rugged with mountains which radiate in all directions from the central region of Arcadia. Among them the attention of the historian is called particularly to the Taygetus range, which forms a rampart on the west to Hollow Lacedæmon. It reaches a height of about 8000 feet.

The Rivers and Lakes of the Land. — Greece has no rivers large enough to be of service to commerce. Most of the streams are scarcely more than winter torrents. A few, however, bear throughout the year a considerable volume of water to the sea. Among the most important streams may be named the Peneus, which drains the Thessalian plain through the gorge between Ossa and Olympus; the Achelous, the largest river in Greece, which, rising in Epirus, runs southward, separating in its lower course

GENERAL REFERENCE MAP OF ANCIENT GREECE





Acarnania from Ætolia; the Alpheus in Elis, on the banks of which the Olympian games were celebrated; and the Eurotas, which threads the central valley of Laconia. The Ilissus and Cephissus are little streams of Attica which owe their renown chiefly to the poets. In midsummer the Ilissus almost wholly disappears.

The following rivers deserve mention, not because of their size or their direct connection with the history of the country, but for



Fig. 2. THE PLAIN OF OLYMPIA. (The Valley of the Alpheus in Elis, where were held the celebrated Olympian games. From Boetticher's *Olympia*.)

the reason of the prominent place they hold in Greek literature. The Acheron is a river of Epirus, which flows through a deep gloomy gorge, and for this reason was fabled by the Greeks to form the entrance to Hades, into which it was believed to fall. The Cocytus, "the stream of wailing," is also a river of Epirus, which the poets likewise transferred to the under-world and made one of the rivers of the infernal regions. The Styx is a small stream of Arcadia, which leaps a lofty precipice in its course, and whose waters were thought by the ancient Greeks to be deadly

poisonous. It, like the Acheron and the Cocytus, was made one of the rivers of the lower world. It was regarded with such awe and reverence that the gods were believed to swear by its "baneful water," and to hold their word as specially inviolable when guarded by such a sanction.

The lively imagination of the Greeks led them to personify under various forms the streams of their land. This gave rise to a crowd of beautiful stories, which told of the loves and the beneficence of the river gods. The favorite form under which a river with a swift current was conceived was that of a man-headed bull, — a figure obviously suggested by its destructive energy in seasons of flood, — which some hero combats and overcomes.

The lakes of Greece are scarcely more than stagnant pools, the back water of spring freshets.¹ In this respect, Greece, though a mountainous country, presents a striking contrast to Switzerland, whose numerous and deep lakes form one of the most attractive features of Swiss scenery. This contrast results from difference in geological formation. The hills of Greece are composed largely of limestone, in which the waters easily wear subterranean passages, and thereby escape from the valleys. Indeed, one peculiar feature of the rivers of Greece is the underground channels into which they often disappear to come to the light again at a lower point in their courses.

Islands about Greece. — Very much of the history of Greece is intertwined with the islands that lie about the mainland. On the east, in the *Ægean* Sea, are the Cyclades, so called because they form an irregular circle round the sacred island of Delos, where was a very celebrated shrine of Apollo. Between the Cyclades and Asia Minor lie the Sporades, which islands, as the name implies, are sown irregularly over that portion of the *Ægean*. They are simply the peaks of submerged mountain ranges, which may

¹ One of the largest of Greek lakes is Lake Copais in Bœotia. Its name is connected with some important engineering works of the early inhabitants of the district.

be regarded as a continuation beneath the sea of the mountains of Central Greece.

Just off the coast of Attica is a large island called by the ancients Eubœa, but known to us as Negropont. Close to the Asian shores are the large islands of Lemnos, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Rhodes. Lesbos was the early hearth of music and song. Chios was widely known as the home of the alleged descendants of Homer, called the Homeridæ. Samos was the birthplace of some of the most distinguished artists and philosophers that the Greek race produced. Rhodes was noted in the later period of Greek history for its schools of oratory and sculpture, and its commercial activity.

In the Mediterranean, midway between Greece and Egypt, is the large island of Crete, noted in legend for its Labyrinth and its legislator Minos. To the west of Greece lie the Ionian Islands, the largest of which was called Corcyra, now Corfu. The rugged island of Ithaca was the birthplace of Odysseus (Ulysses), the hero of the Odyssey. Cythera, just south of the Peloponnesus, was sacred to Aphrodite, as it was here fable said that she rose from the sea-foam.

From the waters of the Saronic Gulf, within sight of the Attic shore, rises the island of Ægina, the inhabitants of which were long the rivals of the Athenians. In the same gulf, hugging the Attic coast, is Salamis, whose name commemorates a great sea-fight between the Greeks and the Persians.

Climate and Productions.—There is a great variety in the climate of Greece. In the north and upon the uplands the climate is temperate, in the south semi-tropical. The slopes of the mountains in Northern Greece and in Arcadia support forests of beech, oak, and pine; while the southern districts of the Peloponnesus nourish the date-palm, the citron, and the orange. Attica, midway between the north and the south, is the home of the olive and the fig. The vine grows luxuriantly in almost every part of the land. Wheat, barley, wine, and oil are to-day, as they were in ancient times, the chief products of the country; but flax,

honey, and the products of herds of cattle and sheep have always formed a considerable part of the economic wealth of the land.

The hills of Greece supplied many of the useful metals. The ranges of the Taygetus yielded iron, in which the inhabitants of Laconia became skilful workers. Eubœa and Cyprus furnished copper, which created a great industry, having its centre in the former island. The hills of southern Attica contained silver mines, which helped the Athenians to build their earliest navy. Mountains near Athens and the hills of the island of Paros afforded beautiful marbles, which made possible the creation of such splendid temples as the Parthenon, and encouraged the sculptor to the patient exercise of all his skill. Thrace and certain districts of Asia Minor, which the Greeks either possessed or traded with, yielded an abundant supply of gold, though the precious metal is not found in Greece proper.

Influence of the Land upon the People. — The physical geography of a country has much to do with moulding the character and shaping the history of its people. Mountains, isolating neighboring communities and shutting out conquering races, foster the spirit of local patriotism and preserve freedom; the sea, inviting abroad and rendering intercourse with distant countries easy, awakens the spirit of adventure, and develops commercial enterprise.

Now, Greece is at once a mountainous and a maritime country. Mountain walls fence it off into a great number of isolated districts, and this is one reason — though not the main reason, as we shall learn — why the Greeks formed so many small independent states, and never could be brought to feel or to act as a single nation. The earlier history of the cantons of Switzerland affords a somewhat similar illustration of the influence of the physical features of a country upon the political fortunes of its inhabitants.

The Grecian peninsula is, moreover, by deep arms and bays of the sea, converted into what is in effect an archipelago. Few spots in Greece are forty miles from the sea. Hence its people were early tempted to a sea-faring life — tempted to follow what Homer calls

the "wet paths" of Ocean, to see whither they might lead. The shores of the Mediterranean and the Euxine were dotted with Hellenic colonies. Intercourse with the old civilizations of Egypt and Phœnicia stirred the naturally quick and versatile Greek intellect to early and vigorous thought. The islands strewn with seeming carelessness through the *Ægean* Sea were "stepping-stones," which invited intercourse between the settlers of Greece and the inhabitants of the delightful coast countries of Asia Minor and thus blended the life and history of the opposite shores. How much the sea did in developing enterprise and intelligence in the cities of the maritime districts of Greece is shown by the contrast which the advancing culture of these regions presented to the lagging civilization of the peoples of the interior districts; as, for instance, those of *Arcadia*.

Again, the beauty of Grecian scenery inspired many of the most striking passages of the Greek poets; and it is thought that the exhilarating atmosphere and brilliant skies of Attica were not unrelated to the lofty achievements of the Athenian intellect. Indeed, we may almost assert that the wonderful culture of Greece was the product of a land of incomparable and varied beauties acting upon a people singularly sensitive to the influences of nature.

The Pelasgians. — The historic inhabitants of the land we have described were called by the Romans *Greeks*; but, as we have already learned, they called themselves *Hellenes*, from their fabled ancestor *Hellen*.

But the *Hellenes*, according to their own account, were not the original inhabitants of the country. They were preceded by a people whom they called *Pelasgians*. Who this folk may have been, or what was their relation to the later historic *Greeks*, is a matter of debate. Some think they were the *Aryan* pioneers in this part of Europe, and stood in some such relation to the *Greeks* as the *Celts* in Western Europe sustained to the *Teutons*. Others regard them as being simply the prehistoric ancestors of the *Hellenes*, or of a part of the *Hellenes*, just as the *Angles* and

Saxons were the progenitors of the English of to-day. Still others think that the Pelasgians and Hellenes were kindred tribes, but that the Hellenes, possessing superior qualities, gradually acquired ascendancy over the Pelasgians, and finally absorbed them.¹

The Pelasgians, whoever they may have been, evidently were a people somewhat advanced beyond the savage state. They cultivated the ground, and protected their cities with walls. Their chief deity was the Dodonean Zeus, so called from his sanctuary of Dodona, in Epirus. He was essentially the same divinity as the Olympian Zeus of the later Greeks.

The Hellenes. — The Hellenes, a race of Aryan stock, were the people who have given Greece her great place in history. Though separated into numerous, independent, self-governing communities, still the bonds of race, language, and religion tended to draw them together into a sort of association or fraternal union. They always regarded themselves as members of a single family; all were descended, according to their fabled genealogy, from the common progenitor Hellen.² All non-Hellenic peoples they called *Barbarians*. At first this term meant scarcely more than "unintelligible folk," carrying with it no intimation of lack of culture in the people to whom it was applied. But later, when the Greeks had become more keenly alive to the fact that they were more beautiful in body as well as more alert in mind than their neighbors, then the word came to express not simply aversion to a foreign tongue, but contempt founded upon inferiority.

The Hellenes were divided into four families or tribes; namely, the Achæans, the Ionians, the Dorians, and the Æolians.

¹ Perhaps the whole matter might be stated in this way: The Greeks at different times bore different names; at first they were known as Pelasgians, afterwards as Achæans, and still later as Hellenes. See Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. i, p. 29.

² According to the mythical genealogy of the Greeks, Hellen, son of Deucalion, the Grecian Noah, had three sons, Æolus, Dorus, and Xuthus. Æolus and Dorus were the ancestors respectively of the Æolians and Dorians. Xuthus had two sons, Ion and Achæus, the first the progenitor of the Ionians, and the second of the Achæans.

The Achæans are represented by the Greek legends as being the predominant race in the Peloponnesus during the Heroic Age. They then overshadowed to such a degree all the other tribes, as to cause their name to be frequently used for the Greeks in general.

The Ionians were a many-sided, enterprising people, singularly open to outside influences. These qualities we may regard as the result of their maritime life, for, speaking broadly, the Ionians were given to commerce and trade, and lived much upon the sea. They developed every part of their nature, and attained unsurpassed excellence in art, literature, and philosophy. The most noted Ionian city was Athens, whose story is a large part of the history of Hellas.

The Dorians, in their typical communities, present themselves to us as a conservative, practical, and unimaginative race. Their speech and their art were both alike without ornament. They developed the body rather than the mind. Their education was almost wholly gymnastic and military. The most important city founded by them was Sparta, the rival of Athens.

In the different aptitudes and contrasted tendencies of these two great Hellenic families, lay, in the words of the historian Ranke, "the fate of Greece." They divided Hellas into two rival parties, which, through their jealousies and contentions, finally brought to utter ruin all the political hopes and promises of the Hellenic race.

The Æolians formed a rather ill-defined division. In historic times the name is often made to include all Hellenes not enumerated as Ionians or Dorians.

When, about the beginning of the eighth century B.C., the mists of antiquity first clear away from Greece, we discover the several families of the Hellenic race in possession of Greece proper, of the islands of the Ægean, and of the western coasts of Asia Minor. Respecting their migrations and dwelling-places previous to their settlement in these lands, we have no certain knowledge. We do know, however, through the testimony of language, that they

belonged, as has already been said, to the great Aryan family, and that they were relatively close kin to the Italian peoples.

The Greek Genius. — We shall learn in the following chapter that the Greeks without doubt received many of the primary elements of their culture from the Orient. But we must not allow this circumstance to render us blind to the fact that the chief element after all in the wonderful product which we call Greek civilization was the Greek genius itself. For it is with races as with individuals. Men of an extraordinary personality are not the product of education or of circumstances. They are born, not made. It is the mental aptitudes of the Hellenes, that original, versatile, imaginative genius, that love of the beautiful and sense of proportion, that sensitiveness to the influences of nature which we have already mentioned as characterizing the Ionian Greeks above all others, — it is these rare mental qualities, gained we know not how, which the Greeks possessed when they entered the lands they occupied in historic times, that afford the only satisfactory explanation of their wonderful achievements in art, in literature, and in philosophy. Without the quickening power of the Greek genius, the germs of culture transmitted to the West from the East would have lain dormant, or have developed into less perfect and less admirable forms. It was a case of good seed falling into good ground — and it brought forth a hundred-fold.

REFERENCES. — Curtius, *History of Greece* (from the German), vol. i. pp. 9-46. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. ii. pp. 141-163; (twelve volume ed.), vol. ii. pp. 211-236; on the geography of Greece. Tozer, *Primer of Classical Geography*. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 1-57. Mahaffy, *Rambles and Studies in Greece*; contains, mingled with discourses on various things, some charming descriptions of Greek scenery. Butcher, *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius*; a suggestive volume, for the mature student.

NOTE. — In the lists of references to parallel readings given in connection with the chapters throughout the book, mention will be made only of books easily accessible and in the English language. Somewhat fuller lists of works, dealing with special periods and subjects of Greek history, will be found in the bibliography at the end of the book.



Fig. 3. COMBAT BETWEEN ACHILLES AND HECTOR. (From a vase.)

CHAPTER II.

PREHISTORIC HELLAS ACCORDING TO GREEK ACCOUNTS.

Character of the Legends. — The real history of the Greeks does not begin before the eighth century B.C. All that lies back of that date is an inseparable mixture of myth, legend, and fact. Yet this shadowy period forms the background of Grecian history, and we cannot understand the Greeks of historic times without some knowledge, at least, of what they believed their ancestors had done and experienced, for these beliefs profoundly influenced their own conduct. What has been said of the war against Troy, namely, "If not itself a fact, the Trojan War became the cause of innumerable facts,"¹ is true of the whole body of Greek legends. These tales were recited by the historian, dramatized by the tragic poet, cut in marble by the sculptor, and depicted by the painter on the walls of portico and temple. They thus constituted a very vital part of the education of every Greek, and afforded the inspiration of many a great and worthy deed.

Therefore, as a sort of prelude to the story we have to tell, we shall repeat some of the legends of the Greeks touching the beginnings of civilization in Hellas, and respecting the labors and achievements of some of their greatest national heroes. But it must be carefully borne in mind that these legends are not history.

¹ Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, p. 6.

Where, however, there seems to be sufficient ground to justify an opinion, we shall suggest what may be the grain of truth in any particular legend, or what part of it may be a dim though confused remembrance of actual events.

Oriental Immigrants. — The legends of the Greeks represent the early growth of civilization among them as having been promoted by the settlement in Greece of Oriental immigrants, who brought with them the arts and culture of the different countries of the East.

Thus from Egypt, legend affirms, came Cecrops, bringing with him the arts, learning, and priestly wisdom of the Nile valley. He is represented as the builder of Cecropia, which became afterwards the citadel of the illustrious city of Athens. From the same land Danaus is also said to have come with his fifty daughters, and to have built the citadel of Argos. From Phœnicia Cadmus brought the letters of the alphabet, and founded the city of Thebes. The Phrygian Pelops, the progenitor of the renowned heroes Agamemnon and Menelaus, settled in the southern peninsula, which was called after him Peloponnesus (the Island of Pelops).

The nucleus of fact in all these legends is probably this, — that the European Greeks received the primary elements of their culture from the East, and this in two ways: first, directly, through the settlement in Greece in prehistoric times of Semitic races, particularly the Phœnicians; and secondly, indirectly, through the Oriental Greeks who, settled on the shores of Asia Minor, in Crete and Cyprus, and possibly in Lower Egypt, came in contact with peoples of Semitic or semi-Semitic race, absorbed certain elements of their civilization, and transmitted these germs of culture to their kinsmen in European Greece.

That the Hellenes did in this manner receive at least many of the rudiments of their civilization does not admit of doubt. For at the very time that the Ionian Greeks were spreading themselves over the western coast of Asia Minor and the islands of the Archipelago, the Phœnicians were establishing their colonies in Crete, Rhodes, and other islands of the Ægean, and possibly even

in Greece itself, and carrying with them the arts and culture of Egypt and Babylonia. At the same time the Hittites, also, having extended their power throughout Asia Minor, were spreading the civilization of the Euphrates to the shores of the Ægean.

The Heroes: Heracles, Theseus, and Minos. — Standing often in close relation to the early foreign settlers of whom we have just spoken, was a great crowd of later heroes, many of whom traced their lineage from these illustrious foreigners, and yet in general are represented by the legends as thoroughly Greek in temper, speech, and act, in all intellectual and moral qualities.

Many of these personages acquired national renown, and became the revered heroes of the whole Greek race. These heroes were, doubtless, in some cases historical persons, but so much of myth and fable has gathered about their names that it is quite impossible to separate that which is really historical from what is purely fabulous. Among the most noted of these heroes are Heracles, Theseus, and Minos. Respecting each of these we will say a word.

Heracles, who is made to spring from the royal line established at Argos by Danaus (p. 16), was the greatest of the national heroes of the Greeks. He is represented as performing, besides various other exploits, twelve superhuman labors, — among which were the slaying of the Nemean lion, the destruction of the Lernean hydra, the cleansing of the stables of Augeas, and the bringing of Cerberus from the infernal regions, — and as being at last translated from a blazing pyre to a place among the immortal gods.

The original of the Greek Heracles was the Syrian sun-god Melcarth, whose worship was introduced into Greece by the Phœnician traders. The Greek imagination gradually transformed and idealized this solar divinity of the East, until he became at last the personification and ideal type of the lofty moral qualities of heroism, self-sacrifice, and endurance, as well as the symbol of the bravery, sufferings, and achievements of the pioneers of Greek civilization.

Theseus, a descendant of Cecrops, was the favorite hero of the

Athenians, being one of their legendary kings. Among his great works were the clearing of the Isthmian highways of robbers, the slaying of the Minotaur, — a monster which Minos, king of Crete, kept in a labyrinth, and fed upon youths and maidens sent from Athens as a forced tribute, — the defeat of the Amazons, and the consolidation of the twelve boroughs or cantons of Attica into a single state.

The legend of Theseus doubtless contains a substantial kernel of history. The consolidation of Attica was certainly an historical event, while the slaying of the Minotaur may be taken to sym-



Fig. 4. BATTLE BETWEEN GREEKS AND AMAZONS. (From a sarcophagus.)

bolize the freeing of the Athenians from a tribute paid to the Phoenicians of Crete, whose custom of sacrificing children to Moloch probably lent to the myth its peculiar form.

Minos, who has already been mentioned as the king of Crete, was one of the great tribal heroes of the Dorians. Legend makes him a legislator of divine wisdom, the suppressor of piracy in the Grecian seas, and the founder of the first great maritime state of Hellas.

The Argonautic Expedition. — Besides the labors and exploits of single heroes, such as we have been naming, the legends of the Greeks tell of three especially memorable enterprises which were

conducted by bands of heroes. These were the Argonautic Expedition, the Seven against Thebes, and the Siege of Troy.

The tale of the Argonauts is told with many variations in the legends of the Greeks. Jason, a prince of Thessaly, with fifty companion heroes, among whom were Heracles, Theseus, and Orpheus, the latter a musician of superhuman skill, the music of whose lyre moved trees and stones, set sail in "a fifty-oared galley," called the *Argo* (hence the name *Argonauts*, given to the heroes), in search of a "golden fleece" which was fabled to be nailed to a tree and watched by a dragon, in the Grove of Ares, on the eastern shores of the Euxine, an inhospitable region of unknown terrors. The expedition was successful, and, after many wonderful adventures, the heroes returned in triumph with the sacred relic.

Different meanings have been given to this tale. In its primitive form it was doubtless a pure myth of the rain-clouds; but in its later forms we may believe it to symbolize the maritime explorations in the eastern seas of some of the tribes¹ of Pelasgian or Achæan Greece.

The Seven against Thebes.—The story of the War of the Seven against Thebes is second in interest and importance only to that of the Siege of Troy. The tale begins with Laius, king of Thebes,—the third in descent from Cadmus,—who, having been warned by an oracle that he would be slain by his own son, should one be born to him, thought to prevent the fulfilment of the prediction by causing his infant child to be exposed on Mount Cithæron. The child was rescued by a herdsman, and brought up by the king of Corinth, having been given the name of Œdipus.

Upon reaching manhood, Œdipus went to the oracle at Delphi to make inquiry respecting his parentage. The only answer he

¹ Conjecturally the Minyans, of Orchomenus in Bœotia. Orchomenus is celebrated in the traditions of the Greeks along with Troy, Mycenæ, and Tiryns as one of the centres of power and riches in Achæan times. The remains, on the ancient site, of walls and buildings, particularly the ruins of a vaulted tomb, like the one at Mycenæ, and known as the "Treasury of Minyas," are a confirmation of the legends.

received was a warning not to return to his native country, because should he do so he would kill his father and become the husband of his own mother. Therefore, avoiding Corinth, Œdipus turned towards Thebes, but on the way met Laius with an attendant, and in a quarrel which arose killed the king, not knowing him to be his father.

Shortly after this event the Thebans were distressed by a woman-headed monster, called the Sphinx, who proposed a riddle¹ to them, and, as often as they failed in their answers, seized and devoured one of the inhabitants of the city. The crown of Thebes and the hand of the widow (Jocasta) of Laius were offered to any one who should solve the riddle. Œdipus interpreted the riddle, and became king of Thebes and the husband of Jocasta. Thus the oracle was fulfilled.

Because of the unwitting crime, a terrible doom overhangs the royal house. The truth finally becomes known. Jocasta hangs herself. Œdipus, in a frenzy of agony, tears out his own eyes. His sons, Eteocles and Polynices, drive him from Thebes, and upon them he invokes the curse of Heaven. The unhappy king is accompanied in his exile by his daughters Antigone and Ismene.

The brothers now quarrel respecting the throne. Polynices flees to Argos and seeks aid of Adrastus, king of that city. With five chiefs besides himself and Polynices, Adrastus makes war upon Thebes. All the heroes except Adrastus are killed (if we may thus speak of one, Amphiaraus, whom the opening earth received unharmed into the world of shades), while the two unnatural brothers also fall, each by the hand of the other.

Creon, the new king of Thebes, refuses to allow Adrastus to bury or burn the bodies of his fallen companions. In his distress, Adrastus supplicates Theseus, king of Athens, to avenge the wrong, — for a denial of the rites of sepulture was considered by the Greeks a most impious act (see p. 56). Theseus makes war

¹ "What animal walks on four legs in the morning, on two at noon, and on three at night?" Answer: *man*, who creeps in infancy, walks upright in manhood, and supports his steps with a staff in old age.

upon the king of Thebes, overcomes him, and secures burial honors for the bodies of the slain heroes.¹

This legend branches out into a hundred tales, which form the basis of many of the greatest productions of the Greek tragic poets.

The Trojan War (legendary date 1194-1184 B.C.).—The Trojan War was an event about which gathered a great circle of tales and poems, all full of an unfailing interest and fascination. In the Homeric epic of the *Iliad* is rehearsed, with a charm of language and beauty of imagery never surpassed, the feats of the struggling heroes, Greek and Trojan, beneath the walls of Ilios.



Fig 5. THE SO-CALLED "BATTLE BY THE SHIPS," BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND THE TROJANS. (After a vase painting)

Ilios, or Troy, was the capital of a strong state, represented as Grecian in race and language, which had grown up in Asia Minor, just south of the Hellespont. The traditions tell how Paris, son of Priam, king of Troy, visited the Spartan king Menelaus, and ungenerously requited his hospitality by secretly bearing away to Troy his wife Helen, famous for her rare beauty.

All the heroes of Greece flew to arms to avenge the wrong. A host of one hundred thousand warriors was speedily gathered.

¹ Ten years after the unsuccessful attempt of the seven chieftains, the sons of those who were lost, headed, according to one account, by Adrastus, and, according to other versions, by Thersander, the son of Polynices, waged a second war against Thebes, to avenge the death of their fathers. They took the city and destroyed it. This expedition was known as the War of the Descendants (Epigoni).

Agamemnon, brother of Menelaus and "king of men," was chosen leader of the expedition. Under him were the "lion-hearted Achilles," of Thessaly, the "crafty Odysseus," king of Ithaca, Ajax, "the swift son of Oileus," the Telemonian Ajax, the aged Nestor, and many more — the most valiant heroes of all Hellas. Twelve hundred galleys bore the gathered clans from Aulis across the Ægean to the Trojan shores.




Fig. 6. THE SO-CALLED TREASURE OF PRIAM. (Found by Dr. Schliemann at Hissarlik, or Troy. The collection includes golden diadems and personal ornaments of various kinds, together with cups, vases, and other articles of gold, silver, and copper. From Schliemann's *Troy and its Remains*.)

For ten years the Greeks and their allies hold in close siege the city of Priam. The Trojans have as allies many of the states of Asia Minor, as well as warriors from more remote lands. On the plains beneath the walls of the capital, the warriors of the two armies fight in general battle or contend in single encounter. At first, Achilles is foremost in every fight; but a fair-faced maiden, who fell to him as a prize, having been taken from him by his chief, Agamemnon, he is filled with wrath, and sulks in his tent.

Though the Greeks are often sorely pressed, still the angered hero refuses them his aid. At last, however, his friend Patroclus is killed by Hector, eldest son of Priam, and then Achilles goes forth to avenge his death. In a fierce combat he slays Hector, fastens his body to a chariot, and drags it thrice round the walls of Troy.

These later events, beginning with the wrath of Achilles and ending with the funeral rites of Patroclus and Hector, form the subject of the *Iliad* of Homer.



Fig 7. DR. SCHLIEMANN'S EXCAVATIONS AT HISSARLIK, OR TROY. (Showing remains of city walls, tower, palace, and paved roadway.)

The city is at last taken through a device of the artful Odysseus. Upon the plain in sight of the walls is built a wooden statue of a horse, in the body of which are hidden several Grecian warriors. Then the Greeks retire to their ships, as though about to abandon the siege. The Trojans issue from their gates and gather in wondering crowds about the image. They believe it to be an offering sacred to Athena, and so dare not destroy it; but, on the other hand, misled by certain omens and by a lying Greek named Sinon, they make a breach in the walls of their city, and drag the statue within. At night the concealed warriors issue from the

horse, open the gates of the city to the Grecians, and Troy is sacked, and burned to the ground. The aged Priam is slain, after having seen his sons and many of his warriors perish before his face. Æneas, with his aged father Anchises and a few devoted followers, escapes, and, after long wanderings, reaches the Italian land and there becomes the founder of the Roman race.

It is a matter of difficulty to point out the nucleus of fact in this the most elaborate and interesting of the Grecian legends. Some believe it to be the dim recollection of a prehistoric conflict between the Greeks and the natives of Asia Minor, arising from the attempt of the former to secure a foothold upon the coast. Since at the time of the composition of the *Iliad* the coast was in the possession of Greeks, the Trojans — such is the conjecture — are represented as Greeks, in order that the description may correspond to the then existing state of things.

That there really was in prehistoric times in the Troad a city which was the stronghold of a powerful and rich royal race has been placed beyond doubt by the excavations and discoveries of Dr. Schliemann.¹

¹ Dr. Schliemann was an enthusiastic student of Homer, who believed in the poet as a narrator of actual events. In the year 1870 he began to make excavations in the Troad (at Hissarlik), on a spot pointed out by tradition as the site of ancient Troy. His faith was largely rewarded. He found the upper part of the hill where he carried on his operations to consist of the remains of a succession of settlements, whose ruins were superimposed one upon another like the strata in a geological formation. In the second stratum from the bottom he found remains of such a character that he was led to believe that they were the actual memorials of the Troy of the *Iliad*. Besides uncovering massive walls and gateways belonging to the defensive architecture of the place, and the foundations of a palace, he exhumed numerous articles of archaic workmanship in bronze, silver, and gold, including the so-called "Treasure of Priam" (see Fig. 6). To the question, Are these the remains and the relics of the city and race of which Homer sung? no positive answer can be given. Possibly so. The geography of the spot corresponds as well as could be expected to the descriptions of the poet, due allowance being made for poetical license. But, on the other hand, the works of art that have been brought to light would seem to belong to a period not later than the fourteenth century B.C., whereas the legend places the siege of the city by the Achæan Greeks in the twelfth century. Gardner sums up the matter in the following words: "It is probable that the author of the *Iliad* had some historic siege in mind, and that the place besieged stood upon the Hill of Hissarlik." — *New Chapters in Greek History*, p. 53.

Return of the Grecian Chieftains. — After the fall of Troy, the Grecian chieftains and princes returned home. The legends represent the gods as withdrawing their protection from the hitherto favored heroes, because they had not spared the altars of the Trojans. Consequently many of them were driven in endless wanderings over sea and land. Homer's *Odyssey* portrays the sufferings of the "much-enduring Odysseus," impelled by divine wrath to long journeyings through strange seas.



Fig. 8. TOMBS OF MYCENÆ. (From Schliemann's *Mycenæ*.¹)

In some cases, according to the tradition, advantage had been taken of the absence of the princes, and their thrones had been usurped. Thus in Argolis, Ægisthus had won the unholy love of Clytemnestra, wife and queen of Agamemnon, who on his return was murdered by the guilty couple.¹ In pleasing contrast with

¹ Accepting as historically true those legends of the Greeks which represent Argolis as having in the earliest times nourished a race of powerful rulers, and Mycenæ as having been the burial place of Agamemnon and his murdered companions, Dr. Schliemann, made confident by his wonderful discoveries at Hissarlik,

this we have exhibited to us the constancy of Penelope, although sought by many suitors during the absence of her husband Odysseus.

The Dorian Invasion, or the Return of the Heraclidæ (legendary date 1104 B.C.).—We set the tradition of the return of the Heraclidæ apart from the legends of the three enterprises just detailed, for the reason that, as we shall see in a moment, it undoubtedly contains a large historical element.

The traditions of the Greeks tell how Heracles, an Achæan, in the times before the Trojan War, ruled over the Peloponnesian Achæans. Just before that event his children were driven from the land. Eighty years after the war, the hundred years of exile appointed by the fates having expired, the descendants of the hero, at the head of the Dorians from Northern Greece,¹ returned,

began excavations at Mycenæ in the year 1876. He soon unearthed remains of an even more remarkable character than those on the supposed site of Troy. The walls of the ancient citadel and the foundations of a great palace were laid bare. But the most interesting of all the discoveries on the spot were several tombs (see Fig. 8) holding the remains of seventeen bodies, which were surrounded by a multitude of articles of gold, silver, and bronze—golden masks and breastplates, drinking cups of solid gold, bronze swords inlaid with gold and silver, and personal ornaments of every kind. Dr. Schliemann believed that he had found the actual body of Agamemnon, the leader of the Greeks at Troy. This conclusion of enthusiasm has not been accepted by archæologists; but all are agreed that the ancient legends, in so far as they represent Mycenæ as having been in early pre-Dorian times the seat of an influential and wealthy royal race, rest on a basis of actual fact. See Schliemann's *Mycenæ*. In the years 1884–85 Dr. Schliemann made extensive excavations at Tiryns, where he laid bare the foundations of the walls of the ancient citadel and the ruins of an extensive palace like that at Mycenæ. Consult his *Tiryns*.

¹ Previous to their migration the Dorians dwelt in Thessaly, on the eastern slopes of the Pindus. In the same region dwelt also the ancestors of the Bœotians. Both peoples were driven from their seats by an invasion of the plain of the Peneus by the Thessalians, who, coming from Epirus, took possession of the land and gave it their own name. The Bœotians moved southward into Central Greece, and subduing the inhabitants of the ancient cities of Orchomenus and Cadmea,—representatives apparently of the same primitive civilization whose monuments we find at Mycenæ and Tiryns,—settled as masters in the land. Thenceforth the district was known from its conquerors as Bœotia. The expelled Dorians likewise migrated southward, and after dwelling for a time in Central Greece, moved on into the Peloponnesus. A part of the race, however, remaining behind, formed the Doris of historic times.

with their aid effected the conquest of the greater part of the Peloponnesus, and established themselves as masters in the land that had formerly been ruled by their semi-divine ancestor.

The Dorians set up, in the different Peloponnesian districts of which they took possession, oligarchical and military governments, and developed, generally, social and political systems characterized by austere and martial discipline.

Towards their conquerors the subjected Achæans cherished an inextinguishable hatred, save in some parts where the two races appear to have quietly blended, and the distinctive relations of conqueror and conquered to have been almost wholly obliterated. Some of the dispossessed Achæans, crowding towards the north of the Peloponnesus, drove out the Ionians who occupied the southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, and settling there, gave the name *Achaia* to all that region. Arcadia, in the centre of the Peloponnesus, was another district which did not fall into the hands of the invaders, and remained distinctively non-Dorian.

Comments on the Legend of the Dorian Invasion. — The nucleus of fact in the legend of the return of the Heraclidæ is doubtless a prehistoric invasion of the Peloponnesus by the Dorians from the north of Greece, and the expulsion or subjugation by them of the native inhabitants of the peninsula. The entire movement may well have occupied several centuries.

This alleged return of the descendants of Heracles to the land of their fathers has been likened to the return of the children of Israel from Egypt to Palestine, and the conquest of that land by them on the ground of an ancient claim to the country through their ancestor Abraham. Again, the migration, for such seems to have been the real character of the movement, has been likened to the great migration of the Germans in the fifth century of our era. In this parallel, the old Achæan culture of whose glory Homer sung, is regarded as having been eclipsed by the incoming of the rude and warlike Dorians, just as the light of Græco-Roman civilization was lost in the night that followed the subversion of Rome by the northern barbarians. According to this conception

the period embraced between the time of the Dorian migration and the First Olympiad¹ (776 B.C.), a period which the traditions make to cover a space of 328 years, corresponds to the Dark Ages in the history of mediæval Europe.

The parallel may be carried still further. As the Teutonic invasion, while destroying so much in the pre-existing culture of Rome, brought in the elements of a new and higher civilization, so did the Dorian invasion, while overwhelming the old Achæan world, bring in at the same time the elements of a new and better culture. For the Dorians, like the Teutons, were a pure and vigorous race, a race filled with martial and moral energy. Says Laurent, commenting upon the comparison with which we are dealing, "Without doubt, the little Hellenic tribes are not to be compared in numbers to the German invaders; but the influence of the Dorian invasion on the development of civilization was as great as that of the people of the North on the social regeneration of Europe."²

The comparison thus drawn out, though we cannot say positively that it faithfully figures the relation of the great Dorian migration to the Achæan civilization commemorated in the Homeric poems, is still a valuable conjectural framework for the history of Greece before the First Olympiad.³

Migrations to Asia Minor.—The Greek legends represent that the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnesus resulted in three distinct migrations from the mother land to the shores of Asia Minor and the adjoining islands.

The northwestern shore of Asia Minor was settled by Æolian emigrants, mainly from Boëotia, among whom were many Achæan refugees from the Peloponnesus.⁴ The neighboring island of Les-

¹ See p. 51.

² *Études sur l'Histoire de l'Humanité*, t. ii. p. 312.

³ The evidence furnished by recent archæological discoveries certainly tends to justify the conclusion that that prehistoric civilization, of which Dr. Schliemann and others have brought to light so many wonderful remains, was actually overwhelmed by the Dorian invasion. See Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, p. 85.

⁴ Curtius believes that the struggle which must inevitably have arisen between

bos became the home and centre of Æolian culture in poetry and music.

The coast to the south of the Æolians was occupied by Ionian emigrants, chiefly from the neighborhood of the Corinthian Gulf, who, uniting with their Ionian kinsmen already settled upon that shore and with the non-Hellenic peoples whom they conquered, built up a line of splendid cities (Ephesus, Miletus, etc.), which finally united to form the heart of the celebrated Ionian confederacy. The Cyclades, together with Chios and Samos, were at the same time filled with Ionian settlers.

South of the Ionians, all along the southwestern shore of Asia Minor, the Dorians, cramped finally in the Peloponnesus, established their colonies. They also settled the important islands of Cos and Rhodes, and conquered and colonized Crete.

The traditions concerned with these various settlements represent them as having been effected in a very short period; but it is probable that the movement embraced many generations, — possibly as long a time as has been occupied by the English race in colonizing the different lands of the Western World.

Society in the Heroic Age as pictured in the Homeric Poems.

—The poems of Homer, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, which were composed before historic times in Greece, were believed by the Greeks not only to give a truthful account of events connected with the Trojan enterprise, but also to reflect a faithful picture of society in the Heroic Age. Hence it remains for us to add a few words upon this subject, in order to complete our sketch of pre-historic Hellas as it presented itself to the imagination of a Greek of the historic period.

The Homeric poems represent the Greeks in the Heroic Age as ruled by hereditary kings of semi-divine or superhuman lineage.

these emigrants and the inhabitants of the Asiatic coast may have been the basis of the story of the Trojan War. "We may with reason," he says, "convey this war out of the isolation in which it remains wholly inconceivable into a larger circle of events, and transfer it out of the mythical times into which it was carried by the poets into the times of actual battle." — *Griech. Gesch.*, i. p. 121 (6th ed.).

The *Iliad* says, "The rule of many is not a good thing: let there be one leader only, one king, him to whom Zeus has given the sceptre and guardian authority, that he may rule."¹ The king was at once the priest, the judge, and the military leader of his people. He was expected to prove his divine right to rule, by his courage, strength, wisdom, and eloquence. When he ceased to display these qualities, "the sceptre departed from him."



THE WORLD ACCORDING TO HOMER.

The king was surrounded by a council (*boule*) of chiefs or nobles. This council, however, was simply an advisory body. The king listened to what the nobles had to say upon any measure he might propose, and then acted according to his own will or judgment, restrained only by the time-honored customs of the community.

¹ ii. 203 206.

Next to the council of the chiefs there was a general assembly, called the *Agora*, made up of all the common freemen. The members of this body could not take part in any debate, nor could they vote upon any question. They were called together to hear matters discussed by the king and his chiefs, that they might know what was resolved upon, and perhaps learn the arguments for and against the resolution. This body, so devoid seemingly of all authority in the Homeric age, was destined to become the all-powerful popular assembly in the democratic cities of historic Greece.

Of the condition of the common freemen we know but little: the legendary tales were concerned chiefly with the kings and nobles. We are certain, however, that the well-to-do class owned their farms, and cultivated them with their own hands; and that the poorer class labored for hire on the estates of the nobles. Slavery existed, but the slaves did not constitute as numerous a class as they became in historic times, nor do they seem in general to have been treated harshly.

In the family the wife held a much more dignified and honored position than she occupied in later times. The charming story of the constant Penelope, which we find in the *Odyssey*, assures us that the Homeric age cherished a chivalric feeling for woman.

In all ranks of society life was marked by a sort of patriarchal simplicity. Manual labor was not yet thought to be degrading. Odysseus constructs his own house and raft, and boasts of his skill in swinging the scythe and guiding the plow. Spinning and weaving were the chief occupation of the women of all classes.

One pleasing and prominent virtue of the age was hospitality. There being no public inns, a sort of gentle necessity forced to the entertainment of wayfarers. The reception accorded the stranger was the same simple and open-hearted hospitality that the Arab sheik of to-day extends to the traveller whom chance brings to his tent. The very best the house afforded was set

before the stranger, and not until after he had refreshed himself was he asked as to his journey and its object.

But while hospitable, the nobles of the Heroic Age were often cruel, violent, and treacherous. Homer represents his heroes as perpetrating without a blush all sorts of frauds and villanies. Piracy was considered an honorable occupation. "It was customary in welcoming a stranger to ask him whether his object in travelling was to enrich himself by piracy, just as we might to-day ask a person whether his object be to enrich himself by mercantile speculation."

Art and architecture are represented as having made considerable advance. The cities are walled, and the palaces of the kings

possess a certain barbaric splendor. Coined money is apparently unknown, wealth being reckoned chiefly in flocks and herds, and in uncoined metals. The poems make no certain mention of the art of writing, but give elaborate descriptions of sculptures of marvellous workmanship. They




Fig. 9. GALLERY IN THE SOUTH WALL AT TIRYNS.
("Tiryns the strong-walled." — *Iliad* ii. 559.)

represent the Greeks as already skilled in building ships, yet as possessing no definite knowledge of the Mediterranean beyond Greece proper and the neighboring islands and shores.

Comments on the Homeric Picture of Prehistoric Hellas. — We have said that this Homeric picture of society in the Heroic Age was regarded by the historic Greek as a true reflection of the manners, customs, and life of his ancestors in that remote fore-

time. But of course this view of the matter may be very far from the truth. We may form many different conjectures respecting the descriptions of Homer: thus we may view the poems as reflecting faithfully the manners and customs of the poet's own time; or we may conclude that they mirror accurately the society of an age and civilization that had already in the poet's time passed away, but of which tradition still preserved a vivid memory; or yet again, we may regard the poems as presenting an idealized picture of a past of which only a dim recollection was living in the minds of men. All that we have a right to assert positively about the matter is well expressed in these words of Professor Abbott: "They [the poems] present to us the ideals of character and life which delighted the audiences to which they were addressed, and continued to delight generation after generation till Hellenism became extinct."¹

REFERENCES. — It is difficult to give references on the subject of this chapter, for the reason that Greek Mythology is in general dealt with as a whole, no effort being made to separate from the mass of stories of the gods and heroes those which we may term historical legends, that is, those which profess to deal with the experiences and deeds of the ancestors of the historic Greeks. For works on the general subject of Greek Mythology, see bibliography at the end of the book. The following works, after the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (Bryant's translation), will be found useful in the present connection: —

Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, chs. i.-v.; compares the Greek legends with recent archaeological discoveries and discusses the question whether or not these discoveries may be regarded as a verification in any degree of the legends. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 47-78. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. i. pp. 309-437; (twelve volume ed.), vol. i. pp. 340-489; chiefly on the interpretation of the Greek myths. Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. i. chs. iii.-x. Symonds, *Studies of the Greek Poets*, vol. i. ch. ii. Timayenis, *Greece in the Times of Homer*: deals with the homes of the people, the family, education, dress, and ornaments. Church, *Stories from Homer*, fascinating book for young readers; and *Stories from Greek Tragedians*. Benjamin, *Troy, its Legends, History, and Literature* (Epoch Series). *The Classic Myths in English Literature*, based chiefly on Bulfinch's "Age of Fable" (edited by Charles Mills Gayley). In chapters

¹ *History of Greece*, vol. i. p. 161.

xvii.-xxvii. are given the tales of the older and the younger Greek heroes, including the legends of the Argonauts, the Seven against Thebes, and the Trojan War. Cox, *Tales of Ancient Greece*. Diehl, *Excursions in Greece* (from the French); an entertaining account of the results of recent excavations at Mycenæ, Tiryns, and on other sites in Greece. Schliemann, *Troy and its Remains* (1875); *Mycenæ* (1878); *Ilios* (1881); *Troja* (1884); and *Tiryns* (1885). For a most admirable summary of all these works of Dr. Schliemann and a scholarly estimate of the historical import of his discoveries, see Schuchhardt, *Schliemann's Excavations* (from the German). See also Lang, *Homer and the Epic*, ch. xv., entitled "Homer and Archæology," for a shorter discussion of the same subject.




Fig. 10. FIFTY-OARED GREEK BOAT. (After a vase painting.)

CHAPTER III.

THE INHERITANCE OF THE HISTORIC GREEKS.

Introductory. — We have seen in the preceding chapter what the Greeks of the historic age believed respecting the life and doings of their forefathers in prehistoric times. It is certain that the prehistoric Greeks did not live in such a romantic world as their children imagined, and that they did not perform all the wonderful exploits that were attributed to them; yet it is certain that the Greek race before its appearance in history had had a long and wonderful experience. How do we know this? Just as we know that a man mature in character and rich in culture has seen much of the world. The Greeks when they appear in history appear with their heads and hands full of those things which are alone the gift of life. They possessed age-marked political and religious institutions, a rich language, an elaborate mythology, an unrivalled epic literature, and an art which though undeveloped was yet full of promise.

Therefore to complete our introduction to the study of the Greeks of historic times, we shall now give a short account of their mental and physical belongings when they first appeared in the light of history.

I. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

The City-State. — The light that falls upon Greece in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. shows the land filled with cities whose genesis and growth carry us far back into prehistoric times. For these cities were not, as were most of the cities of Eastern lands, mere collections of houses. Each was a highly developed

social and political organism. Each was an independent, self-governing community, like a modern state or nation. It made war and peace, and held diplomatic relations with its neighbors. Its citizens were aliens in every other city.

According to the Greek idea the model city must be neither too large nor too small. In this as in everything else the ancient Greeks applied the Delphian rule, "Measure in all things." There is a limit, Aristotle argued, to the size of a city as there is to a plant, an animal, or a ship. It should be large enough, he maintained, to be "self-sufficing," and yet not too large to be well governed. That the government might be good he thought that the city should be small enough to enable each citizen to know all his fellow-citizens.¹

In most cases, the city-state consisted of a single walled town, with a little circumjacent farming or pasture land. Sometimes, however, the city embraced, besides the central town, a large number of smaller places.² Thus the city of Athens, in historic times, included all Attica with its hundred or more villages and settlements, some of which were walled towns. Each of these villages, politically regarded, was an integral part of Athens, and those of their inhabitants who enjoyed the privilege of voting in the public assembly there were Athenian citizens. But Attica, it must be borne in mind, was an exception to the rule. In general the districts or divisions of Greece, as enumerated in our first chapter, were divided among a greater or less number of independent cities.

Within the walls of the city were found various public buildings, such as temples, gymnasia, and market-places. A prominent feature of many cities was the Acropolis, a rocky height, which formed the stronghold of the place. As the cities grew in wealth and culture in historic times, the public buildings grew in number,

¹ Jowett's Aristotle, *Politics*, vii. 4.

² In all or almost all cases, however, save in that of Athens, the outlying villages were so close to the walled town that all their inhabitants, in the event of a sudden raid by enemies, could get to the city gates in one or two hours at most.

size, and magnificence. The market-places were surrounded with splendid porticoes; the Acropolis, consecrated now to the gods, was crowned with rich temples; while beyond the city walls were created public groves and gardens beautified with covered colonnades and art monuments of every kind.

The Origin and Primary Elements of the Early City-State.

—The primitive Greek city-state, as we have already said, had a very composite structure. It was made up, not of individuals, but of a number of communities, each comprising a group of families closely bound together by ties of kinship (real or fictional) and of worship. These primary units¹ were gathered into larger groups, known as phratries or brotherhoods. Above the phratries stood the tribe, and above the tribes the city (*polis*), which like all the lower unions had its common altar-hearth, called the *Prytaneum*, on which the sacred fire was kept constantly burning.

Among the various causes which in prehistoric times operated to draw the villages into the wider union of the city, the most prominent seem to have been the necessity of mutual defence against foreign enemies, the strong hand of the conqueror, and the renown of some local deity. The first of these causes was certainly a potent force making for union in rude and anarchical times.² Several neighboring village communities would unite in building, on some easily defended hill, a citadel intended as a common refuge in times of danger. Naturally this rude fortress,

¹ The group with which we are here concerned is nothing else than the so-called village community. In Greece it is the *genos*, at Rome the *gens*, in early Germany the *mark*, in England the *township*, in Russia the *mir*, among nomadic peoples the *clan*. We may regard the group as simply the expanded family; for in a primitive society the family as it expands holds together, being indissolubly united by the worship of ancestors, whereas in advanced society as it expands it disintegrates, the several households no longer living together, but each usually going its own way.

² For the traditional account of the formation of the city of Athens out of the villages or groups of villages of Attica, see below, p. 102; and for an instance in later Greek history of the creation of a great city out of a large number of Arcadian villages or townships, see further on, ch. xxiv. For the reverse process, namely, the decomposition of cities into villages, of which there are many instances in Greek history, consult Index under the entries *Phocians*, *Mantineia*, and *Olynthus*.

which often sheltered the chief gods of the village as well as in an emergency the villagers themselves, became in time the nucleus of a settlement, and later, after the formation of the city, the Acropolis or citadel of the place.

Of the several graded societies of which the Greek city was composed, the smallest, that is to say, the clan or the group of families, was the most important. The members of this group were, as we have said, the actual or reputed descendants of a common ancestor, whom they worshipped as a sort of guardian divinity. After the formation of the city it was at first only the members of these primary groups who were regarded as citizens, or who had any lot or part in the direction of public affairs. All non-members or strangers were jealously excluded from the worship of the clan, the phratry, the tribe, and the city, and in consequence from all participation in civil and political rights, for as yet there was no distinction recognized between things secular and things religious. Only those who worshipped the same gods could be citizens of the same city. It was only after a long lapse of time that the ties which bound together these primitive family groups became relaxed, largely through a change in the religious beliefs of men, and that the way was thus paved for the entrance of strangers into the city. This great revolution was already in progress at the opening of the historical period.¹

The constitutional reforms at Athens effected by Cleisthenes (p. 121) which placed the members of the ancient Attic clans and the non-members of these societies on the same political footing, and the long and bitter struggle at Rome between the same classes there, — the patricians and the plebeians, — are phases of this transformation of ancient society, which seems to have taken place sooner or later in all the cities of Greece and Italy, and which finally made property and residence instead of birth and worship the basis of civil and political rights and privileges.

The City Government. — As we have seen, the Homeric poems

¹ For the origin and nature of the city-state see Fustel de Coulanges' *The Ancient City* and W. Warde Fowler's *The City-State of the Greeks and Romans*.

represent the preferred form of government in the Heroic Age as having been a patriarchal monarchy (pp. 29, 30). By the dawn of the historic period, however, these paternal monarchies of the Achæan age had given place, in almost all the chief cities, to oligarchies or aristocracies. The power of the "Zeus-born" king had passed into the hands of the nobles of his former council. In some cases the monarchy was allowed to exist alongside the new power that had arisen in the state, just as in England the ancient titular sovereign, divested of all real authority, is permitted to stand by the side of the new and actual sovereign — the People. Thus in Sparta the old monarchy was never actually abolished, though the kings — there were two — were stripped of so much of their power that they remained for the most part scarcely more than shadow-sovereigns.

The history of this revolution among the Greeks, which brought in oligarchical in place of monarchical rule, is very obscure, and we need not here dwell upon it. We need only to note well the fact that at the period of which we are speaking, political power in the various Greek cities had, speaking in general terms, passed into the hands of the oligarchs, that is to say, of the leading families constituting the clans which had come together to form the city. The selfish and oppressive rule, or rather misrule, of these oligarchs, forms the starting-point in the constitutional history of those cities which finally evolved democratic government. A most interesting and instructive part of the internal history of Athens, in so far as it is known to us, consists of the struggles through which the humbler members of the original clans secured an equal share with the aristocratic members of the groups in the management of public affairs.

The Influence of the City upon Greek History. — We cannot understand Greek history unless we get at the outset a clear idea of the Greek city and of the feelings of a Greek towards the city of which he was a member. It was the body in which he lived, moved, and had his being. It was his country, his fatherland, for which he lived and for which he died. Exile from his native

city was to him a fate scarcely less dreaded than death. This devotion of the Greek to his city was the sentiment which corresponds to patriotism among us, only, being a narrower as well as a religious feeling, it was much more intense.

It was this strong city-feeling among the Greeks which prevented them from ever uniting to form a single nation. It was not until late in their history, after their religious ideas had undergone a change, and after much hard experience, that they attempted seriously to form wide political confederations.

These late efforts after unity, however, failed, so that the history of Greece to the very last is the history, in general, of a vast number of independent cities wearing each other out with their never-ending disputes and wars arising from a thousand and one petty causes of rivalry, jealousy, and hatred.

But it was these very circumstances that made life in the Greek cities so intense and strenuous, and that developed so wonderfully the faculties of the Greek citizen. There arose in the Hellenic cities a rich and many-sided culture, which became the precious legacy of Greece to later ages. In the eager intellectual atmosphere of the agora, human talents were developed as plants are forced in the growing air of a conservatory. The cities of Hellas nurtured an art of ideal perfection. Within their walls oratory, literature, history, and philosophy developed forms of supreme excellence. In a word, the wonderful thing which we call Greek civilization was the flower and fruitage of the city-state.

2. RELIGIOUS IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS.

The Greek Religion a Growth. — At the opening of the historic period in Greece, we find the Greeks in possession of a pantheon and worship that were manifestly the product of many centuries of reflection on divine things. The basis of this religion was the old Aryan worship of ancestors and nature-deities, the same as formed the groundwork of the Roman religion ; but during the centuries many foreign elements had been introduced into the

system and more or less perfectly assimilated. Thus there were in it elements of the lowest form of worship known as fetichism, which may have been gathered up through contact of the Hellenes with barbarous races, or, as is more likely, which were simply survivals from a primitive stage of the Hellenic religion itself. One evidence of such a passage of the Hellenic religion from a low to a purer and higher stage is found in the legend of the war of the earth-born giants against the Hellenic gods ; for this myth may probably be regarded as a reflection of a prehistoric conflict between two opposing religious systems, issuing in the triumph of the higher, represented by the gods of the historic Greeks ; a conflict which we may liken to that between Christianity and Paganism in later times.

There were also in the system elements which were plainly importations from the Orient. Thus the cult of Aphrodite, with its licentious rites, had been introduced from Phœnicia ; the orgiastic worship of the great earth-mother Cybele, had been brought in from Phrygia ; while the cult of Dionysus, the god of the vine, with all its wild frenzied rites, had been imported from Asia by the way of Thrace.

Out of these diverse elements the Hellenic genius, by the time of Homer, had evolved one of the most elaborate and beautiful of the religious systems of the ancient world. The pantheon had been in the main arranged ; many of the grosser and immoral elements in the stories of the gods had been eliminated or were in the course of elimination by a deepening ethical feeling ; and the chief gods, in striking contrast to the monstrous divinities of the Oriental mythologies, had been moulded by the fine Hellenic imagination into human forms of surpassing beauty and grace.

The Greeks of historic times believed that the work of determining the relationship of the gods, arranging their genealogies, and fixing their characteristics and attributes, had been done by the poets Homer and Hesiod.¹ But mythologies and pantheons,

¹ For Hesiod, see ch. xxix.

like all other things, grow and are not made. These poets could in the main have done nothing more than simply record the results of the reflections and imaginings on divine things of the race for whom they sung.

The Olympian Council. — The crown of the Greek pantheon was a council or court of twelve members, embracing six gods and six goddesses. The male deities were Zeus, the father and ruler of gods and men, and the wielder of the thunderbolt ; Poseidon, ruler of the sea ; Apollo, or Phœbus, the god of light, of music, of healing, of poetry, and of prophecy ; Ares, the god of war ;



Fig. II. GROUP OF GODS AND GODDESSES. (From the frieze of the Parthenon. "The chief gods, in striking contrast with the monstrous divinities of the Oriental mythologies, had been moulded by the fine Hellenic imagination into human forms of surpassing beauty and grace." — p. 41.)

Hephæstus, the deformed god of fire, and the patron of the useful arts dependent upon it, the forger of the thunderbolts of Zeus, and the fashioner of arms and of all sorts of metal work for the heroes and the gods ; Hermes, the wing-footed herald of the celestials, the god of invention and of commerce, himself a thief and the patron of thieves.

The female divinities were Hera, the proud and jealous queen of Zeus ; Athena, or Pallas, — who sprang full-grown from the forehead of Zeus, — the goddess of wisdom and the patroness of the domestic arts ; Artemis, the goddess of the chase ; Aphrodite, the goddess of love and beauty, born of the sea-foam ; Hestia,

the goddess of the hearth; Demeter, the earth-mother, the goddess of grains and harvests.¹

These divinities were, in the Greek conception, simply magnified human beings, moved by purely human feelings and motives. They have their earthly friendships and loves; they give way to fits of anger and jealousy; they take sides with men in their quarrels and mingle in the battle fray.²

Athena and the Panathenaic Festival.—From among the crowd of Hellenic divinities we select for particular mention Athena, Demeter, Dionysus, and Apollo, for the reason that the worship of each of these had a special significance for Greek life and art.

Athena was a characteristically Hellenic divinity. She was a personification of pure intellect,³ and hence in the myth of her creation was, as we have seen, appropriately represented as issuing full-formed from the forehead of Zeus. She had temples in

¹ The Latin names of these divinities are as follows: Zeus = Jupiter; Poseidon = Neptune; Apollo = Apollo; Ares = Mars; Hephæstus = Vulcan; Hermies = Mercury; Hera = Juno; Athena = Minerva; Artemis = Diana; Aphrodite = Venus; Hestia = Vesta; Demeter = Ceres. These Latin names, however, are not the equivalents of the Greek names, and should not be used as such. The mythologies of the Hellenes and Romans were as distinct as their languages.

² Besides the great gods and goddesses that constituted the Olympian Council, there was an almost infinite number of other deities, celestial personages, and monsters neither human nor divine. Hades ruled over the lower realms; Dionysus was the god of wine; Eros, of love; Iris was the goddess of the rainbow, and the special messenger of Zeus; Hebe (goddess) was the cupbearer of the celestials; the goddess Nemesis was the punisher of crime, and particularly the queller of the proud and arrogant; Æolus was the ruler of the winds, which he confined in a cave secured by mighty gates. There were nine Muses, inspirers of art and song. The Nymphs (Naiads, Nereids, Dryads, Hamadryads, etc.) were beautiful maidens, who peopled the woods, the fields, the rivers, the lakes, and the ocean. Three Fates allotted life and death, and three Furies (Eumenides, or Erinnyes) avenged crime, especially murder and sacrilegious crimes. Besides these there were the Dragon, which guarded the golden apples of the Hesperides; Cerberus, the watch-dog of Hades; Scylla and Charybdis, sea-monsters that made perilous the passage of the Sicilian Straits; the Centaurs, the Cyclops, the Harpies, the Gorgons, and a thousand others.

³ At first, however, Athena was a pure nature deity—the goddess of the thunderstorm. “She brandishes the thunderbolt, and is hence called Pallas or the

various places in Greece, but she was in a special sense the deity and patroness of the Athenians, whose city bore her name. Here was built in her honor on the Acropolis the Parthenon, the most perfect temple created by the genius and piety of the Greeks. In connection with her worship at Athens were celebrated the so-called Panathenaic festivals, which drew great crowds to Athens from all parts of Hellas. A chief feature of these festivals was a solemn procession of men, youths, and maidens, in which was displayed the *peplos*, or sacred robe, intended as a gift to the goddess. On this garment were embroidered various mythological subjects, particularly the contests between Athena and the giants and other monsters which she subdued. The celebrated frieze of the Parthenon was a representation of scenes from this Panathenaic procession.

Dionysus and the Dionysiac Festivals. — The cult of Dionysus, the wine-god, was diffused throughout Greece. His worship was accompanied with orgies which in their gross and licentious nature were rather Asiatic than Hellenic. The festivals in honor of the god, called Dionysia, were celebrated with uncommon magnificence in Attica. The special significance of these festivals lay in the fact that they included theatrical exhibitions, given in later times in the great theatre of Dionysus at Athens, and that out of these dramatic representations grew the wonderful Athenian drama, embracing comedies and tragedies which mark the highest perfection of the dramatic art.

Demeter and the Eleusinian Mysteries. — The cult of Demeter and Persephone, the "Madonna and Child of Greece," was an important part of the religious inheritance of the historic Greeks, mainly for the reason that there were associated with this worship at Eleusis in Attica the celebrated Eleusinian Mysteries. Every

Wielder. . . . The Gorgon [on her shield] is the thundercloud, the tongue-darting serpents surrounding the head are the lightning flashes, which burst forth in all directions. Athena is called Glaukopis, the owl-eyed, probably because she is also the goddess of the clear sky, which has been made bright by the purifying storm, and because the sight of the owl pierces the darkness." Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. i. p. 126.

fifth year the Athenians observed with peculiar solemnity, in honor of the mother-goddess, a festival called the Eleusinia, which acquired a national fame and importance.

In the Eleusinian Mysteries the religion of Greece, it is generally believed, found its highest expression. There were secrets connected with this worship which were known only to the initiated, and which were guarded so carefully that to this day it is not known positively what were the doctrines inculcated, nor the exact nature of the rites performed. It seems almost certain, however, that the hopeful doctrine of a future life more real than



Fig 12 THE CARRYING OFF OF PERSEPHONE BY HADES TO THE UNDERWORLD. HER LEAVE-TAKING OF HER MOTHER DEMETER. (A myth of the seasons, connected with the Eleusinian Mysteries.¹)

that represented by the popular religion was taught or at least suggested by the symbolism of the Mysteries,¹ and that the initiated were helped thereby to live better and happier lives.

The Eleusinian Mysteries were regarded as peculiarly sacred, and to intrude upon the services of the worship or to ridicule or mimic the rites was an offence deemed worthy of death. The whole course of the Peloponnesian War was probably changed through the Athenians becoming convinced that these Mysteries

¹ Demeter as the goddess of agriculture, and Persephone as the goddess of vegetation, would naturally, through the burial and resurrection of the seed-corn, become symbols and parables, to the more thoughtful at least, of the mystery of death and of a new life arising therefrom.

had been profaned by one of their generals, Alcibiades, and through their attempts to bring him to trial and punishment for the alleged crime.

Apollo and his Worship. — But among the crowd of Hellenic deities the one of greatest historical significance was Apollo.¹ He was the special god of the Dorians, and it was chiefly through their migrations, conquests, and colonizations that his cult was diffused throughout Hellas. This Apollonian cult was perhaps the most precious part of the legacy of prehistoric to historic Hellas; for, compared with most of the other Grecian cults, that of Apollo was pure and spiritual, and exerted in general a restraining and elevating influence upon the men of Greece.

Apollo was the Revealer; it was his mission as the god of prophecy to make known the hidden things of Zeus. He was the god of music and poetry, the inspirer of all those emotions which express themselves in lofty song. He was the wise counsellor, and to him the Greeks turned for advice and guidance in all cases of perplexity. He was the god of moral purification, and at his sanctuaries transgressors sought and found absolution and cleansing. Above all he was the moral teacher of men. In the mythology of the Greeks one of his first achievements was the slaying of the monster Python. Whatever else the myth may mean, it expresses in allegory the triumph of light over darkness, of good over evil. It is in keeping with this that we find at the oracle-temples of Apollo, particularly at the shrine of Delphi, of which we shall speak in a moment, a lofty morality inculcated and enforced. Indeed, the Apollonian religion was a chief motive force in Greek life and culture. Curtius ventures to say that "Apollo was the founder of Hellenic history."

The Delphian Oracle and its Influence on Greek Life and History. — From the foregoing remarks respecting the general character of the worship of Apollo, we pass naturally to speak of

¹ In the early period of Greek nature-worship Apollo was simply the god of light; his arrows are the darting rays of the sun, his flocks are the clouds, while his moral qualities are emblems of the nature of light.

the Apollonian oracle at Delphi, which was another invaluable legacy from the misty Hellenic foretime to historic Greece. But first we will say a few words of a general character respecting oracles and divination among the ancient Greeks.

The Greeks believed that in the early ages the gods were wont to visit the earth and mingle with men. But even in Homer's time this familiar intercourse was a thing of the past—a tradition of a golden age that had passed away. In these later and more degenerate times the recognized modes of divine communication with men were by oracles, and by casual and unusual sights and sounds, as thunder and lightning, a sudden tempest, an eclipse, a flight of birds, the appearance or action of the sacrificial victims, or any strange coincidence. The art of interpreting these signs or omens was called the art of divination. It is probable that this art was introduced into Greece from Chaldæa by the way of Egypt and the countries of Asia Minor.

But though the gods often revealed their will and intentions through signs and portents, still they granted a more special communication of counsel through what were known as *oracles*.¹ These communications, it was believed, were made sometimes by Zeus,² but more commonly by Apollo. Not everywhere, but only in chosen places, did these gods manifest their presence and communicate the divine will. These favored spots were called oracles, as were also the responses there received.

The most renowned of the Greek oracles was that at Delphi, in

¹ We should perhaps add that prophets were not unknown among the Greeks. These were persons who, like the Hebrew prophets, were believed to have a super natural insight into the future. Sometimes this gift was hereditary, and then a family or house came to be regarded as set apart from ordinary men. Among the most noted of the Greek prophets were Tiresias, the blind soothsayer of Thebes, and Calchas, the adviser of the Grecians at the siege of Troy.

² The oracle of Zeus of widest repute was that at Dodona (see p. 2). Quite recently (in 1876) the site of the Dodonean shrine was excavated by M. Carapanos, who was rewarded by the discovery of many votive offerings, such as vessels, earrings, bracelets, and various other articles of a similar character, besides, most interesting of all, a considerable number of leaden tablets holding the questions of the visitors to the oracle. See Diehl's *Excursions in Greece*, ch. iii.

Phocis. Here, from a deep fissure in the rocks, arose stupefying vapors, which were thought to be the inspiring breath of Apollo. Over this spot was erected a temple in honor of the Revealer. The communication was generally received by the Pythia, or priestess, seated upon a tripod placed above the orifice. As she became

overpowered by the influence of the prophetic exhalations, she uttered the message of the god. These mutterings of the Pythia were taken down by attendant priests, interpreted, and written in hexameter verse. Sometimes the will of Zeus was communicated to the pious seeker by dreams and visions granted him while sleeping in the temple of the oracle.



Fig 13. THE DODONEAN ZEUS.¹

Some of the responses of the oracle contained

plain and wholesome advice ; but very many of them, particularly those that implied a knowledge of the future, were made obscure and ingeniously ambiguous, so that they might correspond with the event however affairs should turn, and thus the credit of the oracle remain unimpaired.

But notwithstanding that the oracle was often misused by designing priests, as religious institutions in all ages have been, still it rendered many and eminent services to Greek civilization.² "The ordinary histories which we read," says Professor Mahaffy,

¹ See p. 47, note 2.

² We have exercised special care in what follows in the text not to ascribe to the Delphian oracle an influence upon Greek life and thought greater than the

"give us but little idea of the mighty influence of this place [Delphi] in the age of its faith. We hear of [the oracle] being consulted by Cræsus, or by the Romans, and we appreciate its renown for sanctity; but until of very late years there was small account taken of its political and commercial omnipotence."

The Delphian oracle was the ratifier of the political constitutions of the Greek cities, and thereby became the promoter of social and political order. Thus the Spartan legislator Lycurgus secured from Delphi an oracle approving his constitution (p. 63), and the fact that his laws were believed to have been ratified by the god, certainly helped to lend to them that sanctity in which they were held by succeeding generations.

Apollo also superintended, or at least encouraged, the founding of colonies. The managers of the oracle, doubtless through the visitors to the shrine, kept themselves informed respecting the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean, and thus were able to give good advice to those contemplating the founding of a new settlement. In this field, as we shall learn, the oracle rendered a great service to the Greeks.

The Delphian oracle, furthermore, exerted a profound influence upon Hellenic unity. Delphi was, in some respects, such a religious centre of Hellas as papal Rome was of mediæval Europe. It was the common altar of the Greek race. By thus providing a worship open to all, Delphi drew together by bonds of religious sentiment and fraternity the numberless communities of Greece, and created, if not a political, at least a religious union that embraced the entire Hellenic world.

The influence of the oracle in the sphere of morality is shown by the well-known story of Glaucus. Glaucus was a citizen of Sparta who enjoyed an enviable reputation for integrity. To this man a citizen of Miletus entrusted a large treasure for safe-keeping. Many years passed. The man who had made the

facts would seem to justify. Curtius undoubtedly overestimates the influence of the oracle, particularly in the field of Greek colonization. For a criticism of his views see Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 244-249.

deposit died. His sons came to Glaucus to claim the money. Glaucus denied having any remembrance of the alleged transaction. He told his visitors, however, to call again after some days, and if by that time he could recall any memory of the affair, they should have the treasure. The young men went away, and Glaucus hurried to Delphi, in order to ask the god if he might not swear that he had never received the money. To his tempting question he was told threateningly that the vengeance of Heaven ever pursues the race of the perjurer. And he and his house came to a miserable end.¹

Thus was the Delphian Apollo the enforcer of the moral law of Hellas. Dyer, in his *Gods in Greece*, reminds us that Zeus reigned but did not govern. Apollo governed, and made his authority respected in every part of the Hellenic world. "The only real discipline . . . emanated from Delphi and the far-sighted, wide-minded oracle of Apollo at that holy place."²

The Olympian Games. — Another of the most characteristic of the religious institutions of the Greeks which they inherited from the Heroic Age, was the sacred games celebrated at Olympia in Elis, in honor of the Olympian Zeus. The origin of this festival is lost in the obscurity of tradition; but by the opening of the eighth century B.C. it had assumed national importance. In 776 B.C. a contestant named Coroëbus was victor in the foot-race at Olympia, and as from that time the names of the victors were carefully registered, that year came to be used by the Greeks as the starting-point in their chronology. The games were held every fourth year, and the interval between two successive festivals was known as an Olympiad.³

The contests consisted of foot-races, boxing, wrestling, and other athletic games. Later, chariot-racing was introduced, and

¹ Herod. vi. 86.

² Dyer, *The Gods in Greece*, p. 26.

³ The date of an occurrence was given by saying that it happened in the first, second, third, or fourth year of such an Olympiad — the first, second, or third, etc. This mode of designating dates, however, did not come into general use in Greece before the third century B.C.

became the most popular of all the contests. The competitors must be of Hellenic race ; must have undergone special training in the gymnasium ; and must, moreover, be unblemished by any crime against the state or sin against the gods. Spectators from all parts of the world crowded to the festival. The deputies of the different cities vied with one another in the richness and splendor of their chariots and equipments, and in the magnificence of their retinues.

The victor was crowned with a garland of sacred olive ; heralds proclaimed his name abroad ; his native city received him as a




Fig. 14. GREEK RUNNERS

conqueror, sometimes through a breach made in the city walls ; his statues, executed by eminent artists, were erected at Olympia and in his own city ; sometimes even divine honor and worship were accorded to him ; and poets and orators vied with the artist in perpetuating his name and triumphs as the name and triumphs of one who had reflected immortal honor upon his native state.

The Pythian, the Nemean, and the Isthmian Games. — Besides the Olympian games there were transmitted from the prehistoric times the germs at least of three other national festivals. These

were the Pythian, held in honor of Apollo, near his shrine and oracle at Delphi; the Nemean, celebrated in honor of Zeus, at Nemea, in Argolis; and the Isthmian, observed in honor of Poseidon, on the Isthmus of Corinth. Just when these festivals had their beginnings it is impossible to say, but by the time the historic period had fairly opened, that is to say, by the sixth

century B.C., they had lost their local and assumed a national character, and were henceforth to be prominent features of the common life of the Greek cities.

Influence of the Grecian Games.—For more than a thousand years these national festivals, particularly those celebrated at Olympia, exerted an im-



Fig. 15. POSEIDON AND THE ISTHMIAN GAMES. (From a cameo.)

mense influence upon the social, religious, and literary life of Hellas. They enkindled among the widely scattered Hellenic states and colonies a common literary taste and enthusiasm; for into all the four great festivals, save the Olympian, were introduced, sooner or later, contests in poetry, oratory, and history. During the festivals, poets and historians read their choicest productions, and artists exhibited their masterpieces. The extraordinary honors accorded to the victors stimulated the contestants to the utmost, and strung to the highest tension every power of body and mind.¹ Particularly were the games promotive of sculpture, since they afforded the sculptor living models for his

¹ As among ourselves, however, athleticism among the ancient Greeks was often carried to a very irrational and harmful extreme. For some interesting facts in regard to the influence of the excessive devotion of the Hellenic athlete to physical training upon his intellectual development, see letter by James D. Butler on "Olympian Athletes" in the *Nation* of December 6, 1894, p. 424. Cf. Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, pp. 300-4, quoted in part in the *Nation*, December 13, 1894, p. 442.

art (see Fig. 14). "Without the Olympic games," says Holm, "we should never have had Greek sculpture."

They moreover promoted intercourse and trade ; for the festivals naturally became great centres of traffic and exchange during the progress of the games. They softened, too, the manners of the people, turning their thoughts from martial exploits and giving the states respite from war ; for during the season in which the religious games were held it was sacrilegious to engage in military expeditions.

They also promoted intercourse between the different Grecian cities, or states, and kept alive common Hellenic feelings and sentiments. In all these ways, though they never drew the states into a common political union, still they did impress a common character upon their social, intellectual, and religious life.¹

The Amphictyonic Council. — Closely connected with the religious festivals were the so-called Amphictyonies, or "leagues of neighbors," which formed another important part of the bequest from the legendary age to historic Greece. These were associations of a number of cities or tribes for the celebration of religious rites at some shrine, or for the protection of some particular temple.

Pre-eminent among all such unions was that known as the Delphic Amphictyony, or simply The Amphictyony, which was fabled to have been instituted by the hero Amphictyon, a pre-historic king of Attica. This was a league of twelve of the sub-tribes of Hellas, whose main object was the protection of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. Another of its purposes was, by humane regulations, to mitigate the cruelties of war. This was one of the first steps taken in the practice of international law. The following oath was taken by the members of the league : "We will not destroy any Amphictyonic town, nor cut it off from running

¹ It is announced that the Olympic games, after having been suspended since the fourth century of our era, are to be revived. The contests, which it is proposed to make international in character, will probably take place next year (1896) on the ancient plain of Elis and under the presidency of the Duke of Sparta, the heir to the Greek throne. [The games took place at *Athens* in the year named.]

water, in war or in peace ; if any one shall do so, we will march against him and destroy his city. If any one shall plunder the property of the god, or shall be cognizant thereof, or shall take treacherous counsel against the things in his temple at Delphi, we will punish him with foot and hand and voice, and by every means in our power."

Another duty of the Amphictyonic tribes was to keep in repair the roads leading to the Delphian sanctuary. These were carefully levelled, and in rocky places smooth grooves of uniform gauge were cut for the wheels of the chariots and gayly decorated cars which went up in festival procession to the games.

The Amphictyons appear several times prominently in the history of Greece. They waged in behalf of the Delphic god Apollo a number of crusades, or sacred wars. The first of these occurred at the opening of the sixth century B.C. (probably about 595-586), and was carried on against the Phocian towns of Crissa and Cirrha, whose inhabitants had been guilty of annoying the pilgrims on their way to the shrine. The cities were finally taken and levelled to the ground, and the wrath of the gods was invoked upon any one who should dare to rebuild them. Their territory was also consecrated to the gods, which meant that it was never thereafter to be plowed or planted, or in any way devoted to secular use. At the same time the musical contests, which from time to time had taken place at Delphi in honor of Apollo, were expanded and given national significance.

Doctrine of Divine Jealousy.—Several religious or semi-religious ideas, which were a bequest to the historic Greeks from primitive times, colored so deeply all their conceptions of life, and supplied them so often with motives of action, that we must not fail to take notice of them here. These ideas related to the envious disposition of the gods, the nature of the life after death, and the inviolable character of the suppliant.

The Greeks were deeply impressed, as all peoples and generations have been, by the vicissitudes of life. Their observation and experience had taught them that long-continued or unusual

prosperity often issues at last in sudden and overwhelming calamity. They attributed this to the jealousy of the gods, who, they imagined, were envious of mortals that through such prosperity seemed to have become too much like one of themselves. Thus the Greeks believed the downfall of Cræsus, after his extraordinary course of uninterrupted prosperity, to have been brought about by the envy of the celestials, and they colored the story to bear out this version of the matter (p. 131).

Later, as the ethical feelings of the Greeks became truer, this idea of the divine *envy* was moralized into a conception of the righteous *indignation* of the gods, aroused by the insolence and presumptuous pride so inevitably engendered by over-great prosperity (see ch. xxix.).

The Suppliant. — The Greeks of the Heroic Age looked upon the suppliant as specially sacred, and this feeling they transmitted to later times. Whoso did the suppliant an injury, or even hardened his heart against his appeal, him the gods punished with surest vengeance.

But only through certain formalities could one avail himself of the rights of a suppliant. Should one, upon the commission of a crime, flee to a temple, he became a suppliant of the god to whose altar he clung, and to harm him there was a most awful desecration of the shrine. The gods punished with dreadful severity such impiety, and an inexpiable curse rested upon the house of the offender, while awful calamities were sure to fall upon the city or community that tolerated the presence of the accursed.¹

To sit or kneel at the hearth of an enemy was also a most solemn form of supplication. An olive branch borne in the hand was still another form of supplication, which rendered especially inviolable the person of him who thus appealed for clemency.

We must here add, in order to anticipate the perplexity that might otherwise trouble the reader, that the harsh doctrine mentioned above of the inexpiable and hereditary character of certain

¹ See p. 109, n. 2.

crimes, was finally, like the idea of the Divine Jealousy, softened and moralized, and that it came to be believed that by certain rites of purification full atonement might be made for personal or ancestral guilt, and thus the workings of the original curse be stayed.

Ideas of the Future. — To the Greeks life was so bright and joyous a thing that they looked upon death as a great calamity. They therefore pictured life after death, except in the case of a favored few, as being hopeless and aimless.¹ The Elysian Fields, away in the land of sunset, were, indeed, filled with every delight ; but these were the abode only of the great heroes and benefactors of the race. The great mass of mankind were doomed to Hades, where the spirit existed as “a feeble, joyless phantom.” While we believe that the soul, freed from the body by the event of death, becomes stronger and more active, the Greeks thought that without the body it became but a feeble image of its former self. So long as the body remained unburied, the shade wandered without rest ; hence the sacredness of the rights of sepulture.

3. LANGUAGE, MYTHOLOGY, LITERATURE, AND ART.

The Greek Language. — One of the most wonderful things which the Greeks brought out of their dim foretime was their language. At the beginning of the historic period their language was already one of the richest and most perfectly elaborated languages ever spoken by human lips. Through what number of centuries this language was taking form upon the lips of the forefathers of the historic Greeks, we can only vaguely imagine. It certainly bears testimony to a long period of Hellenic life lying behind the historic age in Hellas, for language is one of the

¹ Homer makes the shade of the great Achilles in Hades to say : —

“ I would be
A laborer on earth, and serve for hire
Some man of mean estate, who makes scant cheer,
Rather than reign o'er all who have gone down
To death ” — *Od.* xi 489-90 [Bryant's Trans.].

most slow-growing of all the varied products of human experience and feeling.¹

The Mythology of the Greeks. — Another wonderful possession of the Greeks when they first appeared in history was their mythology. All races in the earlier stages of their development are "myth-makers," but no race has ever created such a rich and beautiful mythology as did the ancient Greeks, and this for the reason that no other race was ever endowed with so fertile and lively an imagination.

This mythology exerted a great influence upon the life and thought of the ancient Greeks. Their religion, their poetry, their art, and their history were one and all deeply impressed by this wonderful collection of legends and myths. Some of these stories inspired religious feeling; some afforded themes to the epic and tragic poets; others suggested subjects to the artists; and still others inspired the actors in Greek history to many an heroic deed or adventurous undertaking.

Early Greek Literature: the Homeric Poems. — The rich and flexible language of the Greeks had already in prehistoric times been wrought into epic poems whose beauty and perfection are unequalled by the similar productions of any other people or race. These epics transmitted from the Greek foretime are known as the "Homeric poems," consisting of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The subject of the *Iliad* is the "Wrath of Achilles," and the woes it brought upon the Greeks in the Trojan War. The *Odyssey* tells of the long wanderings of the hero Odysseus up and down over many seas while seeking his native Ithaca, after the downfall of Troy.

Neither the date nor the authorship of the Homeric poems is known. That they were the prized possession of the Greeks at the beginning of the historical period is all that it is important for us to note at the present time. They were a sort of Bible to the Greeks, and exerted an incalculable influence not only upon the

¹ The Greek language belongs to what is known as the Aryan family of languages, and bears a comparatively close relationship to the Latin speech.

religious but also upon the literary life of the entire Hellenic world.

Early Greek Art.—In the field of art the heritage of historic Greece from the legendary age consisted rather in a certain transmitted esthetic faculty than in technical skill. "The Homeric poetry was, indeed," says Professor Jebb, "instinct with the promises of Hellenic art. Such qualities of poetical thought, such forms of language, announced a race from which great artists might be expected to spring.¹ . . . The shield of Achilles, described in the *Iliad*, is certainly, as a whole, the creation of the poet's fancy, indebted for details to Phœnician, Egyptian, and perhaps Assyrian sources. Yet it illustrates the Hellene's feeling for such workmanship. And a surer presage of Greek art is afforded by the sense which we see in Homer of human beauty, not merely in the youthful, but in the aged,—as when Achilles admires the comeliness of Priam,—or even the dead, as when the Greeks gather round the corpse of Hector."²

These prophecies we shall see passing into fulfilment in the ideal perfection of the art of Pheidias and Praxiteles.

REFERENCES.—Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, books i.—iii. Fowler, *The City-State of the Greeks and Romans*, chs. i.—iii. Jowett's Aristotle, *Politics*. Botsford, *The Athenian Constitution* (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology), pp. 1–101. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 1–111. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. ii. pp. 1–55 and 164–194; *ib.* vol. iii. pp. 276–297; (twelve volume ed.), vol. ii. pp. 57–118 and 236–269; *ib.* vol. iv. pp. 50–73; on the national festivals. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 138–193; on the Homeric poems and the Homeric society and deities. Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. i. chs. i., xi., and xix. Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, ch. ix., "Olympia and the Festivals," and ch. xiii., "Eleusis and the Mysteries." Symonds, *Studies of the Greek Poets*, vol. i. ch. 4, "The Women of Homer." Diehl, *Excursions in Greece*, ch. vii.; on the Grecian Games. James Freeman Clarke, *Ten Great Religions*, ch. viii., "The Gods of Greece."

¹ "When the Hellenes created the Epos, they were already Greeks; *i.e.* the chosen people of poetry and art."—PERROT AND CHIPIEZ, *History of Art in Primitive Greece*, vol. i. p. 7.

² Jebb, *Classical Greek Poetry*, pp. 24, 25.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RISE OF THE SPARTAN POWER IN THE PELOPONNESUS.

The Early Ascendency of Argos: King Pheidon. — We have learned how, according to Greek accounts, the Dorians, long before the historic period, invaded the Peloponnesus, and subjected or drove out the greater part of the Achæan population then possessing the land. One result of the invasion was the establishment of a number of Dorian city-states, of which Sparta, in the south of the peninsula, came in time to be chief and leader.

But before Sparta acquired supremacy in the Peloponnesus, another Dorian city in the north had secured, and for a considerable time maintained, a position of pre-eminence. This was Argos, which arose in Argolis, near the ruins of the old Mycenæan strongholds. At Mycenæ, the city of Agamemnon, the Dorian conquerors walked for centuries over the graves of the ancient royal race of that city without the least conception of what treasures of gold and silver were buried beneath their feet (p. 25, n.). Around Argos were grouped a number of smaller communities, Dorian and Achæan, which held to her the relation of allies or of dependents.

For a long time we see the rising city-state only through the mist of uncertain tradition. Shadowy forms of Argive kings move before us, but it is not until the eighth century before our era that we are able to make out clearly the figure of a single personage. Then King Pheidon stands out in a light strong enough to enable us to pronounce him a man of real flesh and blood.¹

¹ The date of Pheidon is not known with certainty, but probably it falls about 770-730 B.C. On what seems insufficient ground, some place his date a century later.

Several matters of importance are connected by tradition with the name of Pheidon. The royal power at Argos, which had fallen low, he lifted up, and tightened all the slackened bonds of the old Argive confederacy. Such was the reputed arbitrariness of his rule that he acquired among the later Greeks the reputation of having been the most insolent and violent of all Hellenic tyrants.

In the year 748 B.C. Pheidon aided the inhabitants of Pisa, a city in Elis, in getting possession of the sanctuary at Olympia, from the guardianship of which they had been ejected by the Eleans, and then in connection with the Pisatans presided at the celebration of the games of the Eighth Olympiad. Before the next festival came around, however, the Eleans had repossessed themselves of the sacred spot. This matter is of value as showing at once the importance which the Olympian games had already at this date attained, and the real ascendancy at the same period of the city of Argos.

But the most noteworthy matter associated with the name of Pheidon connects itself with the economic life of the times. He is said to have been the first to coin copper and silver in Greece, and to have introduced a new or improved scale of weights and measures. This coinage and standard were known as the Pheidonian or Æginetan, from the circumstance that Pheidon's mint was in Ægina. These scales and measures came to be used very generally in the Dorian cities of Greece proper and the islands of the Ægean.¹

The Pheidonian system of coinage, weights, and measures was of Babylonian origin,² and undoubtedly came into Greece through the mediation of the Phœnicians. Its introduction into Greece

¹ There was another coinage, known as the Eubœan, which was adopted by Corinth, Athens, the cities of Eubœa, and other states. This standard probably found its way into Greece from the Ionians of Asia, who got it from Babylon.

² "The Babylonian talent, mina, and drachma are identical with the [Æginetan]: the word mina and drachma are identical with the [Æginetan]: the word mina is of Asiatic origin; and it has now been rendered highly probable that the scale circulated by Pheidon was borrowed immediately from the Phœnicians, and by them originally from the Babylonians." — GROTE, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. p. 241.

by Pheidon, and its extended use in the Dorian states, show how real must have been at this time the ascendancy of Argos, how trade and commerce were springing up between the states of Greece, and how deep an influence the civilization of the East was at this early period exerting upon the rising cities of Hellas.

After Pheidon, Argos sank into comparative obscurity. In the sixth century she was overshadowed, close at home, by the rising Dorian cities of Corinth and Sicyon, and especially by the growing Spartan power in the southwest of the peninsula. From early times there had been friction between Argos and Sparta, and finally in the century mentioned the Spartan king Cleomenes by a single terrible blow (p. 73) crippled forever the power of the rival state. After this, Argos played, in the main, only an obscure part in the affairs of Greece.

The Location of Sparta. — Sparta, the most renowned after Athens of the cities of Hellas, was the chief of the Dorian cities of the Peloponnesus which owed their origin or importance to the circumstances of the Dorian invasion. It was situated in the deep valley of the Eurotas, in Laconia, about thirty miles from the sea. At this point the river valley widens into a plain about eighteen miles in length by four in breadth, which forms a sort of irregular amphitheatre, shut in by high and rugged mountain walls. This plain, thus sunk deep among the hills of Laconia, was called by the ancients, as already noticed, "Hollow Lacedæmon."¹ The settlement established here by the invading Dorians took its name, Sparta,² from the circumstance that the village or group of villages was built upon tillable ground, whereas the core of most Greek cities consisted of a lofty rock or acropolis. But Sparta needed no citadel. Her situation, surrounded as she was by almost impassable mountain barriers, and far removed from the sea, was her sufficient defense. Indeed, the Spartans seem to have thought it unnecessary even to erect a wall round their city, which stood open on every side until late and degenerate times. And events

¹ Greek fable makes the name Lacedæmon to come from an early king of the land.

² Σπαρτή, sown land.

justified this feeling of security. So difficult of access to an enemy is the valley, that during more than four hundred years of Spartan history the waters of the Eurotas never once reflected the camp fires of an invading army.

Classes in the Spartan State.—Before proceeding to speak of the social and political institutions of the Spartans, we must first notice the three classes—Spartans (*Spartiatæ*), *Periœci*, and *Helots*—into which the population of Laconia was divided.

The Spartans proper were the descendants of the conquerors of the country, and were Dorian in race and language. They composed but a small fraction of the entire population, at no period numbering more than ten thousand men capable of bearing arms.

The *Periœci* (dwellers around), who constituted the second class, were the subjugated natives. They are said to have outnumbered the Spartans three to one. They were allowed to retain possession of their lands, but were forced to pay tribute-rent, and in times of war to fight for the glory and interest of their Spartan masters.

The third and lowest class was composed of slaves, or serfs, called *Helots*. The larger number of these were laborers upon the estates of the Spartans. They were the property of the state, and not of the individual Spartan lords, among whom they were distributed by lot.

These *Helots* had no rights, practically, which their Spartan masters felt bound to respect. If one of their number displayed unusual powers of body or mind, he was secretly assassinated, as it was deemed unsafe to allow such qualities to be fostered in this servile class. It is affirmed that when the *Helots* grew too numerous for the safety of the state, their numbers were thinned by a deliberate massacre of the surplus population.¹

¹ "Once, when they [the Spartans] were afraid of the number and vigour of the *Helot* youth, this was what they did: They proclaimed that a selection would be made of those *Helots* who claimed to have rendered the best service to the *Lacedæmonians* in war, and promised them liberty. The announcement was

Early Traditional History of Sparta : the Legend of Lycurgus.

— Of the history of Sparta before the First Olympiad we have no certain knowledge. Legend indeed busies itself with the affairs of the little state in this remote time, and tells of various conquests by Spartan kings, and of inner dissensions which kept the community in unending turmoil. Peace, prosperity and rapid growth, according to the tradition, were secured to the distracted state through the adoption of a most remarkable political constitution framed by a great lawgiver named Lycurgus.¹

Legend represents Lycurgus as having fitted himself for his great work through an acquaintance, by converse with priests and sages, with the laws and institutions of different lands. He is said to have studied with zeal the laws of Minos, the legendary lawgiver of Crete ; to have become learned, like the legislator Moses, in all the wisdom of the Egyptians ; and even to have journeyed as far as India and have sat as a disciple at the feet of the Brahmins. Another account, however, relates that his entire system of laws was revealed to him by the Delphian oracle.²

Upon the return of Lycurgus to Sparta, — we still follow the tradition, — his learning and wisdom soon made him the leader of a strong party. After much opposition, a system of laws and regulations drawn up by him was adopted by the Spartan people. Then, binding his countrymen by a solemn oath that they would carefully observe his laws during his absence, he set out on a pilgrimage to Delphi. In response to his inquiry, the oracle assured him that Sparta would endure and prosper as long as the people obeyed the laws he had given them. Lycurgus caused this answer

intended to test them ; it was thought that those among them who were foremost in asserting their freedom would be most high-spirited, and most likely to rise against their masters. So they selected about two thousand, who were crowned with garlands and went in procession round the temples ; they were supposed to have received their liberty ; but not long afterwards the Spartans put them all out of the way, and no man knew how any one of them came by his end." — JOWETT'S *Thucydides*, iv: 80.

¹ The date of Lycurgus falls somewhere in the ninth century B.C., probably near its close.

² Herod. i. 65.

to be carried to his countrymen; and then, that they might remain bound by the oath they had taken, resolved never to return. He went into an unknown exile. Three lands claimed to hold his dust; and the Spartans in after years gratefully perpetuated his memory by temples and sacrifices in his honor.

Criticism of the Legend. — It is probable that Lycurgus was a real person, and that he had something to do with shaping the Spartan constitution. But it is almost certain that he simply reformed a constitution already in existence: for it is a proverb that constitutions grow and are not made. Circumstances, doubtless, were in the main the real creator of the peculiar political institutions of Sparta — the circumstances that surrounded a small band of conquerors in the midst of a large and subject population. Nor were they the creation of an hour — the fruit of a happy inspiration. All the events of the early conquest, all the toils, dangers, and hardships which the Dorian warriors endured in the subjugation of the land, and all the prudence and watchfulness necessary to the maintenance of themselves in the position of conquerors, helped, we may believe, to determine the unusual military character of the laws and regulations of the Spartan state.

The work of Lycurgus, then, was not that of a new creation. His mission was that of a wise and far-seeing statesman, whose task it is to "modify and shape already existing habits and customs into rule and law"; to make additions and improvements; to anticipate needs and tendencies. The very fact that the legislation of Lycurgus was adopted and became the system of a state, shows that it must have been essentially the outgrowth of customs and regulations already familiar, and consequently acceptable to at least a large party among the Spartans.¹

The Spartan Constitution: the Kings: the Senate: and the General Assembly. — From what has already been said of the

¹ Holm says: "No people accepts the position of the Spartans without special constraint. This constraint was imposed by the legislator whom the ancients called Lycurgus." — *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 188, 189. But with better reason we may say that this restraint was imposed by the conditions under which the Spartan community existed.

obscurity of the early history of Sparta, the reader will not look for any account of the development of the Spartan constitution. The story of its growth is really unknown. What follows is simply a description of the main features that it presented in later historic times.

The constitution provided for two joint kings, a Senate of Elders, a General Assembly, and a sort of executive board composed of five persons called Ephors.

The two kings corresponded in some respects to the two Consuls in the later Roman republic.¹ One served as a check upon the other. This double sovereignty worked admirably; for five centuries there was no successful attempt on the part of a Spartan king to subvert the constitution. The power of the joint kings, it should be added, came to be rather nominal than real (save in time of war); so that while the Spartan government was a monarchy in form, it in reality was an aristocracy, or rather oligarchy, corresponding very closely in many respects to the feudal aristocracy of mediæval Europe.

The Senate (*gerousia*) consisted of twenty-eight elders. The two co-ordinate kings were also members, thus raising the number to thirty. The duties of the body seem to have been of a judicial and legislative character. No one could become a senator until he had reached the age of sixty. The mode of election, according to Plutarch, was peculiar. The committee who were to decide between the candidates were confined in a chamber near the public assembling place, where, without seeing what was going on, they might hear the clamor of the people. Then the candidates were presented to the meeting, one by one, and the partisans of each greeted their favorite with great and prolonged applause.

¹ Various explanations are given of the origin of this dual monarchy. One theory supposes one king to represent the Achæan race and the other the Dorian; a second assumes that the double monarchy arose from the union of two Dorian settlements; while still a third regards the two kings as representing two leading families at Sparta, whose rival claims to the throne were accommodated by raising a member of each to the royal dignity. See Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 206, 207.

It was the duty of the committee to decide which candidate had been received with the greatest enthusiasm and uproar, and he was declared the people's choice.¹ The proceedings in our own political nominating conventions are not very dissimilar to this usage of the Spartan assembly.

The Apella, or General Assembly, was composed of all the citizens of Sparta over thirty years of age. By this body laws were made, and questions of peace and war decided; but nothing could be brought before it save such matters as the Senate had previously decided might be entertained by it. It was by this assembly that the senators were elected in the manner above described.

In striking contrast to the custom at Athens, all matters were decided without general debate, only the magistrates and persons specially invited being allowed to address the assembly. The Spartans were fighters, not talkers; they hated windy discussion. As in the case of the elections to the Senate, the decision of the assembly respecting any measure was generally made known by acclamation. Sometimes, however, measures of special importance were decided by vote.

The board of Ephors was composed, as we have noticed, of five persons, elected in some way not known to us. This body gradually drew to itself many of the powers and functions of the Senate, as well as much of the authority of the associate kings.

Regulations as to Land, Trade, and Money. — Plutarch says that Lycurgus, seeing that the lands had fallen largely into the hands of the rich, made a general redistribution of them, allotting an equal portion to each of the nine thousand Spartan citizens, and a smaller and less desirable portion to each of the thirty thousand Perioeci. It is not probable that there ever was such an exact redivision and equalization of landed property. The Spartan theory, it is true, seems to have been that every free man should possess a farm large enough to support him without work, so that he might give himself wholly to his duties as a citizen;

¹ Plut. *Lycurgus*, 26.

but as a matter of fact there existed, at certain periods at least, great inequality in landed possessions among the Spartans. In the fourth century, according to Plutarch, not more than one hundred of the citizens held any land.

The Spartans were forbidden to engage in commerce or to pursue any trade ; all their time must be passed in the chase, or in gymnastic and martial exercises. Iron was made the sole money of the state. This money, as described by Plutarch, was so heavy in proportion to its value that the amount needed to make a trifling purchase required a yoke of oxen to draw it. The object of Lycurgus in instituting such a currency was, we are told, to prevent its being used for the purchase of worthless foreign stuff.¹

The Public Tables. — The most peculiar, perhaps, of the Spartan institutions were the public meals (*syssitia*). In order to correct the extravagance with which the tables of the rich were often spread, Lycurgus is said to have ordered that all the citizens should eat at public and common tables. This was their custom, but Lycurgus could have had nothing to do with instituting it. It was part of their military life. Every citizen was required to contribute to these common meals a certain amount of flour, fruit, game, or pieces from the sacrifices ; if any one failed to pay his contribution, he was degraded and disfranchised. Excepting the Ephors, none, not even the kings, was excused from sitting at the common mess. One of the kings, returning from a long expedition, presumed to dine privately with his wife, but received therefore a severe reproof.

A luxury-loving Athenian once visited Sparta and seeing the coarse fare of the citizens, which seems to have consisted in the main of a nauseous black broth, is reported to have declared that

¹The real truth about this iron money is simply this: The conservative, non-trading Spartans retained longer than the other Grecian states the use of a primitive medium of exchange. Gold and silver money was not introduced into Sparta until about the close of the fifth century B.C., when the great expansion of her interests rendered a change in her money-system absolutely necessary. In referring the establishment of the early currency to Lycurgus, the Spartans simply did in this case just what they did in regard to their other usages.

now he understood the Spartan disregard of life in battle : " Any one," said he, " must naturally prefer death to life on such fare as this."

Education of the Youth. — Children at Sparta were regarded as belonging to the state. Every male infant was brought before the Council of Elders, and if it did not seem likely to become a robust and useful citizen, was exposed in a mountain glen. At seven the education and training of the youth were committed to the charge of public officers, called boy-trainers. The aim of the entire course was to make a nation of soldiers who should despise toil and danger and prefer death to military dishonor. The mind was cultivated only as far as might contribute to the main object of the system. Reading and writing were not taught, and the art of rhetoric was despised. Only martial poems were recited. The Spartans had a profound contempt for the subtleties and literary acquirements of the Athenians. Spartan brevity was a proverb, whence our word *laconic*,¹ implying a concise and pithy mode of expression. Boys were taught to respond in the fewest words possible. At the public tables they were not permitted to speak until questioned : they sat " silent as statues." As Plutarch puts it, " Lycurgus was for having the money bulky, heavy, and of little value ; and the language, on the contrary, very pithy and short, and a great deal of sense compressed in a few words."

But while the mind was neglected, the body was carefully trained. In running, leaping, wrestling, and hurling the spear the Spartans acquired the most surprising nimbleness and dexterity. At the Olympian games Spartan champions more frequently than any others bore off the prizes of victory.

But before all things else was the Spartan youth taught to bear pain unflinchingly. He was inured to the cold of winter by being forced to pass through that season with only the light dress of summer. His bed was a bundle of river reeds. Sometimes he was placed before the altar of Artemis, and scourged just for the purpose of accustoming his body to pain. Frequently, it is said,

¹ From Laconia.

boys died under the lash, without revealing their suffering by look or moan.

Another custom tended to the same end as the foregoing usage. The boys were at times compelled to forage for their food. If detected, they were severely punished for having been so unskilful as not to get safely away with their booty. This custom, as well as the fortitude of the Spartan youth, is familiar to all through the story of the boy who, having stolen a young fox and concealed it beneath his tunic, allowed the animal to tear out his vitals, without betraying himself by the movement of a muscle.

The Cryptia, which has been represented as an organization of young Spartans who were permitted, as a means of rendering themselves ready and expert in war, to hunt and kill the Helots, seems in reality to have been a sort of police institution, designed to guard against the uprising of the serfs.

The Spartan Conquest of Messenia: the First and Second Messenian Wars (about 743-723 and 645-631 B.C.). — After the era of the Lycurgean legislation Sparta rose quickly to a place of undisputed pre-eminence among the states of the Peloponnesus. This rapid growth of her power is attributable, without doubt, to her well-framed constitution and her remarkable military discipline.

The first efforts of the reformed state were directed to the conquest of the places in Laconia still in the hands of the non-Dorian population.¹ In a short time the Spartans had gained possession of the whole course of the Eurotas from Sparta to the sea, and had completely subjected the inhabitants of every portion of the Laconian district. The conquered peoples were made either vassals or serfs.

With their power firmly established in Laconia, the Spartans turned their arms against the Messenians. Messenia was one of those districts of the Peloponnesus which, like Laconia, had been taken possession of by Dorian bands at the time of the great invasion. It was the most pleasant and fertile of all the Pelopon-

¹ The Spartans must have held as conquerors a part at least of Laconia before the Lycurgean legislation, since its character presupposes this condition of things.

nesian districts which fell into the hands of the Dorians. Here the intruding Dorians, contrary to what was the case in Laconia, had mingled with the native population to form a new mixed race.

The real cause of the war that now broke out between the Spartans and the Messenians was probably Spartan lust of conquest. The occasion is said to have been some border trouble about some cattle or other petty matter. The struggle falls into two periods, the so-called First and Second Messenian Wars (about 743-723 and 645-631 B.C.). Of these early wars of Sparta the accounts are as confused and contradictory as are those of the early struggles of Rome. It is only the general course of events that we can make out with any degree of certainty.

In the first war the Messenians, under the lead of their patriot king Aristodemus, offered an obstinate resistance to the Spartan invaders. A strongly fortified city on the cliffs of Mount Ithome was the last rallying-place of the hard-pressed Messenians. But after a prolonged siege this citadel fell into the hands of the Spartans, and the first war came to an end. The conquered Messenians were reduced to vassalage, their relation to the Spartans becoming somewhat like that of the Perioeci of Laconia. Many of the better class, preferring exile to servitude, fled beyond the sea to Ionia or to Italy in search of new homes. Rhegium, in Italy, received some of the fugitives.

An interval of three generations separated the First from the Second Messenian War. Then the sons of the sons of those Messenians who had made the first brave fight against the Spartan invaders of their land, taking advantage of Sparta's misfortunes in war, flew to arms, with the desperate determination to drive out the enslavers of their country. The Messenians were aided in their struggle by Argos and some of the Arcadian states, that were jealous of the rising power of Sparta. The Spartans found allies in the Corinthians and the Eleans.

The Messenians in after times so adorned this really heroic period of their history with such extravagant tales of the exploits of their patriot ancestors, that it is quite impossible for us to tell





just what did happen or what was done. It is related that in the midst of the war, the Spartans, falling into despair, sent to Delphi for advice. The oracle directed them to ask Athens for a commander. The Athenians did not wish to aid the Lacedæmonians, yet dared not oppose the oracle. So they sent Tyrtæus, a poet-schoolmaster, who they hoped and thought would prove of but little service to Sparta. Whatever truth there may be in this part of the story, it seems indisputable that, during the Second Messenian War, a poet named Tyrtæus, reanimated the drooping spirits of the Spartans by the energy of his war-hymns. Perhaps it would not be too much to say that Sparta owed her final victory to the inspiring songs of this martial poet.

But the freedom which the fathers could not preserve, the sons could not regain. The uprising was finally crushed, and as a punishment for their revolt the Spartans laid upon the necks of the reconquered people a far heavier yoke of servitude than that which they had endeavored to throw off. From the state of *Periœci* they were reduced to the degrading and bitter condition of the Helots of Laconia. As at the end of the first war, so now many of the nobles fled the country, and found hospitality as exiles in other lands. Some of the fugitives conquered for themselves a place in Sicily, and gave name and importance to the still existing city of Messana (Messina), on the Sicilian straits.

Thus Sparta secured possession of Messenia. From the end of the Second Messenian War on to the decline of the Spartan power in the fourth century B.C., the Messenians were the serfs of the Spartans. All the southern part of the Peloponnesus, from the Ionian to the *Ægean* Sea, was now Spartan territory.

Spartan Supremacy established in Central and Northern Peloponnesus.—After Sparta had secured possession of Messenia, her influence and power advanced steadily until her supremacy or leadership was acknowledged by all the other states of the Peloponnesus, save Argos.

The Arcadian mountaineers offered a stout resistance to the Spartan arms. Foremost in the struggle for freedom was Tegea,

a border city towards Laconia, and one of the few important Arcadian towns. The Tegeans, however, were finally compelled to make terms with Sparta (about 560 B.C.). They retained their autonomy, but were bound to follow the lead of Sparta in war. This alliance was one of the main sources of Sparta's preponderant influence in Greek affairs during the next hundred years and more. After the submission of Tegea, the remainder of the towns and villages of Arcadia were gradually forced into a condition of dependency upon Sparta.

Still more stubborn was the resistance which the Spartans encountered from Argos. This city naturally contended bravely for the maintenance of her ancient supremacy in Northeastern Peloponnesus. But there was no longer a Pheidon at the head of the ambitious state. The Argive power had greatly declined during the seventh century, several of the cities, among them the important states of Corinth and Sicyon, which in earlier times were subject to her authority, having recovered their freedom. Notwithstanding the fallen state of her once really imperial affairs, Argos for a long time offered brave resistance to the encroachments of Sparta.

From time immemorial the Spartans and the Argives had contended for the possession of Cynuria, a mountainous border-district between Laconia and Argolis. Before the beginning of the Second Messenian War Sparta had got a firm hold of a large part of the disputed territory; but it was nearly a century after the close of the struggle with Messenia (about 547 B.C.) before she secured possession of the whole of the district.¹

About a generation after the final loss of Cynuria, the Argives

¹ Tradition represents the last battle between the rival states as having assumed at first the character of a contest in the gymnasium. It was agreed between the two armies that, instead of fighting in the ordinary way, three hundred picked Argives should fight an equal number of picked Spartans, and the city Thyrea (Thyrea and its territory formed the northern part of Cynuria), which was the place in dispute, should be the prize of the party whose champions were victorious. The combat failed, however, to decide the matter, and a regular battle was fought, in which the Spartans were victorious. Read the story in Herod. i. 82.

suffered a loss of infinitely greater proportions. Hostilities having broken out again between them and the Spartans, the latter, under the lead of their king Cleomenes, invaded Argolis. The Argives, defeated in battle, fled for asylum to a sacred grove near at hand. Here they were hemmed in by the Spartans, and then the wood set afire. The six thousand Argives within the grove perished to a man, those that endeavored to escape the flames falling by the Spartan swords. Thus in a single day two-thirds of the fighting population of Argos were destroyed.¹

This terrible crime left Spartan influence supreme in Argolis. Argos remained a free city, but her power extended only a little distance beyond her walls. She refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Sparta, but was powerless to offer, until a later period, any further resistance to her advance to the hegemony of the Peloponnesian states.

Even before the complete destruction of the Argive power by the Spartans they had formed close alliances with the important cities of Corinth and Sicyon. These alliances had been secured by aiding the Dorian oligarchs of these cities to get control of the government. Since the maintenance of the rule of these nobles depended upon outside help, naturally they became firm friends of Sparta and held faithfully to the Lacedæmonian alliance.

During this same period in which Sparta was gaining supremacy in the central and northeastern parts of the Peloponnesus, she was also acquiring influence in the northwestern portion, that is, in Elis. Her appearance here had for its aim the virtual management of the Olympian games, which had already grown into national importance, and which naturally brought great honor and influence to those who enjoyed the superintendence of the festival.

Among the Hellenic tribes occupying the district of Elis were the Pisatans and the Eleans. Olympia lay within the territory of the Pisatans, and in the earliest times the superintendence of the Olympian games was in their hands. But the Eleans, having

¹ The date of this massacre is unknown. It probably occurred about 505 B.C.

conquered the Pisatans, assumed the guardianship of the shrine. The Pisatans made repeated efforts to regain control of the sanctuary. The Eleans called upon Sparta for help, and the opportunity thus afforded the Spartans to interfere in the affairs of Olympia was eagerly embraced by them. The issue of the matter was that the Pisatans were reduced to the condition of serfs, and the management of the Olympian games was eventually secured to the Eleans. But under the circumstances the influence of Sparta at Olympia was, of course, supreme, and, through the national festivals held there every four years, her name and fame were spread throughout all Hellas.

Sparta now began to be looked to even by the Greek cities beyond the Peloponnesus as the natural leader and champion of the Greeks. Her renown was also, it seems, spreading even among barbarian nations; for about the middle of the sixth century B.C. we hear of an attempt made by Cræsus, king of Lydia, to secure her for an ally in his unfortunate war with Cyrus of Persia, which was at that time the rising power in Asia.

Having now traced in brief outline the rise of Sparta to supremacy in the Peloponnesus, we must turn aside to take a wider look over Hellas, in order to note an expansive movement of the Hellenic race which resulted in the establishment of Hellenes upon almost every shore of the then known world.

REFERENCES. — Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus*. (The best translation of Plutarch is Stewart and Long's, 4 vols.) Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 175-315. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. ii. pp. 259-377; (twelve volume ed.), vol. ii. pp. 337-466. Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. i. chs. xv., xvi., and xvii. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 194-278, for the history of the leading Peloponnesian states down to the end of the Second Messenian War; *ib.*, pp. 430-449, for the history of Sparta in the sixth century.

CHAPTER V.

THE AGE OF GREEK COLONIZATION.

(About 750-600 B.C.)

Causes of Greek Colonization. — The latter half of the eighth and the seventh century B.C. constituted a period in Greek history marked by great activity in the establishment of colonies. This expansive movement of the Greek race forms an important chapter not only in Hellenic, but also, as we shall learn, in general history.

The inciting causes of Greek colonization at the period named¹ were various. One was the growth in wealth of the cities of the home land² and the consequent expansion of their trade and commerce. Miletus on the Asian coast, Chalcis and Eretria on the island of Eubœa, Corinth and Megara on the Isthmus, and scores of other cities had grown into large and flourishing commercial communities. This development had created an eager desire for wealth, and given birth to a spirit of mercantile enterprise. Thousands were ready to take part in any undertaking which seemed to offer a chance for adventure or to open a way to the quick acquisition of riches.

Another motive of emigration was supplied by the political unrest which at this time filled almost all the cities of Greece.

¹ We are not concerned in the present chapter with the earlier emigration movement caused by the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnesus, and which resulted in the establishment of the Æolian, Ionian, and Dorian settlements along the Asian shore and on the adjacent islands of the Ægean (see p. 28).

² By the "home land," as we here use the term, we mean the western shore of Asia Minor, the islands of the Ægean, and Greece proper.

The growth within their walls of a wealthy trading class, who naturally desired to have a part in the government, brought this order in conflict with the oligarchs, who in most of the cities at this time held in their hands all political authority. The resulting contentions — which issued sometimes in the triumph of the nobles, and the more unendurable oppression of the masses, sometimes in the victory of the people and the depression of the oligarchy, and still again in the rise of a tyrant whose rule often bore heavily on all orders of the community — created a large discontented class, who were ready to undertake the labor and undergo the privations attending the founding of new homes in remote lands, if only thereby they might secure freer conditions of life.

Other motives blended with those already mentioned. There was the restless Greek spirit, the Greek love of adventure, which doubtless impelled many of the young and ardent to embark in the undertakings. To this class especially did Sicily and the other little-known lands of the West present a peculiar attraction.

To all these inciting causes of the great emigration must be added the aggressions of Sparta upon her neighbors in the Peloponnesus. We have already seen that many of the Messenians, at the end of their first and again at the close of their second unsuccessful struggle with Sparta, joined the emigrants who just then were setting out for the colonies in the western seas (pp. 70, 71).

Relation of a Greek Colony to its Mother City. — The history of the Greek colonies would be unintelligible without an understanding of the relation in which a Greek colony stood to the city sending out the emigrants.

There was a fundamental difference between Greek and Roman colonization. The Roman colony was subject to the authority of the mother city. The emigrants remained citizens or semi-citizens of Rome.¹ The Greek colony, on the other hand, was, in almost all cases, wholly independent of its parent city. The Greek mind could not entertain the idea of one city as rightly ruling over

¹ In this respect the colonies of Rome resembled those of modern European states.

another, even though that other were her own daughter colony. Consequently the principle of city autonomy ruled in dispersed or colonial Hellas as well as in the home land. As a rule, each colony formed a distinct, independent state, and worked out its own political destinies.¹

But while there were no political bonds uniting the mother city and her daughter colonies, still the colonies were attached to their parent country by ties of kinship, of culture, and of filial piety. The sacred fire on the altar of the new home was kindled from embers piously borne by the emigrants from the public hearth of the mother city, and testified constantly that the citizens of the two cities were members of the same though a divided family. Thus by the religion of the hearth were the mother and the daughter city naturally drawn into close sympathy.

The feelings that the colonists entertained for their mother country is shown by the names which they often gave to the prominent objects in and about their new home. Just as the affectionate memory of the homes from which they had gone out prompted the New England colonists to reproduce in the new land the names of places and objects dear to them in the old, so did the cherished remembrance of the land they had left lead the Greek emigrants to give to their new city, to its streets and temples and fountains and hills, the familiar and endeared names of the old home. The reappearance in the colonies of the names of the home land is one clue which, in the study of Greek colonization, enables us to determine the origin of the colonists, and to trace the various currents of emigration which set from the mother country towards the different shores of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

¹ Besides these independent colonies, however, which were united to the mother city by the ties of friendship and reverence alone, there was another class of colonies known as *kleruchies*. The settlers in these did not lose their rights of citizenship in the mother city, which retained full control of their affairs. Such settlements, however, were more properly garrisons than colonies, and were few in number compared with the independent communities. Athens, as we shall see, had a number of such colonies.

The Condition of the Mediterranean World favorable to the Colonizing Movement.—The Mediterranean lands were at this time, say during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., in a most favorable state for this colonizing movement of the Greeks. The cities of Phœnicia, the great rivals of the Greeks in maritime enterprise, had been crippled by successive blows from the Assyrian kings, who just now were pushing out their empire to the Mediterranean. This laming of the mercantile activity of Tyre and Sidon, left their trade and that of their colonies a prey to the Greeks. It should be noticed, however, that after the decline of the cities of Phœnicia, the Phœnician colony of Carthage on the African shore gradually grew into a new centre of Semitic trade and colonizing activity, and practically shut the Greeks out of the greater part of the Mediterranean lying west of Sicily.

Another circumstance was favorable to Greek colonization. The shores of the Mediterranean were at this time, speaking broadly, unoccupied. The great kingdoms of later times, Lydia, Persia, Macedonia, and Rome had not yet arisen, or were still inland powers, and indifferent respecting the coast lands; while the barbarian tribes whose territories bordered upon the sea, of course attached no special value to the harbors and eligible commercial sites along their coasts. But these peoples were advancing in culture and were beginning to feel a desire for the manufactures of foreign lands, and consequently had a strong motive for welcoming the Greek traders to their shores. It is true that the Greek colonists had sometimes to fight hard for a foothold in the new land; but in general the opposition they encountered was slight compared to what they would have met with at a later period, when all the shores had owners who were themselves directly interested in the commerce of the Mediterranean.

We may compare the situation in the Mediterranean at the period of Greek colonization to that of the New World at the opening of the era of colonization by the European peoples. The shore-lands here were virtually without owners, for the reason that the aboriginal tribes had not yet reached the stage of ocean

commerce, and consequently did not value the immediate coast country. Indeed, the colonists or traders were in general well received by the natives, and often at first looked upon as benefactors, since they brought them many articles for which they gladly gave in exchange their hunting and fishing products.

Greek Colonization and the Delphian Oracle. — The colonizing undertakings of the Greeks were, in a measure at least, directed by the Delphian priesthood in the name of the god Apollo, who, as we have seen (p. 49), was regarded as the founder and patron of colonies.¹ A colony established without the sanction of the Delphian oracle was, it was believed, sure to come to grief. And as a matter of fact colonists who had piously sought the counsel of the oracle were more likely to succeed in their undertaking than those who had neglected to secure the co-operation of the Delphian priesthood. There were several reasons for this. In the first place, the managers of the shrine were, through their special knowledge of the Mediterranean lands (p. 49), able to give helpful advice to the emigrants. Again, the priests naturally interested themselves in the affairs of a colony that had been founded under their direction, and labored for its success and prosperity. And still again, colonists going out under the auspices of Apollo were less likely than those whose enterprise had not received such sanction to yield to the hardships and discouragements which they were sure to meet with in their efforts to establish new homes on remote and barbarous shores, since they would be sustained and inspired by the thought that they were under divine patronage and protection.²

In the account which follows of the settlements formed by the Greek colonists on different shores, we shall have occasion to speak of the special services rendered by the Delphian oracle in

¹ Holm thinks that the Delphian priesthood did not take the initiative in colonizing enterprises; but that the spots favorable for settlement were actually selected by the intending colonists themselves, who, however, after their plans were formed sought for their proposed undertaking the sanction of the oracle. *History of Greece*, vol i. pp. 231, 232.

² Cf. *The Pilgrim Fathers in New England*.

the establishment of particular colonies, notably those of Byzantium and Cyrene.

"Spheres of Influence" of the different Colonizing Cities. — We proceed now to give some details respecting the colonization of particular shores, and to speak of the attractions which drew the Greek emigrants to this shore or that. As to-day in the partition of Africa the different European states have what they call their "spheres of influence," so in the era of Greek colonization the various cities of the mother country had what we may designate as their spheres of influence. Thus the influence of the Ionian city of Miletus was paramount in the Black Sea, and the shores of that region became covered with her colonies. The important city of Chalcis, in Eubœa, claimed as her particular territory the Macedonian shore. Corinth, as was natural from her position, sought influence in the seas to the west of Greece.


The Chalcidian Colonies (about 750–650 B.C.). — An early and favorite colonizing ground of the Greeks was the Macedonian coast. Here a triple promontory juts far out into the Ægean, breaking in a dangerous way its northern shore. On this broken shore, Chalcis of Eubœa, with the help, however, of emigrants from other cities, particularly from Eretria, founded so many colonies — thirty-two owned her as their mother city — that the land became known as Chalcidice.¹

One of the chief attractions of this shore to the Greek colonists and traders was the rich copper, silver, and gold deposits found in the mountains of the promontory and the back country. The immense slag heaps found there to-day bear witness to the former importance of the mining industry of the region. The hills too were clothed with heavy forests which furnished excellent timber for ship-building, and this was an important item in the trade of the Chalcidian colonies, since timber in many parts of continental Greece was far from abundant.

The Chalcidian colonies, among which Olynthus was promi-

¹ Potidæa, however, one of the most important cities in Chalcidice, was a colony of Corinth.





ment, exercised a very important influence upon the course and development of Greek history. Their importance in the history of culture can hardly be overestimated. Through them it was, in large measure, that the inland tribes of Macedonia, particularly the ruling class, became so deeply tinged with Hellenic civilization. It was this circumstance which, as we shall learn, gave special historical significance to the Macedonian conquests of later times, making them as it did something more than the mere destructive forays of barbarians.

Colonies on the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Bosphorus.

— A second region full of attractions to the colonists of the enterprising commercial cities of the mother country was that embracing the Hellespont and the Bosphorus, together with the connecting sheet of water known to the Greeks as the Propontis. These water channels, forming as they do the gateway to the northern world, early drew the attention of the Greek traders. Here were founded, among other cities, the Milesian settlement of Cyzicus (756 B.C.) and the Megarian colonies of Chalcedon (675 B.C.) and Byzantium (658 B.C.), the latter of which was destined to a long and brilliant history.

Byzantium was built, under the special direction of the Delphian Apollo, on one of the most magnificent sites for a great emporium that the ancient world afforded. It is said that, when the founders of the colony sought of the oracle advice in regard to a site for their proposed settlement, they received for a reply that they should "build opposite the city of the blind," by which was meant Chalcedon, with the implication that the Chalcidians had shown little sagacity in passing by such an excellent site as that at Byzantium and choosing the inferior one where they were.

The entire region of which we are speaking was strategic ground in ancient as it is in modern times. Between the Greeks and the barbarians, as well as between the Greek cities themselves, there was, as we shall see, many a hard and long fight for the possession of the cities which guarded the gateways to the northern world.

Colonies in the Euxine Region.—The tale of the Argonauts proves that in prehistoric times the Greeks probably carried on trade with the remotest shores of the Euxine. In the Golden Fleece, the prize of the Argonaut heroes (p. 19), we may perhaps recognize a poetical rendering of an early trade in gold gathered from the washings of the streams of the Caucasus. But the chief products and articles of the Black Sea trade in historic times were fish, grain, and cattle, besides timber, copper, and iron.

The fisheries, particularly, of the region formed the basis of a very active and important trade. The fish markets of the commercial Ionian cities of European Greece and of Asia Minor, in which fish formed a chief article of diet among the poorer classes, were supplied in large measure by the products of these northern fisheries.

Besides the products of the mines and fisheries of the region, there was a trade, important in ancient as in modern times, in grain and cattle, nourished by the fertile plains of Scythia (now Russia). So large was the trade in cereals, that we may call this Black Sea region the granary of Greece, in the same sense that North Africa and Egypt were in later times called the granary of Rome.

Still another object of commerce in the Euxine was slaves. This region was a sort of slave-hunters' land—the Africa of Hellas. It supplied to a great degree the slave markets of the Hellenic world. In the modern Caucasian slave trade of the Mohammedan sultans, we may recognize a survival of a commerce which was active twenty-five hundred years ago.

Prominent among the Greek colonies established on the southern shore of the Euxine was Sinope, founded by Miletus about the middle of the eighth century B.C. This city became one of the most important centres of Greek life and trade in these northern regions.

Trapezus, now Trebizond, a colony established by Sinope, was also a place of great importance. It received the Ten Thousand

Greeks as they emerged from the mountains of Armenia, after their memorable march under the lead of the historian Xenophon. A series of colonies of Miletus, among which were Apollonia and Odessus, was also founded on the western Thracian shore, between the Bosphorus and the mouth of the Danube; while numerous other settlements of the same enterprising city, — among which Olbia was chief, — located on or near the estuaries of the rivers running into the Euxine on the north, gathered the trade of the regions tributary to these streams.

Eighty colonies in the Euxine are said to have owned Miletus as their mother city. The coast of the sea became so crowded with Greek cities, and the whole region was so astir with Greek enterprise, that the Greeks came to regard this quarter of the world, once looked upon as so remote and inhospitable, as almost a part of the home country.

Colonies on the Ionian Islands and the Adjacent Shores. — At the same time that the tide of Hellenic migration was overspreading the northern shores of the Ægean and those of the Black Sea, it was also flowing towards the west and covering the Ionian Islands and the coasts of Southern Italy and Sicily.

The group of islands lying off the western coast of Greece, known as the Ionian Isles, together with the adjacent shores of Acarnania and Epirus, formed an important region of Greek colonization. Corinth, as was natural from her position, took a prominent part in the establishment of colonies here. One of the most important of her settlements was Corcyra. The relations of this colony to its mother city were very unfilial, and a quarrel between them was one of the immediate causes of the Peloponnesian War.¹

The colonies on the islands in the Ionian Sea formed the half-way station to Italy, and it was by the way of these settlements that Italy during the era of colonization received a large and steady stream of immigrants.

¹ On the western coast of Greece the Corinthians established the colonies of Anactorium, Ambracia, Leucas, and Epidamnus (circ. 650-600 B.C.).

Colonies in Southern Italy: Magna Græcia. — At this time, Italy, with the exception of Etruria on the western coast, was occupied by tribes that had made but little progress in culture. The power of Rome had not yet risen. Hence the land was practically open to settlement by any superior or enterprising race.



Fountney & Carmichael, Eng'rs, Boston

Consequently it is not surprising that during the Greek colonizing era Southern Italy became so thickly set with Greek cities as to become known as *Magna Græcia*, "Great Greece." Here were founded during the latter part of the eighth century B.C. the important city of Taras, the Tarentum of the Romans (708 B.C.); the Æolian city of Sybaris (721 B.C.), noted for the luxurious life of its citizens, whence our term Sybarite, meaning a

voluptuary;¹ the great Croton (711 B.C.), distinguished for its schools of philosophy and its victors in the Olympian games; Locri (circ. 700 B.C.), famous for the laws and institutions of the legislator Zaleucus; and Rhegium (circ. 715 B.C.), the mother of statesmen, historians, poets, and artists.

Upon the western coast of the peninsula was the city of Cumæ (Cyne), famed throughout the Grecian and the Roman world on account of its oracle and sibyl. This was probably the oldest Greek colony in Italy.

The chief importance of the cities of Magna Græcia for civilization springs from their relations to Rome. Through them, without doubt, the early Romans received many primary elements of culture, deriving thence probably their knowledge of letters, as well as of Greek constitutional law.



Fig. 16. COIN OF SYBARIS.

Greek Colonies in Sicily and Southern Gaul.—The island of Sicily is in easy sight from the Italian shore. About the same time that the southern part of the peninsula was being filled with Greek colonists, this island was also receiving a swarm of immigrants. Here was planted by the Dorian Corinth the city of Syracuse (734 B.C.), which, before Rome had become great, waged war on equal terms with Carthage. Not far from Syracuse was established Leontini, and upon the southern shore of the island arose Agrigentum (Acragas), which became, after Syracuse, the most important

¹ Sybaris is said, doubtless with exaggeration, to have been able to raise an army, counting subject-allies, of three hundred thousand men. In a war with Croton it was wholly destroyed, all its inhabitants being either killed or driven into exile, and the lands of the city being taken possession of by the conquerors (510 B.C.). This destruction of so populous and wealthy a city was one of the heaviest calamities which up to that time had befallen the Hellenic world.

of the Greek cities in Sicily. On the eastern shore, Naxos (735 B.C.), and Catana (about 720 B.C.) were built under the very shadow of Mount Ætna.

Sicily was the most disorderly and tumultuous part of Hellas. It was the "wild, wild West" of the Hellenic world. It was the land of romance and adventure, and seems to have drawn to itself the most untamed and venturesome spirits among the Greeks. To the grounds of disorder and strife existing among the Greek colonists themselves were added two other elements of discord, — the native barbarians and the Phœnicians. The growing power of Carthage, the representative of the Phœnician element, checked the expansion of the Greek colonies, and they were forced to divide the island with these Semitic rivals whom centuries before they had driven from the Ægean.

That part of Gaul which touches the Mediterranean where the Rhone empties into the sea was another region occupied by Greek colonists. A chief attraction here was the amber and tin brought overland from the Baltic and from Britain. Here were established several colonies, chief among which was Massalia, the modern Marseilles (circ. 600 B.C.), a colony of Phœæa in Asia Minor.

Colonies in North Africa and Egypt: Cyrene and Naucratis. — In the seventh century B.C. the Greeks founded on the

African coast, nearly opposite the island of Crete, the important colony of Cyrene, which became the metropolis of a large district known as Cyrenaica. The site of the city was




Fig. 17. COIN OF CYRENE.

one of the most eligible on the African shore. Strangely enough, the Phœnicians, notwithstanding they had such a keen eye for good colonial sites, had passed by the spot; but the Delphian

priests seemed somehow to have become acquainted with the advantages offered by the situation, since an oracle was given some Dorians of the Cyclades to the effect that they should establish a colony in Libya. When emigration to the new settlement lagged, Apollo stimulated the movement by a fresh utterance which threatened with the punishment of unavailing regret all such as should be slack in acting upon the advice of the oracle.¹ Thus under the direction of the Delphian priesthood was established on this admirable site one of the most important of the Greek colonies, a city which was long the chief centre of Hellenic influence in the Southern Mediterranean.

In the Nile Delta the Greeks early established the important station of Naucratis. This colony was at the height of its prosperity in the sixth century B.C., although it certainly existed as early as the beginning of the seventh century. It was the gateway through which Hellenic influences passed into Egypt, and Egyptian influences passed out into Greece.²

Life in the Greek Colonies.—To the preceding brief account of the founding of the Greek colonies, we must add a word respecting life in Dispersed Hellas. We notice some such contrast between life in the Greek colonies and in the home cities as is observable to-day between life in modern European colonies and in their mother countries.

Speaking broadly, it may be said that the society of new settlements is freer and more progressive than that of older lands. There are several reasons for this difference. One is that it is the young and adventurous, the enterprising and open-minded, who are very likely to make up the train of emigrants. Hence the eager,

¹ Herod. iv. 150–159.

² Quite recently the ruins of Naucratis have been discovered and excavated. The importance of the discovery, in the evidence it affords of the influence of Egyptian upon Greek art and culture, can hardly be overrated. It supplies another connecting link between the history of the East and that of the West. Ernest Gardner, in his report of his work, says: "The influence of Egypt flowed through Naucratis to Greece, and the long-perfected models of Egyptian skill roused the emulation, if not always the imitation, of the young and quickly rising art of Greece."

restless, and aspiring spirit that pervades the life of a new settlement. Again, among colonists are apt to be found men who have been the victims of tyrannical government or of oppressive institutions, and who in the new home become the ardent advocates of new forms of government and new social arrangements under which they hope to secure better and more equal conditions of life.

And still again, in a new community there are not so many vested interests as exist in an old country, where, for instance, a wealthy aristocracy has long dominated society, and consequently proposed changes in social or governmental institutions are not so stubbornly opposed. The way is open for reforms; the ground is clear for experiments.

For these various reasons it is usually the case that, while the mother countries cling tenaciously to the institutions and modes of thought and life inherited from the past, their colonies readily introduce new institutions, adapted to the needs of the times. The Greek colonies illustrate the rule. Life in many of them at least was singularly free, active, and progressive. The cities of Magna Græcia in particular became the scene of a splendid social and intellectual development. It was in the Italian city of Croton that Pythagoras found the most congenial environment for his celebrated school of philosophy, and in the earlier colonies in Asia Minor that literature and philosophy took their rise.

Place of the Colonies in Grecian History. — The history of Dispersed Hellas is closely interwoven with that of Continental Hellas. From the colonies many social and intellectual influences flowed into the cities of the home country, and there acted as liberalizing and stimulating forces upon life and thought. Particularly in the political realm did the colonies react powerfully upon the cities of Greece, and in a large measure determine the course of Grecian history. In truth, a large part of the history of Greece would be unintelligible should we lose sight of Greater Greece, just as a large part of the history of Europe since the seventeenth century cannot be understood without a knowledge of Greater Europe. In colonial interests, rivalries, and jealousies we shall

find the inciting causes of many of the contentions and wars between the cities of the home land. It was the rival colonial interests of Athens and Corinth that afforded one of the immediate causes of the disastrous Peloponnesian War, while the decisive blow of that great struggle was struck beneath the walls of the Dorian colony of Syracuse.

Thus the more we learn of the relations of the colonies to their mother cities and to the native races of the countries in which they were planted, the more clearly shall we recognize the vast significance for Greek history — and for universal history as well — of the colonization movement which we have been tracing. In its influence upon the social and intellectual development of mankind it may well be compared to that expansion of the English race which has established peoples of English speech and culture in so many lands and upon so many shores of both the Old and the New World.

REFERENCES. — Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 432-500. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iii. pp. 163-220 and 247-275; (twelve volume ed.), vol. iii. pp. 349-410; *ib.* vol. iv. pp. 20-49. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 333-365. Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. i ch. xxi.



Fig. 18. COIN OF CORINTH.

CHAPTER VI.

THE AGE OF THE TYRANTS.

(About 650-500 B.C.)

The Character and Origin of the Greek Tyrannies. — Just as the Homeric monarchies were superseded by oligarchies, so were these in many of the Greek cities superseded by tyrannies. By the term *Tyrannos* (tyrant) the Greeks did not mean one who ruled harshly, but simply one who held the supreme authority in the state illegally. Some of the Greek tyrants were mild and beneficent rulers, though too often they were all that the name implies among us. Sparta was almost the only important state which did not at one time or another fall into the hands of a tyrant.

The so-called "Age of the Tyrants" lasted, speaking in a general way, from about 650 to 500 B.C., although we hear of tyrants ruling in some cities long before the earlier and in others long after the later date. Indeed, from the close of the disastrous Peloponnesian War in 404 B.C. on to the subjection of Greece by Rome in the second century B. C. there were so many tyrannies set up in the various Greek cities that that period is sometimes called the "Age of the Later Tyrants."

The causes that led to the overthrow in so many cities of oligarchical rule and the establishment of government by a single person were various. A main cause of the rise of tyrannies is found in the misrule of the oligarchs, into whose hands the royal authority of earlier times had passed. By their selfish, cruel, and arbitrary administration of the government, they provoked the revolt of the

people and invited destruction. The factions, too, into which they were divided weakened their authority and paved the way to their fall.

Working with the above causes to undermine the influence of the oligarchs, was the advance in intelligence and wealth of the trading classes in the mercantile and commercial states of Greece, especially in the Ionian cities, and their resulting discontent with the oppressive rule of the oligarchical families and desire to participate in the government.

Tyrannies were established in different ways and by different classes of persons. Sometimes the founder of a tyranny was a patriarchal king, who broke through the constitutional restraints with which his power had been hedged about by the nobles and set himself up as an irresponsible ruler. Such was King Pheidon of Argos, of whom we have already spoken (p. 69). Again, the establisher of a tyranny was sometimes a magistrate or general who misused his authority. Still again, and perhaps most frequently, the person setting up a tyranny was some ambitious disappointed member of the aristocracy, who had held himself out as the champion of the people, and to whom they, anxious to secure economic and political freedom, had entrusted their cause and had given aid in overturning the hated government of the oligarchs.

The Greek Feeling towards the Tyrants.—The tyrants sat upon unstable thrones. The Greeks, always lovers of freedom, had an inextinguishable hatred of arbitrary and irresponsible government; and of course the nobles who were excluded from participation in public affairs, and who often were dealt harshly with by the tyrants and driven into exile, were continually plotting against them. Furthermore, the odious vices and atrocious crimes of some of them caused the whole class to be regarded with the utmost abhorrence, so much so that tyrannicide came to be regarded by the Greeks as a supremely virtuous act. The slayer of a tyrant was looked upon as a devoted patriot and pre-eminent hero.

Consequently the tyrannies were, as a rule, short-lived, rarely lasting longer than three generations. They were usually violently overthrown, and the old oligarchies re-established, or democracies set up in their place. Speaking broadly, the Dorian cities preferred oligarchical, and the Ionian cities democratical government.

Sparta's Opposition to the Tyrants. — Sparta, which state, as has been noted, never fell into the hands of a tyrant, was very active in aiding those cities that had been so unfortunate as to have their government usurped by despots to drive out the usurpers, and to re-establish their oligarchical constitutions. In this matter she was not prompted by an unselfish desire to render a service to the states concerned, but rather aimed to strengthen her own influence in these cities by preserving in them institutions essentially like her own, and by keeping the control of their public affairs in the hands of a few families who should be under the necessity of looking to her for the support of their authority.

Athens, as we shall see, on escaping from the tyranny under which she for a time rested, — that of Peisistratus and his sons, — became the representative and ardent champion of democracy.

Typical Tyrants: Periander of Corinth (625–585 B.C.). — To repeat in detail the traditional accounts of all the tyrants that arose in the different cities of Hellas during the age of the tyrannies would be both wearisome and unprofitable; wearisome because the tales of the various despots possess a singular sameness, and unprofitable because these stories are often manifestly colored and distorted by popular prejudice and hatred, since the Greeks of a later time could hardly speak temperately of a tyrant, so unutterably odious to them was merely the name itself. We shall therefore simply give in brief form the story of two or three of these unconstitutional rulers, who may be taken as fair representatives of their class.

Among the most noted of the tyrants was Periander of Corinth (625–585 B.C.). He inherited the tyranny from his father Cypse-

lus,¹ to whom the outrageous misgovernment of the oligarchical party at Corinth, creating popular unrest and hatred, had offered an opportunity to seize supreme authority. He far surpassed his father in the harshness and burdensomeness of his rule, which bore with intolerable weight upon all classes alike. With the money wrung from his subjects by heavy taxes, he maintained a mercenary force through which he made his position secure, and sustained a court whose magnificence rivalled that of an Oriental potentate.

According to Herodotus, Periander learned of Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, the art of playing the tyrant safely. Having sent a messenger to that despot to ask him respecting the best way to conduct his government, Thrasybulus is said to have conducted the envoy to a field of grain, and, as they walked through it, to have broken off and thrown away such heads as lifted themselves above the others. Then, without a word, he dismissed the messenger. The man, returning to Periander, reported that he had been able to secure from Thrasybulus not a single word of advice, but told how singularly he had acted in destroying the best of his crop of grain. Periander understood the parable, and straightway began to destroy all those citizens whose heads overtopped the others.²

Under the able though harsh rule of Periander, Corinth attained the height of her prosperity and power. The despot conquered the Corinthian colony of Corcyra, and established other settlements on the islands and shores of the Ionian Sea. On the other side of Greece he founded the important colony of Potidæa, on the Macedonian coast, and reduced to a condition of vassalage the city of Epidaurus on the Saronic Gulf. Through these conquests and colonial settlements, all of which contributed to the trading and maritime interests of Corinth, the despot lifted the city to a commanding place among the commercial cities of Greece.

¹ Cypselus ruled as tyrant at Corinth from 655 to 625 B.C. From him the family of Corinthian tyrants are known as the Cypselidæ, or Cypselids.

² Herod. v. 92, section 6.

Periander was, like many another tyrant, a generous patron of artists and literary men. He was also, either through piety or policy, a liberal patron of the gods. He revived the Isthmian games, adding to the festival gymnastic contests, and made splendid votive offerings to the temples at Olympia. Among these gifts was a chest of cedar wood, which commemorated an incident in the life of his father Cypselus.¹ The sides of the chest were covered with pictures, representing various mythological subjects, wonderfully wrought in ivory, gold, and wood. This chest was regarded as one of the art curiosities of Greece, and was still to be seen among the treasures at Olympia in the time of the traveller Pausanias, about seven centuries after the era of the Cypselidæ.²

Periander's varied experiences and his close observation of events seem to have made him something of a philosopher, since many maxims of wisdom, current among the Greeks of later times, were attributed to him as their author, and won for him a place among the Seven Wise Men of Greece.

The tyranny at Corinth lasted only three or four years after the death of Periander. His successor, Psammetichus by name, was assassinated, the Spartans, according to Plutarch, aiding the Corinthians in ridding their city of the despot and restoring oligarchical rule.³

Polyerates, Tyrant of Samos (535-522 B.C.).—Another tyrant whose name and deeds were noised throughout the Hellenic world,

¹ According to legend, the child Cypselus, when certain of the nobles sought his life, was saved by his mother concealing him in a *chest*, whence his name, from the Greek word (*κυψέλη*) for chest.

² See Pausanias, v. 17-19.

³ Nearly contemporaneous with the rule of the Cypselidæ at Corinth, was that at Sicyon of the Orthagoridæ (about 670-560 B.C.), so named from Orthagoras, the founder of the house. The most noted of the dynasty was Cleisthenes. The rule of these tyrants was just and mild, and consequently we are not surprised to learn that their government lasted through four generations. At the same period Theagenes ruled as tyrant in Megara (probably about 630-600 B.C.). The sad state of this city, filled with strife of oligarchs and people, is vividly pictured in the verses of the elegiac poet Theognis, a native Megarian, who wrote during the latter half of the sixth century.

and the vicissitudes of whose career left a deep impression upon the Greek imagination, was Polycrates of Samos (535-522 B.C.).

Polycrates established his rule in Samos in the way so common with the tyrants, — by overturning through violence the government of his own order, the oligarchs. Having made Samos his stronghold, Polycrates conquered many of the surrounding islands in the Ægean, together with several of the cities of the Asian mainland, and made himself the head of a maritime empire, which he maintained with a fleet of a hundred penteconters, the largest navy which any Greek state had up to that time collected.

Polycrates used his swift galleys in overhauling the merchant ships trading in the adjoining seas, and levying tribute upon them. His revenues from this and other sources were so great that he was able to engage in the construction of costly works in aid of navigation in the harbor of Samos, to build fortresses and temples, and to erect for himself a palace on a scale of Oriental magnificence. He maintained a splendid court, to which, among other persons of fame and learning, he invited the celebrated lyric poet Anacreon, a native of Ionia, who seems to have enjoyed to the full the gay and easy life of a courtier, and who, inspired by the congenial atmosphere of his patron's palace, sung so voluptuously of love and wine and festivity that the term "Anacreontic" has come to be used to characterize all poetry overredolent of these themes.

The astonishing good fortune and uninterrupted prosperity of the tyrant awakened, according to Herodotus, the alarm of his friend and ally, Amasis, king of Egypt, who became convinced that such felicity in the lot of a mortal must awaken the envy of the gods (p. 54). Accordingly Amasis wrote his friend begging him to disarm the jealousy of the celestials by sacrificing his most valued possession. Polycrates, acting upon this advice, threw into the sea a precious ring, which he highly prized; but soon afterwards the jewel was found by his servants in a fish that a fisherman had brought to the palace as a present for Polycrates. When Amasis heard of this, he at once broke off his alliance with the

tyrant, fully persuaded that nothing could save him from the terrible reverse of fortune which he was fated to suffer.¹

The issue justified the worst fears of Amasis. Shortly afterwards, Polycrates was allured to the Asian shore by a Persian satrap, a bitter enemy of his, and put to a shameful and cruel death and his body exposed on a cross.

The tyranny established by Polycrates did not end with him, but was by his death shorn of all its brilliancy. When we come to the beginning of the trouble between Hellas and Persia, we shall find an obscure tyrant upon the Samian throne.

Phalaris, Tyrant of Agrigentum (about 560–540 B.C.).—Tyrants arose during the era of the tyrannies, in the Hellenic cities of the West as well as in those of the East. Among the Sicilian despots, Phalaris of Agrigentum was the most notorious. The atrocious modes of punishing his enemies which he is said to have devised have caused his name to become the synonym of ingenious cruelty. He is charged with having cast prisoners into the crater of *Ætna*; with having boiled others alive in heated caldrons; and with having banqueted on the flesh of children.²

The tyrant's master-device of cruelty, however, and the one which, through its simple terribleness, has fascinated the imagination of the world, was the brazen bull. This was a hollow image, into which the tyrant is said to have shut up the victims of his displeasure, in order to subject them to the torture of slow burning by means of a fire kindled beneath the statue. Through an ingenious arrangement of pipes in the nostrils of the image, the cries of the sufferers were transformed into the bellowings of a bull. The tradition of this instrument of torture, with an artistic regard to the requirements of ideal justice, is made to aver that the inventor of the device, and the person who had persuaded the tyrant of its merits as an instrument of government, was its first victim.

Some historical critics are inclined to disbelieve the whole story of this brazen bull in so far as regards its having been an instru-

¹ Herod. iii. 40–43.

² Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. p. 428.

ment of torture used by Phalaris, and suggest that the tradition may have grown out of some features of the Phœnician worship, which required the sacrifice of infants in the fires of the god Moloch. Grote, however, regards the tradition as essentially historical, and believes that the bull found by the Romans at Carthage when they destroyed that city in 146 B.C., and restored by them to Agrigentum, whence it had been taken as a war trophy by the Carthaginians, was the very image within which the tyrant tortured his enemies.¹

The tyrannous rule of Phalaris was ended by a revolt of his outraged subjects, which resulted in his violent death.

Benefits conferred by the Tyrants upon Greek Civilization.

— The fact that tyrannies arose in so many of the cities of the Greek world during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., indicates that the state of Hellenic society at this period rendered necessary autocratic government. The tyrants, doubtless, were evoked by some need of the times. At all events, their rule bridged over a transition period in the political development of the Greek cities, and conferred upon Greek civilization some benefits which, perhaps, could not have been so well secured under any other form of government.

Thus the tyrants, through the connections which they naturally formed with foreign kings and despots, broke the isolation in which the Greek cities up to this time had lived. Pheidon of Argos was in close relations with the Lydian kings; Polycrates was the friend and ally of Amasis, king of Egypt; and the Cypselidæ were also, it seems, in close touch with the reigning house of the same land.² These connections between the courts of the tyrants and those of the rulers of Oriental countries opened the cities of the Hellenic world to the influences of those lands of culture, widened their horizon, and enlarged the sphere of their commercial enterprise.

¹ See Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. iv. p. 65; also Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 428; 429.

² Witness the Egyptian name, Psammetichus, of the last of the race. See p. 94

Again, the tyrants, some of them at least, as for example Periander of Corinth, Polycrates of Samos, and Peisistratus of Athens, were liberal patrons of art and literature. Poetry and music flourished in the congenial atmosphere of their luxurious courts, while architecture, both monumental and utilitarian, was given a great impulse by the public buildings and works which many of them undertook with a view of embellishing their capitals, or of winning the favor of the poorer classes by creating opportunities for their employment. Thus it happened that the age of the tyrants was a period marked by an unusually rapid advance of many of the Greek cities in their artistic, intellectual, and industrial life.

Moreover, the tyrants furthered the interests of religion, through the zeal which many of them manifested in building temples and instituting festivals in honor of the gods. Thus we see Periander at Corinth adding new features to the Isthmian games, and making rich gifts to the shrines at Olympia; and Peisistratus at Athens not only giving new significance and splendor to the Athenian festival sacred to the goddess Athena, — to whom he believed himself especially indebted for his authority, — but also beginning the erection of a most magnificent temple in honor of the Olympian Zeus.¹

The tyrants, in this patronage extended by them to religion, were either prompted by the desire of securing the actual favor of the guardian deities, or were moved by a recognition of the value to a ruler of at least appearing to be pious. In the one case the tyrant received the support of the gods, in the other that of the people, who would naturally regard as sacrilegious any attempt against the government of one whose rule was thus surrounded by the sanctities of religion.

In the political realm the tyrants also rendered eminent services to Greece. By depressing the oligarchies and lifting the people, they created a sort of political equality between these rival orders of society, and thereby helped to pave the way for the incoming

¹ See p. 117.

of democracy. In this respect we may compare the outcome of tyranny among the ancient Greeks to that of absolute monarchy in Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which, by reducing all classes to the same level of servitude, prepared the way for popular government.

In still another way — in the way implied in Emerson's maxim to the effect that bad kings help us, if only they are bad enough — did the tyrants render a great service to the cause of constitutional government in the Greek cities. As we have seen, they rendered rule by a single person unrestrained by law, inexpressibly odious to the Greeks, and thus deepened their love for constitutional government and made them extremely watchful of their freedom. The bare suspicion that any person was scheming to make himself a tyrant was often enough to insure his immediate expulsion from the city, or the infliction of some worse punishment.

Timely Overthrow of the Tyrants. — It was fortunate for Greek freedom that the tyrants were so generally overthrown before the great struggle between Greece and Persia came on. Had the Persian invasion of Greece occurred while the tyrants were still in power at Athens and in the other cities of European Greece, where just before this crisis they had held possession of the government, the issue of the Persian assault upon those states would have been, it seems certain, widely different from what it was. The tyrants would have offered little or no resistance to the invaders, but, led by inclination and interest, would have hastened to secure the continuance of their rule by becoming the vassals of the Great King.

But between the Greek democracies and the Persian despotism there could be no relations of steady friendship or alliance, — nothing but irreconcilable antagonism. And then it was only liberty and self-government that could have evoked that spirit of patriotism and self-devotion which in that period of supreme peril saved the Hellenic world from subjection to the yoke of the barbarians. All this will be clearer to us after we have become

acquainted with the circumstances, which will be detailed in the next chapter, attendant upon the overthrow of the tyranny of the Peisistratidæ at Athens and the establishment of democratic rule in that city, and later have witnessed the sacrifices which were freely made by the Athenian citizens in the maintenance of their popular institutions and in defense of the common liberties of the cities of Hellas.

REFERENCES. — Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. ii. pp. 378-421; (twelve volume ed.), vol. iii. pp. 1-47. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 366-397. Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. i. ch. xxii. * Fowler, *The City-State of the Greeks and Romans*, chs. iv. and v. Rawlinson's Herodotus. Consult index for stories of Cypselus, Polycrates, and Periander. Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History*, ch. iv. Jowett's Aristotle, *Politics*, v. 10-12. Cox, *Lives of Greek Statesmen*: "Polykrates."



Fig. 19. THE ACROPOLIS AT ATHENS. (From a photograph.)

CHAPTER VII.

THE HISTORY OF ATHENS UP TO THE PERSIAN WARS.

The Inhabitants of Attica.—The inhabitants of Attica supposed that they were autochthones, that is, that their race had sprung from the soil itself. History says nothing of their origin, but teaches that they were essentially Ionian in race, with strains of other Hellenic stocks in their veins. It seems certain that at the time of the Dorian invasion many fugitives from other lands, particularly from the Peloponnesus, found an asylum in Attica. Many of these exiles afterwards joined the bands of Ionian emigrants who at that time were seeking new homes on the Asian shore, but some at least appear to have settled permanently in the country and ultimately to have been absorbed by the native population.

The fact that a mixed population occupied the Attic plain is thought by some to be the secret of the versatile, many-sided, yet well-balanced character which distinguished the Attic people above all other branches of the Hellenic race.

One important fact connected with the prehistoric settlement of Attica is that the inhabitants seem never to have been subjected by a foreign race, as happened in the case of most of the districts of the Peloponnesus: for we find no class in Attica corresponding, for instance, to either the Helots or the Periœci of Laconia. This circumstance had much to do in determining the course and character of Attic history.

Legendary History of Attica under her Kings: Theseus and Codrus.— When, in the seventh century B.C., the mists of antiquity clear away from the plain of Attica, Athens, with an oligarchical government, appears as a city-state embracing the whole district. It is evident that this condition of things must have been the outcome of a very long prehistoric development; but of the incidents of that early growth of Athens we are left in almost total ignorance. It is certain, however, that in very early times, Athens, like the other Greek cities, was under the rule of kings. The names of Theseus and Codrus are the most noted of the regal line.

To Theseus, as we have seen (p. 18), tradition ascribed the work of uniting all the Attic villages or townships, of which the number is said to have been twelve, into a single city, on the seat of the ancient Cecropia (p. 16). This prehistoric union, however or by whomsoever effected, laid the basis of the historical greatness of Athens, and therefore is of such importance as to justify our dwelling for a moment upon it, notwithstanding that the whole matter is wrapped in great obscurity.

It appears certain that in primitive times the territory of Attica was occupied by a number of independent communities, of which Athens, or Cecropia, was the most important. This town it was that became the political home for all the inhabitants of the several cantons of the Attic territory. As to how this was brought about we have, as we have already said, no certain information. We may safely assume, however, that the union was a work of time, and that it was effected, in part at least, in the way that such achievements are usually accomplished—by much hard fighting. This period in Athenian history has been well compared to the

early Anglo-Saxon period of English history, the work of the consolidation of Attica being likened to the absorption by Wessex of the other Heptarchic kingdoms.

Thus "before history begins, Athens had achieved a result which Thebes under Epaminondas was unable to attain."¹ How much the union meant for Athens, how it stood related to her ascendancy afterwards in Greece, is perhaps shown by the history of Thebes. Although holding the same relation to Bœotia that Athens held to Attica, Thebes never succeeded in uniting the Bœotian towns into a single city-state, and consequently fretted away her strength in constant bickerings and wars with them.

Respecting Codrus, the following legend is told: At one time the Dorians from the Peloponnesus invaded Attica. Codrus having learned that an oracle had assured them of success if they spared the life of the Athenian king, disguised himself, and, with a single companion, made an attack upon some Spartan soldiers, who instantly slew him. Discovering that the king of Athens had fallen by a Lacedæmonian sword, the Spartans despaired of taking the city, and withdrew from the country.

The Monarchy transformed into an Oligarchy.—At some unknown period in the history of the monarchy at Athens the royal authority was limited by the appointment of a commander-in-chief (Polemarch), to supply, Aristotle tells us, the military ability lacking in some of the kings. Later, the royal power was still further impaired by the election of a new magistrate, called Archon, or ruler, whose duties seem to have been of an administrative character.² These important changes in the Athenian monarchy were manifestly changes effected by the nobles, and in the interest of their own order. There now stood at the head of the state a board consisting of three persons, the King, the Polemarch, and the Archon.

¹ Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. i. p. 28.

² It is uncertain when the first archon was elected, though Greek tradition says that he was chosen either in the reign of Medon, son and successor of Codrus, or in that of Acastus, Medon's successor. Cf. Arist. *Const. of Athens*, ch. 3.

Under this arrangement twelve kings, elected by the nobles from the reputed descendants of Codrus and ruling for life, filled the regal office. Then in the year 752 B.C., the authority and dignity of the regal office was till further diminished by the limiting of the rule of the king to a term of ten years. The monarchy was henceforth no longer a monarchy save in name.¹

In 712 B.C., the fourth ten-year king having been deposed for some abuse of power, the office was thrown open to all the nobles, and soon afterwards (in 682 B.C.) the term of office was reduced to one year. At the same time the offices of Polemarch and Archon were also made annual magistracies, and six junior Archons, called Thesmothetæ, were added to the board.

All these changes mean that the primitive monarchy at Athens was, during prehistoric times, gradually transformed into an oligarchy. In this long constitutional development Athens simply participated in that political revolution which during the period in question changed the form, generally in the interests of the oligarchical party, of the government in probably most of the Greek cities. At the beginning of the historic period, the Athenian constitution had assumed the form outlined in the following paragraph.

The Athenian Constitution about the Close of the Seventh Century B.C.—At the head of the state stood what we may call an executive and judicial board of nine archons or magistrates, filling the place of the old Homeric king. The three highest bore special names, as follows: Archon Eponymus, King-Archon, and Polemarch.² The first was so called because he gave his name to the year, just as in earlier times dates were indicated by the year of the reigning sovereign. He is alluded to as The Archon, and when the term "Archon" is used without any qualifying words it is the Archon Eponymus that is meant. The King-Archon represented the old *Basileus*, now reduced to a second place in the state, and stripped of all the ancient royal functions save those of

¹ Botsford, *The Athenian Constitution*, p. 125.

² Ἀρχων ἐπώνυμος, Ἀρχων Βασιλεὺς, Πολέμαρχος.

a religious nature. The Polemarch was the "field-marshal," the leader in war of the military forces of the state. The other six archons, called, as already noted, Thesmothetæ, were charged with clerical and judicial duties.

Besides this board of magistrates, there was a very important body called the Council (*Βουλή, Boule*) of the Areopagus.¹ This council was composed exclusively of ex-archons, and consequently was a purely aristocratic body. Its members held office for life. The duty of the council was to see that the laws were duly observed, and to judge and punish transgressors. There was no appeal from its decisions.² This council was, at the opening of the historic period, the real power in the Athenian state.

In addition to the magisterial board of archons and the Council of the Areopagus, there is some evidence of the existence of a general assembly (*Ἐκκλησία, Ecclesia*), in which all those who served in the heavy-armed forces of the state had a place.

Such, in the seventh century B.C., were the germs of the political institutions of Athens which during the next two centuries were to exhibit that remarkable expansion which is described in the lately found Aristotelian treatise on the Athenian constitution. After having said a word respecting the classes and parties in the Athenian state at this early period, in order to render intelligible the revolutions of which we shall have to speak, we shall proceed to trace the development of the constitution of Athens up to the time of the beginning of the memorable struggle in the fifth century between Hellas and Persia.

Classes in the Athenian State.—The leading class in the Athenian state was the nobles or Eupatrids. These men were wealthy landowners, a large part of the best soil of Attica, it is said, being held by them. As already shown, all political authority was in their hands.

Beneath the nobles we find the body of the nominally free

¹ So called from the name of the hill, "*Ἄρειος πᾶγος*," "Hill of Ares," which was the assembling place of the council.

² Arist. *Const. of Athens*, ch. 3.

inhabitants. Many of them were tenants living in a state little removed from serfdom upon the estates of the wealthy nobles. They paid rent in kind to their landlords, and in case of failure to pay, they, together with their wives and children, might be seized by the proprietor and sold as slaves.¹ Others owned their little farms, but at the time of which we are speaking had fallen in debt to the wealthy class, their fields being heavily mortgaged to the money lenders. Thus because of their wretched economic condition, as well as because of their exclusion from the government, these classes among the common people were filled with bitterness against the nobles and were ready for revolution. This antagonism between the two orders in the Athenian state is similar to that which we find at Rome between the patricians and the plebeians.

The Rebellion of Cylon (probably 628 or 624 B.C.).²—The rule of the oligarchs was far from being satisfactory. The nobles were divided among themselves, and the common people, burdened with debt, and treated harshly by the Eupatrid magistrates, were discontented and restive. Taking advantage of this state of things, and encouraged by his father-in-law Theagenes, who had made himself tyrant of Megara, Cylon, a rich and ambitious Athenian noble, attempted to overthrow the government, and to take to himself the supreme power. With the aid of friends and a band of mercenaries, he seized the citadel of the Acropolis. Here he was closely besieged. Upon the rock stood a temple of Athena. Being hard pressed, the companions of Cylon—he himself had escaped through the lines of the besiegers—sought refuge within the shrine. The Archon Megacles, fearing lest the death of the rebels by starvation within the sacred enclosure should pollute the sanctuary, offered to spare their lives on condition of

¹ Arist. *Const. of Athens*, ch. 2.

² The exact date is uncertain, though the rebellion is known to have taken place in an Olympic year. Before the discovery of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* this conspiracy was by most historians placed after the legislation of Draco. See J. H. Wright, *The Date of Cylon* (Harvard Studies in Classical Philology), vol. iii., 1892; also Botsford, *The Athenian Constitution* (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology), p. 135.

surrender. Fearing to trust themselves among their enemies without some protection, they fastened a string to the statue of Athena, and, holding fast to this, descended from the citadel into the streets of Athens. As they came in front of the altars of the Eumenides, the line broke ; and Megacles, affecting to believe that this mischance indicated that the goddess refused to them protection, caused them to be set upon and massacred.¹

This crime for the time being went unpunished, but at a later day the people avenged it by driving from the city the family of which Megacles was a member (p. 109, n. 2).

The Laws and Constitution of Draco (621 B.C.). — A short time after the attempted revolt of Cylon, some important changes were effected in the constitution and the laws of Athens. The people were in great distress, and were clamoring for a revision or at least publication of the laws, so that they might be secure against the exactions and cruelties of the wealthy, and the arbitrary and unjust decisions of the Eupatrid magistrates. To meet these demands of the people and to save the state from anarchy, the nobles appointed a person named Draco, one of their own order, to remodel the constitution and draw up a code of laws.

The most important constitutional change made by Draco related to the election of magistrates. These had hitherto been chosen by the Council of the Areopagus. This important function was now committed to the Ecclesia, or popular assembly, in which body all persons had a place who were able to provide themselves with a full military equipment. Moreover, the magistrates were henceforth to be chosen not exclusively from the Eupatrids, but from all persons possessing a certain property qualification, the amount of property, which must be in real estate, varying with the importance and character of the office. In these regulations respecting the qualification and the mode of election of the magistrates, we may perhaps recognize the first step in the democratization of the Athenian constitution.² Wealth instead of birth hence-

¹ Thucyd. i. 126; Plut. *Solon*, 12.

² It is the opinion of some that even before Draco's time wealth was one of the

forth conferred the right to participate in the government. The Ecclesia from this time on drew to itself a constantly increasing share of influence and power.

Draco further modified the constitution by creating, possibly out of elements already existing, a council of four hundred and one members, who were to be chosen by lot out of the whole body of citizens. The duties of this council were probably the oversight of elections and minor matters of government, and the preparation of measures to be laid before the Ecclesia.

Besides making these reforms in the constitution, Draco drew up and published a code of laws. He here probably did little more than to reduce unwritten and conflicting rules, decisions, and ordinances to a definite and written form. Tradition says that the legislator assigned to the least offence the penalty of death, for the reason that he thought all violation of law to be sin against the gods and hence deserving of capital punishment. This alleged severity of the Draconian laws is what caused a later Athenian orator to say that they were written, "not in ink, but in blood." The laws doubtless were severe, but for this harshness Draco probably was not responsible; their severity, in the main, must be regarded as simply a reflection of the callousness of an early and, in some respects, still barbarous age.

But there was one real and great defect in Draco's work. He did not accomplish anything in the way of land or economic reform, and thus did nothing to give relief to those who were struggling with poverty and were the victims of the harsh laws of debt.¹

Struggle between Athens and Megara for the Possession of Salamis (about 610-600 B. C.) — Shortly after the Draconian reforms a war broke out between Athens and the strong commercial city of Megara respecting the island of Salamis, to which both laid claim. The Athenians were at first worsted with great loss in the struggle, and in their discouragement passed a law qualifications for office, and that his reform consisted simply in making more definite these qualifications.

¹ Aristotle pictures the situation in these words: ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς σῶ[μα]σιν ἦσαν δεδεμένοι, . . . καὶ ἡ χώρα δι' ὀλίγων ἦν. — *Ath. Pol.* ch. 4.

forbidding any one ever to bring forward a proposal to renew the war.

At this juncture of affairs there appeared among the Athenians a man destined to a great reputation among his contemporaries and to a still wider fame in later ages. This was Solon, a man sprung from the ranks of the nobles, and belonging to a family reckoning their descent from the sea-god Poseidon. He possessed in rare combination the talents of the poet, the orator, and the statesman. Feeling deeply the shame of surrendering Salamis to the enemy, he labored to inspire the Athenians to renewed efforts for its acquisition. He declared that he would rather become a citizen of some petty island, "than be still named an Athenian, branded with the shame of surrendered Salamis."

Brought to a more resolute mind by the stirring words of the patriot-poet, the Athenians, choosing him to be their leader, resumed the war. The struggle now went on for a long time with varying fortunes, until, both parties wearying of the contest, the Spartans were, through mutual agreement, called in as arbitrators. Partly on the strength of a legend running back to the Trojan War, and which represented the island as about that time coming into the possession of the Athenians, the arbitrators rendered a decision in their favor, and Salamis passed into their hands.¹

Economic Reforms or Relief Measures of Solon (594 B.C.).—The long war with Megara had helped to render still more unendurable the economic condition of the poorer classes of Athenians, and to render still more urgent some extraordinary measures of relief. Attica threatened to become depopulated through the great number of unfortunate debtors who were daily sold into slavery in foreign lands.²

Once more, as a generation before, in the time of Draco, the

¹ The lands of the island were allotted to Athenian settlers, who formed a sort of military colony—the first of the cleruchies established by Athens. See p. 77, n.

² Along with economic distress there was great religious disquietude. In the midst of their misery the people became filled with superstitious fears and persuaded themselves that the gods were visiting them in anger because of the unexpiated crime of Megacles (p. 107). They accordingly demanded and secured the banish-

Athenians placed their laws and constitution in the hands of a single man, to be remodelled as he might deem best. Solon, whose lofty character and distinguished services to the state had won for him the esteem and confidence of all classes, was selected to discharge this responsible duty.

Solon turned his attention first to relieving the misery of the debtor class. His remedial measures here were heroic, but the situation was desperate. He cancelled all debts of every kind,¹ both public and private. The debtor-slave was set free, and the heavily mortgaged fields of the poor farmers were disburdened. Moreover, that there might never again be seen in Attica the spectacle of men dragged off in chains to be sold as slaves in payment of their debts, Solon prohibited the practice in the future of securing debts on the body of the debtor. No Athenian after this was ever sold for debt. Commenting upon this Solonian ordinance, the historian Ranke says: "Solon's laws respecting debtors may perhaps be regarded as one of the first steps towards the recognition of human dignity."

Other economic regulations of Solon forbade the taking of exorbitant interest on loans, and the holding by any single proprietor of more than a specified amount of land.

Solon also effected an important reform in the monetary system.² The money in use at this time in Athens was that of the Pheidonian coinage (p. 60), which, as we have seen, circulated particularly among the Dorian cities. Solon adopted the Eubœic

ment of the Alcæonidæ, the family to which Megacles belonged. Even the bones of the dead of the family were dug up and cast beyond the frontiers of the Athenian land. But even yet the wrath of the gods seemed unappeased, for calamities still continued to befall the people. Therefore, acting in accordance with the advice of the Delphian oracle, the Athenians sent for Epimenides, a venerable and holy seer of Crete, who by sacrifices and expiatory rites cleansed the city and brought the people into a calmer and more reasonable mood. This visit of Epimenides to Athens is thought to have been made in the year 596 B.C.

¹ This measure was known as the *Seisachtheia*, that is "the shaking off of burdens."

² There was no connection between this measure and the cancellation of debts, as was believed before the discovery of the *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία* of Aristotle.

scale, which was that in use in the cities of Eubœa and in other Ionian towns of Asia Minor. This brought Athens into closer commercial relation with the Ionian portion of the Hellenic world, and helped greatly to foster her industries and trade.

Constitutional Reforms of Solon.—Such were the monetary and the most important of the economic reforms of Solon. His constitutional reforms were equally wise and beneficent, and of the very greatest significance for the history of the Athenian democracy. He effected important changes in the Ecclesia, the Council of Four Hundred and One which Draco had created, and the Areopagus.

The Draconian innovations had created the Ecclesia, or at least given significance to that body. The assembly was composed at this time of all those persons who were able to provide themselves with arms and armor, that is to say, of all the members of the three highest of the four property classes¹ into which the people were divided. The fourth class, the Thetes, were excluded. Solon opened the Ecclesia to them.² But while becoming members of the public assembly, and acquiring the right to participate in the election of magistrates and to vote on such matters as might come before the assembly, the Thetes did not acquire the privilege of holding office, but as an offset to this were not subject to direct taxation. At the same time the Thetes were admitted to the dicasteries, or popular jury-courts, by which, instead of by the Areopagus as hitherto, all magistrates charged with any wrong were to be tried.³ This was a most important step in the democratization of the Athenian state; the magistrates

¹ These classes bore the following names: *Pentakosiomedimni*, those citizens whose yearly income from landed property amounted to 500 or more medimni of corn (about 750 English bushels); *Hippes* (knights), those whose income from land fell between 500 and 300 medimni; *Zeugitæ* (possessors of a yoke of oxen), those whose income from land was between 300 and 200 medimni; and *Thetes* (serfs or hired laborers), those whose income from land was less than 200 medimni.

² At the same time Solon made a new census and redistribution of the citizens among the four property classes. The disburdening ordinance, changing as it did the economic status of so many persons, had rendered this necessary.

³ But only after the expiration of their term of office.

were henceforth responsible to the people, being now both elected by them and judged by them.

The Council of Four Hundred and One, called into existence by the Draconian legislation, was reorganized by Solon. It was henceforth to consist of four hundred members, each tribe¹ contributing one hundred. One of its chief duties seems to have been to prepare the measures to be laid before the Ecclesia.

The Areopagus remained, under the Solonian constitution, the guardian of the laws and the protector of the constitution, punishing without appeal lawbreakers and conspirators against the state. Before all else was it to maintain a strict censorship of public and private morals.

Respecting the archons, Solon made in the constitution the following change, which was of vital importance, particularly to the common people. He provided that henceforth any person who deemed himself wronged by a decision of the archons might appeal his cause to a popular court. Since the Eupatrid magistrates often perverted justice in the interests of their own order, or of those able to purchase their favor, this privilege of appeal offered a safeguard against magisterial insolence and oppression.

Special Laws enacted by Solon. — Besides the above relief measures and constitutional reforms of Solon, the legislator enacted various laws having diverse aims and purposes. The most noted of these ordinances is his so-called Sedition Law. Observing that in the frequent political contentions that disturbed the state, some of the citizens, consulting their personal comfort, refrained from taking part in the fight between the contending factions, Solon

¹The population of Attica comprised originally four tribes (*φυλαί*). The names of these were as follows: Geleontes, Hopletes, Ægicores, and Argades. The origin and exact nature of these so-called tribes, whether ethnic groups or industrial classes or castes, is not known to us. Each of the tribes contained three phratries or brotherhoods (*φρατρίαι*); each phratry was composed of thirty gentes (*γέννη*), and each gens was made up of thirty families. As the consolidation of the Athenian state advanced, the division lines of these groups grew more and more obscure and confused, and new territorial subdivisions of the people were made for administrative purposes.

made a law to the effect that any one failing to take sides on such an occasion should forfeit his citizenship and be regarded as infamous. Solon's idea seems to have been that by this measure he would secure the more general participation in political affairs of "good citizens," and at the same time deter unprincipled persons from stirring up sedition, by making them apprehensive of a general uprising of the people. It is interesting to note that among the measures urged by modern reformers to correct the evils of modern democracy, is found one — compulsory voting — which in principle is wholly like the Sedition Law of the Athenian statesman.

By other laws, Solon limited the amount of land that any single person might hold; specified on what conditions an alien might become a citizen of Athens, and, by making these conditions easy, opened the door of Athenian citizenship to many hitherto excluded from any lot or part in the government; prohibited, in the interests of the manufacturing class, the exportation of all Attic products, save the oil of the olive; in the interests of industry in general, enjoined upon the Areopagus the chastisement of all idlers; in the interests of the individual and the general welfare, enacted that to the father who had neglected to teach his son a trade, that son might refuse support; and in the interest of womanly modesty and morality, made many stringent regulations respecting marriage dowers, and the appearance and conduct of women in public. For instance, no woman was to appear upon the street after dark, unless in a chariot preceded by a torch-bearer. "This law marks an epoch in the history of the Athenian family. Heretofore the wife enjoyed great freedom, went abroad at pleasure, and indulged her tastes apparently without hindrance. Now the old freedom of Homeric days began to be restricted. The wife came to be confined more and more to the house, and her influence on the public life of Athens waned through the succeeding years."¹

The Travels of Solon.—Legends of a later generation gathered thick about the name of Solon, as about the name of the

¹ Botsford, *The Athenian Constitution*, p. 178.

Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus. Like Lycurgus, he is said, after his reform of the Athenian laws, to have gone on travels in foreign lands. The reason generally assigned for his leaving Athens was the annoyances to which he was subjected by everybody asking him questions about his laws, censuring him for his innovations, or importuning him to make additional changes in the constitution. Before setting out on his travels, Solon is said to have persuaded the people to take an oath not to change for one hundred years the laws he had given them.

The tradition carries Solon to Egypt, Cyprus, and Lydia, and represents him as being received everywhere with the veneration due his wisdom and character. His alleged visit to the Lydian court, and his interview with the king Crœsus, form the basis of one of Herodotus' most charming tales. After having shown Solon all his treasures, the king asked him whom he deemed the most happy of men. Solon replied, "Tellus of Athens," a plain citizen of that city who had died fighting for his country. Crœsus then inquired of the sage whom after Tellus he esteemed the happiest, thinking that he would assign to him at least the second place. But this place Solon gave to two youths of Argos, who, after the performance of a great feat of strength and endurance in which they had greatly honored their mother and themselves, fell asleep in a temple and died without awakening.

Hereupon Crœsus exclaimed angrily: "Athenian stranger, do you then so lightly estimate my happiness that you do not even regard me as of equal worth with private men?"

Solon replied in effect that the gods are jealous and delight in troubling men, and that since fortune is fickle, ruin often following prosperity, no man may be accounted happy until his life has closed peaceably and well.¹

It must be added that this story is probably a pure embellishment by the Greek imagination of the travels of Solon, since Crœsus at this time had not acquired the wealth and fame which the tale presupposes.

¹ Herod. i. 30-32.

Peisistratus makes himself Tyrant of Athens (560 B.C.).—

Upon his return to Athens, Solon found the state the prey of civil discord. The constitutional machinery failed to work smoothly, and some years no archon was elected.¹ There were various factions in the state. Some were feeling angry because of Solon's abolition of debts, which measure had ruined them; others were dissatisfied with the new constitution because by it they were shorn of power; and still others were stirred by ambitions which led them to foment trouble in the hope of furthering their personal interests.

The important parties were known as the Shore, the Plain, and the Hill, being so named from the regions of Attica in which was round the chief strength of the respective factions. The Shoremen formed the moderate constitutional party; the men of the Plain, consisting chiefly of large landowners, formed the oligarchical party; the men of the Hill, made up largely of shepherds, were ardent democrats.

The last-named faction, the mountaineers, were led by Peisistratus, an ambitious noble and a nephew of the lawgiver Solon. This man courted popular favor, and called himself "the friend of the people." His uncle Solon seems to have been almost the only man who penetrated his designs. He told the citizens that Peisistratus was aiming to make himself tyrant of Athens. But the people paid no heed to the warnings of Solon, and Peisistratus was left undisturbed to consummate his plot against the liberties of the city.

One day having inflicted many wounds upon himself, he drove his chariot hastily into the public square, and pretended that he had been thus set upon by the nobles, because of his devotion to the people's cause. The people, moved by sympathy and indignation, voted him a guard of fifty men. Under cover of raising this company, Peisistratus gathered a much larger force, seized the Acropolis, and made himself master of Athens. Though twice

¹ In the year 581 B.C. the archonship was usurped by the archon (Damasias) elected for the preceding year, but he was finally forcibly deposed.

expelled from the city by the combination of the parties of the Shore and the Plain against him, still he as often returned, and reinstated himself in the tyranny..

The first restoration of the tyrant was accomplished by a singular device, which, as Herodotus remarks, shows the extreme simplicity of the Athenians. Those concerned in the plot to restore the tyrant set afloat a rumor to the effect that the goddess Athena was herself leading Peisistratus back to the city. Presently a chariot appeared in which alongside Peisistratus stood a beautiful woman dressed to personate the patron-goddess. The ex-tyrant and the goddess were received by the credulous people with amazed veneration, and thus the tyranny was re-established.¹

Peisistratus died 527 B.C., thirty-three years after his first seizure of the citadel. Of all these years he had actually held the tyranny probably not more than eighteen or twenty; during the remainder he had been in exile, scheming to regain his power at Athens.

Character of the Rule of Peisistratus. — Peisistratus gave Athens a mild rule, and under him the city enjoyed a period of great prosperity. He may be taken as a type of the better class of Greek tyrants, and much that was said in an earlier chapter² respecting the domestic and foreign policies of these rulers finds illustration in the circumstances of his reign.

The usurper supported his power, as many of the other tyrants did, by means of a body-guard of mercenaries, and met the expenses of his government by a careful husbandry of all the ordinary revenues of the city, and by taxation. He maintained the forms of the constitution of Solon, but took care that all the chief offices should be held by his relatives or adherents. Following the policy of many another usurper, he sought to render the industrial classes contented with his government by giving encouragement to both commerce and agriculture.

It was, as we have seen, the general policy of the tyrants to

¹ Herod. i. 60; cf. Arist. *Const. of Athens*, ch. 14.

² See ch. vi.

strengthen themselves by means of foreign alliances. This we find Peisistratus doing. He entered into alliances with Sparta, Thebes, Macedonia, Samos, — at this time in the hands of the tyrant Polycrates (p. 94), — and other states. Through these various connections Peisistratus made firmer his position both at home and abroad, while giving at the same time a wider range to the growing fame of Athens, and enlarging the field of enterprise of the Athenian traders.

But before all else was the tyrant, in imitation of so many others



Fig. 20. RUINS OF THE GREAT TEMPLE OF ZEUS OLYMPIUS AT ATHENS. (Began by the tyrant Peisistratus and completed seven centuries later by the Roman Emperor Hadrian. From a photograph.)

of his class, a liberal patron of the gods (p. 98). He established what was known as the Great Panathenæa, a festival celebrated every fourth year in honor of Athena;¹ instituted a new festival in honor of Dionysus; caused the sacred island of Delos to be purified through the removal of all the tombs from the vicinity of the shrines of Apollo; and lastly, began at Athens the erection of a

¹ The annual festival in honor of the same patron goddess continued to be celebrated as hitherto, but henceforth was known as the Less Panathenæa.

temple to Zeus Olympius on such a magnificent scale that it remained unfinished until the resources of the Roman Emperor Hadrian, nearly seven hundred years later, carried the colossal building to completion.

Nor did Peisistratus fail to follow the traditional policy of the tyrants in respect to the patronage of letters. He invited to his court the literary celebrities of the day. He is said to have caused



Fig. 21. THE ATHENIAN TYRANNICIDES, HARMODIUS AND ARISTOGEITON. (Marble statues in the Naples Museum, recognized as ancient copies of the bronze statues set up at Athens in commemoration of the assassination of the tyrant Hipparchus.)

the Homeric poems to be collected and edited, and to have gathered at Athens the first public library; but the testimony for the truth of these traditions is not of the highest character. He is said also to have added to the embellishments of the Lyceum, a sort of public park just outside the city walls, which was filled with shady groves, inviting porches, and pleasant promenades, and which in after times became one of the favorite resorts of the poets, philosophers, and pleasure-seekers of the capital.

Expulsion of the Tyrants from Athens (510 B.C.).—The two sons of Peisistratus, Hippias and Hipparchus, suc-

ceeded to his power. At first they emulated the example of their father, and Athens flourished under their rule. But at length an unfortunate event gave an entirely different tone to the government. Hipparchus, having insulted a young noble, named Harmodius, this man, in connection with his friend Aristogeiton and some others, planned to assassinate both the tyrants. Hipparchus was

slain, but the plans of the conspirators miscarried as to Hippias. Harmodius was struck down by the guards of the tyrants, and Aristogeiton, after having been tortured in vain in order to force him to reveal the names of the other conspirators, was put to death.

We have already spoken of how tyrannicide appeared to the Greek mind as an eminently praiseworthy act (p. 91). This is well illustrated by the grateful and venerated remembrance in which Harmodius and Aristogeiton were ever held by the Athenians. Statues were raised in their honor, and the story of their deed was rehearsed to the youth as an incentive to patriotism and self-devotion.

The plot had a most unhappy effect upon the disposition of Hippias. It caused him to become suspicious and severe. His rule now became a tyranny indeed, and was brought to an end in the following way.

After his last return to Athens, Peisistratus had sent the "accursed" Alcæonidæ into a second exile. During this period of banishment an opportunity arose for them to efface the stain of sacrilege which was still supposed to cling to them on account of the old crime of Megacles (p. 107). The temple at Delphi having been destroyed by fire, they contracted with the Amphictyons to rebuild it. They not only completed the work in the most honorable manner throughout, but even went so far beyond the terms of their contract as to use beautiful Parian marble for the front of the temple, when only common stone was required by the specifications.

By this act — a pious and generous one, had it only been wholly disinterested — the exiled family won to such a degree the favor of the priests of the sacred college that they were able to influence the utterances of the oracle. The invariable answer now of the Pythia to Spartan inquirers at the shrine was, "Athens must be set free."

Moved at last by the repeated injunctions of the oracle, the Spartans resolved to drive Hippias from Athens. Their first attempt was unsuccessful; but in a second, made in connection

with the Alcmaeonidæ headed by Cleisthenes, they were so fortunate as to capture the two children of Hippias, who, to secure their release, agreed to leave the city (510 B.C.). He retired to Asia Minor, and spent the rest of his life, as we shall learn hereafter, seeking aid in different quarters to re-establish his tyranny in Athens. The Athenians passed a decree of perpetual exile against him and all his family.

Renewal of Party Strife (509-508 B.C.). — Straightway upon the expulsion of the tyrant Hippias, there arose a great strife between the commons led by Cleisthenes, who of course wished to conduct the government on the lines drawn by Solon, and the nobles, headed by Isagoras, who aimed at the restoration of the old oligarchical rule.

Isagoras, finding himself overmatched by the popular party, which the incidents of the tyranny had strengthened, appealed for aid to his personal friend Cleomenes, king of Sparta. Cleomenes responded by first demanding of the Athenians that they cast out from among them "the accursed." This blow was aimed particularly at Cleisthenes, upon whom was assumed to rest the family curse incurred by his ancestor Megacles (p. 107), — and did not fail to produce the effect intended; for, apprehensive of the result of this appeal to the superstitious feelings of the people, Cleisthenes, with some of his closest friends, withdrew from Athens. Cleomenes, at the head of a small band of soldiers, soon after arrived at the city, and, prompted by Isagoras, drove into exile seven hundred families belonging to the party of Cleisthenes.

But the patriotism of the Athenians seems to have been stirred by this insolent interference by foreigners in their affairs. Their threatening attitude frightened Cleomenes, and led him, with his friends and followers, to seek refuge in the citadel of the Acropolis. Here he was besieged by the people, and in a short time compelled to surrender. To avoid incurring the revenge of the Spartans, the Athenians did not deal harshly with Cleomenes, but allowed him and his Spartan soldiers, together with Isagoras, to

retire unharmed from the country. Those Athenians who had taken part with Isagoras in the movement were all put to death.

Cleisthenes and his friends were now brought back from exile, and in his hands was placed the constitution in order that he might mould it into a form still more democratic than that which had been given it by Solon. Thus in the year 508 B.C. Cleisthenes became the third great legislator of the Athenians.

The Constitution of Cleisthenes (508 B.C.).—In place of the four so-called Ionian tribes¹ into which all the citizens of Athens up to this time had been divided, Cleisthenes formed ten new tribes, in which were enrolled all the free inhabitants of Attica, including, it would seem, resident aliens and emancipated slaves.² The change amounted to what we should call "an extension of the franchise." The ten new tribes, which were practically geographical divisions of Attica, were each made up of a number of local subdivisions, called *demes*, or townships, into which Cleisthenes, for the purposes of his reforms, had divided Attica. There were a hundred or more of these. In the interest of democratic equality, each member of a deme was to have added to his individual name that of his deme, instead of his father's name.

The demes constituting any given tribe were not allowed to be contiguous, but were located in each of the old local divisions, the Plain, the Shore, and the Hill (p. 115). The object of this was to break up the old factions, and also to give each tribe some territory in or near Athens, so that at least some of its members should be within easy reach of the meeting-place of the Ecclesia.³

¹ See p. 112, note.

² The ancient tribes were not dissolved, but now lost all political significance, and continued to exist simply as religious bodies. The four *property classes* also remained unchanged, save that they were enlarged by the admission to them of the new-made citizens. The duties and privileges of these classes (eligibility to the archonship, etc.) remained as before. See p. 107; also p. 111, notes 1 and 2.

³ The meetings of the Ecclesia in early times were held on a low hill to the west of the Acropolis, supposed to be identical with the so-called Pnyx Hill of to-day. "After the construction of the Dionysiac theatre [this spot] was abandoned as the regular place of popular assemblies, and was used only for special meetings." See monograph by John M. Crow, entitled "The Athenian Pnyx," in *Papers*

This reorganization of the tribes and the local units of the Athenian state, was the most important of the constitutional reforms effected by Cleisthenes. It effected such a radical change in the interest of the masses that he, rather than Solon, is regarded by many as the real founder of the Athenian democracy. The aristocratic exclusiveness which characterized the old tribes was destroyed; the factions of the Plain, the Shore, and the Hill, which had so often endangered the safety of the state, were effectually

broken up; while the roll of citizens was greatly lengthened, and thereby new strength and vigor were imparted to the democracy. After this reform Athens advanced rapidly to the place of leadership among the cities of Hellas.



Fig. 21. THE BEMA, OR ORATOR'S STAND, ON THE PNYX HILL AT ATHENS. (From a photograph.)

The Council of the Four Hundred

(p. 112) was remodelled by Cleisthenes in accordance with his new divisions of the state. Its membership was raised to five hundred, fifty from each of the new tribes. Its chief duties were to prepare recommendations to be acted on by the popular assembly, and to exercise certain judicial and administrative functions.¹

of the American School of Classical Studies, vol. iv., 1885-1886. On the Pnyx Hill may be seen a platform mounted by steps, the whole cut out of the native rock (see Fig. 21). This rock-pulpit is believed to be the celebrated *Bema* of the Athenian orators.

¹ The presiding officers of the public assembly were supplied by the Senate. To the fifty senators of each tribe was assigned by lot one of the ten nearly equal periods, called Prytanes, into which the year was divided. The fifty senators, who thus during one-tenth of the year acted as a sort of executive committee, were known as Prytanes (collectively as the Prytany), and were kept at the public expense at the Prytaneum (p. 37). The Prytany was divided into five groups of

The Areopagus was left essentially unchanged, but the strengthening of the democratic organs of the government resulted in a lessening of its power and influence.

Certain changes were made in the organization of the army.¹ In place of the four strategi or generals who commanded the forces of the four old tribes, ten generals were now elected, one by each of the ten new tribes. Until a later period, however, these tribal commanders were, as heretofore, subordinate to the polemarch, who still held the chief command of the forces of the state.

But of all the innovations or institutions of Cleisthenes, that known as *ostracism* was the most characteristic. By means of this process any person who had excited the suspicions or displeasure of the people could, without trial, be banished from Athens for a period of ten years. Six thousand votes² cast against any person in a meeting of the popular assembly was a decree of banishment. The name of the person whose banishment was sought was written on a shell or piece of pottery, in Greek *ostrakon* (ὄστρακον), whence the term "ostracism."

The design of this institution was to prevent the recurrence of such an usurpation as that of the Peisistratidæ. It was first used to get rid of some of the old friends of the ex-tyrant Hippias, who the Athenians had reason to believe were plotting for his return. Later the vote came to be employed, as a rule, simply to settle disputes between rival leaders of political parties, and, when thus used, was designed to put an end to dangerous contentions between powerful factions in the state. Thus the vote, viewed in one way, merely expressed political preference, the

ten members each, and to each section was assigned the duty of presiding for seven days at all assemblies both of the Boule and the Ecclesia convened during this period. Each day the Prytany chose one of their number chairman, and to him was entrusted for twenty-four hours the custody of the seal of the state and the keys of the Acropolis.

¹ Not, however, until six or seven years after the formation of the ten tribes.

² Or possibly a majority of the votes cast in an assembly of not less than six thousand citizens. The authorities are not clear.

ostracized person being simply the defeated candidate for popular favor. No stigma or disgrace attached to him.

The power that the device of ostracism lodged in the hands of the people was not always wisely used, and some of the ablest and most patriotic statesmen of Athens were sent into exile through the influence of some demagogue, who for the moment had caught the popular ear.¹

Such, in brief outline, was the new Cleisthenean constitution. "By conferring large benefits upon the people, and by opening to them new and attractive spheres of activity, [it] inspired them with a patriotism hitherto unknown. A great tide of public enthusiasm and public energy, arising at this point, surged onward through the Persian wars, carrying the Athenians victoriously through these crises in the history of their country and the world, liberating the Ionic Greeks, founding a great maritime empire, gaining in height and strength, with each political advance, till it reached its climax in the marvellous activity of the Periclean age."²

Sparta opposes the Athenian Democracy.—The oligarchical party at Athens was, as was natural, bitterly opposed to all these democratic innovations. The Spartans, too, viewed with distrust and jealousy this rapid growth of the Athenian democracy, while their king Cleomenes was burning to avenge himself upon the Athenian populace for the recent humiliation to which they had subjected him (p. 120). It was plain that the Athenians would be forced to fight for their new constitution.

Alarmed at the preparations which they learned Cleomenes was making to lead a Peloponnesian army into Attica, the Athenians

¹ The institution was short-lived. It was resorted to for the last time during the Peloponnesian War (418 B.C.). The people then, in a freak, ostracized a man, Hyperbolus by name, whom all admitted to be the meanest man in Athens. This, it is said, was regarded as such a degradation of the institution, as well as such an honor to the mean man, that never thereafter did the Athenians degrade a good man or honor a bad one by a resort to the measure. It is probable, however, that the institution fell into disuse about this time for the reason that the diminishing number of Athenian citizens rendered it impossible to secure the requisite number of voters in the assembly. See Botsford, *The Athenian Constitution*, p. 207.

² Botsford, *The Athenian Constitution*, p. 208.

sent an embassy to the Persian satrap Artaphernes, at Sardis, in Asia Minor, to sue for an alliance with the Persian king. The satrap offered to send aid on condition that Athens should become the vassal of his master. The envoys, taking counsel of their fears, assented, on behalf of Athens, to these humiliating terms; but the Athenians at home, when acquainted with what their commissioners had done, were furious, and indignantly refused to ratify the engagement. They were seeking for an ally, not for a master.

The only ally they found was the little state of Plataea, which shortly before this had broken away from the Bæotian confederacy, and sought the protection of Athens. This had been granted, and the little Plataean army was now at the service of their patrons.

The Peloponnesian army was soon on Attic soil. The Spartans, realizing the seriousness of their undertaking, had sent into the field the flower of their troops, and both their kings, Demaratus and Cleomenes. They had also called upon all their allies for large contingents, so that the army of invasion was a formidable one. Besides, Thebes, and Chalcis in Eubœa, had entered into alliance with the Peloponnesians, and were preparing to invade Attica from the north.

The Athenians rallied their forces and moved out to meet the Peloponnesian army; but dissensions in the camp of the invaders prevented a battle. The allies of the Spartans had not been informed of the object of the expedition, and upon learning that its aim was to set up a tyranny in Athens, refused to take any hand in the matter. They were sustained in this decision by the Spartan king Demaratus, and the outcome was the dispersal of the allies without the striking of a single blow. Cleomenes was constrained, in disappointment and anger, to lead his army back to Sparta.

After the withdrawal from Attica of the Peloponnesian forces, the Athenians chastised the Thebans for giving aid to the Spartans; and then crossing the channel to Eubœa, captured Chalcis,

took away from the Chalcidians their lands, and distributed them by lot among four thousand Attic farmers (506 B.C.).

These colonists were not ordinary emigrants; they did not cease to be citizens of Athens. In a word, the part of the island thus settled became simply an addition to Attic territory. This was the second of that class of colonies which we have already described under the name *cleruchies*.¹ It proved to be of vast service to Athens.

Cleomenes now thought to secure his object through Hippias. Inviting the deposed tyrant over from Asia, he called at Sparta a convention of all her Peloponnesian allies, and tried to persuade them to aid the Spartans in restoring Hippias to power in Athens. But the eloquent portrayal by the Corinthian deputy Sosicles, of the wrongs Corinth had endured at the hands of the tyrant Perianther (p. 92), and his scathing rebuke of Sparta's inconsistency in overthrowing tyrannies elsewhere and then trying to set one up in Athens, caused all the allies to refuse to lend any aid to the proposed undertaking, so that Cleomenes was forced to abandon it.

Hippias now withdrew once more to Asia Minor, and we soon find him at the court of Darius, seeking aid of the Persians. His solicitations, in connection with an affront which the Athenians just now offered the king himself by aiding his revolted subjects in Ionia, led directly up to the memorable struggle known as the Græco-Persian Wars.

REFERENCES. — Plutarch, *Life of Solon*. Botsford, *The Athenian Constitution*. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 316-431. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. ii. pp. 422-529; *ib.* vol. iii. pp. 324-398; (twelve volume ed.), vol. iii. pp. 48-162; *ib.* vol. iv. pp. 102-181. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 279-308, 398-429, 450-486. The accounts of the Athenian constitution in Curtius, Grote, and Abbott, which were written before the recent discovery of the Aristotelian treatise, must be read with caution and under the light of the new evidence. Holm, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 376-432. Kenyon's Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, chs. 1-22. Cox, *Lives of Greek Statesmen*: "Solon," "Peisistratus" and "Kleisthenes."

¹ See p. 77, note; also p. 109, note.



Fig. 22. GREEK WARRIORS PREPARING FOR BATTLE.

PART SECOND.

THE PERSIAN WARS.

(500-479 B.C.)



CHAPTER VIII.

HELLAS OVERSHADOWED BY THE RISE OF PERSIA.

Cause of the Persian Wars. — In a foregoing chapter on Greek colonization we showed how the expansive energies of the Greek race, chiefly during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., covered the islands and shores of the Mediterranean world with a free, liberty-loving, progressive, and ever-growing population of Hellenic speech and culture. The first half of the sixth century had barely passed before this promising expansive movement was first checked and then seriously cramped by the rise of a great despotic Asiatic power, the Persian empire, which, pushing outward from its central seat on the table-lands of Iran to the Ægean Sea, before the close of the century had subjugated the Greek cities of

Asia Minor, and was threatening to overwhelm in like manner those of European Greece. Here must be sought the real cause of the memorable wars between Hellas and Persia.

To understand, then, the character and import of the contest which we are approaching, we must now turn from our study of the rising cities of Greece in order to acquaint ourselves with the nature and growth of this colossal empire whose portentous shadow was thus darkening the bright Hellenic world, and whose steady encroachments upon the Greek cities threatened to leave the Greeks no standing-room on the earth.

The Beginnings of the Medo-Persian Power.—The country that we know as Persia was in very early times entered by Aryan tribes, kinsmen of the Hellenes. They drove out or absorbed a people of non-Aryan race whom they found in possession of the land. The tribes that settled in the south, in the mountainous districts along the Persian Gulf, became known as the Persians; while those that took possession of the regions of the northwest were called Medes.

The Medes, through intermixture with the aboriginal inhabitants of the country, became somewhat different from the Persians; but notwithstanding this the names of the two peoples were always very closely associated, as in the familiar legend, "The law of the Medes and Persians, which altereth not."

The Medes were at first the leading people. Cyaxares (625–585 B.C.) was their first prominent leader and king. Aided by the Babylonians, he destroyed the great capital Nineveh, and thus brought to an end the empire of the Assyrian kings, who for centuries had been the hated oppressors of the peoples of Western Asia. The destruction of the Assyrian power resulted in the speedy extension of the new Median empire to the river Halys in Asia Minor, where it touched upon the possessions of the kings of Lydia.

About the middle of the sixth century B.C. the Persians, who were being held in at least partial subjection to the Median crown, revolted, overthrew the Median king, and thereafter held the place of leadership in the dual state.

The leader of the revolt against the Medes was Cyrus (558–529 B.C.), known in history as Cyrus the Great, the tributary king of the Persians. Through his energy and soldierly genius, he soon had built up an empire more extended than any over which the sceptre had yet been swayed by Oriental monarch, or indeed, so far as we know, by any ruler before his time. It stretched from the western frontier of India to the Ægean, and thus embraced not only all the territories of the earlier Median empire, but also those of the kingdoms of Lydia and Babylonia. Of the various conquests of Cyrus it concerns us to notice here only that of the Lydian kingdom, the single monarchy preceding the Persian whose history is connected in any vital way with that of Hellas.

Destruction by Cyrus of the Lydian Monarchy (about 546 B.C.). — Lydia was a country in the western part of Asia Minor. It was a land highly favored by nature. It embraced two rich river valleys, — the plains of the Hermus and the Cayster, — which from the mountains inland sloped gently to the island-dotted Ægean. The Pactolus, and other tributaries of the streams we have named, rolled down “golden sands,” while the mountains were rich in the precious metals. The coast region did not at first belong to Lydia; it was held by the Greeks, who, as we have seen, had fringed it with cities. The capital of the country was Sardis, whose citadel was set on a lofty and precipitous rock.¹

The Lydian throne was at this time held by Cræsus (about 560–546 B.C.), the last and most renowned of his race. Under him the Lydian monarchy had attained its greatest extension. We need to notice now only his relations to the Greek cities of the coast. The attacks which his predecessors had made upon these Hellenic communities had been for the most part successfully repelled; but he succeeded in bringing them all in subjection to his authority.

This subjection to a semi-barbaric power of the flourishing Hel-

¹ The Lydians were a mixed people, formed, it is thought, by the mingling, in prehistoric times, of Aryan tribes that crossed the Ægean from Europe, with the original non-Aryan population of the country.

lenic cities of Asia was the first great disaster that had befallen Hellas. The disaster, however, was tempered by the character of Crœsus, who was an enlightened and liberal ruler, and was kindly disposed towards the Greeks. He dealt generously with the subject cities, leaving to them their government and institutions, and exacting only a moderate tribute.

Now the fall of Media, which had been a friendly and allied power, and the extension thereby of the domains of the conqueror Cyrus to the eastern frontiers of Lydia, naturally filled Crœsus with alarm. He at once formed an alliance with Nabonadius, king of Babylon, and Amasis, king of Egypt, both of whom, like Crœsus, were filled with apprehensions respecting the safety of their own kingdoms. Furthermore, in obedience to certain oracles which bade him seek the help of the most powerful of the Greek states, Crœsus formed an alliance with Sparta, which at this time was regarded as the strongest in war of all the Grecian cities. These alliances show with what feelings of common alarm the growth of the new empire of Cyrus had filled all these lands whose independence was threatened by his ambition and his restless energy.

Crœsus was minded to anticipate the expected attack of Cyrus by first taking the field himself; but before committing himself to so important a step, he resolved to seek counsel of the gods. Accordingly he sent messengers to various oracles to make inquiry as to what would be the issue of his proposed war against Cyrus. It was upon the answer of the Delphian oracle, which Crœsus had enriched with gifts of fabulous value, that he especially relied. The reply which this oracle returned to his inquiry was that, if he attacked Cyrus, "he would destroy a great empire." Interpreting this favorably, he sent again to inquire "whether his kingdom would be of long duration," and received in substance the following answer: "When a mule¹ shall become king of the Medes, then hasten away and tarry not." Deeming the accession of a mule

¹ The allusion is to the (traditional) mixed Persian and Median descent of Cyrus.

to the Persian throne altogether impossible, Crœsus inferred the oracle to mean that his empire should last forever.¹

Thus encouraged in his purpose, Crœsus, without waiting for his allies to join him, imprudently crossed the river Halys and threw down the gage of battle to Cyrus. But he had miscalculated the strength and alertness of his enemy. Cyrus met in Cappadocia the Lydian army of invasion. After a severe battle here, in which neither side could claim a victory, Crœsus recrossed the Halys into his own dominions, whither he was followed by Cyrus. Taken at a disadvantage in front of Sardis, Crœsus was defeated in battle, and driven within the walls of his capital, which after a short siege fell into the hands of the Persians.

There was a tradition current among the later Greeks which told how Cyrus had



Fig. 23. CRÆSUS ON THE PYRE.

caused to be erected a pyre on which to burn Crœsus, but at the last moment was struck by hearing the unfortunate monarch repeatedly call out the name of Solon. Seeking the meaning of this, he was told of the visit paid Crœsus in his prosperous days by the Athenian lawgiver Solon, and of the conversation that took place between the king and the sage (p. 114). Cyrus, it is said, was so deeply impressed by this illustration of the fickleness of fortune, that he relented and ordered Crœsus to be taken from the pile. But the rising flames rendered his rescue by human means impossible. Then Crœsus called in prayer upon Apollo, whose shrines he had so honored and enriched. Straightway clouds overspread the sky and a heavy

¹ Herod. i. 53-56.

downpour of rain speedily quenched the fire.¹ Though this legend is probably a pure fiction, still it is an historical fact that Cyrus dealt generously with his unfortunate prisoner, and that Crœsus for a long time afterwards was a trusted counsellor of the Persian court.

The fall of the Lydian kingdom has a special significance for Grecian history, from the fact that power in Asia Minor now passed from the hands of the tolerant, Greek-loving Lydian kings into the hands of intolerant, Greek-hating Persians. The rulers of Lydia appreciated Greek civilization, and were friends of the Greek gods and patrons of the Greek shrines. The Persian kings, however, speaking generally,² were ignorant and disdainful of Greek culture, and as monotheists were naturally hostile to Greek worship. The Greeks had now good reason, as says Curtius, to tremble for city, temple, and altar.

Conquest by the Persians of the Asiatic Greek Cities (546–544 B.C.).—The Greek cities of the Asian coast which had formed part of the Lydian kingdom soon realized of what serious concern to them was the revolution that had transferred authority in Asia Minor from Lydian to Persian hands. Cyrus had asked them to join him in his war against Crœsus, but all except Miletus, satisfied with the easy conditions which that king had imposed upon them, refused to listen to any proposal of the kind. Upon the downfall of Crœsus, these cities hastened to offer submission to the conqueror, asking that he would allow them to retain all the privileges which they had enjoyed under the Lydian monarchy. Cyrus refused their petition. Thereupon they closed their gates against him, and resolved to fight for their liberties. In a short time, however, all were reduced to submission. Many of the Ionians, rather than live in Ionia as slaves, abandoned their old homes and sought new ones among the colonies of Western Hellas, and on the Thracian shore.³ All the remaining inhabitants of the

¹ Herod. i. 86, 87.

² Cyrus, as has recently been learned from the cuneiform inscriptions, was not zealous in the promotion of the worship of Ahura Mazda.

³ The important Thracian colony of Abdera was founded by these exiles.

Asian Greek cities, together with those of the large islands of Chios and Lesbos, became subjects of the Persian king. The cities retained the management of their own affairs, under such governments as they chanced to have, but were forced to pay tribute, and to furnish contingents to the army of their master. Thus at one blow was the whole of the eastern shore of the Ægean, the cradle and home of the earliest development in Greek poetry, philosophy, music, and art, lost to the Hellenic world.



Fig. 24. TOMB OF CYRUS THE GREAT AT PASARGADÆ,
THE OLD PERSIAN CAPITAL. (Present condition.)

Conquest of Egypt and other Lands by Cambyses (529-522 B.C.).—Cyrus transmitted his vast empire to his son Cambyses. Possessing far less ability than his father for the execution of great projects, Cambyses nevertheless conceived even vaster schemes of conquest and dominion. Not content with Asia as a field for his ambition, he resolved to add the country of Africa to his wide inheritance.

Cambyſes first brought the cities of Phœnicia under his authority and thus obtained control of their large naval resources. Straightway their galleys were ordered to be put in readiness to aid in the proposed subjection of Egypt. To the Phœnician fleet

when collected was added a large contingent of ships furnished by the Asian Greeks, who were thus compelled to assist their master in reducing to slavery the rest of the world. Cyprus, a dependency of Egypt, was now conquered, and the naval strength of the Cypriots added to the already formidable armament of the Persian king.

Supported by his fleet, Cambyses marched his army from Syria into Egypt, captured Memphis, ascended the Nile to Thebes, and brought all the country under his control. The conquest of Egypt drew after it the subjection to the Persian power of the Greek colonies of Cyrene and Barca on the African coast. Cambyses had planned an expedition against Carthage, but was forced to abandon the undertaking on account of the refusal of his Phœnician sailors to help enslave their kinsmen.

This extension of the authority of the Persian king over Phœnicia, Cyprus, Egypt, and the Greek colonies of the African shore, was a second severe blow to Greek interests and Greek independence. The naval armaments of all these maritime countries were now subject to the orders of the Persian despot, and were ready to be turned against those of the Greeks who still were free.

Religious Revolution in Persia : Magianism and Zoroastrianism.— While Cambyses was in Egypt, a revolt against him broke out at home. A Magian impostor, Gomates by name, or Smerdis as called by the Greeks, taking advantage of the hatred entertained by the people towards Cambyses, had usurped the throne. To understand this revolution, we must bear in mind that there were at this time two opposed religions in Persia : Zoroastrianism, which taught the simple worship of one God under the name of Ormuzd, or Ahura Mazda ; and Magianism, a less pure faith, whose professors were fire-worshippers. The former was the religion of the Persians ; the latter that of the Medes. The usurpation which placed Smerdis on the throne had been planned by the Magi, or fire-priests, to which order Smerdis himself belonged.

Cambyses had set out on his return to Persia when news of the

revolt was brought to him. Disheartened by the intelligence, he in despair took his own life. But the usurper Smerdis enjoyed his royal honors only for a few months. He was assassinated by a band of Persian nobles, led by a prince named Darius, son of Hystaspes, who had sprung from another branch of the royal house of Persia than that to which Cyrus and Cambyses belonged. Darius now mounted the throne. His first act was to punish by a general massacre the Magian priests for the part they had taken in the usurpation by Smerdis. The pure Zoroastrian worship was reinstated; and the temples which had been destroyed by the Magians, or fire-worshippers, were restored. All the inscriptions of Darius evince great zeal for the restored religion, and breathe a spirit of pious dependence upon Ormuzd.

Reform by Darius of the Persian System of Government.—For several years Darius was busy suppressing revolts in almost every province of his wide dominions. With quiet and submission finally secured throughout the empire, he gave himself for a time to the arts of peace. He built a palace at Susa, and erected magnificent structures at Persepolis; established post-roads centring in Susa; and remodelled the government, making such wise and lasting changes that he has been called “the second founder of the Persian empire.” Previous to the reforms of Darius, the Persian government was like that of all the great Oriental monarchies that had preceded it; that is, it consisted of a great number of subject states, which were allowed to retain their own kings and manage their own affairs, on condition of their paying tribute and homage, and furnishing contingents, in time of war, to the army of the Great King.

The system of government which Darius I. organized—and which was reproduced, if not imitated, by the Romans—is known as the *satrapal*, a form represented to-day by the government of the Turkish Sultans. The entire kingdom was divided into twenty or more provinces, over each of which was placed a governor, called a satrap, appointed by the king. These officials held their position at the pleasure of the sovereign, and were thus rendered

his subservient creatures. Each province contributed to the income of the king a stated revenue.

There were provisions in the system by which the king might be apprised of the disloyalty of his satraps. Thus the whole dominion was firmly cemented together, and the facility with which the semi-sovereign states that constituted the different elements of the empire under the old system could plan and execute revolt, was removed.

Conquests in India. — With the empire he had inherited thus reorganized, Darius conceived and entered upon the execution of vast designs of further conquests, the far-reaching effects of which were destined to live long after he had passed away. Inhospitable steppes on the north and burning deserts on the south seemed the barriers which nature herself had set as the limits of dominion in these directions. But on the eastern flank of the kingdom the rich and crowded plains of India invited the conqueror with promises of endless spoils and revenues; while on the west a new continent, full of mysteries, presented virgin fields never yet traversed by the army of an Eastern potentate.

Darius determined to extend the frontiers of his empire in both these directions. He first dispatched, according to credible accounts, two naval expeditions of observation—one to seek information respecting the Indus country, and the other to make such investigations of the western seas and Grecian states as might be needful to his plans.

At one blow the region of Northwestern India known as the Punjab, was brought under Persian authority; and thus with a single effort were the eastern limits of the empire pushed out so as to include one of the richest countries of Asia—one which henceforth returned to the Great King an annual revenue vastly larger than that of any other province hitherto acquired, not even excepting the rich district of Babylonia.

Destruction of the Sea-power of Polycrates in the Ægean. — But it was the extension of the Persian authority in the West that most intimately concerned the Greek world. The year preceding

the accession of Darius to the Persian throne had witnessed the fall of Polycrates (p. 96), and the virtual destruction of his maritime empire in the Ægean ; for though the tyranny established by him lasted on after his death, his successor, Meandrius, was unable to maintain the old authority, and early in the reign of Darius the island of Samos, terribly ravaged by a Persian force, came in vassalage to the Persian king.

The empire of Polycrates was scarcely more, it is true, than a piratical sea-power ; yet it was a Greek state, and might have proved, in the critical time fast approaching, an effectual barrier against the barbarian wave of conquest which now threatened to overwhelm even the cities of European Greece.

The Scythian Expedition of Darius : Conquests in Europe (513? B.C.).—The growing anxiety of the Greeks in the home land was intensified by the passage of the Bosphorus, about the year 513 B.C., by an immense Persian army led by Darius in person, and aimed at the Scythians, old foes of the Asian peoples, inhabiting the bleak steppes which comprise South Russia of to-day.

After having crossed the Bosphorus by means of a bridge of boats, constructed by a Samian architect, Darius dispatched his fleet, consisting of six hundred ships, drawn chiefly from the Greek cities of Ionia, Æolis, and the Hellespontine regions, to the Euxine, with orders to construct a pontoon bridge over the lower course of the Danube, and there to await the arrival of the land forces.

Meanwhile Darius was leading his army through Thrace, receiving the submission of many Greek cities of the coast, and of the barbarian tribes inland. Reaching the Danube, and finding the bridge of boats already completed, he marched his army across the river, and, leaving the Ionians to watch the structure, pushed on into the Scythian plains. After a few weeks of wearisome pursuit of an ever-vanishing enemy, Darius resolved to retreat from the country by the way he had come.

As soon as the Scythians became aware that the army of Darius was in retreat, their light cavalry set out in pursuit, aiming straight

for the Danube at the spot where it had been bridged. Arriving here before the Persians, the Scythians endeavored to persuade the Ionians whom Darius had left in charge of the bridge, to break it down, and thereby free themselves from Persian servitude; for the Scythians promised, if the Ionians would do this, to see to it that Darius should be treated in such a manner that "he would never again make war upon any one."

A council of the Ionian generals was called to consider the situation. Miltiades, an Athenian general who at this time ruled as king in the Thracian Chersonese, urged that they follow the advice of the Scythians, and destroy the bridge, thereby ensuring at once the independence of Greece, and freeing the Asian Greeks from servitude to Persia. But this suggestion was opposed by Histiaëus, the tyrant of Miletus, who argued that they, as holders of the governments in the various cities, would gain nothing but rather lose everything by such a course, inasmuch as the Persian king was their good friend and supporter. The counsel of Histiaëus was adopted, and Darius and his army were thus saved from destruction at the hands of the Scythians.¹

Darius requited in rather a dubious way this great service rendered him by Histiaëus. Some subsequent circumstances having awakened the suspicions of the king in regard to the trustworthiness of the tyrant, he insisted upon his going with him to Susa, on the pretext that he wished to have so valued a friend always near his person. So from being an important personage in Ionia, Histiaëus became virtually a prisoner at the Persian court.

Results of the Scythian Campaign.—After recrossing the Danube, Darius retreated through Thrace, and by means of his fleet passed over into Asia, leaving behind in Europe, however, eighty thousand of his troops under the command of his trusted general Megabazus. This commander completed the reduction of the barbarian tribes and Greek cities of Thrace, and even secured the submission to Darius of the king of Macedonia.

A little later another Persian general, Otanes by name, recon-

¹ Herod. iv. 137.

quered Byzantium, Chalcedon, and other Greek cities in the Hellespontine region which had risen in revolt while Darius was away on his Scythian campaign, and also subjugated the islands of Lemnos and Imbros in the Ægean.

The expedition of Darius thus resulted in the addition of both Thrace and Macedonia, together with important islands in the Northern Ægean, to the Persian empire, and in the advance of its frontiers to the passes of the mountains which guard Greece on the north. The greater part of the shores of the Ægean was now in the possession of the Great King. That sea which had so long been the special arena of Greek activity and Greek achievement, had become essentially a Persian lake. Moreover, through the loss of the Hellespontine regions, the Greeks were practically cut off from the Euxine, which had come to be such an important part of the Hellenic world.

The Rise of the Persian Power in the East synchronizes with the Rise of the Power of Carthage in the West. — At the same time that the Greeks of the Eastern Mediterranean were thus falling under the yoke of the Persians, and the liberty of the cities in the home land was being threatened with extinction, the Greeks in Sicily were being hard pressed by another barbarian people, the Phœnicians. The power of Carthage was rising, and the Greek cities of Sicily were just now engaging in a doubtful contest with her for the possession of the island. Thus all round the horizon, threatening clouds were darkening the once bright prospects of the Hellenic world.

It was, indeed, a critical moment in the history of the Greek race. As Ranke says, "It cannot be denied that the energetic Greek world was in danger of being crushed in the course of its vigorous development."

REFERENCES. — Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, books i.-iv. This portion of Herodotus' history is devoted in the main to an account of the lands of the East which came to form a part of the empire of the Persian kings, and is in the nature of a prelude to the story which Herodotus set out to tell of the great struggle between Persia and Hellas. In reading these books the student

must bear in mind that they have a very different historical value from that possessed by those portions of the history which deal primarily with Greek affairs. "The net result of Oriental research," says Professor Sayce (Preface to *Ancient Empires of the East*, pp. xi., xii.), "in its bearing upon Herodotus is to show that the greater part of what he professes to tell us of the history of Egypt, Babylonia, and Persia, is really a collection of 'märchen,' or popular stories, current among the Greek loungers and half-caste dragomen on the skirts of the Persian empire. . . . After all, . . . it may be questioned whether they are not of higher value for the history of the human mind than the most accurate descriptions of kings and generals, of wars and treaties and revolutions." Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 112-193. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iii. pp. 399-491; (twelve volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 182-280. Rawlinson, *The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World*.

CHAPTER IX.

THE REVOLT OF THE IONIANS.

(500-493 B.C.)

Aristagoras incites the Ionians to Revolt (500 B.C.).—The Greek cities reduced to servitude by Persia could neither long nor quietly endure the loss of their independence. In the year 500 B.C. Ionia became the centre of a wide-spread rebellion against the Great King.

The instigator of the revolt was Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus and the son-in-law of Histæus (p. 138). He was an unprincipled and ambitious man, willing to join hands with either the Persians or the Greeks if only he could advance his own interests. He had fallen into disfavor with Artaphernes, the satrap of Sardis, and was filled with apprehension lest he should be deprived of his government. He determined to anticipate the expected action of the satrap, by raising a rebellion of all the Greek cities against the Persian power. This was an easy thing to do on account of the impatience with which the double yoke of the tyrants and the Persians was borne. His mind was fixed in its resolve by a letter just at this moment received from his father-in-law Histæus, who was still held in honorable detention at Susa. Herodotus tells how Histæus, in order to secure the secrecy of his message, had recourse to the following device: taking a trusty slave, he shaved the hair from his head, pricked the letters upon the skin, and, after the hair had grown again, sent the man to Aristagoras, bidding him upon his arrival at Miletus to tell Aristagoras to shave his head and look thereon. The message that Aristagoras read

was short. It was this: "Set revolt on foot in Ionia."¹ Histiaëus was homesick, and hoped that if trouble should break out in Ionia, Darius would be constrained to send him down to smooth over matters.

The exhortation of his father-in-law fell in exactly with the half-matured plans of Aristagoras. He resolved to put them at once into execution. Calling a council of his friends, he revealed all to them. Most encouraged him in his purpose, and the revolt was determined upon. Aristagoras gained the support of the Milesians by resigning his tyranny, and establishing a democratic government for their city. Through his aid the tyrants in the other cities of Ionia and Æolis were driven out, and the government everywhere was taken into the hands of the people. Many of the exiled despots went over to the Persians, and later were found in the Persian army fighting against their country.

Aristagoras seeks Aid at Sparta and Athens.—With the revolt well on foot in Ionia, Aristagoras set out for Greece to secure aid. He went first to Sparta, and addressed himself to King Cleomenes. But Cleomenes was not favorably impressed with the proposals of the "Milesian stranger," and ordered him to quit Sparta at once. Aristagoras then proceeded to Athens, in the hope of securing there the assistance that was refused by Sparta.

Affairs at Athens were in a shape favorable to the mission of Aristagoras. The Athenians had just driven out their tyrants, and given a more democratic form than ever to their constitution through the reforms of Cleisthenes (p. 121), and hence were naturally in sympathy with the recent revolution in Ionia. Moreover, Athens was regarded as the mother state of the cities of Ionia, and hence the Athenians felt that the aid these cities now solicited ought not to be withheld. And to this consideration was added their own cause of complaint against the Persians, because they had taken the part of the Athenian exiles, and had demanded that Hippias be taken back and reinstated in his former authority at

¹ Herod. v. 35.

Athens. The Athenians had refused to do this, and consequently they were already, as Herodotus says, "in bad standing with the Persians," and were not likely to be as circumspect in their conduct as they might otherwise have been. They were, therefore, easily won over by Aristagoras. They voted that twenty ships should be sent to the aid of the Ionians. "These ships," in the words of Herodotus, "were the cause of great harm as well to the Greeks as to the barbarians."¹

The Burning of Sardis (499 B.C.).—The Athenian fleet sailed for Ionia, having been joined by five triremes furnished by the Eretrians, of Eubœa, who enlisted in the enterprise out of gratitude to the Milesians for services rendered them in one of their island wars.

From the Ionian coast, the forces of the expedition marched upon Sardis. The city was taken without opposition, save the citadel, which was defended by a force under the command of Artaphernes himself. The Greeks were scarcely in possession of the place before a fire started by a soldier in one of the reed-thatched houses laid the whole city in ashes. Among the buildings destroyed was the temple of Cybele, a goddess held in the highest veneration by the Lydians in common with other peoples of Asia.

Frightened by the gathering forces of the Lydians and Persians, the Greeks withdrew from Sardis and took up their line of retreat to the coast. They were pursued by the enemy, and near Ephesus, where they finally made a stand, sustained a heavy defeat. Thoroughly disheartened, the Athenians now forsook their Ionian confederates and sailed back to Athens.

This unfortunate expedition was destined to have momentous consequences. The Athenians had not only burned Sardis, but "had set the whole world on fire." When the news of the affair reached Darius at Susa, he asked, it is said, who the Athenians were, and being informed, called for his bow, and placing an arrow on the string, shot upward into the sky, saying, as he let fly the

¹ Herod. v. 97.

shaft, "Grant, O Zeus, that I may have vengeance on the Athenians." After this speech, he bade one of his servants every day when his dinner was spread to repeat to him three times these words: "Master, remember the Athenians."¹

The Spread of the Revolt.—Deserted by the Athenians, the only course left open to the Ionians was to draw as many cities as possible into the revolt. They accordingly stirred up to rebellion against the Persian king all the Greek cities of the Hellespont and the Propontis, together with the Carians, and all the Greek and barbarian cities, save one, on the island of Cyprus. The movement threatened the destruction of the Persian power in all those regions where its yoke had been laid upon the neck of once free Hellenes. It was an opportune time for setting fast limits to the threatening advance of the Persian arms, and had Sparta and Athens with the other cities of Greece only lent such aid to their Asiatic kinsmen as considerations of duty and prudence dictated, the decisive battle between Greek and barbarian might have been fought in this Ionian war, and European Greece have been saved from the great invasion. But the inability of the Greek cities to stand together in a common cause was never more lamentably illustrated than at just this moment.

Suppression of the Rebellion: the Fall of Miletus (494 B.C.).—The military resources of the Great King were now collected for the suppression of the rebellion, which thus at a blow had separated from his empire the long reach of Asiatic coast land from the Bosphorus to Lycia. To rehearse in detail the battles, sieges, and various military operations that filled the six years of fighting that now followed, would be both tedious and uninteresting. We shall, therefore, simply speak in general terms of the conduct of the war and indicate its outcome.

The task of suppressing the rebellion fell upon the satrap Artaphernes. Two heavy blows were dealt the insurgents at the places most remote from the centre of the revolt—in Cyprus and on the Hellespont. The revolt in the island of Cyprus was first put

¹ Herod. v. 105.

down with the aid of the Phœnicians and other maritime tributaries. The next blow was struck on the Hellespont, five cities on the Asian shore being destroyed. The Persian generals moved promptly and energetically in this direction, in order to prevent a union at this point between the Thracians and the revolted Greeks, whereby all the Persian conquests in Europe would have been endangered.

The land and sea forces of the Persians at last closed in around Miletus. The maritime resources of the Persian empire at this time are well exhibited in the immense armament that gathered in front of the city to shut it in by way of the sea. There was finally collected here a fleet of six hundred ships, made up of contingents from the several maritime countries tributary to the Great King — from Phœnicia, Egypt, Cilicia, and Cyprus. Of all these vassals the Phœnicians, according to Herodotus, showed the greatest zeal in the undertaking. This was but natural, since Miletus, the “Queen of the Sea,” the Venice of those early times, had for centuries been chief among those Greek cities whose commercial activity had driven the Phœnicians from the *Ægean*; and they were now hoping that, through the destruction of this great rival, the trade of that part of the *Mediterranean* might again fall into their hands.

The Ionians having in a general council resolved to try the fortunes of a sea-fight in defense of Miletus, mustered in opposition to the Persian naval forces a fleet of three hundred and thirty-three triremes. There were ships from Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and various cities of the coast land. Had the Ionians been willing to submit to discipline, and all been steadily loyal to the common cause of Greek freedom, they might possibly have gained a decisive victory over the barbarians. But both these conditions were lacking. The indolent, easy-going Ionians preferred lying in the shade of their tents on the shore to training in the tiresome naval exercises. And then the ex-tyrants in the Persian army, speaking in the name of the Great King, by promises and threats, had sown the seeds of treachery among the Ionian allies. Under these

circumstances the battle¹ naturally proved a great Persian victory — and the Ionian cause was lost ; for the scattering of the sea-force of the Ionians and their allies meant the fall of Miletus, which was now closely beset by sea and land, and after a long siege taken, in the sixth year of the revolt. The most of the men were slain, while the women and children were carried off in a body and settled in a town called Ampe, near the mouth of the Tigris.

The cruel fate of Miletus stirred deeply the feelings of the Athenians. They must have felt that they themselves were, in a measure at least, responsible for the calamity, through their desertion of the cause of their kinsmen. When, the year following the fall of the city, the poet Phrynichus presented in the theatre at Athens his drama entitled the *Capture of Miletus*, the people were moved to tears, and afterwards fined the poet a thousand drachmas “for recalling to them their own misfortune.” They also made a law forbidding the presentation of the piece again.²

The End of the Ionian Revolt. — After the fall of Miletus the other cities that still held out were quickly conquered. The Greek fleet having been scattered, the Ægean was defenseless, and Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos fell into the hands of the Persians. The remaining cities of Ionia shared the fate of Miletus. They were taken and burned, and the fairest of the boys and maidens were carried off for the service of the Great King. This was the third time, Herodotus reminds us, that the Ionians had been reduced to slavery, — first by Cræsus, then by Cyrus, and now again by Darius. This last enslavement was worse than either of the others.

After the reduction of Ionia the Persian fleet sailed to the Hellespont, in order to complete the subjugation of that region. All the cities on the European side of the strait were taken and burned. The inhabitants of Byzantium and Chalcedon, preferring exile to a worse fate, fled before the advancing Persians, and settled in Mesembria on the Thracian shore in the Euxine. In

¹ This naval fight is known as the battle of Lade, 496 B.C.

² Herod. vi. 21.

the Chersonese the Greek cities were also, with a single exception, laid waste.

The first serious attempt of the enslaved Greeks to recover their lost freedom was thus suppressed. The eastern half of the Greek world, filled with the ruins of once flourishing cities, and bearing everywhere the cruel marks of barbarian warfare, lay in double vassalage to the reinstated tyrants and the Great King. "The mild Ionian heavens did their part to heal the wounds: the waste places were again in time built upon, and cities, such as Ephesus, bloomed again in great prosperity; but as to a history of Ionia, that was for all time past."¹

REFERENCES. — Rawlinson's Herodotus, v. 28-38, 49-54, 97-126; *ib.* vi. 1-42. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 193-220. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iii. pp. 492-521; (twelve volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 280-310. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 46-73. Cox, *Lives of Greek Statesmen*: "Aristagoras."

¹ Curtius, *Griech. Gesch.* i. 629 (6th ed.).

CHAPTER X.

THE FIRST AND SECOND EXPEDITIONS OF DARIUS
AGAINST GREECE.

(492-490 B.C.)

The Reconstruction of Ionia by Artaphernes after the Revolt.

—After he had overcome all armed resistance, Artaphernes regulated the affairs of the states that had been in rebellion against Persian authority. His measures were in general wise, if we except his reinstatement of the tyrants instead of allowing the Greek cities to govern themselves under their democratic constitutions. As was reasonable, he forbade these rulers to make war upon one another, and required them to submit to arbitration any differences that might arise between them. Furthermore, he made a fresh survey of the country, a measure which speaks volumes as to the waste and change that the war had wrought, and, dividing the land anew into tax-districts, established the tribute which each city should pay.

Artaphernes is superseded by Mardonius (492 B.C.).—At this stage of his reconstructive measures, Artaphernes was superseded by a younger and more active man, a son-in-law of Darius. Why Artaphernes should thus have been set aside, it is difficult to divine. But it would appear that a party opposed to him at court, by criticism of the way in which he had conducted the Ionian war, had shaken the confidence that the king had hitherto placed in him. Moreover, the timid and conservative policy of Artaphernes in regard to an attack upon the Greek cities of Europe, was to give place to a more vigorous and aggressive one,

which should widen on the European continent the possessions of the Great King. In addition to all this, the policy of ruling the conquered Greek cities by means of the tyrants, — a policy which had resulted very unsatisfactorily on account of the shifty character of the despots themselves, — was to be given up, and the government in the cities was to be placed again in the hands of the people. The customs and political preferences of the Greeks were to be respected, and their characteristic culture left undisturbed, while, however, they were to be incorporated into the Persian empire, and were to maintain towards the Great King the relation of tribute and homage-paying vassals.¹

That this in general was the policy of the Philhellenic party, as the historian Curtius names it, which Mardonius represented, we have a right to believe from the acts themselves of the young commander ; but though it was a generously conceived policy from the standpoint of the Persian rulers, to whom Ormuzd seemed to have committed the task of regulating the affairs of the world, still the part assigned in it to the Greek race was one which it was by nature wholly disqualified from acting.

Mardonius' Expedition against Eretria and Athens (492 B.C.). — Mardonius was to carry the war into Europe, and punish Eretria and Athens for the part they had taken in the burning of Sardis (p. 143). To this end he marched from Susa with a large army down to the Cilician coast, where he himself joined the fleet there gathered, and then proceeded along the shores of Asia Minor towards the Hellespont, while the land forces were led by other generals across the country to the same rendezvous.

Reaching Ionia, Mardonius deposed all the tyrants whom Artaphernes had set over the Greek cities, and placed the government everywhere in the hands of the popular party. Resuming his voyage, he hurried to the Hellespont, and crossing the strait, proceeded with a large land and naval force along the Thracian shore towards Greece.

The gods averted from the Greek cities the threatened danger.

¹ Curtius, *Griech. Gesch.* i. 629; ii. 3.

As the fleet was rounding Mount Athos, the easternmost of the three promontories of Chalcidice, a heavy wind, which suddenly issued out of the north, scattered the fleet, dashing about three hundred of the ships to pieces upon the rocks, and overwhelming in the waters more than twenty thousand men.

Meanwhile the land forces under Mardonius were receiving rough treatment at the hands of the warlike tribes of Thrace. Great numbers were killed and Mardonius himself was wounded. The survivors of both the sea and the land forces now turned back to the Hellespont, and the expedition was abandoned as a failure.

Darius demands of the Greek Cities Earth and Water as Symbols of Submission.—The disaster which had overtaken the Persian armament did not avail to turn Darius from his purpose of avenging himself upon Athens and Eretria and subjecting to his authority all Greece. Preparatory to a second attempt against the Greek states, he called upon all the maritime cities of his empire for contingents of transports and warships, and at the same time sent heralds throughout Greece to demand of the cities earth and water as symbols of submission.

Many of the states, both on the mainland and on the islands, fearing to brave the anger of the Great King, gave the emblems demanded. But Sparta and Athens both refused to give the required tokens of submission, and even went so far in their indignation as to violate the persons of the heralds, the Athenians throwing those that appeared in their city into a pit,¹ and the Spartans casting those who made the demands of them into a well and telling them to help themselves to earth and water.

Quarrel between the Æginetans and the Athenians.—Among the cities which gave earth and water to Darius was Ægina, situated upon a little island bearing the same name, just in front of the seaport of Athens. Now between Athens and Ægina there had been a long-standing feud, arising chiefly from commercial

¹ The Barathron (*Βάραθρον*), which was a cliff or chasm on the west side of the Hill of the Nymphs, outside the ancient walls. Criminals were flung from the precipice before as well as after execution.

rivalry. Consequently the Athenians were ready to put the very worst construction upon the act of the Æginetans. They persuaded themselves that their old enemy was getting ready to join the Persians in their threatened attack upon Athens, and straight-way sent commissioners to Sparta to complain of the conduct of the Æginetans, and to ask for Spartan intervention on the ground that this was a matter which concerned closely all Greece. This embassy proves how commanding a position Sparta at this time held among the cities of Greece, and how ready even Athens was to acknowledge her as the natural protector of all the Hellenes.

The appeal of the Athenians was favorably received by the Spartans, and Cleomenes went himself to Ægina, and attempted to seize the guilty citizens. But he was resisted on the ground that if the Spartans had really authorized such a procedure they would have sent both of their kings on the errand, and Cleomenes was baffled in his purpose.

The course of the Æginetans had been instigated by the second Spartan king Demaratus, who, it will be remembered, had helped to cause the attempt of his colleague Cleomenes to restore the tyranny at Athens to miscarry (p. 125). Cleomenes now returned to Sparta with a fixed determination to rid himself once for all of his enemy. To effect his purpose, he caused the right of Demaratus to the throne to be attacked on the ground of alleged illegitimacy of birth. The matter was referred for a decision to the Delphian oracle, which, bribed by Cleomenes, pronounced against Demaratus. This gave his place to Leotychides, the next in succession. Demaratus, breathing wrath and revenge, soon found his way to Susa, where he was received with many tokens of favor by Darius, who naturally was delighted at having in his service an ex-king of Sparta. Thus was added another to the ever-increasing band of the enemies of the Greeks now gathered at the court of the Great King.

After he had rid himself of his rival, Cleomenes returned with the new king to Ægina. The Æginetans could do nothing else now save to yield to his demands. In compliance with these,

they delivered up to him ten of their chief citizens. These persons Cleomenes handed over to the Athenians, by whom they were to be held as hostages for the good conduct of the Æginetans in case the Persians should make an attack upon Athens.

The Second Persian Expedition crosses the Ægean: the Capture of Eretria.—Meanwhile Darius was completing his preparations for the invasion of Greece, being kept firm in his resolve by the remembrance of the injury he had received from Athens and Eretria, as well as by the exhortations of the Peisistratidæ and other Greek exiles at Susa, all of whom without ceasing urged him on, each hoping to find his own interests advanced in the enslavement to the Persians of his fellow-citizens.

Since Mardonius had led his expedition only to destruction, he was now deposed from his command, and the lead of the new forces was entrusted to Datis the Mede and Artaphernes the Persian, the latter being a nephew of the king. Their orders were to bring the inhabitants of Athens and Eretria in chains to Susa.

Instead of following the course of the earlier expedition along the dangerous upper shores of the Ægean, Datis and Artaphernes struck straight across the sea to Eubœa, stopping at the various islands on their way, and taking from them recruits and hostages. After the reduction of the town Carystus in Southern Eubœa, the Persian fleet advanced to Eretria, the first aim of the expedition. The Eretrians sent messages to Athens for aid. The Athenians immediately ordered the four thousand cleruchs recently settled upon the Chalcidian lands (p. 126) to go to their assistance. This they did. But unfortunately it was in Eretria as in most other Greek cities. The citizens were divided among themselves, and there were traitors within the walls. This state of things being made known to the Athenian colonists, they, following the advice of friends in Eretria, abandoned the city to its fate, and saved themselves by crossing the straits into Attica. After a siege of six days, the city was betrayed into the hands of the Persians. It was sacked and burned with all its temples, in revenge for the part

the Eretrians had taken in the burning of Sardis. All the inhabitants, the men together with their wives and children, were loaded with chains and put on board the Persian ships, to be carried away as slaves to Susa. The orders of Darius as to Eretria were thus fulfilled.

With their work in Eubœa done, the Persians crossed the straits to Attica, to wreak like vengeance upon Athens. Under the guidance of the aged Hippias, they cast anchor in the bay of Marathon, barely one day's journey from the capital. Here was a sheltered roadstead, edged by a crescent-shaped plain backed by the rugged ranges of Parnes and Pentelicus. Upon this level beach, which offered a favorable field for the employment of their cavalry, the Persian generals disembarked their troops, filled with confidence by their recent successes.

The Battle of Marathon (490 B. C.).—The Athenians made surpassing efforts to avert from their city the impending destruction. Each of the ten tribes furnished a thousand soldiers led by its own general, and thus was made up a force of ten thousand men.

The polemarch, or war-archon, at this time was Callimachus, but the most experienced and trusted of the generals was Miltiades. At a council of war of the commanders, where the question was whether they should await behind their walls the coming of the Persians, or march out and meet the invaders on the open plains, it was decided that the little army should hasten to Marathon and there offer the enemy battle.

While the Athenians were thus preparing themselves for the coming fight, a fleet runner, Phidippides by name, was hurrying with a message to Sparta for aid. The practical value of the athletic training of the Greeks was now shown. In just thirty-six hours Phidippides was in Sparta, which was one hundred and thirty-five or forty miles from Athens. He informed the Spartans of the capture of Eretria by the barbarians, and besought their immediate aid, that Athens, the most ancient of Grecian states, might not suffer a similar fate. But it so happened that it lacked

a few days of the full of the moon, during which interval the Spartans, owing to an old superstition, dared not set out upon a military expedition. However, they promised aid, but marched from Sparta only in time to reach Athens after all was over.

Phidippides, however, brought to the Athenians a message which encouraged them greatly. He reported that, in passing over the highlands of Arcadia, he had seen the god Pan, who bade him say to the Athenians that although they had neglected him, still "he felt kindly towards them, and would aid them in the future as he had aided them in the past."¹ This lent to the Athenians more strength than a Spartan contingent would have brought, and, after the war, they gratefully dedicated to Pan a temple at the foot of the Acropolis, and instituted in his honor sacrifices and games.

Assistance more tangible came from Platæa. The Platæans, firm and grateful friends of the Athenians on account of the protection they had accorded them against the Thebans, no sooner had received their appeal for help than they responded to a man, and joined them at Marathon with a thousand heavy-armed soldiers.


The Athenians and their faithful allies, numbering about eleven thousand in all, took up their position just where the hills of Pentelicus sink into the plain of Marathon. The Persian host, numbering one hundred thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, occupied the low ground in their front, while their war-ships and transports covered the beach behind.

Of the ten Athenian generals five were in favor of engaging the enemy at once, while the other five counselled delay. Among those in favor of prompt action was Miltiades. He went to the war-archon, Callimachus, with whom lay the casting vote, and represented to him the danger in deferring the fight. The friends of Hippias might set on foot a movement in the interest of the tyrant, and Athens might thus be thrown into confusion, and everything spoiled. As to the superior number of the bar-

¹ Herod. vi. 15.

barians, if only the gods held aloof, the Athenians need have no fear of the issue of a fight. Persuaded by these representations, Callimachus cast his vote in favor of engaging the enemy at once.¹

The other generals who had voted with Miltiades, as the day of command came to each,² yielded their right to him, in order that he might carry out at once the decision that had been reached ; but Miltiades refrained from battle until the regular rotation of the office brought his own day of command.



At last the day arrived upon which the future of Athens and of all Greece was to be committed to the cast of a single battle. Miltiades drew up his forces in battle order just at the foot of the hills. The line was drawn out to equal length with that of the Persians, the centre being thin and weak, but the wings deep and strong. • The Plateæans formed the left wing.

¹ As to the time and place of this debate we follow the account of Herodotus (vi. 109) ; but Cornelius Nepos makes it to have occurred at Athens before the army set out for Marathon. See Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. iv. p. 31.

² The supreme command came by rotation to each of the generals in turn for a single day.

Sacrifices having been offered and the omens being auspicious, the charge was sounded and the Greeks advanced on a run towards the Persian lines. The issue of the battle was for a time doubtful. The centre of the Greek lines, which, as we have seen, had been weakened in order to strengthen the wings, was broken by the barbarians, and pushed back towards the hills. Meantime, however, the strong thick-ranked wings had broken and scattered the portions of the Persian lines confronting them; and now wheeling, attacked the Persians who were following the retreating centre of the Greeks. This movement decided the battle. The barbarians, thus set upon, gave up the pursuit, and turned in flight.

The Persians fled to their ships, and here many, while trying to board the vessels, were killed by the pursuing Greeks. Some of the Greeks, in the eagerness of the pursuit, even laid hold of the escaping boats. Seven were thus captured; the others escaped.¹

Miltiades at once dispatched a courier to Athens with intelligence of his victory. The messenger reached the city in a few hours, but so breathless that, as the people thronged eagerly around him to hear the news he bore, he could merely gasp, "Victory is ours," and fell dead.

But the danger was not yet over. The Persians, instead of returning to the coast of Asia, sailed round Cape Sunium, and bore down upon Athens, thinking to take the city before the Athenian army could return from Marathon. This course is said to have been suggested to them by the Alcmaeonidæ, and it was

¹ The absence from the battle of the Persian cavalry, to which the Persians in fitting out their expedition had attached so much importance, is a matter of surprise. Curtius explains this by supposing that the Persians, when after landing at Marathon they found themselves confronted by the Athenians, had reshipped their horses, with the intention of sailing around to the Peiræus, as they afterwards really did, and attacking Athens before her defenders could be recalled. Miltiades, as Curtius surmises, timed his attack so as to strike the Persians when a part of their troops were already on board the ships and the remainder still on shore.—*Griech. Gesch.* ii. 24 (6th ed.).

believed that persons of this party, by the flashing of a shield on Mount Pentelicus, had given the Persians a preconcerted signal.

Miltiades, however, informed by watchers on the hills of the movements of the enemy, straightway set out with his little army for the capital, which he reached just at evening, probably on the day following the fight at Marathon.¹ The next morning, when the Persian generals would have made an attack upon Athens, they found themselves confronted by the same men who had beaten them back from the Marathon shore. Shrinking from another encounter with these citizen-soldiers, the Persians spread their sails and bore away for the Ionian shore.

The day following the battle, the Spartans, two thousand in number, arrived at Athens. They had made a forced march, covering the distance between Sparta and Athens in about seventy-two hours. Before returning home they visited the battle-field and looked upon the yet unburied bodies of the Persians.² They bestowed generous praise upon the Athenians for the brave fight they had made, and doubtless, true soldiers as they were, regretted that they had not had part in it.

The most unusual honors were accorded to those Athenians who had fallen on the field.³ "It was the custom of the Athenians to carry home the remains of those who had fallen in battle and place them in the fair suburb of the Ceramicus. But the excellent bravery of the heroes of Marathon demanded a peculiar mark of honor; they, and they alone, were buried on the scene of their immortal victory."⁴ Over their bodies was raised a great mound of earth, which forms to-day a prominent feature of the Marathonian plain. Surmounting the tumulus were ten marble pillars, on which were inscribed the names and tribes of the slain.

¹ There is some doubt on this point. Herodotus leaves us to infer that the Athenians returned to the city on the day of the battle.

² Herodotus makes the loss of the Persians 6400.

³ One hundred and ninety-two Athenians were slain.

⁴ Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. p. 91.

Results of the Battle of Marathon. — The battle of Marathon is justly reckoned as one of the “decisive battles of the world.” It marks a turning-point in the history of humanity. The battle decided that no longer the despotism of the East, with its repression of all individual action, but the freedom of the West, with all its incentives to personal effort, should control the affairs and mould the institutions of society. The tradition of the fight forms the prelude of the story of human freedom and progress.

By the Marathonian victory, the budding civilization of Athens was saved to mature its fruit, not for Hellas alone, but for the world. We cannot conceive what European civilization would be like without those rich and vitalizing elements contributed to it by the Greek, and especially the Athenian genius. But the germs of all these might have been smothered and destroyed had the barbarians won the day at Marathon. Ancient Greece, as a satrapy of the Persian empire, would certainly have become what modern Greece became as a province of the empire of the Asiatic Turks.

Moreover, the overwhelming defeat which the handful of Athenian freemen had inflicted upon the servile hordes of the Great King broke the spell of the Persian name, and destroyed forever the prestige of the Persian arms. The victory gave the Hellenic peoples that position of authority and pre-eminence that had been so long held by the successive races of the East. It marked the beginning of European history. It especially revealed the Athenians to themselves. The consciousness of resources and power became the inspiration of their after achievements. They did great things thereafter because they believed themselves able to do them. From the battle of Marathon dates the beginning of the great days of imperial Athens.

Miltiades falls into Disgrace. — The distinguished services Miltiades had rendered his country, made him the hero of the hour at Athens. Taking advantage of the public feeling in his favor, he persuaded the Athenians, the year following the battle of Marathon, to put in his hands a fleet for an enterprise respect-

ing the nature of which no one save himself was to know anything whatever. Of course it was generally supposed that he meditated an attack upon the Persians or their allies, and with full faith in the judgment as well as in the integrity of their favorite, the Athenians gave him the command he asked.

But Miltiades abused the confidence placed in him. He led the expedition against the island of Paros, simply to avenge some private wrong. The undertaking was unsuccessful, and Miltiades, severely wounded, returned to Athens, where he was brought to trial for his conduct. His eminent services at Marathon pleaded eloquently for him, and he escaped being sentenced to death, but was subjected to a fine of fifty talents, the cost of fitting out the expedition. This sum he was unable to pay, and, being cast into prison, died soon after of the effects of his wound. His son Cimon afterwards paid the fine. But the stain of Miltiades' act could not be effaced even by filial piety, and a dark blot remained upon a reputation otherwise the most resplendent in Grecian history.

War between Athens and Ægina.—A war that now broke out between Athens and Ægina was at once a sort of sequel to the second Persian invasion under Datis and Artaphernes, and a prelude to the third under Xerxes. It will be recalled that just before the battle of Marathon the Athenians, through the intervention of the Spartan king Cleomenes, had got into their hands ten of the leading men of Ægina, as hostages for the loyal conduct of that city.¹ The Æginetans now demanded of the Athenians the return of these citizens; but the Athenians very dishonorably refused to give them up, notwithstanding that Leotychides, king of Sparta, who seconded the Æginetans in their demands, warningly recited

¹ See p. 152. The sequel of the matters there detailed, in so far as concerns the chief actor in them, was as follows: the bribery of the Delphian oracle by Cleomenes, by which means he had secured the deposition of his colleague Demaratus, soon afterwards became known, and Cleomenes was driven from Sparta. He busied himself among the Arcadian cities in forming a league against his own state. The ephors, fearing the consequences of his malicious activity, invited him to return to Sparta and resume his old position as king. He did so, but his conduct was so

to them the story of the fate of the perfidious Spartan Glaucus (p. 49). The Æginetans retaliated by seizing an Athenian ship bearing a sacred embassy, and thereby got into their hands a number of the prominent citizens of Athens. These mutual injuries led up quickly to open war between the two states. Corinth, not from love of Athens, but from hatred of her commercial rival Ægina, gave indirect aid to the Athenians by selling to them for a nominal sum—since her laws forbade the loaning of the public ships—twenty of her war-galleys. The Argives, in a somewhat similar indirect way, aided the Æginetans by allowing a thousand of their citizens to serve as volunteers in the Æginetan army. For several years the war was carried on in a desultory manner, without any decisive advantage being gained by either party.

Themistocles and his Naval Policy.—At this time there came prominently forward at Athens a man whose genius, aided by favoring circumstances, was destined to create the naval greatness of the Athenian state. This was Themistocles, a sagacious, far-sighted, versatile statesman, who, in his own words, though “he knew nothing of music and song, did know how of a small city to make a great one.” He was an ambitious man, whom “the trophies of Miltiades robbed of sleep.” Unfortunately, however, he was a man of serious defects of character, the nature of which his own acts will soon reveal to us.

Themistocles saw clearly that the war with Ægina could be brought to a successful issue only through the adoption by Athens of a maritime policy that should transform her land forces into a naval power overwhelmingly superior to that of her rival. But it was not alone this enemy close at hand that Themistocles had in view. While many among the Athenians were inclined to believe that

violent that the ephors finally put him into the stocks as a madman. Watching his opportunity, he committed suicide. “The significance of his reign lies in this: that he made the nearest approach to a military despotism ever known at Sparta. . . . Had he succeeded in his attempt . . . the Peloponnesus might have been combined under the rule of a single monarch, an event which would certainly have thrown the history of Greece into a different channel.” — ABBOTT, *History of Greece*, vol. i. pp. 100, 101.

the battle of Marathon had freed Athens forever from the danger of another Persian attack, Themistocles was clear-sighted enough to perceive that that battle was only the beginning of a tremendous struggle between Hellas and Persia, and the signal for still another, more formidable, invasion of Greece by the barbarians. Hence he labored incessantly to persuade the Athenians to strengthen their navy, as the natural and only permanent and reliable defense of Hellas against subjection to the Persian power.

Aristeides opposes the Policy of Themistocles and is ostracized (483 B.C.). — Themistocles was opposed in his naval policy by Aristeides, a man of a wholly different type, and whose impartiality as a judge and scrupulous integrity as a citizen had earned for him the title of "the Just." Aristeides was an old-fashioned conservative, who was distrustful of the innovations proposed by Themistocles. He feared that Athens would make a serious mistake if she converted her land forces into a naval armament. It seemed to him a wide departure from the traditions of the fathers. The sea suggested to him something unsteady and adventurous. He did not wish to see the landed proprietors and the staid peasant farmers of Attica, the men whose firm ranks had won the day at Marathon, converted into a mob of sailors, eager to embark on doubtful enterprises, and shifting in opinions and policy as the wind. He believed the land a better basis than the sea for the support of a great Hellenic state.

The contention between the radical democratic party, led by Themistocles, and the conservative party, headed by Aristeides, grew at length so bitter that the peace of the state was endangered. Aristeides himself is said to have told the Athenians that "if they were wise they would throw both himself and Themistocles into the Barathron." The Cleisthenean device of the ostracism was finally called into use to decide the matter. Six thousand votes were cast against Aristeides, and he was compelled to go into exile.

It is related that while the vote that ostracized him was being taken in the popular assembly, an illiterate peasant, who was a stranger to Aristeides, asked him to write the name of Aristeides

upon his tablet. As he placed the name desired upon the shell, the statesman asked the man what wrong Aristeides had ever done him. "None," responded the voter; "I do not even know him; but I am tired of hearing him called the *Just*."

The Athenians strengthen their Navy and fortify the Peiræus.

—After the banishment of Aristeides, Themistocles was free to carry out his naval policy without further serious opposition. Circumstances, as we have intimated, happily concurred in the advancement of his plans. Just at this time there was a large sum of money in the treasury of the city, which had been derived from the public silver mines at Laurium, in the southeastern part of Attica. This money was about to be divided among the citizens, but Themistocles persuaded them to devote it to the building of war-ships. Within a year or two a hundred or more ships were added to the Athenian navy, so that before the close of the year 481 B.C. Athens had a fleet of two hundred galleys, and was consequently by far the strongest at sea of all the cities of Hellas.

While the fleet was in process of construction the Athenians, here also under the inspiration of Themistocles, were at work fortifying the Peiræus, with a view to making it instead of the old roadstead of Phalerum the chief port of Athens. It was a little farther from the capital than the harbor at Phalerum, but in all other respects, particularly in its defensibility, was vastly superior to it.

Such were the circumstances under which Themistocles induced the Athenians to enter upon a policy which was to prove a turning-point in the history of their city, and indeed of all Hellas. The Æginetan war was thus the making of Athens; for had it not been for the immediate and pressing necessity created by that struggle, it is doubtful whether the Athenians could have been persuaded, even by the eloquence of Themistocles, to make ready against what seemed to many of them so remote a contingency as another Persian invasion. But these ships, built primarily to be used against Ægina, were the very galleys which, as we shall see, turned the day against Xerxes at Salamis. This was the ground for the

following remarkable assertion of Herodotus: "The Æginetan war proved the salvation of Hellas, by compelling the Athenians to make themselves strong on the sea."¹ The following chapter will be a commentary upon these words.

REFERENCES. — Rawlinson's Herodotus, vi. 43-45, for the expedition under Mardonius; *ib.* 95-124, for the second expedition; *ib.* 132-136, Miltiades' disgrace. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 223-268. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 1-64; (twelve volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 311-378. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 74-114. Cox, *The Greeks and the Persians* (Epoch Series). This book covers the whole period of the struggle down to the battle of Mycale. Creasy, *Decisive Battles of the World*, ch. i., entitled "The Battle of Marathon." Cox, *Lives of Greek Statesmen: "Miltiades."*

¹ Herod. vii. 144.



Fig. 25. HOPLITE, OR HEAVY-ARMED GREEK WARRIOR.

CHAPTER XI.

THE INVASION OF GREECE BY XERXES: THE MARCH TO THERMA.

(480 B.C.)

Darius plans the third Expedition against Greece. — No sooner had the news of the disaster at Marathon been carried to Darius than he began to make gigantic preparations to avenge this second defeat and insult. He called upon all the provinces of his empire to equip new and larger levies of troops, and to furnish in increased amount military stores of every kind. The king proposed to lead the new expedition in person.

The last plan of campaign, that followed by Datis and Artaphernes, and which made Athens the direct aim of an armament launched from the shores of Asia Minor, was abandoned, and a return made to the earlier plan of Mardonius, which made the Hellespont and the Thracian shore the track of the army of invasion. The first plan of attack would, through lack of means of transport, have necessarily limited the number of the invading army; while the second possessed the advantage of offering an unsurpassed opportunity for an impressive display of the immense resources of the Great King.

For three years the preparations for the great undertaking were pushed forward with unflagging zeal. Then occurred a revolt of the Egyptians. It is probable that this trouble had been stirred up by the Greeks, with the object of preoccupying Darius with home affairs. Just at this juncture Darius died, and his son Xerxes, whose mother was Atossa, a daughter of Cyrus the Great, came to the throne (486 B.C.).

Xerxes continues the Preparations begun by Darius.—Xerxes' first care upon coming to the throne was to suppress the revolt in Egypt. This being effected, he was free to turn his attention to the Greeks. The king himself was at first little inclined to embark in the undertaking against Greece planned by his father; but Mardonius, whose unfortunate experience in the expedition he had led out some years before had not caused him to abandon the hope and ambition of some day being satrap of the beautiful and rich land of Greece, was incessantly urging the king not to forget the duty that was imposed upon him of punishing the Athenians for all the injuries they had done the Persians, and as constantly representing to him the grand opportunity here offered for adding a country excellent in soil and rich in cities to the provinces of his empire. Furthermore, the Aleuadæ, princes of the city of Larissa in Thessaly, who had acquired great influence and power in that land, had sent an embassy to Susa, promising to aid the Persians in an attack upon Greece. The Peisistratidæ at Susa also never ceased to urge Xerxes to a vigorous prosecution of the plans of his father.

Acted upon by these various persuasions, Xerxes became fully minded to lead the long-proposed expedition against the Greeks. Before entering upon the undertaking, however, the king is represented by Herodotus as summoning a council of Persian nobles to acquaint them with his determination, and to seek their advice. Artabanus, the uncle of Xerxes, alone opposed him in his design. The immoderate ambition of the king, in view of the envious nature of the gods, had awakened the apprehensions of the old and experienced counsellor, and he labored to dissuade him from engaging in so vast a project. "Dost thou not see," said he, "how the lightning smites always the highest buildings and the tallest trees? Thus often the mighty host is overwhelmed by lightning and tempest, sent by the jealous gods; for the gods are jealous of mortals, and will allow no one unduly to exalt himself."¹

¹ Herod. vii. 10. Such views as these of the envy of the gods were of course Greek and not Persian. See above, p. 54.

But through dreams and visions Xerxes was confirmed in his purpose, and the preparations for the proposed undertaking were pushed forward with new energy in accordance with what seemed the manifest will of heaven.¹

From the suppression of the revolt in Egypt onward for four years, all Asia was kept astir. Levies were made upon all the states that acknowledged the authority of the Great King, from India to Macedonia, from the regions of the Oxus to those of the upper Nile. From all the maritime states upon the Mediterranean were demanded vast contingents of war-galleys, transport-ships, and naval stores.

While these land and sea forces were being gathered and equipped, gigantic works were in progress on the Thracian coast and on the Hellespont to ensure the safety and facilitate the march of the coming hosts.

It will be recalled that the expedition of Mardonius was ruined by the destruction of his fleet in rounding the promontory of Mount Athos (p. 150). That the war-ships and transports of the present armament, upon the safety of which the success of his undertaking so wholly depended, should not be exposed to the dangers of a passage around this projecting tongue of land, Xerxes determined to construct across the isthmus connecting it with the mainland a canal of sufficient depth to allow the passage of his triremes two abreast. This great work consumed three years.² Traces of the cutting may be seen to-day, the line of the trench being marked by a series of shallow pools of water.

¹ Read Herodotus, vii. 8-19. The supernatural element which the historian introduces into his account of this council, as well as the speeches which he puts into the mouths of the king and his advisers, are manifestly unhistorical; but it would be an error to suppose that for this reason all these passages of Herodotus are without value to the student of the Græco-Persian wars. The supernatural features of the account will show how an intelligent Greek of that time thought and felt about such matters; and the speeches, like those which Thucydides later put into the mouths of his characters, will illustrate what opinions and policies, in the mind of the Greeks at least, could consistently be attributed to the various counsellors around the Great King.

² The neck of land is something over a mile in width, and rises at one point about fifty feet above the sea-level.

At the same time that the canal at Mount Athos was being excavated, a still more gigantic work was in progress upon the Hellespont. Here Europe was being bound to Asia by a double bridge of boats, probably at a point where the strait is about one and a half miles in width. This work was in the hands of Egyptian and Phœnician artisans. The vessels that bore the roadway were kept in place by heavy cables of flax and papyrus.

In addition to these preparations, Xerxes caused immense stores of provisions for man and beast to be gathered into great magazines along the proposed line of march. The largest depots were established along the Thracian shore, as here the least dependence could be placed upon securing stated supplies from the inhabitants.

By the spring of the year 481 B.C. the preparations for the long-talked-of expedition were about completed, and in the fall of that year we find Xerxes upon his way to Sardis, which had been selected as the rendezvous of the contingents of the great army of invasion.

From this place Xerxes sent heralds once more to all the Greek states, except Sparta and Athens, that had refused earth and water to the messengers of his father; conceiving that now, with a knowledge of the vastness of the Persian army which was marching upon Europe, they might think better of their former refusal. The king did not send embassies to the Athenians and Spartans, because of the violence they had offered the Persian heralds on the former occasion (p. 150).

The Hellespontine Bridges are broken: the New Bridges.—Just as Xerxes was about to march from Sardis, news was brought to him that the bridges across the Hellespont had been broken by a violent storm. Herodotus relates that Xerxes was thrown into a great passion by this intelligence, and ordered the architects of the bridges to be put to death, the Hellespont to be scourged with three hundred lashes, and fetters to be thrown into the waters. It was also told in the historian's day that the king had even ordered the straits to be branded with branding irons. The scourgers at least faithfully carried out the orders of their master,

and as they lashed the traitorous and rebellious waters, cursed them "in non-Hellenic and blasphemous words."¹

Other architects were now ordered to span the straits with two stronger bridges. The upper bridge, that is, the one towards the Euxine, was supported by three hundred and sixty, and the lower one by three hundred and fourteen triremes and pentecosters, placed parallel with the current, and all securely anchored, so as to resist not only the current of the Hellespont but also the power of the prevailing winds.

There were three gaps left in the lines of the boats, in order to allow the free passage up and down the straits of light craft. Each bridge was provided with six cables, made of flax and papyrus, placed a little distance apart and drawn taut by means of capstans. Upon the cables thus arranged were placed and securely fastened heavy planks, in such a manner as to form a continuous roadway from shore to shore. Upon these were strewn small branches of trees, and over these was laid a covering of earth, well pressed down. The roadways were protected by parapets, to prevent accident in the passage of the horses and the beasts of burden.²

Crossing of the Hellespont. — All these works being completed, with the first indication of the approaching spring of the year 480 B.C., just ten years after the defeat of Datis and Artaphernes at Marathon, the vast Persian army broke up its winter quarters at Sardis, and began its march towards Europe.

Arriving at Abydos upon the Hellespont, Xerxes, from a marble throne that had been set up on a neighboring hill, reviewed his fleet, and overlooked at once all his land and sea forces. As he beheld the innumerable army filling all the plain below him, and the vessels of his fleet hiding the waters of the Hellespont, his first feeling was one of pride and exultation, but afterwards he wept; and when Artabanus expressed surprise at this sudden change in feeling, the king replied: "A great wave of pity passed over me,


¹ Herod. vii. 35.

² Herod. vii. 36.



MAP
ILLUSTRATING THE
INVASION OF
GREECE
by
XERXES

Route of Xerxes



as I thought how short is the life of man, and reflected that of all this multitude, numberless as it is, not one will be living a hundred years from now.”¹

The passage of the straits as pictured in the inimitable narration of Herodotus is one of the most dramatic of all the spectacles afforded by history.

Before the troops began to cross, prayers were offered, the bridges were strewn with branches of the sacred myrtle, and incense was burned upon them, while the sea itself, just as the sun arose, was placated with a libation, poured from a golden censer by the king himself, who at the same time prayed towards the sun for success in his great undertaking. Then he cast into the water the golden cup with which he had poured the libation, together with other treasures, either as a sacrifice to the sun-god, or as an expiatory offering to the Hellespont for the scourging he had given it.

The passage of the troops now began. To avoid accident and delay, the trains of baggage-wagons and the beasts of burden crossed by one causeway, while the foot-soldiers and the cavalry crossed by the other. The first of the host to cross were the sacred guard of the Great King, the Ten Thousand Immortals, — so called because their number was never allowed to fall below ten thousand, — all crowned with garlands as in festival procession. Following them was the great multitude of various nations; and then, preceding the king, and moving slowly, came the resplendent chariot of the Sun (Ormuzd), drawn by eight milk-white horses, all richly caparisoned, with the charioteer on foot, for no mortal was ever permitted to enter the sacred car. Then came the king, accompanied by his lancers and his mounted guard, and after him the remaining multitudes of different races. For seven days and nights, Herodotus affirms, the bridges groaned beneath the living tide that Asia was pouring into Europe. It seemed more like a migration of the nations than the march of a regular army.²

¹ Herod. vii. 44-46.

² Herod. vii. 54, 55.

The Census and Review at Doriscus.—The crossing of the straits having been successfully accomplished, the land forces marched up the Chersonese to the mainland, then turned westward and followed the Thracian coast to the plain of Doriscus, through which the Hebrus flows into the sea, where through prearrangement they joined the fleet, which meanwhile had sailed round the lower point of the peninsula, and crept along the shore to the point named. Here were a strong Persian fortress and garrison. Upon the extended plain Xerxes drew up all his forces for review and census. The ships of the fleet were dragged ashore and beached, and the men they bore were, it would seem, enumerated with the others.

The countless host could be numbered in no usual way. Ten thousand men were crowded in as close a body as possible, and then the space they had occupied was enclosed by a low wall. The enclosure thus formed was made the unit of enumeration. It was packed with soldiers, and when no more could find room to stand, it was inferred that ten thousand were within. One hundred and seventy times was the enclosure filled and emptied. According to this rude enumeration, the land forces of Xerxes amounted to 1,700,000. The naval force brought the number up to the amazing total of 2,317,000. Herodotus adds to this an equal number of slaves and attendants, and thus represents the entire host as numbering between five and six million persons. We are, by many considerations, forced to believe that these figures of the historian are greatly exaggerated and that the actual number of the Persian army, counting land and sea forces, could not have exceeded 900,000 men.

But, in any event, we may safely believe that the army was the largest that the world had yet seen gathered for any undertaking. To Herodotus it seemed as though all the peoples of Asia and of Africa were there bent upon the ruin of Greece. Forty-six different nations were marching with Xerxes to the war. The costumes and equipments of the different contingents were as varied as the countries whence they came. There was every

variety of dress, from the light cotton tunic of the native of India to the leopard or lion skin in which the Ethiopian wrapped his body. Some were clad in bronze armor; others offered their naked bodies to the blows of the enemy. The weapons borne varied from the well-tempered blade of Damascus to the fire-hardened stave of the Libyan. Some of the nomadic horsemen were armed simply with the lasso.¹

Among all these nations the Persians were accounted the bravest and most reliable in battle. They wore rich garments, and, after the Persian fashion, displayed upon their persons a vast quantity of gold ornaments. They were accompanied, in many instances at least, by their wives; and the richest had trains of slaves and beasts of burden.

The fleet was composed of 1187 triremes,—besides 3000 transports and crafts of various description,—of which the Phœnicians and the Syrians had furnished 300, the Egyptians 200, the Cyprians 150, the Cilicians 100, the Pamphylians 30, the Lycians 30, the Carians 70, and the Greeks of Asia, of the northern islands of the Ægean, and of the Hellespont, 307. The large number of Greek ships shows to how great a degree Xerxes was employing the resources of that part of the Greek world which he had already subjugated, to reduce to submission the remaining portion.

It excites our surprise, as it moved the wonder of Herodotus, that five of these Greek ships were under the command of a woman—Artemisia by name, queen of Halicarnassus, and ruler of several other Dorian cities. It was her energetic and adventurous spirit alone that had led her to attach herself to the expedition of Xerxes. She rendered special service, as we shall learn, both in battle and in council to the Great King.

¹ The following are the nations which Herodotus mentions as furnishing contingents to the army of Xerxes: the Persians, the Medes, the Cissians, the Hyrcanians, the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, the Bactrians, the Scythians, the Indians, the Arians, the Parthians, and various other nations of Central Asia; the Arabians, the Ethiopians, and the Libyans; the Paphlagonians and other peoples of Asia Minor; the Thracians and various other European tribes.

After the census, Xerxes reviewed the whole armament, riding in his chariot through the ranks of the land forces, and passing in a galley in front of the line of ships, which had been pushed from the beach, and, with every man of their crews and their fighting force at his post, arranged side by side in a close row, their prows all being turned in the same direction. With the review completed, the troops and ships proceeded on their way.¹

The Army augmented by Greeks, Thracians, and Macedonians. — The army, upon leaving Doriscus, moved forward in three parallel columns, each under its own commander. All this region through which the Persians were now marching, it will be recalled, had been brought under the Persian yoke by the earlier campaigns of the Persian general Megabazus (p. 138). Consequently all the Greek cities of the coast were forced to add their contingents of ships to the naval force of Xerxes, and the Thracian tribes of the interior to send companies of warriors to swell the ranks of the land forces, while the vassal prince Alexander of Macedonia, when that country was reached by the Persian columns, felt constrained to join, with all his fighting force, the retinue of the Great King.

Reaching the river Strymon, which, like the Hellespont, had been bridged, the Persians, in obedience to that same feeling in regard to the sacredness of streams that had led Xerxes to offer placatory sacrifices to the Hellespont, propitiated the river god by the sacrifice of a number of sacred white horses, and by various Magian rites; and just at the place where the army crossed the stream, known as "The Nine Ways," they buried alive nine native boys and nine maidens.²

The Strymon being passed, the army soon reached the neck of the peninsula of Mount Athos, where the great canal had been cut for the fleet. Xerxes was greatly pleased with the state in which he found this work, and rewarded the inhabitants of Acanthus,

¹ For the whole paragraph, see Herod. vii. 59-100.

² Herod. vii. 114.

who had shown themselves zealous in the matter, with the royal commendation and rich presents.

Burdensome Entertainments. — Before setting out from Sardis, Xerxes had sent forward heralds to order the cities on the proposed line of march to prepare repasts for the army as it advanced, and to furnish special delicacies for the royal table. Many of the cities, moved either by policy or by fear, made extraordinary efforts to comply with the royal wishes. For months before the arrival of the king, the inhabitants were busy grinding wheat and barley, fattening cattle and poultry, collecting cups and vessels for table service, and in making other preparations for the suitable entertainment of their coming guest.

The inhabitants of the island of Thasos, who held lands on the continent, felt constrained to give Xerxes an entertainment which cost them \$500,000 in our money. Other cities provided entertainments almost as costly. But the situation might have been worse, as appears to have been recognized by a certain Greek, a man who seems to have had the faculty of seeing the bright side of things, who proposed to his fellow-citizens, after they had with "vast labor" served a repast for the king and his army, that they should go in a body to the temple and "thank the gods that Xerxes was accustomed to eat only once a day; for had he required them to prepare breakfast as well as dinner, either they must have run away before his coming, or remaining at home have been reduced to a state of utter destitution."¹

Xerxes visits the Pass of Tempe. — Leaving Acanthus, the army and the fleet separated. The fleet, after having passed through the canal, sailed around the two remaining peninsulas of Chalcidice, and, receiving large accessions of ships from the cities on the way, drew up at Therma, on the Thermaic gulf, where it was joined by the army, whose line of march ran directly across the Chalcidian land.

From his camp at Therma, Xerxes caught his first view of the mountains of Greece. Far away towards the south the summits

¹ Herod. vii. 118-120.

of Olympus and Ossa arose above the horizon. Having a great longing to behold with his own eyes the wonderful Pass of Tempe, of which he had been told, he caused a Phœnician galley to bear him to the spot. The great gorge seems to have moved the wonder of the king; yet his thoughts would appear to have been directed not so much to the grandeur or picturesqueness of the scenery, as to the opportunity for mischief that the formation of the land here afforded to an enemy seeking the harm of the Thessalians. He asked his guides whether there was any other passage by which the waters of the Peneus could be led to the sea. Upon being informed that Thessaly was upon every side surrounded by mountains, with only this single gorge of Tempe as an outlet for its waters, he remarked that he now understood why the Thessalian princes had in such good time sent him tokens of their submission (p. 165); for how easily could he have caused this gorge to be filled, and thus have converted all Thessaly into a lake.¹ Having completed his inspection of the pass, Xerxes returned to his army.²

In the Tempe pass, Xerxes "stood at the door of Hellas. Only a few weeks before, ten thousand full-panoplied men were here encamped, in order at the threshold of the Amphictyonic lands to meet the invading enemy: now all was deserted, the pass open, the village empty, the army gone. Where were the Greeks? How were they prepared to receive the land and sea forces of all Asia, which, gaining constant accessions of strength from the Greek cities as they moved on, had for aim the subjection of Greece? For now the Persian attack concerned not alone the Athenians, as was the case ten years before, but all the races and states of Hellas."³

Considering how much was at stake, our wonder is moved that the Greeks should have left the most important pass leading into Northern Greece undefended. And this leads us to turn from

¹ See p. 2.

² Herod. vii. 128-130.

³ Curtius, *Griech. Gesch.* ii. 47 (6th ed.).

watching the movements of the Persian army of invasion, in order to notice what Athens and other Greek cities were doing to avert the impending danger.

REFERENCES. — Rawlinson's Herodotus, viii. 1-130. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 269-283. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 102-143; (twelve volume ed.), vol. v. pp. 1-44. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. 115-139.

CHAPTER XII.

THE INVASION OF GREECE BY XERXES: THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

(480 B.C.)

The Greeks in Council at Corinth (481 B.C.). — The Greeks of the continent had not remained in ignorance of what was going on in Asia. From time to time startling rumors of the vast preparations that the Great King was making to enslave them were borne across the Ægean to their ears. At last came the news that Xerxes was about to begin his march. Something must now be done, and done quickly. Mainly through the exertions of Themistocles, a council of the Greek cities was convened at Corinth, in the fall of the year 481 B.C., for the purpose of concerting measures for the defense of Grecian liberties. But on account of rivalries, feuds, and party spirit, many of the states of Hellas held aloof from the alliance, and could not be brought to work with the others for the defense of the common Grecian land. The reception accorded the envoys sent by the states in council to Argos, Syracuse, Corcyra, and Crete, asking them to help repel the threatened invasion from Asia, will better than anything else disclose to us how divided at this critical moment was the strength of even that part of the Hellenic world that still remained free.

The Embassy to the Argives. — And first as to the embassy to Argos. It seems that the Argives, who had kept themselves informed respecting the movements of Xerxes, had been expecting that they would be called upon by the other Greeks to lend

help against the barbarians, and, in order that they might in such a case know how to act, had sent a messenger to Delphi to ask the advice of the oracle.

Notwithstanding that the oracle in the answer returned had plainly counselled them not to take part in the coming war, still the Argives, in reply to the message from the confederates, promised to join them, provided the Spartans would first consent to a truce with them of thirty years, and moreover divide with them the chief command of the confederate forces.

The object of the truce which the Argives made one of the conditions of their joining the alliance was to gain time for the filling up, by the growth of their boys into manhood, of the great gaps made in their ranks by the recent terrible loss of six thousand of their fighting men (p. 73). The demand for joint leadership with the Spartans in the conduct of the war was inspired, not only by present jealousy of Sparta, but also by a remembrance of the time when Argos held that very place of leadership among the Greek states which was now claimed and maintained by Sparta.

The Spartans refused assent to the demands of the Argives for an equal share in the command of the allied forces, but did express a willingness to allow the single Argive king a place alongside the two kings of Sparta. As this arrangement would have given Sparta two out of three votes, the leadership would practically have been in the hands of the Spartans, and consequently this proposal was indignantly rejected by the Argives, who said in substance that they would rather be subjects of the barbarians than of the Spartans.

It was natural that the unpatriotic conduct of the Argives should have caused reports to circulate among the Greeks which ascribed their refusal to take part in the war to the very basest motives. It was said that they had been bribed by Xerxes. They were even accused of having urged the Persians to come into Greece, in the hope, through the enslavement of the land, of gaining some advantage for themselves.

Embassy to Gelo of Syracuse.—The embassy to Gelo, the

tyrant of Syracuse, was not more successful than that to the Argives. Gelo was at this time the most powerful despot in the Hellenic world. He had raised Syracuse to a high pitch of prosperity and splendor, having greatly increased the population of the place by settling within its walls the better class of the inhabitants of neighboring cities which he had overcome in war.

The envoys of Athens, Sparta, and the other confederates, being admitted to the presence of Gelo, represented to him the critical state of the Greeks in the East, and besought his help in repelling the threatened invasion of the barbarians. They further admonished the tyrant not to deceive himself with the notion that the Persian king would limit his conquests to Greece. With that land enslaved, he would surely proceed without delay to subdue the Greek cities of the West.

Replying to the envoys, Gelo promised to send an army of forty-four thousand men, foot and horse, and two hundred triremes. He further offered to furnish corn for the whole Greek army during the war. The condition, however, upon which Gelo made this splendid offer was that he himself should be given the leadership of all the allied forces.

One of the Lacedæmonian envoys indignantly rejected the proposals of Gelo, saying that groans would break from Agamemnon's grave should his shade hear that Sparta had yielded precedence in Greece to Syracuse, and the tyrant was constrained to modify the conditions of his offer by agreeing to still send the armament named, provided he were given the command either of the land or of the sea forces. But to the proposal in this form the Athenian envoys objected, saying that the Athenians, the possessors of the largest navy in the Greek world, the only people in Greece who had always lived upon the same spot, and who, according to the testimony of Homer, had sent to the Trojan War one of the best of the leaders of the Greeks,¹ though they might yield the command of the fleet to Sparta if she wanted it, still

¹ Menestheus.

would never consent that that leadership should be given to any other people, and certainly not to the Syracusans.

Gelo, sarcastically remarking to the envoys that they seemed to be well supplied with commanders, but were likely to be in need of men to receive commands, dismissed them, and the hope that the cities of Greece had entertained of receiving succor from Sicily was at an end.¹

Embassies to the Corcyræans and the Cretans. — The Corcyræans, who at this time stood next to the Athenians in naval strength, made, to the envoys who invited their aid, ready promises of help. But these islanders were treacherous. It was late before they moved, and then the fleet, consisting of sixty ships, which they sent out, hung about the southern coast of the Peloponnesus, waiting for the issue of the expected battle, and ready to join whichever side chanced to be victorious.

Nor was any assistance secured from the Cretans. After hearing the request of the envoys, they sent a message to Delphi to get the advice of the oracle. The oracle reminded them how the assistance that their fathers gave to Menelaus in the war against Troy brought to them nothing but loss and suffering,² and thus intimated very plainly that they would be fools if they engaged in another quarrel between the Greeks and the Asiatics, which was no concern of theirs.

The Medizing Party among the Greeks. — Thus, from different causes, many of the Hellenic cities refused to join the confederation, so that only about fifteen or sixteen states³ were

¹ Herod. vii. 153–162, for the whole interview. It is not probable that Gelo was serious in his proposal to send an army to the help of the Greeks in the home land, since just at this time he was threatened by the Carthaginians, by whom, as we shall see, he was actually attacked later, at just the moment when the fight with the barbarians in Greece was at the hottest.

² Legend tells how the resentful shade of Minos brought famine and pestilence upon the Cretans for helping the Greeks in the Trojan War, notwithstanding some time before the Greeks had refused to assist the Cretans in avenging his murder in Sicily, whither he had gone in search of Dædalus.

³ These included all the important states of European Greece, save Argos and Thebes. The latter city refused to join the alliance from jealousy of Athens.

brought to unite their forces against the barbarians ; and even the strength of many of these cities that did enter into the alliance was divided by party spirit. The friends of oligarchical government were almost invariably friends of Persia, because the Persian king looked with more favor upon oligarchical than democratical government in his subject Greek cities. Thus, for the sake of a party victory, the oligarchs were ready to betray their country into the hands of the barbarians. To make their conduct appear less outrageous to the common Hellenic mind, some of these so-called "Medizing¹ Greeks" even tried to make out that the Persians were the descendants of the Greek hero Perseus, and hence pure Hellenes, submission to whom could not be regarded as disgraceful.

Furthermore, the Delphian oracle was wanting in courage, if not actually disloyal, and by its timid responses, as witness the oracles given to the Argives and the Cretans (pp. 177, 179), disheartened the patriot party.

Resolutions of the Corinthian Council.— But under the inspiration of Themistocles the cities in convention at Corinth determined upon desperate resistance to the barbarians. They resolved that all feuds existing between members of the league should be extinguished, and solemnly bound themselves, after the struggle should be over, to make united war upon any and every city that should, unless constrained by force, submit to the Persians, and to dedicate one-tenth of the spoils to the shrine of the Delphian Apollo.

The Spartans were given the chief command of both the land and the naval forces. The Athenians might fairly have insisted upon their right to the command of the allied fleet, but they patriotically waived their claim for the sake of harmony.

Passing at last to the consideration of the question where they should make their first stand against the invaders, the allies decided to concentrate a strong force at the Pass of Tempe, and

¹ The reference, of course, is to the Medes, by which term the Greeks usually designated the Persians.

at that point to dispute the advance of the enemy. They were influenced to this decision by the presence at Corinth of envoys from the Thessalians,—for the Thessalians in general were opposed to the course of the Aleuadæ princes (p. 165),—who urged the confederates to cover Thessaly by a guard at the defile of Olympus, assuring them that the Thessalians would not be slack in their devotion to the common Grecian cause; but at the same time warning the allies that, if they did not thus strengthen their hands against the invaders, they would be compelled to make the best terms they could for themselves with the Persians.

The Greek Garrison at Tempe and at Thermopylæ.—The force which the allies sent to the Pass of Tempe amounted to about ten thousand heavy-armed men, the Athenian contingent being under the command of Themistocles. To this force the Thessalians, according to their promise, added a considerable body of cavalry. Scarcely had the Greeks taken their stand in the defile of Tempe, before intelligence was brought to them that the Persians were intending to enter Thessaly through another pass some distance inland, leading over the Olympian range from Macedonia. It was impracticable for the Greeks to defend this second pass, for the reason that the entrance to the same on the northern side was held by the Macedonians, who were tributaries of the Great King. Consequently the allies abandoned the idea of holding the Pass of Tempe, and returned by ship to Corinth. These circumstances will explain how it happened that Xerxes on his visit to the pass (see p. 174) found it open and undefended.

It was most unfortunate that the march of the Persians could not have been intercepted at these passes on the northern frontier of Greece, for then the strength of the Thessalians would have been secured to the patriot party; whereas now the forces of the entire Thessalian region went to swell the Grecian contingent in the army of invasion. It seemed as though Hellas were doomed through unhappy circumstances, as well as through

the selfish misconduct of cities and parties, to become herself the instrument of her enslavement to the barbarians.

After the withdrawal of the forces of the allies from the Pass of Tempe, and the consequent abandonment of all Northern Greece to the invaders, it was finally resolved by the council at Corinth to garrison the Pass of Thermopylæ, and at that point to offer the first resistance to the march of the Persian army. As a cover to the force in the pass, it was decided that the allied fleet should be stationed at the north end of Eubœa, where it could command the entrance to the strait running between this island and the mainland. These resolves of the Corinthian Council, upon receipt of the intelligence that the Persian army was already at the northern foot of the ranges of Olympus, were at once carried into execution.

Having now taken a glance at the situation of affairs among the Greeks, and noticed what preparations they were making to meet the approaching danger, we must return to Therma, where we left the Persian army, and watch its further progress.

The Persian Army advances to Thermopylæ and the Fleet to Artemisium. — Pushing on from Therma, the Persians climbed the Olympian range, a road having been cut through the woods that covered the summit, and, marching across Thessaly, drew up at last on the Malian plains, in front of the guards that the Greeks had stationed in the Pass of Thermopylæ. This march was made by the army without special incident.

Before the main fleet put out from Therma, ten of the swiftest galleys were sent in advance more than a hundred miles down the coast, to spy out the way. Near Cape Sepias, the Persian vessels came upon three watch-ships of the Greeks. Two of these with their crews the barbarians captured, and, taking the Greek first made prisoner, who chanced to be a man of unusual beauty, sacrificed him at the prow of one of their ships, which seems to have been done in accordance with a custom of the barbarians to thus sacrifice as a good omen the first of their captives.

Signal fires, lighted by watchers on the island of Sciathus,

informed the Greek ships anchored off Artemisium of what had taken place. The terror spread through the fleet by the intelligence was such that the Greeks at once lifted their anchors, and retreated down the Eubœan straits to Chalcis, thinking that the narrowness of the channel at that point would deprive the Persians of the advantage they possessed in the number of their ships.

Following closely the ten advance ships, the whole Persian fleet of triremes now moved down the coast to Cape Sepias in Magnesia, making the entire distance of one hundred and three miles in a single day.¹ As only a very short reach of the coast here presented a favorable beach, the boats in the moorage were arranged eight deep along the strand, those in the landward row being moored to the shore, while those of the remaining rows swung at anchor. While in this position the fleet was struck by a violent storm, which lasted for three days. The ships nearest the shore were saved by being hastily pulled upon the beach; many of those farther out were driven ashore both above and below the place of anchorage, and broken to pieces upon the rocks. Four hundred triremes were lost, together with an uncounted number of merchant ships and of men.


The moral effect upon the Greeks of this disaster was great, inasmuch as they firmly believed that the gods of the winds had interposed in their behalf. Thus inspired with new courage, the Greeks at Chalcis now moved their vessels back to their first anchorage at Artemisium; while the ships of the Persian fleet that had escaped the storm crept around the southern point of Magnesia, and found a quiet haven in the Pagasæan bay.

The Greeks and the barbarians were now face to face on the land and on the water. The Persian fleet will attempt to force its way through the strait at Artemisium, while the Persian army will endeavor to clear of its Grecian guards the Pass of Thermopylæ. The great fight in the pass will first claim our attention.

The Battle of Thermopylæ (480 B.C.). — The pass that was to witness the heroic defense which has forever associated its name

¹ Herod. vii. 126.

with patriotic devotion and martial discipline calls for no extended description to render intelligible the account of the struggle that there took place. It was at this time a narrow causeway, — the deposits of streams have changed the spot much in the course of the succeeding centuries, — bordered on one side by precipitous mountains, and on the other pressed so closely by the sea or marsh-ground that there was not sufficient room for two wagons to pass



each other. At the foot of the cliffs broke forth a number of hot springs, hence the name of the pass, Thermopylæ, or "Hot Gates."

In this narrow pass it was that the Greeks, in accordance with the resolution of the Corinthian Congress, made their first stand against the Persians. Leonidas, king of Sparta, with three hundred Spartans and about six thousand allies, mainly Arcadians, Corinthians, Thespians, and Thebans, held the pass.¹

¹ Arcadia had sent 2220 men; Corinth, 400; Phlius, 200; Mycenæ, 80; Thespiæ, 700; Thebes, 400; Phocis, 1000; and the town of Opus in Locris, a number not stated. Herod. vii. 202-203.

The three hundred Spartans that formed the body-guard of Leonidas were picked men, somewhat advanced in years, and every one with a son left behind at Sparta, so that no Spartan family should become extinct through the possible accidents of battle. From this unusual precaution taken by Leonidas,—for the body-guard of a Spartan king was ordinarily composed of young men,—we may rightly infer that he realized when he set out from Sparta that he was leading a forlorn hope.

The Thebans were in the pass against their will. They were, through enmity towards the Athenians, kindly disposed towards the Persians; but when Leonidas, just to test their loyalty to the Grecian cause, called upon them to rally with the other Greeks at Thermopylæ, they dared not refuse.

The force, all told, was an insignificant one to hold against the Persian host a pass upon the safe-keeping of which so much depended; but it so happened that the Greeks in general were just getting ready for the celebration of the Olympian games, while the Spartans in particular were making preparations for the observance of a festival in honor of Apollo, and rather than postpone these the Greeks left the handful of men at Thermopylæ unsupported to hold in check the Persian army until the festival season was past. Such action of the Greeks at this critical moment of their affairs illustrates with what sincerity of religious feeling and absorption of interest they regarded their sacred festivals and games.

Among the Greeks at Thermopylæ, now confronted by the Persians, there was a division of opinion. Those from the Peloponnesus urged a retreat to the Isthmus of Corinth, but the men from Phocis and Locris insisted upon a defense of the pass which they had been sent to hold. The proposal of the Peloponnesians, if acted upon, meant the abandonment of all Central Greece, as Northern Greece had already been abandoned, to the invaders. It was decided by the voice of Leonidas that all should remain at Thermopylæ, and the fight be made, not for the Peloponnesus alone, but for all Greece lying southward of the spot where they stood.

Without the co-operation of his fleet, Xerxes could dislodge the Greeks in the pass only by a direct attack in front.¹ Before assaulting them, he summoned them to give up their arms. The answer of Leonidas was, "Come and take them." The temper of his companions was apparently as resolute as his own. One of them just before the battle being told by somebody, who thought to frighten him, that the number of the barbarians was such that their arrows "would obscure the sun," quietly replied, "Very well, we shall then fight in the shade."

For two days the Persians stormed the pass, the Asiatics being driven to the attack by their officers armed with whips. But every attempt to clear the way was foiled; even the Ten Thousand Immortals, whom at last Xerxes sent forward, thinking they would make a quick end of the resistance, were hurled back from the Spartan front like waves from a cliff.

But an act of treachery on the part of a Malian, Ephialtes by name, the "Judas of Greece," rendered unavailing all the heroism of the keepers of the pass. Running over the mountain on the flank of Leonidas was a footway, by which a force might be led to the rear of the Greeks. Where the path crossed the summit of the ridge, the Phocians kept guard. This mountain path was revealed to Xerxes by Ephialtes, and under his guidance a Persian force, commanded by the satrap Hydarnes, stealthily made its way by night to the spot where the Phocians were keeping watch. As soon as the Phocians became aware of the approach of the enemy, they retreated a short distance, in order to gain a more advantageous position; but by this movement they left the path open, and the Persians, without stopping to attempt to dislodge the Greeks, hastened on towards the goal of their march.

The startling intelligence was brought to Leonidas that the Persians were descending the mountain path in his rear. He realized instantly that all was lost. His allies, save the Thebans,

¹ The disaster which had befallen the Persian ships off Magnesia, and the advance of the Greek fleet to Artemisium, prevented Xerxes from landing a force farther down the coast in the rear of Leonidas.

were given permission to seek safety in flight while opportunity remained. But for Leonidas and his Spartan companions there could be no thought of retreat. Death in the pass, the defense of which had been entrusted to them, was all that Spartan honor and Spartan law left them. Still another consideration is said to have weighed with Leonidas. A little before this the Pythia at Delphi had given the Spartans an oracle to the effect that either their city or one of their kings must needs become the prey of the Medes. Leonidas, as is related of Codrus (p. 103), resolved to die for the advantage of his country.

The next day, bravely attacking the Persian host, Leonidas and his faithful guards fought with desperate valor; but being surrounded at last, they were overwhelmed by mere weight of numbers, and were slain to a man. With them also perished the seven hundred Thespians, who had preferred death with their companions to life saved by deserting them. The Thebans, whom Leonidas, according to Herodotus, had compelled to remain, in the midst of the fight went over in a body to the Persians. Their lives were spared by Xerxes, but their bodies were branded as a sign that they were now the property of the Great King.

The body of Leonidas was, after the barbarous custom of the Asiatics, grossly mutilated, the head being cut off and the trunk exposed on a cross.

Memorials and Incidents of the Fight. — The fight at Thermopylæ echoed through all the after centuries of Greek history. The Greeks felt that all Hellas gained great glory on that day when Leonidas and his companions fell, and they gave them a chief place among their national heroes. Memorial pillars marked for coming generations the sacred spot, while praising inscriptions and epitaphs, composed by the lyric poet Simonides of Ceos, told in brief phrases the story of the battle. Among these was one inscription in honor of all the Peloponnesians who had any part in the fight, and which with perhaps "pardonable exaggeration" told how "here four thousand men from the Peloponnesus fought against three hundred myriads"; and another in special

memory of the Spartans who had fallen, which, commemorating at once Spartan law and Spartan valor, read: "Stranger, go tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here in obedience to their commands!"¹

The story of Aristodemus, one of the two men who, out of the three hundred Spartans, escaped death in the battle, is worthy of notice for the reason of the insight it gives us into the inner life of the martial community on the Eurotas. This man and a companion, named Eurytus, at the critical hour on the last day chanced to be away from the Greek camp, on account, as one story runs, of some trouble of the eyes. Learning of the desperate situation of their companions in the pass through the treachery of Ephialtes, Eurytus bade his helot buckle his armor on him, and lead him to where the fight was going on; and there he shared death with his companions in arms. But the courage of Aristodemus failed him, and he held himself aloof from the battle. Returning afterwards to Sparta, he was shunned by every one as a coward, and was made to feel so keenly his disgrace that the year following the battle of Thermopylæ, in the great fight at Plataea, he recklessly exposed himself, and through an honorable death atoned for his former fault.

The fate of the other man who of the three hundred survived the battle, is equally illustrative of Spartan sentiment. This soldier, Pantites by name, seems to have been absent from the battle through no fault of his own, having been sent out on some commission by Leonidas. Nevertheless, after his return home, life was made so unendurable to him that he went and hanged himself.²

The Battle of Artemisium (480 B.C.).—While Leonidas and his men were so gallantly striving to hold in check the hordes of Xerxes at the Pass of Thermopylæ, the fleet of the Greek allies now at Artemisium was endeavoring with equal bravery to prevent the immense fleet of the Persians from entering the Eubœan strait. The Greek fleet collected at this place numbered over three hun-

¹ Herod. vii. 228.

² Herod. vii. 229, 232.

dred ships, of which Athens had furnished two hundred, counting the reserves which she brought up after the first day's fight.¹ A part of Athens' ships were manned by her faithful allies, the Plataeans, who had no navy of their own. The number of men borne by the fleet could not have been far from sixty thousand, as each vessel must have carried on the average two hundred men. Notwithstanding that Sparta had furnished only ten ships, still the chief command of the fleet was held by the Spartan Eurybiades, since the allies had refused to serve under an Athenian commander. This circumstance shows how jealous the smaller mari-



time states were of the recently grown naval power of Athens, and at the same time illustrates how universally Sparta was regarded as the natural leader of all the Greeks.

Although the great losses which the Persian fleet had suffered in the recent storm (p. 183) had filled the Greeks with fresh courage and hope, still many among them were apprehensive of the issue of a fight with the still immensely superior force of the enemy, and urged a second retreat. The Eubœans, fearing that these

¹ The states besides Athens represented in the fleet, and the number of ships furnished by each, were as follows: the Corinthians, 40 ships; the Megarians, 20; the Æginetans, 18; the Sicyonians, 12; the Lacedæmonians, 10; the Epidaurians 8; the Eretrians, 7; the Trœzenians, 5; the Ceans, 4; and the Locrians, 7. Herod. viii. 1.

counsels of timidity would be acted upon, went to the Spartan Eurybiades and begged him to hold the fleet at the head of Eubœa for at least a few days, so that they might have time to carry their families and their property beyond the reach of the Persians.

Failing in their efforts with Eurybiades, the Eubœans went to Themistocles, and, by means of a bribe of thirty talents, secured from him a pledge that the Greeks should fight at Artemisium, and not abandon Eubœa as a spoil to the barbarians. Themistocles was able to make good his promise only by using a part of the money he had received from the Eubœans in bribing Eurybiades, together with the commander of the Corinthian ships. He thus brought it about that the fleet was held at Artemisium, and battle there offered the Persian ships.

The commanders of the Persian fleet, relying upon their superiority in number of ships, thought by sending a squadron around Eubœa into the Euripus and thus blocking the retreat of the Greeks, to be able to capture the entire fleet. Accordingly two hundred ships were dispatched on this mission; but while upon the passage round the island, they were all driven ashore and wrecked by a violent storm. Meanwhile the Greeks, having been informed by a deserter from the Persians of the plans of the enemy and of the weakening of their fleet through the sending out of the Eubœan squadron, resolved to attack them, and at least test their fighting qualities and their skill in handling their boats. The engagement thus brought on was interrupted by the darkness of night, before either side had secured a decisive victory.

The next day the Greeks, encouraged by reinforcements from Athens, and by the news of the destruction of the Persian ships on the Eubœan coast, made another attack upon the fleet of the barbarians, but with indecisive results, as upon the preceding day.

The combat on the third day was begun by the Persian fleet, which, advancing in the form of a crescent, endeavored to surround the Greeks. Both fleets were greatly damaged in this day's fight, but separated as on previous days without any decided

advantage having been gained by either side. But on the evening of this day the watcher who with a swift ship at his service had been stationed near Thermopylæ for the purpose of informing the Greek fleet at Artemisium how matters might be going in the pass, came with the news that Leonidas had been overpowered, and that the pass was lost. As there was now nothing to be gained by holding the water passage any longer, it was resolved to withdraw before the enemy, and retreat down the channel.

This movement was executed with the Corinthian ships in the lead and the Athenians in the rear. As the fleet in this order moved through the strait, Themistocles set ashore at favorable spots men who, following his directions, cut on the rocks inscriptions which he hoped would be seen by the Greeks serving in the Persian fleet. The inscriptions exhorted these Greeks not to fight against their kinsmen: but if they were forced to do so through fear, then to "fight backwardly." Even if this appeal should not lead the Ionians to desert from the Persian fleet, still Themistocles hoped that the inscriptions would at least make Xerxes uneasy and suspicious respecting his Greek auxiliaries, and thus keep him from using them in future fights.¹

Having passed through the Euripus, the entire Greek armament rounded Cape Sunium, and, yielding to the entreaties of the Athenians, came to anchor in the gulf of Salamis, near Athens, and awaited events.

The Persians attempt to plunder the Temple at Delphi. — Shortly after the withdrawal of the Greeks from Artemisium, both the fleet and the army of Xerxes moved on towards Athens. As the Persian army marched into Phocis, the inhabitants sought safety either in the surrounding mountains or in the towns of the Locrians on the gulf of Corinth. Their villages and temples, thus abandoned, were burned by the barbarians, who were guided and incited to the work of devastation by the Thessalians, hereditary enemies of the Phocians.

Upon nearing Delphi, Xerxes sent a strong detachment to

¹ Herod. viii. 22.

secure the treasures, of which wonderful accounts had been given him, stored in the temple of Apollo at that place, while he himself, with the main body of his army, held on the direct course leading into Attica. The intelligence of the approach of the barbarians threw the guardians of the shrine into a fever of excitement. In their perplexity, however, how best to secure the sacred treasures, they bethought themselves to ask the oracle what measures they should adopt. Apollo replied that he would take care of his own. Thus relieved of anxiety in regard to the holy treasures, the Delphians now sought safety for themselves and their families. Sending their wives and children across the Corinthian Gulf into the Peloponnesus, and hiding their goods in a convenient cave, the men, for the most part, sought refuge for themselves in the hills back of Delphi. The prophet of Apollo, Aceratus by name, and sixty others were the only persons who remained in the city.

A great portent, so Herodotus avers, now assured those who had stayed behind that Apollo would make good his word. A part of the sacred armor, which hung in the deepest recesses of the shrine, was removed from the temple without hands, and placed on the ground in front of the fane, plainly showing that the god himself was going forth to meet the coming enemy. Still greater prodigies, it is said, followed; for as the barbarians neared Delphi, a sudden thunder-storm burst above their heads, while huge masses of rock, detached from the sides of Parnassus, rolled down upon them, ploughing wide gaps through their columns, and a great battle-shout of invisible hosts issued from the neighboring temple of Athena. Terrified by these prodigies, the barbarians turned and fled, while the Delphians, emboldened by these signs that Apollo was fighting for them, ran down from the hills where they had been hiding, and, pursuing the fleeing barbarians, slew immense numbers of them. Invisible powers aided them in the pursuit and slaughter, for those of the Persians who escaped afterwards related that they were followed by two giant warriors, who wasted their ranks as they fled. The Del-

phians maintained that these ghostly warriors were heroes of the foretime, whose shrines were held in reverence in that place.¹

Such is the story of the defense of the Delphian temple which was afterward circulated among the Greeks, and apparently received by them in general as a true account of what had really happened.²

REFERENCES.—Plutarch, *Life of Themistocles*. Rawlinson's Herodotus, vii. 131-239; *ib.* viii. 1-40. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 283-315. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 144-201; (twelve volume ed.), vol. v. pp. 45-104. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 139-175. Cox, *Lives of Greek Statesmen*: "Gelon."

¹ Herod. viii. 36-39.

² It seems probable that a timely thunder-storm created a panic in the army of the barbarians, and aided in saving the temple from pillage. The displacement of the armor, the rolling of the stones down the mountain, the war-shout from the temple, and the mysterious warriors may all very well have been devices of the priests.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE INVASION OF GREECE BY XERXES: SALAMIS.

(480 B.C.)

The Abandonment of Athens by the Athenians.—While the expedition against Delphi was meeting with its strange discomfiture, as related in the last chapter, the main body of the Persians was moving on through Bœotia. Here they were joined by all the Bœotians,¹ who had already admitted Macedonian garrisons into their towns, and in every way shown their readiness to be of service to the Persians.

The Athenians had hoped that the allies would make a stand against the invaders in Bœotia, but this hope was now dissipated; for the Peloponnesians, thinking only of their own homes, had begun to build a wall across the isthmus at Corinth, working day and night upon the barricade under the promptings of an almost insane fear. Attica was to be abandoned to the barbarians.

The Athenians were divided in opinion as to what course they should pursue. They had already, anticipating the crisis, sent to Delphi for counsel.² Their messengers had received at first a very disheartening oracle, which declared that Athens must needs become the prey of the barbarians. Unwilling to be the bearers of the hopeless message to their countrymen, they took olive-

¹ Excepting the Platæans, the Thespians, and the inhabitants of Haliartus. The Platæans abandoned their little city and cast in their lot with their good friends, the Athenians. The Thespians found an asylum at Corinth. The people of Haliartus seem to have perished with their city.

² There is some uncertainty as to just when the Athenians sought advice at Delphi. Probably it was about the time that Xerxes entered Thessaly.

branches in their hands, and thus as suppliants presented themselves before the god, praying him to give them a more encouraging answer. In response to this prayer, Apollo gave them this message : —

“ Pallas has not been able to soften the lord of Olympus,
 Though she has often prayed him, and urged him with excellent counsel.
 Yet once more I address thee in words than adamant firmer.
 When the foe shall have taken whatever the limit of Cecrops
 Holds within it, and all which divine Cithæron shelters,
 Then far-seeing Jove grants this to the prayers of Athene;
 Safe shall the wooden wall continue for thee and thy children.
 Wait not the tramp of the horse, nor the footman mightily moving
 Over the land, but turn your back to the foe, and retire ye.
 Yet shall a day arrive when ye shall meet him in battle.
 Holy Salamis, thou shalt destroy the offspring of women,
 When men scatter the seed, or when they gather the harvest.” ¹

With this answer the messengers returned to Athens. Straightway there arose a great discussion as to the meaning of the oracle. There were various opinions as to what was meant by the phrase “ wooden wall.” Some thought that thereby the priestess directed them to seek refuge in the forests on the mountains ; others believed the oracle meant that they should defend the Acropolis, as in ancient times the height had been surrounded by a wooden palisade. Still others thought it clear that the oracle commanded them to rely upon their ships — plainly these were the “ wooden wall.”

But if the oracle pointed to the fleet, then what was the meaning of the line, “ Holy Salamis, thou shalt destroy the offspring of women ” ? These words seemed to presage disaster. But Themistocles, who favored that interpretation of the phrase “ wooden wall ” which made it to mean the Athenian navy, called attention to the significance of the phrase “ Holy Salamis,” saying that if the god had meant to foretell a calamity to the Athenians, the possessors of the island, this expression would not have been used, but rather that of “ Luckless Salamis.” Plainly it all meant

¹ Herod. vii. 141 (Rawlinson's Trans.).

that the barbarians and not the Athenians were there to meet with a great calamity.¹

The interpretation given the oracle by Themistocles was accepted by the Athenians, and helped to shape their course of action when the critical moment arrived. First, the aged men, the women, the children, and the slaves were carried to different places of safety, — to Ægina, Salamis, and Troezen. The last-named city, which all through this fight for Greek independence showed a noble, self-sacrificing spirit, received the greater part of the homeless fugitives and cared for them as for her own, even paying the school expenses of the children, and permitting them to pick fruit wherever they might find it.² The flight was hurried, for a prodigy gave warning that there was no time to lose. The guardian serpent that the Athenians believed lived on the Acropolis had abandoned the place. This was revealed by the fact, announced by the priestess, that the food regularly set out for it, and hitherto as regularly consumed, had been untouched. As the withdrawal of the gods from a city was regarded by the ancients as a sure presage of its approaching destruction, the Athenians now hastened their departure from their doomed homes.³

With their wives and children conveyed to places of safety, all the fighting men of Athens crowded into the ships which had been engaged in the work of removal, and joined the fleet of the allies that lay at anchor off Salamis. All the villages and homesteads of Attica, together with the capital, were thus abandoned to the barbarians.

The Burning of Athens by the Persians. — The Athenians had barely effected the removal of their families, before there came

¹ Herod. vii. 142, 143. It is probable that both these oracles had been secured from Delphi through the influence of Themistocles. By the first threatening message, he probably aimed to bring the Athenians to the resolve to abandon Attica; and, by the second, to inspire them with courage to offer the enemy battle at Salamis.

² Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 10.

³ The circulation of this report was probably another device of Themistocles to bring the people to a prompt acquiescence in his proposal that they should abandon their homes.

to them at Salamis a messenger with the news that the barbarians, having on their way through Bœotia burned the deserted towns of Thespiæ and Plataea, which the Thebans had pointed out to Xerxes as places whose inhabitants were hostile to him, were now in Attica ravaging the fields far and wide.

The news proved true. After a march of four months from the crossing of the Hellespontine bridges, the avenging Xerxes stood with his army in front of the city whose inhabitants had defied and insulted his father by giving aid to his rebel subjects, and by casting his heralds into a pit. The city was wholly deserted, saving the presence of a few people on the Acropolis. These had taken refuge there, and barricaded the height with stakes and boards, being convinced that they had the right meaning of the oracle in interpreting the "wooden wall" as pointing to the Acropolis and not to the fleet. Being besieged here by the Persians, they made an obstinate defense of the place. But they were fighting against fate. The oracle that had devoted all Attica as a spoil to the barbarians must needs be fulfilled. The citadel soon fell into the hands of the barbarians, and all of its defenders perished. The temple of Athena and the other buildings on the height were given to the flames. Sardis was avenged. The joy in distant Susa, when a messenger from Xerxes arrived there with the news, was unbounded.¹

The Greek Generals in Council at Salamis. — While the Persians were thus overrunning Attica and sacking and burning Athens, the Greek fleet, in which the hopes of the patriot party were now centred, lay moored, as we have just noticed, in front of the island of Salamis. Here the ships that had fought at Artemisium had been reinforced by fifty-four other vessels from various cities of the mainland and of the islands, so that the whole number of ships in the allied armament amounted to near four hundred, the greater part of which were triremes.

The chief command of the fleet was still held by the Spartan Eurybiades, who, when the ships were mustered, called a council

¹ Herod. viii. 99.

of the leaders to decide respecting the place where battle should be offered the barbarians. Opinions were, as usual, divided. Some were for fighting where they were ; but others, particularly the Peloponnesians, were in favor of a battle at the Isthmus, so that in case of defeat they should be able to get home by land, whereas, if defeated at Salamis, they would be imprisoned on the island.¹

The greater number voted in favor of the proposal to fight at the Isthmus. Themistocles, greatly distressed over this decision, returned to his vessel. Here he was met by his teacher and friend Mnesiphilus, a patriot of clear counsel, who, upon hearing from Themistocles the resolve of the leaders, advised him to return straightway to Eurybiades, and representing to him that if once the ships left Salamis no power on earth could hold them together and prevent their scattering to their homes, endeavor to prevail upon him to use all his influence to hold the fleet where it then lay, and there fight in defense of their common fatherland.

Themistocles, acting upon the advice of Mnesiphilus, went to the ship of Eurybiades, and besought an interview. This being granted, Themistocles rehearsed all the arguments against the Isthmian project and those in favor of fighting the Persians at Salamis, and in so far won Eurybiades to his way of thinking that he agreed to call the captains to a second council for a reconsideration of the recent vote.

When the captains were again assembled, Themistocles, addressing his words to Eurybiades, and avoiding the use of all arguments that might give offense to any of the allies, rehearsed at length the advantages of Salamis over the Isthmus for a fight with the enemy. The substance of these was that at Salamis the Greeks would fight in a narrow channel, and thus be at no disadvantage on account of the small number of their ships as compared with that of the barbarians ; and that a victory gained at the island would contribute just as much to the defense of the Peloponnesus as one gained at the Isthmus, and besides would save Salamis,

¹ Herod. viii. 48.

Megara, and Ægina, which the other course would at the outset abandon to the enemy. Nor did he neglect to remind the assembly of the oracle that had promised them a victory at Salamis.

At this point a certain Corinthian captain, named Adeimantus, bade Themistocles to hold his peace, since, seeing "he was a man without a city," he had no right to a voice in the meeting. The taunt made reference to the fact that Athens was in the possession of Xerxes. Themistocles' grand reply was, in substance, that Athens was there in her ships.

What would have been the issue of the debate which was stirring up so much bad feeling it is difficult to say, had not Themistocles at this stage of the discussion thrown out a threat which apparently outweighed all his arguments. He declared that, if his advice was not followed, the Athenians would withdraw from the fleet, take on board their wives and children and sail away to Italy, and there found a new Athens. This threat caused Eurybiades to give his voice for the course Themistocles urged, and it was decided to offer the enemy battle in front of Salamis.¹

The Greeks are encouraged by a Favorable Omen. — While preparations for the fight were being made, an earthquake shook the island. The pious Greeks, accepting the omen, invoked the tutelary heroes of the place, Telamon and Ajax, and sent a ship to Ægina to bring to Salamis the images of other heroes that were there, — images that the Greeks held in great veneration.

Besides the earthquake there was another omen, which was not observed by the Greeks at Salamis, but which was noticed by some of the Greek exiles who were with Xerxes in Attica, and was afterwards reported by them. These men happened to be near Eleusis, where the Eleusinian festival in honor of Demeter and Persephone was wont to be celebrated by the Athenians, and from there saw a great cloud of dust arising from the road leading from Athens to Eleusis, such as a great procession might stir up, and at the same time heard unearthly voices chanting the Bacchic song. The dust-cloud gradually rose and drifted away in the

¹ For the whole debate, Herod. vii. 56-63.

direction of Salamis. This was taken to presage that the battle would be fought there, and that the gods of the Athenian land would help the Athenians and their allies.¹

The Stratagem of Themistocles. — Not all the Greeks at Salamis had heartily concurred in the resolve to await the Persians there. Those from the Peloponnesus were especially dissatisfied with the decision that held them at the island, as this seemed to them to serve simply the interests of the Athenians, and it began to look as though the fleet would, in spite of everything that could be done or urged, break up and scatter. A third council was called, and another debate took place between those in favor of fighting at the Isthmus and those who insisted upon their risking a battle at Salamis. Themistocles, seeing that those opposed to his plan would carry the meeting, resorted to the following stratagem. He withdrew himself from the council without being observed, and sent hurriedly a trusty slave to the Persian fleet — which, having advanced from Northern Eubœa, was now lying at anchor near the Athenian port of Phalerum — with instructions to say to the Persian commanders that his master was at heart a friend of the Persians, and was hoping for their success; and in order to render them a service had now sent to inform them that the opportune moment for attacking the Greeks had come, as they were quarrelling among themselves and stricken with panic, and thus in no condition to make a stout fight.

The Persians were deceived. They resolved to act at once upon the advice given by Themistocles. During the night on which the misleading message was received, the Persian ships, under cover of the darkness, were so stationed as to block up both ends of the channel between Salamis and the mainland,² and thus to cut off from the Greeks who lay on the Salaminian shore all chance of

¹ Herod. vii. 64, 65.

² Professor Goodwin has shown conclusively that the Persian ships cut off the retreat of the Greeks, not by slipping into the channel between the Attic shore and Psyttaleia and surrounding their fleet as it lay at the town of Salamis, as is assumed by Grote, Cox, Curtius, and others, but by blocking the outlet of the Salaminian

escape. At the same time a detachment of Persians was landed on a little island, called Psyttaleia, situated in the midst of this water passage, as it was thought that the fight would be hottest at this point in the channel, in which case these troops were to kill the Greeks and rescue the Persians who might be cast ashore here.¹

Aristeides comes to the Fleet.—While the Persians were thus quietly and secretly enclosing the Greek fleet, the Greek captains were carrying on their debate into the night, wholly unconscious of the movements of the enemy. The contention was at its height when Aristeides, who had taken advantage of a recent decree of the Athenians inviting exiles whose banishment had been simply for a limited term to return and aid in the defense of Athens against the barbarians, arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Having full knowledge of the situation of things on the island, he went directly to the place where the captains were holding their meeting, and caused Themistocles to be told that Aristeides was outside and wished to speak with him. As Themistocles appeared, Aristeides, extending to his rival his hand, said: "Let our rivalry ever be, and particularly at such a moment as this, a generous contention as to which shall confer the greatest benefit upon our country." He then informed Themistocles that they were surrounded by the Persians, and told him to tell the captains that the time for debate was past.

Themistocles, greatly pleased with this news, made known to Aristeides what he had done, in order to force the Greeks to fight where they were, and then asked him to go within and repeat to the captains what he had just told him. Aristeides entered the meeting, and told the Greek commanders what he had already made known to Themistocles, adding that he had himself only with the greatest difficulty succeeded in passing through the enemy's lines on his way from Ægina.

strait, probably just south of Psyttaleia, and also the entrance of the channel on the Megarian side. See his paper entitled, "The Battle of Salamis," in *Papers of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, vol. i., 1882-83.

¹ Herod. viii. 74-76.



This startling intelligence was received with incredulity by many ; but every doubt was soon removed from all minds by the arrival with the same news of a Grecian trireme which had deserted from the Persian fleet. Debate now gave place to active preparations for battle.¹

The Battle of Salamis (480 B. C.).—The morning following this anxious night, the Greeks, after listening to encouraging speeches from their commanders, manned their ships, pushed a little way from the shore, and arranged themselves in battle order, the Athenian ships holding one end of the line and the Lacedæmonian the other.

Straightway the Persian fleet bore down upon the Grecian ships, and caused them to back towards the shore. At this instant a trireme, darting forward out of the Greek line, boldly charged the enemy, and immediately the fight became general. The Persian ships, Herodotus asserts, fought better here than they did at Artemisium, and for the reason, he thinks, that at Salamis they were fighting under the eye of Xerxes himself ; for the king had caused a throne to be placed on the Attic shore, whence he could overlook the channel where the fight was going on. The Greeks serving in the Persian fleet also fought, for the most part, in a manner worthy of a better cause, only a few seemingly following the exhortation of Themistocles to “fight backwardly” (p. 191).

Artemisia fought with the bravery of a man, and won for herself new distinction in the eyes of all. At a moment of panic and confusion in the lines of the barbarians, while retreating with her galley, she either accidentally or purposely rammed one of the Persian ships, which happened to be in her way, and sunk it. The king’s attention was attracted to the affair ; but he, with those around him, supposed that the ship which Artemisia had destroyed belonged to the Greeks, and, greatly pleased with the splendid service that the queen was rendering him, said to those standing by, “My men have behaved like women, and my women like men.”

¹ Herod. viii. 79-82.

The flight of Artemisia was but an incident of a general retreat of the Persian fleet before the now victorious Greeks. The very multitude of the ships of the barbarians became a source of disaster to them. The galleys pushing back in retreat from the front were intercepted by those crowding up from behind, until all were jammed together in a helpless mass, and many were wrecked. Meanwhile the Athenian triremes on the one side, and those of the Æginetans on the other, were destroying such of the enemy's ships as sought to escape. About two hundred of the Persian ships were destroyed, the wreckage being cast by tide and wind on the shores of Salamis and Attica. The Greeks lost forty ships. The surviving vessels of the shattered barbarian fleet gathered at Phalerum, under shelter of the land forces.

Prominent among those whose deeds of personal address and bravery had contributed largely to the completeness of the great victory, was Aristides; who, when the enemy began to retreat, crossed with some Athenians from Salamis to the islet of Psyttaleia, mentioned above, and slew all the Persian troops that had been landed there before the beginning of the fight. This detachment, according to Æschylus, embraced the very flower of the Persian army, and its destruction caused Xerxes the greatest alarm and grief.¹

Xerxes resolves to retreat. — Immediately after the battle Xerxes dispatched a messenger to Susa with tidings of the disaster that had befallen his fleet. The historian Herodotus and the dramatist Æschylus both paint in vivid colors the dismay that the doleful intelligence produced among the Persians left behind, who had but a few days earlier received from Xerxes a message telling of the burning of Athens and the prosperous running of his affairs.

The battle of Salamis marks a turning-point in the history of the great invasion. The decisiveness of the blow caused Xerxes to lose faith in his undertaking, and he was even filled with apprehension lest the Greeks should sail away to the Hellespont and destroy the bridges there, thus cutting off all means of retreat, and

¹ For details of the fight, Herod. viii. 83-95; and Æschylus, *The Persians*.

endangering his own personal safety. He therefore resolved to hasten back to Asia before the enemy should have time to execute what he feared they had in mind. But as it was necessary that the Greeks should be kept in ignorance of his intentions, he set his army at work building a causeway from the Attic shore to Salamis, and started other works as though he were going to stay in Greece and vigorously push the war.

Mardonius, however, was well aware of the real intentions of Xerxes, and encouraged him to carry them into execution. But he exhorted the king to leave him behind with three hundred thousand of the best troops, and with this force he promised to retrieve the misfortune at Salamis and conquer the whole of Greece. He did not think they should be wholly disheartened because, through the poor fighting qualities of the diverse nations making up the sea forces, they had suffered a defeat on the water; the Greeks, though good sailors, were of little account on land.

The advice of Mardonius fell in with the feelings of the king, and preparations for the retreat were begun. Xerxes gave orders to the fleet at Phalerum to sail at once with all haste to the Hellespont, for the purpose of protecting the bridges; and then he himself with the land forces began to retrace through Attica and Bœotia the blackened trail which marked the route by which his devastating army had so recently advanced.¹

The Greeks pursue the Persian Fleet. — The Greeks had been completely deceived as to the plans of the Persians. They were busy getting their ships ready for another attack, when intelligence was brought to them that the enemy's fleet had secretly withdrawn from Phalerum and was on its way towards the Hellespont. Straightway they set out in pursuit, following the retreating enemy as far as Andros, without catching a glimpse of a barbarian ship.

At this island the Greeks held a council, at which the question was whether they should go on to the Hellespont and break down the bridges, or return home. Themistocles was in favor of con-

¹ Herod. viii. 97-103, 107.

tinuing the pursuit and destroying the bridges. He was opposed by the Spartan Eurybiades, who maintained that for the Greeks to thus shut up Xerxes' army in Europe would be the very worst thing they could possibly do, since the barbarians, having no alternative but to fight, would fight desperately and conquer the whole of the continent. He advised that the retreat of the barbarians out of Europe should rather be made easy. After they were all well out of Greece and in Asia, then the Greeks might attack them there.

Eurybiades carried with him all the other Peloponnesian members of the council. Seeing that his first advice found little or no favor save among the Athenians, Themistocles now turned completely about and made a strong speech on the lines that had been drawn by Eurybiades. It was wise, he said, never to press a conquered enemy too hard, as despair might nerve them to renewed efforts that would bring them victory.¹

It was maintained by the enemies of Themistocles, when later events revealed to the Athenians the real character of the man, that he said these things at this time in order to place Xerxes under obligation to him, thinking that some time or other he might need a friend in Persia.

The Greeks collect Fines from the Medizing Islanders. — The pursuit having been relinquished, the Greeks, acting at the instigation of Themistocles, proceeded to punish, by the levying of fines, certain cities of the Cyclades for having given aid to the barbarians.

The first demand for money was made of the city of Andros. The men of this city refused to pay. Themistocles told them that they must, as he had in his ships "two powerful gods — Persuasion and Necessity." The Andrians responded that they had what for this emergency were two mightier gods — "Poverty and Helplessness." The Andrian gods prevailed over the strong gods of the Athenians, and Themistocles got no money from the Andrians; although he is said to have secured a large ran-

¹ Herod. viii. 109.

som from the Parians and other islanders. Herodotus charges Themistocles with having kept some of this money and turned it to his own use.

The Retreat of Xerxes to Sardis. — While the Greeks were thus employed among the islands, Xerxes was hastening on his retreat up through Greece. Arriving in Thessaly, he left Mardonius here with three hundred thousand picked men, many of them Persians of quality and wealth, and including the Ten Thousand Immortals. It was the arrangement that this force should winter in Thessaly and Macedonia, and the following spring again march south and complete the conquest of Greece.

With the remainder of his army Xerxes continued his retreat toward Asia, being escorted by sixty thousand of the select troops of Mardonius, under the lead of Artabazus. In about one-half the time that had been consumed in the advance march, Xerxes reached the Hellespont, but with his army terribly thinned through famine, thirst, heat, cold, fatigue, and disease, all of which had pursued and distressed the fugitives in their hurried flight through Macedonia and Thrace.

The Hellespontine bridges were gone, having been swept away like the earlier ones by a storm ; so Xerxes and the troops that remained were carried across the channel in boats.¹ From the Hellespont Xerxes went up to Sardis, where he remained for a while, seemingly reluctant to return to his capital Susa, from which he had set out so short a time before in such pride and state. Such was the end of the great invasion, so far as it was under the lead of the king himself.

The Greeks dedicate the First-fruits of Salamis to the Gods and allot the Prizes of Valor. — Upon the return to Salamis of the ships that had been sent in pursuit of the barbarian fleet, the Greeks first attended to the setting aside of the first-fruits of their

¹ There afterwards circulated among the Greeks a highly embellished tale of Xerxes' passage from Europe to Asia, which even the story-loving Herodotus himself, though he repeats it, felt constrained to confess had no basis whatever in actual fact. See his history, viii. 118.

victory as a gift to the gods, and the allotting to the most worthy of the prizes of valor. As it was a naval victory that the gods had helped the Greeks to win, three of the captured galleys were dedicated to them in their several temples — one at the Isthmus to Neptune, the ruler of the waves that had engulfed such multitudes of the barbarians ; one at Sunium to Athena, who had inspired the wise counsel of the Greeks ; and one at Salamis to the hero Ajax, who had helped the Greeks at the island. Also rich gifts were sent to the Delphian Apollo, to whose inspiring counsels it was due that Salamis should henceforth be held “ holy ” by the men of Hellas. These gifts to the oracle, consisting of bronze spoils from the barbarians, were cast into a statue of Apollo, eighteen feet in height, and bearing in one hand the usual emblem of a naval victory, — the beak of a ship.¹

After they had thus made their offerings to the gods, the Greeks assembled at the Isthmus, in order to award the prizes for zeal, valor, and merit among the various cities, warriors, and commanders. To Ægina, among the states, was given the first prize, and to Athens the second, though surely these awards should have been reversed ; but jealousy of Athens prevented the allies from rendering her the meed of praise which was richly her due for her services and sacrifices in the common cause. To an Æginetan soldier, too, was also allotted the first prize for personal valor, and to two Athenians the second.

When it came to adjudging the awards of merit among the generals, each of the commanders, it is said, cast his ballot for himself for the first prize, and the majority of them for Themistocles for the second prize. The result was that no awards were allotted. It was, however, almost universally conceded that the first prize should have been given to Themistocles ; and the Spartans, probably through policy, — for the services of Themistocles could not yet be dispensed with, as the barbarian army was still in Greece, — invited him to Sparta, and there made amends to him for his disappointment by according to him honors such as no Greek

¹ Herod. viii. 121.

had ever before received at their hands. They gave him an olive crown, a splendid chariot, a large sum of money, and, in addition to all, when he set out on his return to Athens, escorted him as far as Tegea, in Arcadia, with an honor guard of three hundred Spartan knights.¹

REFERENCES. — Æschylus, *The Persians*. An historical drama which celebrates the victory of Salamis. Rawlinson's Herodotus, viii. 41-125. Plutarch, *Life of Aristeides*. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 315-331. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 202-241; (twelve volume ed.), vol. v. pp. 104-147. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 175-205. Church, *Stories from the Greek Tragedians*, ch. entitled, "The Story of the Persians, or the Battle of Salamis."

¹ Herod. viii. 93, 124.

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CHAPTER XIV.

THE CAMPAIGN OF MARDONIUS: PLATÆA AND MYCALE.

(479 B.C.)

Artabazus in Chalcidice (479 B.C.). — After Artabazus had seen Xerxes safely across the Hellespont (p. 207), he turned back, and with his large escort marched towards Thessaly. Arriving at Chalcidice, he found many of the cities of that region, encouraged by the recent misfortunes of the Persians, in full revolt against the Great King. Chief among the places which had thus cast off their allegiance was Potidæa. To this city, as well as to Olynthus, which he suspected of the intention to revolt, Artabazus laid regular siege. Olynthus soon falling into his hands, all the inhabitants were taken to a spot outside the walls and slain, while the territory of the city was given to the Chalcidians. In front of Potidæa, however, the Persians suffered a heavy loss from an unusual rise and overflow of the sea, and, raising the siege, Artabazus resumed his march to Thessaly, where the greater part of the Persian forces left with Mardonius had passed the winter.

Mardonius attempts to bribe the Athenians. — With the opening of the spring of 479 B.C., Mardonius, having first consulted various Greek oracles, sent an embassy to Athens for the purpose of endeavoring to detach the Athenians — whom he recognized as the mainstay of the naval power of the Greeks — from the Hellenic league and to persuade them to form an alliance with the Persians. This commission was entrusted to Alexander of Macedonia, whose friendly relations with the Athenians, Mardonius conceived, would help to secure a prosperous issue of the embassy.

Arriving at Athens, to which the people had returned after the retreat of the Persians, Alexander laid before the Athenians the overtures that he bore from Mardonius. These were, in substance, that Xerxes would wholly overlook the past, give back to them their territory and aid them in winning more besides if they wished, help them to restore their temples, and leave them their freedom, provided only they would form an alliance with him. To these words which Alexander had received from Mardonius, he added others of his own, as a friend urging the Athenians to accept the terms offered by the Persians and not to persist in a contention which would be sure to entail on them infinite suffering, and which in the end could have but one issue — their utter ruin.

At this stage of the proceedings at Athens, envoys appeared from Sparta; for when the Spartans had heard that Mardonius had sent an embassy to the Athenians with offers of friendship, they were alarmed lest the Athenians should accept the terms offered, and had straightway dispatched deputies to Athens to expostulate with the Athenians against their entering into an alliance with the barbarians. The Athenians had felt certain that the Spartans, as soon as they heard of the Persian embassy, would do just this thing, and consequently had lengthened their conferences with Alexander in order to give the expected envoys from Sparta time to arrive; as they were desirous that these Spartans should themselves hear the brave answer which they were fully minded to give to the Persian proposals.

The Spartan envoys, still ignorant of the mind of the Athenians, began at once to implore them not to yield to the persuasions of Mardonius and become the ally of the Persians. It was they who had started the war and got the other Greeks into the trouble, and it would be a shameful thing for them now to desert their allies and kinsmen. And that the distress of the Athenians — for their fields were lying waste — might not impel them to the dishonorable resolve from which they were trying to dissuade them, the Spartans, in the name of the allies, promised to furnish food for their families until the war was over.

The Athenians now gave to Alexander the answer that he should carry back to Mardonius: "While the sun holds his course in the heavens," it ran, "we will never form a league with the Persian king. Rather shall we never desist from fighting against him, looking for aid to the gods whom he has disdained, and whose temples and statues he has destroyed."

After the Athenians had dismissed Alexander with this answer, Aristides, as spokesman for his fellow-citizens, told the Spartan envoys that they ought by this time to have known the Athenians better than for a moment to have thought that they were capable of forming an alliance with the barbarians. "Neither all the gold in the world," said Aristides, "nor the most beautiful and productive of lands, offered them as a bribe, would induce them to join the Medes and help to enslave Hellas." Then the speaker, after referring to the many concurring motives—resentment against the barbarians for ruined homes and desecrated altars, remembrance of their kinship with all the men of Hellas, and their ancient love of freedom—which urged the Athenians to maintain their resolve and to hold fast to the Greek alliance, admonished the ambassadors to see to it that the Lacedæmonians were ready to do their part in the coming war; for they might rest assured that after Mardonius had received the reply the Athenians had sent him, it would not be long before the barbarian army would be on the march towards the south.¹

The Spartans then returned home. Thus were embassies sent, received, and dismissed, and the signal given for the next great fight between the Greeks and the barbarians.

Mardonius marches from Thessaly into Attica.—The Athenians were right in supposing that Mardonius, after receiving their answer, would soon be upon them. He straightway broke up his winter camp and marched towards Athens, drawing to his army immense numbers of hardy recruits from Thrace and Macedonia, splendid horsemen from Thessaly, and soldiers from all the Greek cities along his route. As he marched into Bœotia, the Thebans

¹ Herod. viii. 140-144.

advised him to establish his camp there, and, before attacking the Greek allies, to divide them by bribing some of their chief men. This was doubtless wise counsel; but Mardonius instead of heeding it pushed on into Attica, being impelled, Herodotus says, by a great ambition to be able to send news to Xerxes, by means of fire-signals along the islands in the Ægean, of the capture of Athens.

But Mardonius found only a deserted plain and an empty city, such as Xerxes had found the previous year. For the second time the Athenians had abandoned their homes, and with their families and such of their goods as they could carry with them taken refuge on the island of Salamis and in their ships. They had delayed their flight as long as they dared, hoping that the Spartans would come to their help. But this hope had been disappointed. One cause of this failure of the Spartans to come to the prompt assistance of their faithful allies was the same as that which had brought them too late to Marathon,—their preoccupation in the observance of a sacred festival. Furthermore, they had been hard at work upon the wall across the Isthmus, and had it now in such a state of completion that they had little fear of the barbarians being able to break into the Peloponnesus, and consequently they were indifferent respecting the Athenian alliance.

Mardonius renews his Offers of Friendship to the Athenians.

—Conceiving that under present circumstances the Athenians might think better of their first resolve, Mardonius sent to them at Salamis an envoy, offering again his earlier proposals of friendship and alliance. The proposals of Mardonius having been presented to the Athenian council, one of the members, Lycidas by name, advised that they be laid before the popular assembly for consideration. The mere suggestion that the proposals should be entertained created such indignation among the councillors and those standing around, that they instantly set upon Lycidas and stoned him to death. The women, stirred by the same feelings that had prompted the men to this deed, rushed to the house of Lycidas and stoned to death his wife and children. It is probable that this violent outbreak is in a measure to be attributed to a

suspicion on the part of the Athenians that Lycidas had taken a bribe from Mardonius, and that his counsel had been given in the interest of the barbarians.¹

The Athenians send to Sparta for Help. — From their retreat at Salamis, the Athenians sent messengers to the Spartans to chide them for their past slackness and to admonish them as to their future conduct. In obedience to their instructions, the envoys, upon their arrival at Sparta, sharply upbraided the Spartans because of their ungenerous treatment of their Athenian allies, who had just given such proof of their readiness to sacrifice everything for the common cause, and then called upon them to promptly muster their forces with those of Athens, Plataea, and Megara, in Attica, in order to there offer battle to the invaders.

The ephors acted with great deliberation, and kept the Athenian ambassadors waiting several days for a reply to their demands. It seems evident that they were relying upon the Isthmian wall, and the patriotism of the Athenians. They were, however, reminded by an influential Tegean that they might go too far in their selfish policy, and, through breaking faith with the Athenians, drive them into an alliance with the Persians. Then, with the Athenian fleet at the service of Mardonius, the wall across the Isthmus would be of little account.

These representations of the danger they would incur through a persistence in their selfish and ungenerous treatment of their allies led the ephors to the resolve to send at once a body of troops, under the command of the regent Pausanias, to the Isthmus. But they hid this intention from the Athenian ambassadors, and dispatched the forces secretly by night. The next day the envoys, being about to return home, thinking their commission had resulted in nothing, first heaped reproaches on the ephors, and then gave notice to them that the Athenians, since they were deserted by their allies, would, through necessity, make the best terms they could with the barbarians. When it was too late, then the Spartans would realize the evil they had brought upon themselves

¹ Herod. ix. 5.

through their desertion of such good friends and allies as the Athenians.¹

To these upbraidings the ephors replied by informing the envoys that the Spartan forces were already a good distance on the march to the Isthmus. The situation finally becoming clear to the ambassadors, they set out for home, but not without their own opinion as to the whole proceeding on the part of the Spartans.

Although the Spartans were so dilatory in starting, still when finally they did move, they moved with an army worthy of the place they held as leaders of the Greeks, and commensurate with the gravity of the danger that was threatening. The detachment sent on in the night consisted of five thousand Spartans, and thirty-five thousand Helots, seven to each Spartan. To this force was afterwards added five thousand Pericæci, each attended by one Helot, so that an army of fifty thousand, all told, marched from Laconia. It was the largest army that Sparta had ever put into the field, and greatly exceeded in number any force that she ever afterwards mustered for any undertaking. Nothing but a full, though late, realization of how critical was the situation could have nerved her to this supreme effort.

Mardonius ravages Attica and withdraws into Bœotia. — The fact that the Spartans were on the march in force towards the Isthmus was made known to Mardonius by a messenger from Argos ; for the Argives, through hatred of the Spartans, were acting in the interest of the barbarians. Upon the receipt of this intelligence Mardonius determined to withdraw from the mountain-hemmed Attica into Bœotia, where he would be among friends, and where the nature of the ground would enable him to use his cavalry to advantage. Before leaving Attica, however, he destroyed at Athens all the buildings that had escaped destruction the previous year or which had since been restored by the Athenians, and ravaged the plain anew. Then, after a cavalry raid into Megaris in the vain hope of destroying a small force of Spartans that he had learned was in that region, he led his army over a low pass in

¹ Herod. ix. 11.

the hills that border the Athenian lands on the north, and thus came into Bœotia.

Once in the Bœotian territory, Mardonius bent his course towards Thebes, and, sitting down in a fortified camp on the banks of the Asopus in the neighborhood of that city, awaited the arrival of the Greeks.

The Greeks follow the Persians into Bœotia: they repulse a cavalry Attack.—Meanwhile the Peloponnesian allies were mustering at the Isthmus. Being assembled, they offered sacrifices, and finding the omens favorable, set forward on the march to Eleusis in Attica, where they were joined by the Athenians. The allied army then crossed the hills into Bœotia, and drew up their forces on the lower slopes of Mount Cithæron, directly in front of the barbarian camp.

In this position the Greeks were attacked by the Persian cavalry, commanded by Masistius, a rich Persian of unusual beauty of person, of gigantic stature, and a commander of great ability. The charge, however, was repulsed, and Masistius, having been thrown from his horse, was surrounded by the enemy and killed. It is said that beneath his scarlet tunic he wore a golden breastplate, which rendered harmless all the blows the Athenians rained upon his body, and that they were able to slay him only by the thrust of a weapon into his eye.

Masistius was, after Mardonius, the most indispensable and most highly esteemed man in the Persian army, and his death was mourned by the barbarians with such Oriental vehemence that, in the words of Herodotus, "all Bœotia resounded with the lamentations."¹

After the repulse of the cavalry attack, the Greeks abandoned their first position and took up a new one nearer Plataea, which offered special advantages in the abundance of its springs and the nature of the ground.

The Tegeans and Athenians contend for the Place of Honor.

In the arrangement of the confederate lines, a sharp dispute

¹ Herod. ix. 19-24.

arose between the Athenians and the Tegeans as to which should be assigned the second place of honor, on the left wing. The Tegeans stoutly insisted upon being given the place, since from the time of the Return of the Dorians this place had always been theirs by privilege and right, having been earned by many a brave fight and many a memory-worthy exploit. The Athenians had done nothing, they said, either in ancient or modern times, to entitle them to the place.

The Athenians, stirred up by the last observation of the Tegeans, responded with warmth, and enumerated some of the things they had done, alike in remote and in recent times. They recited their deeds in the times of the Heraclidæ; their exploits under the lead of their king Theseus in the War of the Seven against Thebes; their fight, under the lead of the same king, against the Amazons; their services in the Trojan War; and then, coming down to more modern times, "since a nation once brave might in the lapse of time degenerate and be brave no longer," they reminded the Tegeans of Marathon—where the Athenians stood almost alone against "forty and six nations." If they had never done anything else, that would entitle them to all the privileges the Greeks could grant.


Having thus shown how good was their claim to the disputed honor, the Athenians addressed themselves to the Spartans, with whom the decision rested, saying that though they certainly had a right to the place in question, still they were ready to take any station that might be assigned them.

The Athenians carried the day; for by acclamation the Spartan troops accorded to them the post of honor on the left wing, while they themselves held the right.¹

The Battle of Platæa (479 B.C.). — For ten days the two armies,

¹ Herod. ix. 26–28. The Greek army thus marshalled at Platæa was the largest that the Greeks had ever gathered. There were 110,000 men, of which number 38,000 were hoplites. The barbarians outnumbered the Greeks probably three to one; for in addition to the force of 300,000 Asiatic troops that Xerxes had left behind with Mardonius, he now had under his command Greek auxiliaries that had joined him to the estimated number of 50,000. Herod. ix. 32.

with the Asopus separating their lines, confronted one another, both refraining from opening the battle because the omens were not propitious. The general engagement was finally brought on



(From Grote's Greece.)

in the following manner. Several circumstances made it necessary for the Greeks again to change their position. First, in their present position, they were greatly harassed by the Persian horse; second, the spring¹ upon which they relied had been choked up

¹ The fountain of Gargaphia.

and ruined by the enemy ;¹ and third, the Persian cavalry shut up their provision trains in the passes of the Cithæron, and they were without food.

These various circumstances led the Greeks to resolve upon a retreat towards Plataea, where there was abundant water, and where the nature of the ground would afford them protection from the enemy's cavalry, while their proximity to the passages through the Cithæron would enable them to protect their provision trains. It was agreed that the movement should be executed under cover of the following night.

At the hour decided upon, the contingents forming the centre of the Greek line began their march promptly, but, in their anxiety to get as far as possible from the Persians, moved back some distance beyond the designated spot. The march of the Spartans was delayed until morning through the obstinacy of one of the captains, who, deeming a retreat disgraceful, refused to move his command, and wasted precious hours in arguing the matter with Pausanias. This quarrel delayed also the Athenians, for they were timing their movements by those of the Spartans. The result was the morning found the wings of the Greek army widely separated, and upon the march, instead of being properly marshalled in battle order along the proposed new line.²

Day revealed to the barbarians the movements of Pausanias. Thinking the Greeks to be in full retreat, the whole Persian army, with ranks all in disorder, started in pursuit. The Spartans and Tegeans, soon overtaken, turned upon their pursuers, and engaged them in a firm hand-to-hand fight. Pausanias sent a messenger to the Athenians asking aid ; but the Athenians were now themselves being attacked, and could extend no succor. But the Spartans and Tegeans alone were more than a match for the barbarians. The Persians, fighting bravely, but in a haphazard way, fell in heaps before the Spartan spears. At last Mardonius was slain.

¹ The Persian cavalry prevented the Greeks, who had no horse, from going down to the river for water.

² Herod. ix. 49-57.

This virtually decided the battle. Disordered masses of the barbarians — for when the other Asiatic troops saw the Persians give way they also turned in flight — crowded towards the fortified enclosure (p. 216).

At this critical moment, Artabazus marched treacherously from the field, taking with him the forty thousand troops under his command. The Greeks in the Persian ranks, for the most part, “fought backwardly,” showing that though they were marching with the Great King’s army, their hearts were not in his business; but such of the Thebans as had espoused the Persian cause from hatred of the Athenians, fought obstinately. When finally they did give way, they found a refuge within the walls of their own city.

The Spartans in their pursuit coming up to the palisade, at once assailed it; but not being skilful in attack upon walls, made no headway until the Athenians arrived, when a breach was soon made in the defenses, and the place taken by storm. The barbarians seem to have been slain here almost to a man. Not counting the forty thousand men led away by Artabazus,¹ only about three thousand of the barbarians, according to Herodotus, survived the battle. This is probably an exaggeration; but in any event the barbarian army was virtually annihilated. The loss of the Greeks was only a little over thirteen hundred.²

The Prize of Valor, the Booty, and the Offerings to the Gods.

— Before making a division of the booty, the victors, in accordance with their custom, first allotted the prize of valor. Both the Athenians and the Spartans were claimants for the honor, and so violent was the contention between them that, to avoid a civil

¹ Artabazus directed his march, or rather flight, towards the Bosphorus. In passing through Thrace he lost a large part of his troops through famine and the swords of the natives. With the survivors, he finally escaped into Asia.

² A tale told of Pausanias in this connection is valuable, whether strictly true or not, as illustrating the Greek abhorrence of the Oriental practice of mutilating the bodies of their slain enemies. An Æginetan having urged Pausanias, in revenge for the shameful treatment that the barbarians had accorded to the body of Leonidas at Thermopylæ (p. 187), to behead and suspend on a cross the body of Mardonius, Pausanias rebuked him severely, declaring that to misuse the dead was an act befitting a barbarian, but unworthy of a Greek. Herod. ix. 79.

war, Aristides, the Athenian commander, proposed that the matter be referred to a council of all the Greeks. At this meeting, a citizen of Corinth moved that the prize be bestowed upon the Plataeans, which was accordingly done, and peace established; for no one could be envious or jealous of the brave but unfortunate little state of Plataea.¹

The spoils of the battle-field were unusually rich, for multitudes of noble and wealthy Persians were among the slain. The captured camp was filled with the richest gold-plated furniture, with gold and silver drinking-cups, bowls, bracelets, chains, and other ornaments of every kind, with inlaid weapons and armor. Among the spoils was the magnificent war-tent of Xerxes, which he had left behind for Mardonius. Seeing this with all its luxurious appointments, Pausanias ordered the Persian cooks to make ready a banquet, such as they were used to prepare for their master, and, at the same time, directed his own men to lay a Spartan meal. The ludicrous contrast moved Pausanias to laughter, and, causing the Greek leaders to be summoned, he said to them, directing their attention to the two tables: "Consider the folly of this Persian, who, having such a luxurious table at home, should come so far to possess himself of our meager fare."²

A tithe of all the spoils was presented to Apollo at Delphi. Out of the gold that fell to his share was moulded a tripod, which was mounted on a bronze stool, formed of three entwined serpents. More than a hundred years after the battle, the tripod was stolen by the Phocians, but a portion of the bronze pedestal may be seen to-day at Constantinople. Out of another part of the brazen spoils were made two colossal statues, one for the Olympian Zeus, and the other for the Isthmian Neptune.

To Zeus the Protector was also raised an altar at Plataea. This was done in obedience to an oracle from Delphi, which had further given instructions that no sacrifices should be offered upon

¹ We follow here Plutarch, *Aristides*, 20. Herodotus does not tell to whom the prize was allotted, nor does he speak of the strife between Athens and Sparta.

² Herod. ix. 52.

the new altar until all the fires throughout the Plataean district had been extinguished, because they had been defiled by the presence of the barbarians, and clean fire brought from the common hearth at Delphi. In accordance with these instructions, every fire in Plataea and the surrounding country was extinguished, even the coals at the pyres of the dead being quenched. Then a swift Plataean runner, Euchidas by name, hastened to Delphi, took fire from the altar there, and then ran back to Plataea, making the run both ways, a distance of one hundred and twenty-five miles, in one day. Embracing his friends, he gave to them the sacred fire, and then, like the runner from Marathon, fell dead.¹

When the portion of the booty devoted to the gods had been set aside, the remainder was distributed among the victors, Pausanias receiving a tenfold portion.²

The Consecration of the Plataean Land. — We have seen that the prize of valor was given to the Plataeans. The honor was worthily bestowed, for the Plataeans had not only fought well alongside their patrons and friends the Athenians, but had also given a splendid example of self-devotion for the common cause ; for when just before the battle an oracle from Delphi had told the Athenians that they would gain the victory if they fought on their own territory, the Plataeans had straightway voted that their land should be given to Athens in order that the Athenians, without withdrawing from where they stood, as they were minded to do, might fight on their own soil for their own freedom and that of the other Greeks.

The Plataean land did not, however, remain a part of the Athenian territory. After the battle, Aristides, who feared on the one hand that such an extension of Attica might arouse jealousy, and on the other hand was unwilling to leave the Plataeans, who had been such devoted allies of Athens, exposed to the resentment of their enemies the Thebans, proposed that the Plataean land should, like that of Elis in the Peloponnesus, be declared sacred

¹ Plut. *Aristeides*, 20.

² Herod. ix. 71-83, for various details of the battle.

and inviolable, as the spot where the gods had given the Greeks their glorious victory over the barbarians. This was done. Plataea was built up anew, and in front of the city gate was founded a national temple to Zeus the Deliverer, and all the confederates bound themselves to defend as a religious duty the territory thus consecrated, and to punish any city that should violate the peace of the land.

By the Plataeans was assumed the duty of caring for the graves on the battle-field, and of offering each year sacrifices to the manes of "the brave men who had there died for the freedom of Greece." As a further memorial of the battle, it was resolved, on Aristides' proposal, that, besides yearly gatherings at the place of commissioners from all the cities of Greece, every fifth year there should be held a special commemorative "Festival of Freedom," with games and contests and the giving of prizes, like those at Olympia.¹

The same patriotic feelings that had inspired these acts of the confederates, caused them, at this same time, under the lead of Aristides, to renew the alliance which they had formed at Corinth at the beginning of the war. It was resolved that there should be maintained by the confederated states, for guarding the freedom of Greece and for the further prosecution of the war against the barbarians, an army of ten thousand heavy-armed men, a thousand horse, and a hundred war-galleys.

The Punishment of the Thebans. — From the field of Plataea the confederates, before dispersing, marched to the city of Thebes, resolved, in respect to the leaders of the Theban party that had espoused the cause of the barbarians, to carry into effect the resolution of the council of Corinth at the beginning of the war (p. 180). The Thebans refusing to deliver up the chiefs of the Medizing party, the allies laid siege to the city. After a twenty days' investment, the Thebans surrendered the chief offenders, on the understanding that they should be given a fair trial; but as soon as Pausanias had the men in his power, he conveyed them

¹ Plut. *Aristeides*, 21.

to Corinth, having dismissed the allies, and there put them to death. His reason for not allowing the men a trial was the fear that they would bribe their jurors, and thus escape the punishment that they so richly deserved.

The Battle of Mycale (479 B.C.). — Upon the same day, according to tradition, that the Greeks won the victory over the barbarian army at Plataea, they gained another over a combined land and sea force at Mycale in Ionia.

The Greek fleet that fought at Salamis had, after the unsuccessful pursuit of the Persian ships (p. 205) dispersed to their homes for the winter. With the opening of the following spring, the ships of the several states mustered one hundred and eighty strong at Ægina, the Athenian squadron being headed by Xanthippus, who had been given the place held the preceding year by Themistocles, while the supreme command of the allied fleet was in the hands of the Spartan king Leotychides.

The Persian ships that escaped from Salamis, after having ferried across the Hellespont the troops that accompanied Xerxes in his retreat into Asia, withdrew, the greater part of them, to Ionia for the winter. When spring came, all the ships, about three hundred in number, mustered at Samos, and from there watched the cities of Ionia and the Ægean; for since the great fight at Salamis the Greeks enslaved to Persia had been restless, and were ready at the first favorable moment to strike for freedom.

The two fleets, thus situated, were neither of them at first eager to provoke a fight. The Persians could not forget Salamis, and distrusted their ability to cope with the Greeks on the water; but they were still confident of their own superiority on the land, and so waited quietly for the arrival of the expected good news from Mardonius. The Greeks, on the other hand, were timid, and could not be induced to venture into the Ægean beyond Delos.

While the Greek fleet was lying at this island, certain Samians came thither secretly, and urged the leaders to cross to Ionia, saying that the Ionians only needed a glimpse of their ships to be incited to revolt from the Persians. Leotychides was influenced

to set sail for Samos. As the Greeks approached the island, the Persian fleet fled to Mycale on the Ionian coast, where Xerxes had an army of sixty thousand men. Under shelter of this army, and with its aid, the ships of the fleet were dragged upon the land, and a rampart built round them.

The Greek fleet came on from Samos, and, seeing the state of things, resolved to gain a naval victory on land. Disembarking, they advanced at once to attack the Persians, who were drawn up in battle order in front of the barricade. Just at this moment a rumor spread through the ranks of the Greeks that their brethren had gained a great victory at Plataea. A herald's staff, too, was seen lying on the shore, as though just cast up by the waves. Thus encouraged, the Greeks charged the barbarians in a wild rush, put them to flight, and, pursuing them closely, entered with them into the fortified enclosure. Here all who offered resistance were slain.

The victory was rendered more complete by the action of the Greeks in the Persian army, who, when they saw how affairs were running, turned their arms against the barbarians. "On that day," says Herodotus, "the Ionians revolted a second time from the Persians." After the battle, the Greeks carried the booty to their vessels, and then burned the Persian ships where they lay. They then sailed away to Samos.

This victory at Mycale was a fitting sequel to the one at Plataea : that had freed European Greece from the presence of the barbarians ; this, in the phrase of Herodotus, "restored to Grecian freedom the Hellespont and the islands." For straightway Samos, Chios, Lesbos, and the other islands of the Ægean that had been in vassalage to Persia were now liberated, and at once received as members into the confederacy of the patriot states of the mother land, and gave oath that they would be faithful to the cause of Hellas.¹

The Greek Fleet in the Hellespont. — The victorious fleet bore away from Mycale to the Hellespont, in order to break down the

¹ Herod. ix. 90-106.

bridges, which were assumed to be still in existence. Upon arrival there and finding that the winds had destroyed the bridges (p. 207), the Spartan contingent of the fleet sailed for home, while the Athenians laid siege to Sestus, in the Thracian Chersonese, and just as winter was coming on, forced the place to open its gates.

The Athenians now returned home for the winter, carrying with them sections of the broken bridge-cables which they had found at Sestus, and which were placed within the temple of Athena on the Acropolis, there to serve both as a proud trophy of the war, and as an impressive illustration of the divine punishment that had befallen the audacious and impious attempt of the barbarians to lay a yoke upon the sacred waters of the Hellespont.¹

REFERENCES.—Rawlinson's Herodotus, viii. 126-144; *ib.* xi. 1-107. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 321-352. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 242-294; (twelve volume ed.), vol. v. pp. 147-203. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 206-242.

¹ Herod. ix. 114, 115, 118, 121.



PART THIRD.

FROM THE PERSIAN WARS TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

(479-431 B.C.)



CHAPTER XV.

THE MAKING OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

(479-445 B.C.)

The Rebuilding of Athens : the New Walls. —After the battle of Plataea and the expulsion of the barbarians from Greece, the Athenians who had found an asylum at Salamis, Ægina, and other places returned to Athens. They found only a heap of ruins where their city had once stood. All the houses, save a few that had been used as quarters by the Persian officers, had been burned, and even the city walls, it would seem, had for the most part been thrown down.

Under the lead of Themistocles, the people, with admirable spirit, set themselves to the task of rebuilding their homes and erecting new walls. The exalted hopes for the future of their city which had been raised in the Athenians by their almost incredible achievements during the past few months, together with their resolve to create an asylum large enough to receive the

whole population of Attica in case of another invasion, so that they should never again be forced to become exiles without a city, led them to trace a vast circuit of seven miles around the Acropolis as the line of the new ramparts.

The states of the Peloponnesian League, particularly Ægina and Corinth, watched the proceedings of the Athenians with the most jealous interest. While they could not but admire Athens, still they feared her. The Spartans, informed by the Æginetans of what was going on in Attica, sent an embassy to dissuade the Athenians from rebuilding their walls, hypocritically assigning as the ground of their interest in the matter their fear lest, in case of another Persian invasion, the city, if captured, should become a stronghold for the enemy.

Themistocles, "the Athenian Odysseus," had a talent for just such diplomacy as the case seemed to demand; for the Athenians were not strong enough to insist by force of arms upon their right to manage their own affairs. Accordingly Themistocles caused the Spartan envoys to be sent home with the reply that Athens would send commissioners to Sparta to consider the matter in council there. Then, as one of the envoys, he himself set out for Sparta, having previously arranged that the other members of the commission should not leave Athens until the walls were sufficiently advanced to defy assault. With astonishing unanimity and energy, the entire population of Athens, the rich and the poor, men, women, and children, set to work upon the walls. Material was torn from temples and tombs and built into the defenses.

While this was going on at Athens, Themistocles was at Sparta, with amazing address wondering with the Lacedæmonians what so delayed his colleagues. From day to day the business upon which he had come was postponed, in order to give time for the arrival of the tardy envoys. At length rumors came to Sparta of the state of affairs at Athens. Themistocles assured the people that these were mere idle reports. Fresh rumors came. Then he advised the Spartans to send messengers of their own to Athens to get

the truth of the matter. They did so. But Themistocles had already dispatched a messenger to the Athenians informing them that the Spartan envoys were on the way, and ordering their detention in Athens as hostages for himself and the other members of the embassy, who had now arrived at Sparta.

By all these stratagems sufficient time was gained to enable the Athenians to carry the wall to such a height that they could defy interference. Then Themistocles boldly administered some "wholesome advice to the Spartans. He told them, when they and their allies sent ambassadors again to Athens, to deal with the Athenians as with reasonable men, who could discern what belonged to their own interest, and what to the general interest of Greece."

These circumstances attendant upon the refortifying of the Athenian capital we have narrated at some length, because of the light they throw upon the succeeding history of Athens. They exhibit the tremendous energy with which the recent great events of the Persian War, and Athens' part in them all, had inspired the Athenians. As Grote observes, both arm and mind were strung to the very highest pitch. It was this tension, calling forth the very best in every man, that carried forward events at Athens in such a remarkable manner during the generation immediately following the War of Liberation.

This contention respecting the walls of Athens also affords us a glimpse of the rising jealousy between Sparta and other states and Athens, which at last, intensified by different political tendencies, issued in the long and calamitous struggle of the Peloponnesian War.

The Fortifications of the Peiræus (478-477 B.C.).—At the same time that the work of restoration was going on at Athens, the fortifications of the harbor of Peiræus, begun, as we have seen, at an earlier date (p. 162), were being enlarged and strengthened. Themistocles was here merely carrying out the maritime policy which he had formulated for the Athenians before the invasion of Xerxes, and to which the circumstances of the past few months

had given a most emphatic endorsement. 'That Athens' supremacy depended upon control of the sea had become plain to all. Consequently the haven-town was now surrounded with walls even surpassing in strength and fully equalling in compass the new walls of the upper city.¹

The Peiræus soon grew into a bustling commercial city, one of the chief centres of trade in the Hellenic world. Its population was made up largely of resident aliens, who were attracted to the place by the extension to them of unusual privileges. The mercantile and trading classes among the Athenian citizens were also naturally drawn thither; and it is said that nothing but the sacred memories and traditions that gathered about the Acropolis prevented the whole population of the upper city from draining itself into the lower town.

In close connection with Themistocles' policy respecting the Peiræus itself, stands his policy in regard to the Athenian navy. The advice which he had given the Athenians respecting the creation of a fleet had proved so wise and prescient that they were quite ready now to listen to his further counsel, so that he easily led them to the resolve to add each year twenty well-equipped triremes to the fleet with which they had fought at Salamis.

The Greek Fleet under Spartan Lead continues the Work of liberating the Greek Cities.—While the building operations we have described were going on at Athens and the Peiræus, the confederate fleet was engaged in setting free those Greek cities which were still held enslaved by the Persians.

The year following the battle of Plataea, a united Peloponnesian and Athenian fleet, under the command of the Spartan Pausanias, sailed to Cyprus, and in a short time succeeded in liberating most of the cities of the island. Then, while the summer winds were still favorable, the union fleet bore away to the Bosphorus, for the purpose of reconquering Byzantium, which was still in the hands of a Persian garrison. Before the close of the season the city

¹ They were seven miles in circuit, about sixteen feet thick, and thirty feet high, and were constructed throughout of solid masonry.

was captured, and thereby the control of the gateway to the Euxine was regained by the Greeks. Not until nearly two thousand years afterwards did it again fall into the hands of Asiatic barbarians.¹

The Treachery of Pausanias.—The unworthy character of the Spartan commander Pausanias now concurred with circumstances to turn the current of Greek history into a channel which probably otherwise it would never have followed. The elevation to which he had been lifted seems to have produced in Pausanias a sort of dizziness. He became incredibly conceited, arrogant, and presumptuous. He had even gone so far as to have engraved on the base of the votive tripod at Delphi (p. 221) an inscription in which he took to himself all the glory of the victory of Plataea. The ephors had caused the offensive legend to be erased, and the marks of the erasure may be seen to-day upon the standard at Constantinople.

At just this time, the insensate ambition of the regent was suggesting to him the scheme of making himself tyrant of all Greece. He believed that, by securing the co-operation of Xerxes through offering to rule in Greece as his viceroy, he could consummate this amazing piece of treachery. In pursuance of his plans, he sent to Susa the Persian prisoners taken at Byzantium, together with a letter in which he actually offered to become the son-in-law of the Great King. A great change had come over the man since the time when, in the tent of Mardonius at Plataea, he had looked with such disdain upon Persian splendor and luxury (p. 221).

Xerxes was naturally greatly pleased with the prospect thus afforded him of yet annexing Greece as a satrapy to his empire, and sent Pausanias assurances of every assistance in men and money. The head of Pausanias seemed now to be completely turned. He dressed like a Persian, surrounded himself with Persian guards, and deported himself generally as though already a satrap of the Great King and tyrant of Hellas. The common

¹ In A.D. 1453 it became the prize of the Ottoman Turks.

soldiers, particularly the Athenians and the other Ionians, he treated with outrageous insolence and cruelty, and behaved towards his brother generals with preposterous arrogance. They were kept waiting when they called to confer with him upon urgent business, or were refused by him an audience altogether, on the ground that he was too busy to see any one.

Matters soon reached a crisis. Some Ionian sailors, indignant beyond self-restraint at the conduct of Pausanias, while cruising one day, purposely ran their ship into the regent's galley; and when he, beside himself with rage, upbraided them for their conduct, they told him to betake himself home, adding that nothing but the memory of Plataea restrained them from visiting upon him then and there the punishment he so richly deserved.

Shortly after this a summons came to Pausanias from the ephors at Sparta, whither information of the state of affairs in the fleet had been carried, commanding him to return home and give an explanation of his behavior.

The Formation of the Confederacy of Delos (477 B.C.). — Having repudiated the authority of Pausanias, the Ionian fleet straightway turned to the Athenian general Aristides as leader and commander. When, a little later, a Spartan general, Dorcis by name, arrived to take the place of Pausanias, the Ionian ships, which constituted the larger part of the fleet, refused to recognize his authority. Thus was transferred from Sparta to Athens that command of the allied fleet of the Greek cities which the Athenians had patriotically yielded to the Spartans when the invasion by Xerxes was impending (p. 180), but to which even at that time they had a just claim, as having the largest navy in Hellas.

Under the inspiration of Aristides, the Ionian states, in order that they might be able to carry on more effectively the work to which they had set their hands of liberating the Greek cities yet in the power of the Persians, now formed a league known as the Confederacy of Delos, in which Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies were to have no part. All the Asian cities of Ionia and Æolus, almost all the island-towns of the Ægean, the cities of

Chalcidice, together with those just set free along the Hellespont and the Bosphorus, became members of the alliance. The league was a free association of independent and equal states. Athens was, indeed, to be the head of the confederacy, but she was not on that account to possess or to exercise any irresponsible authority over the other members of the union. Aristides was chosen as the first president. Matters of common concern were to be in the hands of a congress, convened yearly in the sacred island of Delos, and composed of delegates from all the cities.

At Delos, also, in the temple of Apollo, was to be kept the common treasure-chest, to which each state was to make contribution according to its ability. What proportion of the ships and money needed for carrying out the purposes of the union should be contributed by the several states, was left at first entirely to the decision of Aristides, such was the confidence all possessed in his fairness and incorruptible integrity; and so long as he retained control of the matter, none of the members of the alliance ever had cause of complaint.¹

The formation of this Delian League constitutes a prominent landmark in Grecian history. It meant not simply the transfer from Sparta to Athens of leadership in the maritime affairs of Hellas. It meant that all the promises of Panhellenic union which there were in the Great Alliance formed at Corinth in 481 B.C. had come to naught. It meant, since the Peloponnesian Confederacy still continued to exist, that henceforth Hellas was to be a house divided against itself.

Cimon and the War against the Persians: the Capture of Eion (476 B.C.).—One of the ablest of the Athenian generals at this time was Cimon, the son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon. He was one of those whose spirits had been fired by the exciting events attendant upon the Persian invasion. He had called attention to himself and acquired a certain reputation, at the time of the abandonment of Athens, by being the first among the

¹ The annual sum raised at first amounted to four hundred and sixty talents (about \$500,000).

young Athenian knights to hang up his bridle as a votive offering in the temple of Athena on the Acropolis and thereby to announce his resolution henceforth to devote himself to the service of the fleet, in accordance with the advice of Themistocles.

To him it was that the command of the confederate fleet of the Delian allies as it set out on the work of completing the liberation of the Greek cities, was entrusted. Cimon's first undertaking was the siege of Eion (476 B.C.), at the mouth of the Strymon, on the Thracian shore. The Persian governor of the city, Boges by name, when he realized that the fortress must soon fall into the hands of the enemy, took a resolution peculiarly Oriental. Gathering all the gold and silver treasures to be found in the city, he carried them to the top of the walls, and in full sight of the Greeks flung them into the river beneath. Then erecting a great pyre, he first killed his wife and children and household slaves and threw their bodies upon it, and then cast himself into the flames.¹

The capture of Eion is worthy of special note, for the reason that it gave the Athenians—who, acting as conquerors rather than liberators, took possession of the place for themselves—a foothold upon the Thracian shore, and eventually secured to them at the expense of the neighboring Thasians command of the lucrative trade of that region. We shall see later what momentous consequences grew out of their establishment upon that northern coast.

Cimon at Scyros : the Relics of Theseus.—Some time after the capture of Eion (in 470 B.C.) Cimon engaged in an undertaking which brought additional advantages to Athens. The inhabitants of the island of Scyros having been guilty of piracy, the Athenians, as the guardians of the commerce of the Ægean, took it upon themselves to punish the offenders. The island was easily overrun, and was taken possession of by Athenian citizens, as in the case of Salamis (p. 109, n. 1). Scyros formed an excellent naval station for the Athenians, and its acquisition by them was another

¹ Herod. vii. 107.

step towards the imperial position that they were aiming at in the Ægean.

On the island were found what were declared to be the bones and the mighty spear and sword of the national hero Theseus (p. 17), who, according to tradition, had met his death there through treachery. The sacred relics were transported to Athens with solemn pomp, and there buried amidst impressive ceremonies. Over the spot was afterwards erected the magnificent



Fig. 26. TEMPLE OF THESEUS AT ATHENS. (From a photograph.)

temple known as the Theseum, which is one of the best preserved of all the monuments of Grecian antiquity. It is probable that in this remarkable affair, which naturally redounded to the honor of Cimon, fraud was mingled with pious credulity.

The Battle of the Eurymedon (466 B.C.).—Four years after the punishment of the pirates of Scyros, Cimon led a strong expedition, consisting of three hundred war-ships, to the Lycian coast of Asia Minor, for the purpose of liberating the Greek cities in that region still held by the Persians. At the mouth of the Eurym-

edon, in Pamphylia, Cimon gained over the Persian fleet and army a sea and land victory (466 B.C.) which was a counterpart of the celebrated fight at Mycale. Shortly afterwards, falling in with a squadron of eighty Phœnician ships which were on their way to reinforce the Persian fleet just destroyed, he sunk or scattered the entire armament.

These successive victories completed the emancipation of the Asiatic Greeks. All the Hellenes were once more free. Things

were now restored to the condition they were in before the rise of the Lydian monarchy, by the kings of which, as we have seen, the enslavement of the Greek cities was begun (p. 129).

The victory at the Eurymedon added another to the memorial monuments of Athens. Upon the Acropolis, in honor of the triumph, was erected the beautiful temple, still standing as a restoration, known as the temple of Nike Apteros, or "Wingless Victory."



Fig. 27. TEMPLE OF NIKE APTEROS, OR WINGLESS VICTORY, ON THE ACROPOLIS AT ATHENS. (From a photograph.)

The Death of Aristides

(about 468 B.C.).—The formation of the Delian League and the assess-

ment of the contributions to the common chest, seems to have been the last prominent service that Aristides rendered his native city; at least, nothing further worthy of note is recorded of his public acts. The exact time of his death is unknown. Plutarch, however, tells us that he died in such poverty that the expenses of his burial were borne by the state. He had not used

his official position to enrich himself; nor did he ever commit an act, so far as we know, inconsistent with the honorable title that he bore of the Just. He was the best citizen that Athens ever brought forth.

The End of Pausanias and of Themistocles.—We must now follow to their less worthy end two other men, the Spartan Pausanias and the Athenian Themistocles, both of whom we have seen, like Aristeides, playing great parts in the story we have been following.

Pausanias obeyed the summons of the ephors (p. 232), which reached him at Byzantium, and returned home to answer the charge of treason. He succeeded in freeing himself from the accusation, probably by representing his negotiations with the Persians as being, like those of Themistocles at Salamis, intended merely to entrap the enemy.¹ His efforts, however, to secure reinstatement in his command were unsuccessful; notwithstanding this, he returned to Byzantium as a private person, and gathered in that city, probably with money furnished by Xerxes, a band of Thracian mercenaries, with the intention doubtless of betraying the place into the hands of the Persians. But being driven out by the watchful Athenians, he went to the Troad, where he was waited upon by messengers from the ephors, who a second time had sent for him to come home to give an account of himself. He returned, but no one daring to appear as his accuser, he retained his liberty, and moved about the city at will.

This freedom he utilized to carry on an intrigue with the Helots of Laconia, and to maintain a treasonable correspondence with the Persian satrap Artabazus. In this latter matter he "dug a pitfall for his own feet." He placed in the hands of a confidential slave a letter which he was to carry to the satrap. Now this slave had observed that none of the bearers of these dispatches to Artabazus ever came back. This suggested to him the opening of the letter to see what might be its contents. He found that it closed with an injunction to Artabazus to put to

¹ Curtius, *Griech. Gesch.* ii. 131.

death the bearer of the dispatch, in order that no secrets might be divulged. The indignant slave straightway carried the letter to the ephors. These magistrates, since the testimony of a slave was always regarded with suspicion, resolved to bring it about that Pausanias should bear witness against himself. Accordingly they caused the slave to seek an asylum in a temple of Poseidon. As they had supposed he would do, Pausanias sought an interview with his slave, and in the course of the conversation that ensued — which was overheard by two of the ephors who had secreted themselves in the temple — dropped words which plainly revealed the fact that he was guilty of the crime which had been imputed to him.

The ephors now took steps to place the traitor under arrest. Pausanias, however, divining their intention, fled for refuge to the temple of Athena of the Brazen House. Not daring to lay hands upon him there, the ephors caused the door of the temple to be walled up, and left the traitor to die of starvation. Just before he breathed his last, he was dragged from the temple, in order that the place might not be defiled by his death within the sacred enclosure (about 470 B.C.).

The closing events in the life of Pausanias are interwoven with the closing events in the life of Themistocles. The Spartans professed to have found in the letters which had come into their possession during the trial of Pausanias information that showed Themistocles to be a partner in the guilt of the regent. Themistocles was at this time in exile at Argos. He had been ostracized from Athens in 471 B.C. The exact grounds on which he was banished are unknown to us; but he had grown arrogant, and doubtless had given occasion for the suspicion that he entertained the hope of some day ruling as a tyrant in Athens. Certain it is that no one had any confidence in his integrity; he was known to be accessible to bribes, and was feared generally as an unscrupulous intriguer.

At Argos, Themistocles busied himself in stirring up trouble in the Peloponnesus for the Spartans, whom he seems to have

believed to have had a hand in bringing about his banishment from Athens. The Spartans resolved to drive him from Argos, and if possible destroy him. The timely revelations in the papers of Pausanias put them in possession of evidence which they could use for his undoing. They accused him to the Athenians, who brought him to trial on the charge of treason. He was found guilty, and persons were sent to arrest him at Argos.

Eluding the officers, Themistocles fled first to Corcyra, but finally bent his steps to Susa, the Persian capital. Here he is said to have addressed to the king the following letter: "I, Themistocles, have come to you, I, who of all Hellenes did your house the greatest injuries so long as I was compelled to defend myself against your father; but still greater benefits when I was in safety and he in danger during his retreat. And there is a debt of gratitude due to me [here he noted how he had forewarned Xerxes at Salamis of the resolution of the Hellenes to withdraw, and how through his influence, as he pretended, they had refrained from breaking down the bridges¹]. Now I am here, able to do you many services, and persecuted by the Hellenes for your sake. Let me wait a year, and then I will myself explain why I have come."²

The time that Themistocles asked for was granted him. This period he utilized in learning the language of the country. When the year had passed, Themistocles was presented to the king, who was greatly pleased at having in his service the ablest man among all the Greeks; for he hoped through him to succeed in making Greece a part of his empire. He appointed him governor of the city of Magnesia, in Asia Minor, and made abundant provision for his wants by assigning to three cities the duty of providing for his table; Magnesia was to furnish bread, Lampsacus wine, and Myus meat. Plutarch relates that as one day the exile sat down to his richly loaded board he exclaimed, "How much we should have lost, my children, if we had not been ruined." He died probably about 460 B.C., but the circumstances connected with

¹ See p. 206.

² Thucyd. i. 137 (Jowett's Trans.).

his death are not known with certainty. According to one tradition, he died a natural death; but another account makes him to have committed suicide. His bones are said to have been carried to Athens and secretly buried in Attic soil.

"Such," in the words of Thucydides, "was the end of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, the two most famous Hellenes of their day."

How the Athenians converted the Delian League into an Empire.—During the period marked by the various transactions and events narrated in the foregoing paragraphs, the Athenians were gradually transforming the Delian League into a great coast and island empire of which they were the absolute and irresponsible masters. We must now notice in what way Athens used her position as head of the confederacy to reduce her at first equal and independent allies to the condition of servile tributaries.

The contributions assessed by Aristides upon the different members of the confederation consisted of ships and their crews for the larger states, and of money payments for the smaller ones. From the first, Athens attended to this assessment matter, and saw to it that each member of the league made its proper contribution.

After a while, some of the cities preferring to make a money payment in lieu of ships, Athens accepted the commutation, and then, building the ships herself, added them to her own navy. Thus the confederates disarmed themselves and armed their master.

Very soon the restraints which Athens imposed upon her allies became irksome, and they began to refuse, one after another, to pay the assessment in any form. Naxos, one of the Cyclades, was the first island to secede, as it were, from the league (466 B.C.). But Athens had no idea of admitting any such doctrine of state rights, and with her powerful navy forced the Naxians to remain within the union, and to pay an increased tribute.

About two years later (in 465 or 464 B.C.), the Thasians, angered at the interference by Athens in their Thracian trade

(p. 234), revolted, and called upon Sparta for help. Serious trouble at home alone prevented the Spartans from giving the aid solicited, for they were viewing with growing uneasiness and jealousy the steadily augmenting power of Athens. Disappointed in receiving the expected help from Sparta, the Thasians, after sustaining a siege of two years by the Athenian fleet under Cimon, were forced to submission. The walls of their city were demolished, and their possessions on the Thracian mainland taken from them.

What happened in the case of Naxos and Thasos happened in the case of almost all the other members of the confederation. By the year 449 B.C. only three of the island members of the league — Lesbos, Chios, and Samos — still retained their independence. They alone of all the former allies did not pay tribute.

Even before the date last named (probably about 457 B.C.), the Athenians had transferred the common treasury from Delos to Athens, and, diverting the tribute from its original purpose, were beginning to spend it, not in the prosecution of war against the barbarians, but in the carrying on of home enterprises, as though the treasure were their own revenue. About this time also the congress probably ceased to exist.

Thus what had been simply a voluntary confederation of sovereign and independent cities was converted into what was practically an absolute monarchy, with the Attic democracy as the imperial master. Thus did Athens become a tyrant-city. From being the liberator of the Greek cities she had become their enslaver.

What made this servitude of the former allies of Athens all the more galling was the fact that they themselves had been compelled to forge the very chains which fettered them; for it was their money that had built and was maintaining the fleet by which they were kept in subjection, and forced to do whatever might be the will of the Athenians.

Revolt of the Spartan Helots: the Third Messenian War (464-456 B.C.).—The trouble, referred to in the preceding

paragraph, which prevented the Spartans from sending help to the Thasians, was the almost complete destruction of their city by a terrible earthquake (464 B.C.). Twenty thousand of the inhabitants are said to have perished. In the panic of the appalling disaster the Spartans were led to believe that the evil had befallen them as a punishment for their recent violation of the temple of Poseidon, from which some Helots, who had fled to the sanctuary for refuge, had been torn.

The Helots, on their part, were quick to interpret the event as an intervention of the gods in their behalf, and as a signal for their uprising. No sooner had the news of the situation at Sparta spread among them, than they seized arms and hastened thither with the purpose of making an end once for all of their oppressors. But the Spartans who had survived the catastrophe were on the alert, and the attack was repulsed. The Messenians, however, were now in arms. Entrenching themselves in the old stronghold on Mount Ithome, they maintained against their former masters a long and bitter struggle, known as the Third Messenian War (464-456 B.C.).

The Spartans, finding themselves unable to reduce their revolted serfs to submission, were forced to ask aid of the other Grecian states. Ægina and Plataea both sent assistance, but there was lacking in the Spartans and their allies skill in conducting operations against an enemy behind fortifications. Consequently the Spartans were constrained to sue at Athens for help, for the Athenians had a reputation for dexterity in carrying on sieges.

Pericles, one of the leading statesmen in Athens at this time, implored his countrymen not to lend themselves to the building up of the power of their rival. But the aristocratic Cimon, who had always entertained the most friendly feelings for the Spartans, exhorted the Athenians to put aside all sentiments of enmity and jealousy, and to extend succor to their kinsmen in this desperate posture of their affairs. "Let not Greece," said he, "be lamed, and thus Athens herself be deprived of her yoke-fellow." The great services Cimon had rendered the state enti-

bled him to be heard. The assembly voted as he advised, and so the Athenians fought for some time side by side with the Lacedæmonians.

But the Spartans were distrustful of the sincerity of their allies, and this feeling gradually grew into positive fear lest the Athenians should take advantage of their position in the country and pass over to the side of the enemy. Acting under this apprehension, which was probably entirely groundless, they, with characteristic Spartan bluntness, dismissed the Athenian forces. The incident is of special import on account of its revealing so plainly the growing jealousy and mistrust between the two rival states.

After a prolonged struggle, the Spartans succeeded in subduing the rebellion, and in re-establishing throughout Messenia the old order of things. Many of the refugee Messenians, through the favor of Athens, found an asylum at Naupactus, on the Corinthian Gulf.

The Ostracism of Cimon: the Areopagus stripped of its Authority (464 B.C.). — The discourteous dismissal of the Athenian troops by the Spartans aroused the most bitter resentment at Athens. The party of Pericles, who had always opposed the resolution of aiding their rivals as impolitic and weakly sentimental, took advantage of the exasperated feelings of the people to secure the ostracism of Cimon as the leader of the aristocratical party and the friend of Sparta (461 B.C.), and to effect some important changes in the constitution in favor of the people, which made it almost purely democratical in character.

The constitutional changes concerned the position in the state of the ancient court of the Areopagus (p. 105). The great and patriotic services rendered by this council during the Persian Wars had given it a place of great influence and power during the years immediately following the battles of Salamis and Plataea. But public sentiment had now changed. The council was regarded by the democratic party with some such feelings of distrust and hatred as are entertained by the English Liberals towards the House of Lords. The court seemed to them, as indeed it was, the stronghold of aristocratic prejudice and conservatism, and

nothing but an obstruction in the way of government by the people. The life tenure of the members of the council was also offensive to the democratic spirit, just as the hereditary principle in the Upper House of the English Parliament is an offense to English radicalism. The paternal, censorious, and irresponsible character of the authority of the council also tended to render the body the object of popular dislike and even positive odium. Moreover, some of its members had been recently found guilty of serious misdemeanors, and these disclosures had naturally tended to undermine the influence of the council as a whole.

The attack upon the Areopagus was led by Ephialtes, a friend of Pericles. The court was stripped of all its functions,—save the trial of cases touching homicide and arson,—which were now distributed among the various courts and boards of a popular character; namely, the public assembly, the discasteries or citizen-courts, and the Council of Five Hundred.

This reform amounted to a revolution. It swept away the last bulwark in the constitution against the inroads of the democratic spirit. It removed the last constitutional check upon the will of the people. Henceforth, for good or for ill, that will was to be supreme. Henceforth the Athenians were to be their own censors and judges, as well as their own legislators. Henceforth the people were themselves to be the sole guardians of the constitution and the laws. As a symbol of all this, Ephialtes caused the Solonian tablets to be brought down from the Acropolis, where they had hitherto been kept, and set up in the market-place.

The oligarchical party was naturally rendered desperate by the success of their democratic enemies. The bitterness of feeling armed the hand of the murderer, and Ephialtes was assassinated (462 B.C.). This was the first time, if we forget the slaying of the tyrant Hipparchus, that a “political assassination” had taken place at Athens. Unfortunately it was not to be the last.

Pericles comes to the Head of Affairs (about 460 B.C.).—The assassination of Ephialtes and the ostracism of Cimon left Pericles the sole prominent leader in Athens, and from this time

on until his death shortly after the opening of the Peloponnesian War, he was the very soul of the Athenian democracy.

His policy was just the opposite of that of Cimon, which was the maintenance in Greece of a dual hegemony, Sparta being allowed the leadership on land and Athens on the sea. Pericles believed that such a double leadership was impracticable, and the whole aim of his policy was to make the authority of Athens supreme not only on the sea but also on the land. In all this he but resumed the policy of Themistocles, whose political heir he was.

Pericles through Alliances extends the Influence of Athens in European Greece. — In pursuance of his anti-Spartan policy Pericles entered into an alliance with Argos (461 B.C.), the inveterate enemy of Sparta. Argos had by this time recovered in a large measure from the terrible blow given her by the Spartan king Cleomenes (p. 73). She had captured and destroyed the ancient towns of Mycenæ and Tiryns, and had subjected to her authority other towns of Argolis, thereby regaining her old position of pre-eminence in that district of the Peloponnesus. Hence an alliance with her was a matter of great moment to Athens.

Pericles also formed an alliance with Thessaly, thinking that the Thessalian cavalry would prove a valuable addition to the land forces of Athens. But the most important alliance of all was that which Pericles entered into with the city of Megara (459 B.C.), since this gave the Athenians control of the passes leading from the Peloponnesus into Attica and Bœotia.

War with Ægina and Corinth (459-456 B.C.): the Fall of Ægina. — Naturally all these movements looking towards the extension and consolidation of the power and influence of Athens both in the Peloponnesus and in Central Greece, intensified the jealousy of Sparta, and especially created alarm in the nearer Dorian states of Ægina and Corinth. Sparta, however, at just this moment, could do nothing to prevent the Athenians from carrying out their ambitious policy, since she was now in the midst of her trouble with her revolted Helots (p. 242). Corinth

and Ægina, therefore, resolved to attempt with simply their own forces to arrest this dangerous expansion of the Athenian power.

The Athenians exhibited extraordinary energy in defending themselves and their allies. They defeated in two naval engagements the allied Corinthian and Æginetan fleet, laid regular siege to Ægina, and warded off an attack upon Megara. At this same time the Athenians were also fighting against the Persians in Egypt with a fleet of some two hundred ships.

After a protracted blockade, Ægina fell into the hands of the Athenians (456 B.C.). The Æginetans were forced to throw down the walls of their city, to surrender their ships, and to pay tribute to Athens. Thus did Athens rid herself of one of the most formidable of her commercial rivals, and thus was struck from the roll of the free states of Hellas a city which had played a great part in Grecian history, from the heroic age down to the memorable fight at Salamis.


The Construction of the Long Walls (about 461-456 B.C.). — About this time the Athenians were carrying towards completion the celebrated so-called Long Walls,¹ which connected Athens with the ports of Peiræus and Phalerum. Later (445 B.C.), as a double security, they built a third wall, which ran parallel to the northernmost of the first walls.² By means of these great ramparts Athens and her ports, with the intervening land, were converted into a vast fortified district, capable in time of war of holding the entire population of Attica. With her communication with the sea thus secured, and with a powerful navy at her com-

¹ This device of practically carrying the sea, so far as war operations were concerned, to an inland city, was not now for the first time acted upon. Just previous to this the Athenians had built for their Megarian allies two long walls which connected the city of Megara with its harbor town Nisæa. But these walls were only about one mile in length, or one-fourth that of those now undertaken.

² The Long Walls were each between four and five miles in length, and sixty feet high. They were defended by numerous towers, which, when Athens became crowded, were used as shops and private dwellings. The walls were employed as highways, the top being wide enough to allow two chariots to pass each other conveniently. The foundation of the northern wall now forms in part the road-bed of the railroad running from the Peiræus to Athens.

mand, Athens could now bid defiance to her foes on sea and land.

Athens becomes Supreme in Bœotia, Phocis, and Locris. — Meanwhile, just before the fall of Ægina, a call for help from their mother-land Doris (p. 26, n. 1), a call which could not be allowed to go unheeded, caused the Spartans to send an army, made up chiefly of their allies, across the Corinthian gulf into Central Greece.



ATHENS AND THE LONG WALLS.

With the disturbers of the Dorians punished, this army took up quarters with the Bœotians, since the watchfulness of the Athenians prevented its returning to the Peloponnesus either by the way it had come across the gulf or through Megara.

Taking advantage of the presence in the country of this force, the oligarchical party in the Bœotian cities planned a revolution, which had for its aim the revival of the old Bœotian confederacy and the making of Thebes again the real master of the land. At the same time the oligarchs in Athens were in communication with

the Spartan army in Bœotia, and were planning with its help the overthrow of the Athenian democracy.

Pericles, becoming acquainted with the plans of the conspirators, determined to ward off the threatened danger by at once attacking the Peloponnesian army in Bœotia. With a force of fourteen thousand men, composed in part of Argive and Thessalian contingents, Pericles marched into Bœotia and offered battle to the Spartans and their allies at Tanagra (457 B.C.). For the first time in two generations the Spartans and the Athenians thus met as declared enemies.¹ The Athenians were defeated, their Thessalian allies having basely deserted them in the midst of the fight and gone over to the enemy.

The Spartans, with characteristic lack of energy and push, instead of following up the advantages of their victory, marched back to the Peloponnesus by the way of the Isthmus, the Athenians being now in no situation to dispute their passage through the Megarian mountains. The consequence was that two months later the energetic Athenians were again in Bœotia with another army. At Cœnophyta (456 B.C.) they gained a decisive victory over the Bœotian forces, and all Bœotia, together with Phocis and Locris, came in subjection to Athens. At Thebes the oligarchical party was dispossessed of power and a democratic government set up. The other Bœotian cities were deprived of their independence, and were bound to follow the lead of Athens in war. The Locrians were obliged to furnish hostages as pledges of loyal conduct. Thus at one stroke was the authority of Athens extended over a great part of the historic ground of Central Greece. It looked as though Pericles' dream of a land empire for Athens, in connection with her maritime dominion, was about to be realized.

Athenian Disaster in Egypt (454 B.C.).—The extraordinary activity of the Athenians, and their wonderful resources, are shown by the fact that at the very time they were carrying on their operations in Greece proper and extending their authority and influence there in every direction at the expense of the friends and allies of

¹ The last hostile meeting before this had taken place in 507 B.C. (p. 125).

Sparta, they were prosecuting vigorous campaigns against the Persians, the common enemy of Hellas.

As we have noticed (p. 246), at the time of the blockade of Ægina, they were sustaining a fleet of two hundred ships in the Syrian waters and in Egypt, where they were aiding a revolt of the Egyptians¹ against the Persian king, their object being to detach Egypt from the Persian empire, and to annex the rich and populous island of Cyprus to the Delian League. Here, however, they met with a terrible loss. Being shut up in an island formed by interlacing branches of the Nile, they were closely besieged by the Persians, who, after maintaining the blockade for over a year, finally rendered the island untenable by draining the canal which formed its defense on one side. The Athenians now burned their ships, which could no longer be of any use to them, and after a stubborn fight with the enemy who swarmed over the dry bed of the canal, were compelled to surrender (454 B.C.). Those that escaped marched across the desert to Cyrene, whence they found their way home by ship.

The Recall of Cimon (454 B.C.) : his Death (449 B.C.) : End of the War with the Persians.—The year of this disaster saw the recall of Cimon from exile. The splendid conduct of his friends and supporters at the battle of Tanagra, had caused a change of feeling at Athens towards him. His maxim had always been "Peace among the Hellenes and united war against the barbarians." Through his influence, a truce of five years was now arranged between Athens and Sparta (451 B.C.).

The hands of the Athenians were now free to resume their attacks upon the Persians and to avenge the terrible defeat in Egypt. Two hundred ships were placed under the command of Cimon, to be used against the common enemy as he might deem best. Cimon sailed to Cyprus, designing to attack the Phœnician cities there which still held to the Persians. Shortly after his arrival at the island, sickness put an end to his life (449 B.C.). After gaining a splendid sea and land victory (battle of Salamis,

¹ Under the lead of Inarus, a Libyan.

449 B.C.), the Athenians returned home, bearing with them with pious care the bones of their beloved commander.

The death of Cimon deprived the Athenians of probably the greatest commander who had ever risen among them. For more than a quarter of a century he had been the leader of their victorious fleets in the War of Liberation. But he was something more than a mere soldier and admiral. He was a statesman whose policies, though possibly sometimes unwise, were at least patriotic and indicative of an outlook that embraced not Athens alone but all Hellas. His disposition was kind and generous, and he dispensed his riches with a free hand in benefactions to the poor, in the erection of magnificent public monuments at Athens, and in the beautifying of the parks and walks in and about the city. The Academy owed much of its beauty and attractiveness to his munificence, and he is said to have laid at his own expense the foundation of a considerable section of the Long Walls. His temporary loss of popular favor and his ostracism were a reflection, not upon him, but upon those who sent him into exile.

Cimon had been the most strenuous advocate of the policy of unceasing war against Persia. His death seems to have opened the way for a cessation of hostilities between the Great King and the Greek cities, which had been practically continuous from the time of the Ionian Revolt. The Greeks had nothing further to gain by prolonging the war. The Persians had long since been expelled from every part of Hellas.

The Athenians are said to have sent an ambassador by the name of Callias to Susa to arrange the terms of peace.¹ The Athenian orators of a later time boastfully declared that the terms of the treaty were, that no Persian war-ship should pass the eastern limit of Lycia in the Mediterranean, nor beyond the Cyanean Rocks, near the entrance of the Bosphorus, in the Euxine ;

¹ This is the so-called "Peace of Cimon," or "Peace of Callias." Everything about it, as explained in the text, is uncertain. Some writers place the treaty just after the battle of the Eurymedon (466 B.C.), others just after the death of Cimon. See Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii, pp. 362-367.

and that no Persian satrap in Asia Minor should attempt to exercise any authority within three days' foot-journey of the coast. The Athenians, on their part, were to make no further attacks upon Cyprus or Egypt.

It is not probable that a definite treaty of this character was ever made between Persia and the Greek cities, yet there seems to have been an understanding reached by the parties concerned which practically amounted to the same thing. From the time of the battle of the Eurymedon (466 B.C.) until towards the close of the Peloponnesian War, no Persian war-ship ever appeared in the Ægean; and, on the other side, the Greeks, after the expedition to Cyprus (449 B.C.), refrained from making any further attacks upon the Persian empire.

Athens at the Height of her Power (448 B.C.). — Athens had now reached the highest point of power and prosperity that she ever attained. The Ægean had become an Athenian lake. Its islands and coast lands, together with the Hellespontine region, formed practically an Athenian empire. The revenue ships of Athens collected tribute from two hundred Grecian cities.

In addition to these imperial possessions, Athens controlled, through willing or unwilling allies, a considerable part of continental Greece. From the Corinthian Gulf to the Pass of Thermopylæ on the Malian Gulf all the states were dependent upon her will. Ægina had become a part of her territory; Argos stood in close alliance with her.

And while the power and prestige of Athens had been thus constantly rising, the reputation and influence of her rival, Sparta, had been as steadily declining. It almost seemed as though the union of the cities of Hellas was to be effected on an imperial basis through the energy and the achievements of the Athenians.

Events leading up to the Thirty Years' Truce (445 B.C.). — But within a short time the affairs of Athens had assumed a very different aspect. In 447 B.C. the oligarchical party in Bœotia arose against the democratic governments which Athens had set up in the Bœotian cities. The Athenians, under the lead of Tolmides,

hastened to the help of their friends; but they had gone out with an insufficient force, and met with an overwhelming defeat (447 B.C.).^{at Coronea} The party hostile to Athens now came to power in all the cities of Bœotia, while at the same time Phocis and Locris were lost to the Athenian alliance. Under a single blow the whole structure of Athenian authority in Central Greece had crumbled in ruins.

Troubles thickened. The subject cities of Eubœa, the most important of all the possessions of Athens, now also rose in revolt. Pericles was hurrying to the island with an army to suppress the uprising, when news was brought to him that the Athenian garrison in Megara had been treacherously set upon by the Megarians, aided by the Corinthians and others, and massacred. Moreover, to add to the seriousness of the situation, just at this juncture a Spartan army, under the lead of the young king Pleistoanax, and acting in concert with the Eubœan rebels, marched through the now open passes of Megaris, and began to devastate the Attic plain in the neighborhood of Eleusis.

The resourcefulness and energy of Pericles alone saved the Athenian state. He bribed the young Spartan king and his counsellors, and thus secured the withdrawal from Attica of the Spartan army. This danger being averted, Pericles hastened with a strong force across the straits of Eubœa, and quickly reduced the revolted cities there to obedience (446 B.C.). The island was now bound more firmly than ever to Athens by the reorganizing of the constitutions of the various cities, and by the establishment of additional citizen colonies, like the one at Chalcis (p. 126).

But Megara was not recovered, and Pericles was fain to seek peace with Sparta. Negotiations were opened which ended in the celebrated Peace of Pericles, or the Thirty Years' Truce (445 B.C.). By its terms each of the rival cities was left at the head of the confederation it had formed,¹ but neither was to interfere with the subjects or allies of the other, while those cities of Hellas which

¹ Athens, however, was to withdraw from all places in the Peloponnesus, Nisæa, Trœzen, etc., in which she had established garrisons.

were not yet members of either league were to be left free to join either according to their choice. Megara and the cities of Bœotia became at once members of the Spartan confederacy.

The real meaning of the 'Thirty Years' Truce was that Athens must give up her ambition to establish a land empire and henceforth be content with supremacy on the seas.

REFERENCES. — Plutarch, *Lives of Pausanias, Themistocles, Aristeides, and Cimon*. Abbott, *Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens* (Heroes of the Nations), chs. iii.-ix. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 353-459. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 330-437; (twelve volume ed.), vol. v. pp. 239-352. Abbott, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 243-415. Cox, *The Athenian Empire from the Flight of Xerxes to the Fall of Athens* (Epoch Series); earlier chapters. Cox, *Lives of Greek Statesmen*: "Aristeides," "Themistokles," "Pausanias," and "Kimon."

CHAPTER XVI.

THE AGE OF PERICLES.

(445-431 B.C.)

General Character of the Period. — The fourteen years immediately following the Thirty Years' Truce are usually designated as the Years of Peace. During all this period Athens was involved in only one short war of note (p. 257). And not only was there peace throughout the empire of Athens, but also throughout the Mediterranean world. There was peace between the Eastern Greeks and the Persians, as well as between the Western Greeks and the Carthaginians. The rising city of Rome, too, was at peace with her neighbors, and throughout Spain and Gaul the tribes had laid aside their arms. Thus there was peace throughout the world, as happened again four centuries later in the reign of the Roman emperor Augustus. And as that later period of peace marked the Golden Age of Rome, so did this earlier era mark the Golden Age of Athens.¹

The epoch, as we here limit it, embraced less than half the lifetime of a single generation, yet the influence it has exerted upon the civilization of the world can hardly be overrated. During this short period Athens gave birth to more men of real genius than probably all the world besides has produced in any period of equal length.

Among all the great men of this age, Pericles stood pre-eminent. He was in a large measure the creator of the age, so that by right

¹ Lloyd, *The Age of Pericles*, vol. ii. p. III.

it is called after him the Age of Pericles.¹ "Pericles," says the historian Lloyd, "was the chosen and trusted guide of at once the most pure and the most democratic government the world had ever, — nay has ever seen, and which owed this qualification, at least, very importantly to himself. What it achieved under his guidance, what he achieved by command of its councils and resources, it has taxed the best powers of the best critics and the best historians both of politics and of the arts to tell."²

But though the authority of Pericles in the Athens of this period was so absolute, still this authority, as the language just quoted intimates, was merely that which genius and character justly confer. Pericles ruled, as Plutarch says, by the art of persuasion. His throne was the Bema. He was never even archon. The only offices he ever held were those of strategus, superintendent of public works, and superintendent of the finances.



Fig. 28. PERICLES.

The Demos was the source and fountain of all power. The reforms and revolutions of a century and more had finally removed all restraints upon the will of the people, and that will was now supreme. Every matter which concerned Athens and her empire was discussed and decided by the popular assembly. Never before in the history of the world had any people enjoyed such unrestricted political liberty as did the citizens of Athens at this

¹ This designation is a very elastic one: by it is often meant the whole period marked by the influence of Pericles, say from the assassination of Ephialtes (p. 244) in 462 B.C. to the death of Pericles in 429 B.C.; and again it is employed to designate the entire period of Athenian ascendancy from the battle of Platea to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

² Lloyd, *The Age of Pericles*, vol. ii. 97.

time, and never before were any people, through so intimate a knowledge of public affairs, so well fitted to take part in the administration of government. As a rule, every citizen was qualified to hold public office. At all events the Athenians acted upon this assumption, as is shown by their extremely democratic practice of filling almost all the public offices by the use of the lot. Only a very few positions, and these in the army and navy, which called for special qualifications, were filled by ballot or open voting.¹

The Ostracism of Thucydides (443 B.C.). — We have said that Pericles' influence was supreme during the period with which we are at present concerned. There was no serious attempt made by any one to dispute this supremacy save just at the opening of these years, when Thucydides,² a relation of Cimon, and a really able man, assumed the lead of the old oligarchical party and endeavored to discredit Pericles and his policy. One feature of that policy to which he offered the most strenuous opposition was the spending of the money of the allies for the sole benefit of the Athenians. He maintained that this was wrong, and that, if the tribute was no longer needed for carrying on the war against Persia, then it should no longer be exacted. Thucydides did not gain a large following. His adherents, in the meetings of the public assembly, all sat together on the same benches for the purpose of better supporting their leader ; but this revealed the weakness of the party, and they were nicknamed "The Few." The device of ostracism was at last resorted to, and Thucydides was sent into exile, as his relation Cimon had been before him ; and Pericles from this on had a comparatively free hand in carrying out his policy.³

¹ The person designated by lot for any position was obliged to undergo a kind of examination before he could assume the office ; but this examination was a merely formal matter, probably very much like that which the alien among us seeking citizenship is required to undergo in respect to good character.

² The son of Melesias, and not the historian.

³ It is natural of course that one who occupies such a position as that held by Pericles should awaken many jealousies and stir numerous resentments. And

Pericles suppresses the Revolt of Samos (440 B.C.). — We have already said that the quiet of the so-called years of peace was interrupted once by the din of hostilities. It was the revolt from Athens of the important island of Samos that broke the general quietude. The Samians had refused to acquiesce in a decision which Athens had rendered as arbitrator in a dispute between them and the Milesians. Pericles had gone to the island, taken from the oligarchs the control of the government, and transported a hundred of their order to Lemnos to be held there as hostages for the good behavior of the remainder. This arbitrary and outrageous act, as it was regarded by the Samians, since Samos was still an independent ally of Athens and not a subject, tribute-paying state like most of the islands of the Ægean, provoked a determined revolt. At the same time Byzantium also seceded from the empire.

The situation was regarded as alarming, for Samos had a powerful fleet, and the city possessed the formidable fortifications constructed by the tyrant Polycrates (p. 95); besides there was danger not only of the revolt spreading among the subject states of Athens, but of interference by the Peloponnesians on the side of the rebels. Hence all the ten generals, including Pericles, hurried across the Ægean to Samos with a strong fleet of sixty ships to crush the uprising. After a siege of nine months, the city was forced to surrender. The Samians were required to throw down their walls, surrender their war-ships, give hostages, and pay

Pericles did have many enemies, and was frequently subjected to annoyance and persecution. Usually the attacks upon him were made indirectly through his friends. Thus charges of corruption and sacrilege were brought against his friend Pheidias (see ch. xxviii.), which without doubt were primarily intended to annoy Pericles. Also Aspasia, a brilliant Milesian woman who was associated with Pericles in a way condemned by modern morality (see ch. xxxi.), was charged among other things with impiety. Pericles was able to secure her acquittal only by making before the court a most abject plea in her defense. Again, Anaxagoras, a philosopher to the loftiness of whose teachings Plutarch attributes in large measure the elevation and liberality of the views of Pericles, who was his friend and disciple, was prosecuted on the charge of irreligion (see ch. xxx.). The outcome of the trial was his banishment from Athens.

the cost of the war. Byzantium at the same time made peace with Athens.

The revolt might easily have proved a much more serious matter than it did ; for the Samians, after they had resolved upon revolt, had sent envoys to Sparta to ask for help. The Spartans were inclined to grant the petition, and called a congress of their allies to consider the matter. At this meeting the Corinthians, who, like the Athenians, had subordinate allies and were interested in upholding the principle of authority, maintained as Hellenic law that every independent city had a perfect right to deal as it pleased with its free or independent allies, and that no other state had any right to interfere. This attitude of the Corinthians is all that prevented the Peloponnesians from taking action hostile to Athens, which was a piece of extraordinary good fortune for her, since their interference at that moment might easily have resulted in the ruin of her empire. When half a generation later the onset from the side of the Peloponnesus came, the Athenian empire was better consolidated, and ready for the shock.

The Limitation of Citizenship to Persons of pure Attic Descent. — A few years before the time where we have now arrived, Pericles had secured the enactment of a law which had a very important bearing upon the history of the period with which we are dealing. This was a law limiting Athenian citizenship to persons born of an Athenian father and an Athenian mother.¹ What influences brought about this legislation we do not know with certainty ; but it would seem that just now, since the privileges and immunities of Athenian citizenship were becoming valuable, those possessing these rights were growing more and more anxious to keep them as exclusively as possible to themselves.

¹ Arist. *Ath. Pol.* ch. 26. The law was passed in the year 451 B.C. According to Plutarch, almost five thousand persons were disfranchised by the act, and the roll of citizens thereby reduced to 14,050. We have an illustration of the working of the law in the case of Pericles himself. In the last year of his life he was deprived by death of both his sons, and was thus left without an heir ; but by a special decree of the Ecclesia an illegitimate son of his by the celebrated Milesian Aspasia was made an Athenian citizen and permitted to bear his father's name. Plut. *Pericles*, 37.

This feeling may be likened to that which is growing up among ourselves respecting citizenship, and which would place restrictions upon the naturalization of foreigners, withholding from them the rights and privileges which have been so freely extended to aliens in the past.

Whatever may have been the motives which prompted the passing of the law, it marked a most significant change in the policy of the Athenian state. Up to this time Athens had been the most liberal of all the cities of Greece in the admission of aliens or semi-aliens to the franchise of the city. It was the opening of her gates to strangers in the time of Theseus (p. 102) that laid the basis of her historical greatness. The same liberal policy, followed by the legislators Solon and Cleisthenes, had broadened and strengthened the foundations of the state, and contributed largely to give Athens her imperial position among the states of Hellas. This was the only path by which Athens could possibly reach the goal of Panhellenic aspiration, — the union into a real nation of the multitude of Greek cities. It was the path upon which Rome was just now entering, and by which she was to gain the dominion of the world. From the time of the legendary Romulus on, Rome never shut her gates absolutely against aliens, but gradually admitted to Roman citizenship ever wider and wider circles of foreigners, until at last every freeman in the empire was a citizen of Rome.

Probably it was impossible for Athens to play in history the part of Rome. The feeling of the Greek for his own city was too strong. But we cannot help asking ourselves when we see Athens thus abandoning the liberal policy which had carried her so far and done so much to secure for her the commanding position she held in Greece, and adopting the principle of political exclusion, what might have been her future had she only steadily adhered to the earlier and more generous principle, and kept her gates, as Rome did hers, wide open to strangers, and thereby kept full and strong the ranks of her citizens.

We are told that as an immediate result of the law in question

five thousand persons were disfranchised, and the list of Athenian citizenships reduced to about fourteen thousand.

Pericles' Policy in regard to Athenian Colonization.— It was a part of the policy of Pericles to consolidate the empire which Athens had gained and to tighten her hold upon dependent allies or conquered territory, by the establishment of Athenian settlements, particularly of citizen colonies or cleruchies (p. 77, n.). Even before the 'Thirty Years' Truce the Athenians had established a considerable number of cleruchies in different islands of the *Ægean*, as well as on the Thracian shore. During the present period Pericles established an additional number of these military settlements, together with some regular colonies in different parts of the empire. To the motive just stated for establishing foreign settlements, there now seems to have been added that of providing for the unemployed and discontented classes of the capital. The number of these, it would appear, had become dangerously increased by the law limiting Athenian citizenship, upon which we have just commented.

One of the most important of the regular colonies founded by Pericles was that of *Thurii*, in Southern Italy (443 B.C.). This was, in fact, a restoration on a new site of the ancient *Sybaris*, which had been destroyed by its rival *Croton* about seventy years before this. The incentive to the undertaking was an appeal to the Hellenic world for help to rebuild the city walls, made at just this time by the descendants of the ancient *Sybarites*. Pericles gathered for the enterprise volunteers from all parts, so that the population of the new city was of a very mixed character,—Dorians, Ionians, and *Æolians* all living together within its walls. Among the distinguished men who made the new city their home was the historian *Herodotus*, who here wrote his history of the great struggle between Greece and Persia.

More important, however, to Athenian interests was the great colony of *Amphipolis*, founded a little later (437 B.C.) at the mouth of the *Strymon* in *Thrace*. This city became the centre of Athenian activity in this Thracian region, and was destined to

be the scene of some of the most stirring transactions of the Peloponnesian War.

From these matters pertaining to the foreign policy of Pericles we turn now to notice some features of his domestic policy.

Pericles takes the Citizens into the Pay of the State.—It was a fixed idea of Pericles that in a democracy there should be not only an equal distribution of political rights among all classes, but also an equalization of the means and opportunities of exercising these rights, together with an equal participation by all in social and intellectual enjoyments. By such an equalization of the privileges and pleasures of political and social life, he would destroy the undue influence of the rich over the poor, and banish class envy and discord.

In promoting his views Pericles carried to great length the system of payment for the most common public services. Thus he introduced, or at least organized, the system of payment for military services; hitherto the Athenian, save probably as respects service in the fleet, had served his country in time of war without compensation. He also secured the payment of the citizen for serving as a jurymen,—a very important innovation. Through his influence also, or that of his party, salaries were, during this period when everything was being democratized, attached to the various civil offices, all of which were originally unpaid positions. This reform enabled the poorer citizens to offer themselves as candidates for the different magistracies, which under the earlier system, notwithstanding the provisions of the constitution, had been practically open only to men of means and leisure.

It was the same motives that prompted the above innovations which led Pericles to introduce or to extend the practice of supplying all the citizens with free tickets to the theatre and other places of amusement,¹ and of banqueting the people on festival

¹ This payment by the state of the admission money to the theatre was known as the *theoricon*; the pay for serving as a juror in the dicasteries was named *dicastica*; that for attendance at the Ecclesia, *ecclesiasticon*. Pay for attendance at the Ecclesia was not introduced until some years after the time of Pericles.

days at the public expense. Respecting the effect of these particular measures upon the character of the Athenian democracy, we shall say a word in a following paragraph.¹

The outcome of the general policy of Pericles was that before the beginning of the Peloponnesian War almost every citizen of Athens was in the pay of the state. Aristotle says that more than twenty thousand were receiving payment for one kind of service or another.²

The Dicasteries.—Among the services just enumerated for which the citizen received a payment from the state was that rendered by the Athenian jurymen in the great popular courts. These tribunals formed such a characteristic feature of the Athens of Pericles that we must pause here long enough to cast a glance upon them.

Each year there were chosen by lot from the whole body of Athenian citizens of thirty years of age and upwards six thousand persons, six hundred from each tribe, who collectively formed what was known as the *Heliæa*. One thousand of this number was held in reserve; the remaining five thousand were divided into ten divisions of five hundred each. These divisions were called *dicasteries*, and the members *dicasts* or jurymen. Although the full number of jurors in a dicastery was five hundred, still the usual number sitting on any given case was between two hundred

¹ Plutarch says that Pericles introduced this system of state doles and largesses in order to outbid Cimon, who bought the favor of the multitude by an open-handed liberality, setting a free table, throwing down the fences around his orchards so that all might help themselves to the fruit, and by generous gifts to needy persons. Although rivalry between Pericles and Cimon may have suggested to the former some of his socialistic measures, still his system in general must have been, as we have said, the outgrowth of his views as to the proper functions of the state, particularly of a state holding the imperial position that Athens was then maintaining.

² The various classes and magistrates supported by the public funds are given as follows: 6000 dicasts, 1600 bowman, 1200 horsemen, 500 senators, 500 harbor-guards, 50 city-guards, 700 domestic magistrates, 700 foreign magistrates, 2500 hoplites, 4000 sailors, the crews of 20 watch-ships, 2000 sailors forming crews of ships employed in collecting tribute, together with jailers and other officers. *Constitution of Athens*, ch. 24.

and four hundred. Sometimes, however, when an important case was to be heard, the jury would number two thousand or even more.

Just when these citizen courts were instituted is unknown with certainty. There were popular courts from the time of Solon, but they first became of importance upon the overthrow of the Areopagus by Ephialtes (p. 244).

There was an immense amount of law business brought before these courts; for they tried not only all cases arising between the citizens of Athens, but attended also to a large part of the law business of the numerous cities of Athens' great empire. All cases arising between subject cities, all cases in which an Athenian citizen was interested, and finally, indeed, all important cases arising in the dependent states were brought to Athens and heard in these courts. It is easy to see that the volume of business transacted in them must have been immense.

The pay of the juror was at first one obol per day; but later this was increased to three obols, a sum equal to about eight cents in our money. This, it seems, was sufficient to maintain an Athenian citizen of the poorer class.

When a case was to be tried, it was assigned by lot to one of the dicasteries, this method of allotment being observed in order to guard against bribery.

The average Athenian enjoyed sitting on a jury. As Lloyd says, "the occupation fell in wonderfully with his humor." The influence of the courts upon the Athenian character was far from wholesome. They fostered certain tendencies among the Athenians which needed repression rather than stimulation.

The decision of the jurors was final. There was no body or council in the state to review their decision. The judgment of a dicastery was never reversed or annulled. The decisions of the dicasts were not always consonant with justice; but probably the verdicts were, on the whole, as just and reasonable as are those of the modern jury.

Pericles adorns Athens with Public Buildings. — Athens having achieved such a position as she now held, it was the idea

of Pericles that the Athenians should so adorn their city that it should be a fitting symbol of the power and glory of their empire. Nor was it difficult for him to persuade his art-loving countrymen to embellish their city with those masterpieces of architecture that in their ruins still excite the admiration of the world.

Among various structures was the Odeon or "Music Hall," erected just beneath the Acropolis. This building was intended for the musical contests that were held in connection with the




Fig. 29. THE CARYATID PORCH OF THE ERECHTHEUM. (From a photograph.)

Panathenaic festivals. The roof of the structure was an imitation of the great tent of Xerxes, which was a part of the spoils of the field of Plataea (p. 221). Indeed it is possible that the tent itself was at first made to do service as a roof.

Near the Odeon, on the southeastern slope of the Acropolis, was the celebrated theatre of Dionysus, which Pericles is believed to have improved and adorned.

But the most noteworthy of the Periclean structures were grouped upon the Acropolis. Here, as the gateway to the sacred



Fig. 30. RESTORATION OF THE ACROPOLIS OF ATHENS.

enclosure of the citadel, were erected the magnificent *Propylæa*, which have served as a model for similar structures since the age of Pericles. A chamber in one of the wings was adorned with frescoes by the celebrated painter Polygnotus. The beautiful little temple of Nike Apteros (Wingless Victory), which stood on the right as one entered the enclosure, has already been mentioned (p. 236).

The Erechtheum, sacred to Athena Polias and Poseidon, was erected on the site of an older temple which perished with the other buildings on the Acropolis at the time of the Persian invasion. The beautiful porch of the Caryatides, shown in the accompanying cut (Fig. 29), was added some time after the death of Pericles.

But the most perfect of all the buildings erected here was the Parthenon, sacred to the virgin goddess Athena. The architect of this building was Ictinus; the sculptures were designed by Pheidias. Within was the celebrated ivory and gold statue of the goddess. Near the temple stood the colossal bronze statue of Athena Promachos, made, it is said, from the spoils of Marathon, whose glittering spear-point was a beacon to the sailor rounding Cape Sunium.

The Athenians obtained the vast sums of money needed for the prosecution of their great architectural and art undertakings from the treasury of the Delian confederacy. The allies naturally declaimed bitterly against this proceeding, complaining that Athens with their money was "adorning herself as a vain woman decks her body with gay ornaments." But Pericles' answer to these charges was, that the money was contributed to the end that the cities of the league should be protected against the Persians, and that so long as the Athenians kept the enemy at a distance they had a right to use the money as they pleased.

Strength and Weakness of the Athenian Empire. — Under Pericles Athens had become the most powerful naval state in the world. In one of his last speeches,¹ made soon after the outbreak

¹ The so-called "Funeral Oration"; see p. 286.

of the Peloponnesian War, in which he recounts the resources of the Athenian empire, Pericles says to his fellow-citizens: "There is not now a king, there is not any nation in the universal world, able to withstand that navy which at this juncture you can launch out to sea."

And this was no empty boast. The earlier empires of the Orient that once had held wide dominion had long since fallen, and the later Medo-Persian power which had arisen upon their ruins, and which at the opening of the fifth century B.C. was threatening to extend its authority over the world, had been checked in its insolent advance by Hellenic valor and discipline, so that at this time there was no power in the East that the Athenians need fear. In the West, Rome had not yet risen into prominence, and Carthage was barely able to contend upon equal terms with the Greek cities of Sicily. Beyond question the Hellenes were at this moment the leading race in the world; and Athens, notwithstanding the limitations placed upon her ambition by the terms of the 'Thirty Years' Truce, was the real head of Hellas. She had extended her dominion over a large part of the Greek cities, and it was but natural that the more sanguine of her citizens should believe that she was destined to rule over all.

But the most significant feature of this new imperial power was the combination of vast material resources with the most imposing display of intellectual resources that the world had ever seen. Never before had there been such a union of the material and the intellectual elements of civilization at the seat of empire.¹

¹ "The average ability of the Athenian race [was], on the lowest possible estimate, very nearly two grades higher than our own; that is, about as much as our race is above that of the African negro. This estimate, which may seem prodigious to some, is confirmed by the quick intelligence and high culture of the Athenian commonalty, before whom literary works were recited, and works of art exhibited of a far more severe character than could possibly be appreciated by the average of our race, the calibre of whose intellect is easily gauged by a glance at the contents of a railway bookstall." — GALTON, *Hereditary Genius*, p. 342 (2d Am. ed., 1887); quoted by Kidd, *Social Evolution*, ch. ix.

Literature and art had been carried to the utmost perfection possible to human genius. Art was represented by the inimitable creations of Pheidias and Polygnotus, while the drama was illustrated by the incomparable tragedies of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides.¹

But there were elements of weakness in the splendid imperial structure. The Athenian empire was destined to be short-lived because the principles upon which it rested were in opposition to the deepest instinct of the Greek race, — to that sentiment of local patriotism which invested each individual city with political sovereignty. Athens had disregarded this feeling. Pericles himself acknowledged that in the hands of the Athenians, sovereignty had run out into a sort of tyranny. The so-called confederates were the slaves of Athens. To her they paid tribute. To her courts they were dragged for trial.² Naturally the subject cities of her empire regarded Athens as the destroyer of Hellenic liberties, and watched impatiently for the first favorable moment to revolt, and throw off the hateful yoke that she had imposed upon them. Hence the Athenian empire rested upon a foundation of quicksand.

Had Athens, instead of enslaving her confederates of the Delian League, only been able to find out some way of retaining them as allies in an equal union, — a great and perhaps impossible task under the then conditions of the Hellenic world, — as head of the federated Greek race she might have secured for Hellas the sovereignty of the Mediterranean, and the history of Rome might have ended with the first century of the Republic.

Furthermore, there were elements of weakness within the Athenian democracy itself. Greatly as Pericles had exalted Athens, and vastly as he had extended her reputation, still by some of

¹ For short notices of the lives and works of these artists and poets, see further on, chs. xxviii. and xxix.

² The subject cities were allowed to maintain only their lower courts of justice; all cases of importance, as we have seen (p. 263), were carried to Athens, and there decided in the Attic tribunals.

his measures he had sown the seeds of future evils. In his system of payment for the most common public services, and of wholesale public largesses and gratuities, he had introduced or encouraged practices that had the same demoralizing effects upon the Athenians that the free distribution of corn at Rome at a later time had upon the Roman populace. These pernicious customs cast discredit upon labor, destroyed frugality, and fostered idleness, thus sapping the virtues and strength of the Athenian democracy.

Illustrations of these weaknesses, as well as of the strength of the Athenian empire, will be afforded by the great struggle between Athens and Sparta known as the Peloponnesian War, the causes and chief incidents of which we shall next rehearse.

REFERENCES. — Plutarch, *Life of Pericles*. Abbott, *Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens* (Heroes of the Nations), chs. x.-xviii. Grant, *Greece, in the Age of Pericles* (University Series). The first half of the book is devoted to a review of Athenian history before the time of Pericles. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. pp. 460-641. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 438-533; (twelve volume ed.), vol. v. pp. 352-407; *ib.* vol. vi. pp. 1-50. Cox, *The Athenian Empire*; and *Lives of Greek Statesmen*: "Ephialtes" and "Perikles."

PART FOURTH.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

(431-404 B.C.)

CHAPTER XVII.

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR: TROUBLES AT
CORCYRA AND POTIDÆA.

Introductory. — Before the end of the life of Pericles the growing jealousy between Ionian Athens and Dorian Sparta and her allies broke out in the long and calamitous struggle known as the Peloponnesian War, to which we have already made frequent allusion. Pericles had foreseen the coming storm: "I descry war," said he, "lowering from the Peloponnesus." He saw clearly that the deep-seated jealousies and the opposed political principles of the two rival states must sooner or later, in spite of truces and treaties, bring them to a final trial of strength for sole leadership in Greece. His whole later policy looked toward the preparation of Athens for the "irrepressible conflict."

Quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra respecting Epidamnus (435-432 B.C.). — One immediate cause of the war was the interference of Athens, on the side of the Corcyræans, in a quarrel between them and their mother city Corinth. The real root of this trouble between Corinth and Corcyra was mercantile rivalry. Both were enterprising commercial cities, and both wished to con-

trol the trade of the islands and the coast towns of Western Greece. But it was some question touching the affairs of Epidamnus,¹ a city on the Illyrian coast which had been founded by the joint enterprise of the Corcyræans and Corinthians, that brought matters to a crisis. The Corcyræans offered to refer the matter in dispute to mutually approved Peloponnesian states, or to Delphi, for arbitration, but the Corinthians would not assent to the proposal. War followed. In a naval battle, the Corinthians were worsted, and many of their ships destroyed (435 B.C.). Their victory gave the Corcyræans control of the Ionian Sea, and they spent a great part of the summer after the battle in cruising about the waters to the west of Greece, robbing the merchant-ships and annoying the coast settlements of the Corinthians and their allies.²

The Corcyræan and Corinthian Envoys at Athens.—The Corinthians now gave themselves for the space of two years to the work of building a new navy, with the resolve of avenging themselves and their allies upon the Corcyræans.

Alarmed at the extent of the preparations being made for their chastisement, the Corcyræans resolved to ask Athens for admission to the Athenian league, for up to this time they had held aloof from both the rival confederacies of Athens and Sparta. Accordingly they sent an embassy to the Athenians to entreat their alliance and assistance. When the Corinthians heard of the commission, they likewise sent envoys to Athens to dissuade the Athenians from granting the petition of the Corcyræans. The Athenians gave the ambassadors of both cities a hearing.³

¹ Later, Dyrrachium.

² Thucyd. i. 24-30.

³ Respecting the speeches which Thucydides introduces so frequently in his narrative, he himself says: "As to the speeches which were made either before or during the war, it was hard for me, and for others who reported them to me, to recollect the exact words. I have therefore put into the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as I thought he would be likely to express them, while at the same time I endeavored, as nearly as I could, to give the general purport of what was actually said." (Jowett's Thucydides, i. 15.) We shall give only the substance of these speeches—simply enough to indicate the drift of the arguments of the several speakers.

The Corcyraean envoys admitted at the outset that the policy hitherto followed by them not to enter into alliances with other states through fear that they might thus be drawn into wars that did not concern themselves, was unwise and short-sighted, inasmuch as in times of danger, such as the present, this policy left them isolated, and weak to repel aggression. But they begged the Athenians to overlook their "indolent neutrality, which was an error but not a crime," and to lend them aid against the Corinthians, who, having first wronged them, were now oppressing them.

They represented to the Athenians that by admitting them to their alliance and undertaking their defense, they would make them their everlasting and grateful friends — and they had a strong navy. This last point, that the Athenians would be acquiring helpful as well as grateful friends, the envoys particularly pressed upon the attention of the Athenians.

Anticipating that the Corinthians would deprecate Athenian interference on the ground that Corcyra was a colony of theirs, and that strangers should not come between the mother and her daughter, the envoys said that the Corinthians should "be made to understand that all colonies honor their mother city when she treats them well, but are estranged from her by injustice. For colonies are not meant to be the servants but the equals of those who remain at home."¹ To show that they had been treated unjustly, they told how their offer to refer the matter in dispute to arbitrators had been rejected by the Corinthians (p. 271).

As to the treaty obligations between Sparta and Athens, the envoys maintained that the Athenians would be violating none of these in admitting them to their alliance; for the last treaty² made provision for just such cases as the present, expressly providing that any city which at that time was a member of neither the Spartan nor the Athenian confederacy might join either at will.

¹ Thucyd. i. 33. The quotations from Thucydides in this and the following chapters that deal with the Peloponnesian War are uniformly from Jowett's translation.

² The treaty referred to is the Thirty Years' Truce. See p. 251:





Then the envoys, recurring to the argument of the advantage to Athens of an alliance with a maritime power like Corcyra, reminded the Athenians that Corcyra, being a sort of half-way station between Italy and Greece, would be of great importance to Athens in case the western cities should ever become the allies of the Lacedæmonians, since the Corcyræans could give aid to an Athenian fleet on its way to Italy, or block the passage of a hostile fleet sailing thence for Greece. They finally summed up their speech in these words: "Hellas has only three considerable navies: there is ours, and there is yours, and there is the Corinthian. Now if the Corinthians get hold of ours, and you allow the two to become one, you will have to fight against the united navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus. But if you make us your allies, you will have our navy in addition to your own ranged at your side in the impending conflict."¹

The envoys from Corcyra having thus spoken, those from Corinth were given an opportunity to present their side of the controversy. First, they touched upon what they claimed was the real motive of the Corcyræans in hitherto holding themselves aloof from all alliances — "they did not want to have an ally who might go and tell of their crimes"; for they represented the Corcyræans as being little better than pirates. As to their complaint of ill-usage, there was nothing in it. The Corinthians had always treated their colonies well, which was proved by the fact that "no city was more beloved by her colonies than Corinth."

As to the offer of arbitration to which the Corcyræans had referred, that, the speakers maintained, was all a pretense. It was not made until after they had become frightened by the preparations which the Corinthians were making to punish them as they deserved.

But there were special reasons, the Corinthians went on to say, why Athens, no matter what might be the circumstances of this quarrel between them and the Corcyræans, should not accede to the petition of the latter. In the first place, she would be break-

¹ Thucyd. i. 36.

ing the treaty. The provision referred to by the Corcyræans, which gave to cities outside the leagues permission to join either at will, did not have in view cities which might seek enrollment that they might thereby be enabled to injure others. In the second place, such action on the part of Athens would make Corinth her enemy and lead straight on to war between the two cities. In the third place, when the subjects of Athens revolted at Samos, the Corinthians had maintained the principle "that every one should be allowed to chastise his own allies," and had thereby prevented outside interference in Athenian affairs; now the Athenians should make returns to them for this service.¹ Moreover, the principle that the Corinthians at that time maintained was one in the maintenance of which as Hellenic law the Athenians above all others were interested. In the fourth place, the envoys still urged, Athens owed the Corinthians a debt of gratitude, which she ought now to discharge in a substantial way, for the twenty ships they loaned her when she was in the midst of her trouble with Ægina.² They had now shown the Athenians, so the envoys concluded, what course was right and just. They should not choose expediency instead of justice, "for the true expediency is the path of right."³

The Athenians resolve to form a Defensive Alliance with the Corcyræans.—After the Corinthian envoys had made their speech, the Athenians, having now listened to what each side had to say, took the matter under consideration. They seemed to realize the grave importance of the step that they were urged by the Corcyræans to take; but after some wavering they resolved to enter into a defensive league with them. They would not enter into an offensive alliance, for the reason that this might require them to aid the Corcyræans in an attack on Corinth, and that would be a plain violation of the treaty with the Spartan confederacy.

The motive of the Athenians for entering into this alliance was

¹ See p. 258.

² See p. 160.

³ Thucyd. i. 42; for the whole conference, 31-43.

to prevent any accession to the naval power of Corinth by her possible acquisition of the fleet of the Corcyræans, and to make sure of Corcyra as an important station and watch-post on the route to Italy. In all this, the Athenians were of course looking forward to the war with the Peloponnesians, which they saw to be coming on apace.

The Battle of Sybota (432 B.C.).—In accordance with the new alliance, the Athenians sent to Corcyra ten ships, with strict orders to their commanders, however, to act only in the defense of Corcyra and her possessions. These ships, like the Athenian contingents in the Ionian army that burned Sardis (p. 143), were fated to bring great woes upon Athens and all the other Greek cities.

The Corinthians soon collected a fleet of a hundred and fifty ships, which embraced contingents from several of their allies, and sailing against Corcyra, cast anchor at a promontory on the mainland opposite the northern point of the island. The Corcyræans, with a hundred and ten ships, put out to meet them, being accompanied by the Athenian vessels. The two navies, according to Thucydides, were the largest that the Greeks had ever gathered to fight one another.

An obstinate battle took place (battle of Sybota, 432 B.C.). The Athenians refrained at first from taking an active part in the engagement, simply relieving a Corcyræan ship when hard pressed, or placing themselves in the way of the Corinthian galleys. Finally, however, the Corcyræans having begun to flee, the Athenians took a hand in the fight. But both the Athenians and their allies were driven to the Corcyræan shores.

Here they collected the ships still sea-worthy and again put out to offer the Corinthians battle. Just as the engagement was about to begin, twenty vessels which the Athenians had sent to strengthen the original little squadron of ten, appeared in sight. Seeing them, the Corinthians retreated to the mainland, and, after exchanging some words with the Athenians, set sail for home. They carried with them a thousand prisoners, of whom eight

hundred were sold as slaves, while the remainder, many of whom were influential citizens of Corcyra, were held in a sort of honorable captivity, the intention of the Corinthians being to use them in effecting a revolution in the island in the interest of Corinth.

"Thus the war ended to the advantage of Corcyra, and the Athenian fleet returned home. This was the first among the causes of the Peloponnesian War, the Corinthians alleging that the Athenian fleet had taken part with the Corcyræans and had fought against them in defiance of the treaty."¹

The Revolt of Potidæa (432 B.C.).—The second immediate cause of the Peloponnesian War was another collision between the Athenians and the Corinthians on the opposite side of Greece, at Potidæa, which was situated on the peninsula uniting Pallene with the Macedonian shore. It was the affair at Corcyra that precipitated the trouble here.

Potidæa was a Corinthian colony, which, without giving up its relations to its mother city, had become a member of the Athenian league. It received each year magistrates sent out from Corinth, and paid tribute to Athens. This double relation, after the Corinthians and Athenians had come to blows in the western sea, was sure to create trouble here. The Athenians, fearing that the Corinthians would incite the city to revolt, ordered the Potidæans to demolish a portion of their walls, to give hostages as a pledge of faithfulness, and to send home the Corinthian officials.

The circumstances doubtless justified the Athenians in taking these precautions to forestall rebellion. Not only were the Corinthians angry and resentful, but Perdiccas, the king of Macedonia, was now hostile to Athens, and all her Chalcidian tributaries were watchful of an opportunity to revolt. An uprising at Potidæa might incite rebellion throughout all the Thracian region, and the large interests of Athens in those lands and seas be destroyed at a blow.

¹ Thucyd. i. 55.

But the Potidæans could not be expected to submit without protest and resistance to the demands of the Athenians. They sent envoys to Athens to secure if possible a revocation of the orders that had been given the Athenian admirals respecting Potidæa; and at the same time, since they had but little hope in the embassy to the Athenians, sent other envoys to Sparta to ask aid against their oppressors. The embassy to Athens was fruitless; but the Spartans promised the Potidæans to interfere in their behalf if the Athenians attacked them.

Emboldened by this promise of aid from the Peloponnesus, the Potidæans revolted, and persuaded many of the Chalcidian towns to do likewise. Meanwhile the Corinthians had sent to the assistance of Potidæa a considerable marine and land force, made up largely of volunteers not only from Corinth but from various states of the Peloponnesus. The Athenians defeated the allied Peloponnesians and Potidæans in a battle fought near Potidæa, and, driving the fugitives within the walls of the city, blockaded the place by land and sea.¹

Meeting at Sparta (432 B.C.). — Such was the situation when the Corinthians, seconded by the Megarians and Æginetans, who had each their own causes of complaint against Athens, appealed to Sparta, as the head of the Peloponnesian league, for aid and justice. The Spartans hereupon sent out invitations to the effect that any of their allies who had charges to prefer against Athens should send envoys to Sparta at a stated time.

The envoys having arrived, they were given in turn an opportunity to state their grievances before the Spartan popular assembly.

The complaint of the Megarians was that the Athenians, in violation of the treaty, had excluded them from all Attic ports and markets. The Æginetans, through fear, did not make any public accusation against Athens, but they caused it to be understood that she had virtually reduced them to a state of slavery.

Others stated their wrongs, and then the Corinthians made a scolding speech in which they roundly lectured the Spartans for

¹ Thucyd. i. 56-65.

being so blind to what was going on around them, for their neglect of their allies, and for their dilatoriness when the situation demanded prompt action. They even laid the blame for the enslavement of many once free cities by Athens at their door: "for the true enslaver of a people," they reasoned, "is he who can put an end to their slavery but has no care to do it; and all the more, if he be reputed the champion of liberty [among them]."

They then contrasted the slowness and conservatism of the Spartans with the alertness and enterprise of the Athenians, with whom to conceive was to execute, who were "always abroad," while the Spartans were "always at home," and to whom idleness was "as disagreeable as the most tiresome business." They told the Spartans that they must give up their "old-fashioned" notions, adopt the new Hellenic ways, and bestir themselves, if they wished to retain that position of leadership among the Peloponnesians which they had inherited from their ancestors.¹

After the Corinthians had thus spoken, some Athenian envoys, who chanced to be present at Sparta, asked permission to address the assembly. They made no attempt to reply to the accusations that had been brought against Athens, thinking that the Spartan assembly was not the proper tribunal for the hearing of such matters, and also because there is no answer to be made to mere invective, but simply reminded the assembly of the services that Athens had rendered all the Greeks in the Persian Wars, how they alone beat back the barbarians at Marathon, and how at Salamis, when they had no longer any city of their own to save, they fought to save those of their allies. They maintained that the Athenian empire was not a conquest, but a growth; it had arisen out of the circumstances of the struggle between the Hellenes and the barbarians. The Athenians had nursed the growth, to be sure, but they should not be reviled for that. "An empire was offered us," said the envoys; "can you wonder that, acting as human nature always will, we accepted it and refused to give it

¹ Thucyd. i. 68-71.

up again, constrained by three all-powerful motives, — ambition, fear, and interest. We are not the first that have aspired to rule ; the world has ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the stronger.”

The envoys then proceeded to say that the Athenians were worthy of power, and that they had not exercised it with unnecessary harshness, certainly not as tyrannically as the Spartans would have used it. They concluded by admonishing the Spartans not to hurry, at the instigation of Athens' enemies, into a war of which no one could foresee the issue.¹

When the speaking of the various deputies was at an end, the Spartans dismissed them with all the other strangers, and in secret the popular assembly deliberated upon the complaints of their allies. The king Archidamus, a man of wide experience and sound judgment, earnestly advised the Spartans not to enter into a war with Athens. He had seen too much of war to have any desire to see more. Athens, he said, was superior to Sparta in wealth and in her navy. Sparta might be superior in her army, but land forces could not reach any considerable part of the possessions of the Athenians, whose empire was a maritime empire, and one that reached out to remote lands. He advised therefore that they take ample time to think about the matter, and that, before having recourse to arms, although they should be making preparations for war, they try remonstrance and arbitration.²

The moderate and sensible counsel of Archidamus was opposed by the ephor Sthenelaidas. The substance of his speech was that Sparta ought to stand by her allies. He assumed that they were being ill-treated by Athens.

The ephor then put the question to the assembly for a decision. The assembly decided that Athens had broken the treaty.

The Spartans at Delphi : the Peloponnesians vote for War. — Before proceeding further, the Spartans sent to Delphi to inquire of the god what would be the issue of a war with Athens. They

¹ Thucyd. i. 72-78.

² Thucyd. i. 79-85.

are said to have received for an answer that "they would gain the victory, if they would fight with all their might," and that the god himself, "whether invited or uninvited," would help.

An assembly of the allies of Sparta was now called for the purpose of deciding by the vote of all whether or not the war should be undertaken. The Corinthians had been busy among the various cities kindling a war spirit, and at the meeting also their deputies fanned the flame. The sum of what they said was this: "The tyrant which has been set up in Hellas is a standing menace to us all alike; she rules over some of us already, and would fain rule over others. Let us attack and subdue her, that we may ourselves live safely for the future and deliver the Hellenes whom she has enslaved."¹

A majority of the states represented in the convention voted for a united attack upon Athens; and the following year was spent in making preparations for war.

Embassies between Sparta and Athens.—While preparations for hostilities were being made, embassies were passing back and forth between Sparta and Athens. First, the Spartans sent an embassy to Athens demanding that they "drive out the curse of the goddess." By this they meant that the Athenians should expel the Alcmaeonidæ, upon whom they professed to believe that the curse of Cylon still rested (p. 107). Now this was an attempt, under the pretext of zeal for religion, to discredit Pericles; for he belonged to the family whose exile they were demanding.

The Athenians replied to this embassy by directing the Spartans to purge themselves of the curse that was cleaving to them for the murder of the suppliant Helots taken from the temple of Poseidon (p. 242), and also of that which was upon them for the death of Pausanias in the precincts of the temple of Athena of the Brazen House (p. 238).

After this, another embassy came from Sparta, ordering the Athenians to restore to Megara the privileges of the Athenian ports, to raise the siege of Potidæa, and to give back to Ægina

¹ Thucyd. i. 124.

her independence. The Athenians refused to do any of these things.

Still a third embassy came, bearing this message: "The Lacedæmonians desire to maintain peace, and peace there may be if you will restore independence to the Hellenes."

Compliance with this meant, of course, the dissolution of the Athenian empire. In a speech before the popular assembly called to frame an answer to these extraordinary demands, Pericles reviewed the situation, showed the Athenians how useless it was to attempt to conciliate their enemies by concessions, inspired them with confidence in their affairs by pointing out the elements of strength in their empire and the sources of weakness in the Peloponnesian confederacy, and brought them to the resolution to give the Spartans an answer which in substance declared the Athenians to be ready to restore independence to those cities of their empire which were free at the time of the treaty, whenever Sparta should allow the cities subject to her to govern themselves in their own way. The reply further represented that the Athenians "would do nothing upon compulsion, but were ready to settle their differences by arbitration upon fair terms according to the treaty."¹ This reply of the Athenians to the last demands of the Spartans put an end to all further embassies.

Such were the circumstances under which Athens and the Peloponnesians drifted into war — into a war that was fated to distress all Greece for the lifetime of a generation, and to bring to utter ruin Athens and her empire.

REFERENCES. — Jowett's *Thucydides*, bk. i. Embraces some matters of a general introductory nature and not bearing directly on the subject in hand. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. iii. pp. 1-53. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. iv. pp. 534-557; (twelve volume ed.), vol. vi. pp. 50-75.

¹ Thucyd. i. 145.



CHAPTER XVIII.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR TO THE PEACE OF
NICIAS.¹

(431-421 B.C.)

The Beginning: Attack upon Plataea by the Thebans (431 B.C.). — The first act in the long and terrible drama was enacted at night, within the walls of Plataea. This city, though in Boeotia, was, as we have seen, under the protection of Athens, and would have nothing to do with the Boeotian league.

Anxious to get possession of this place before the actual outbreak of the war which they saw to be inevitable, the Thebans planned its surprise and capture. Three hundred Thebans gained access to the unguarded city in the dead of night, and, marching to the public square, summoned the Plataeans to exchange the Athenian for a Boeotian alliance.

The Plataeans were upon the point of acceding to all the demands made upon them, when, discovering the small number of the enemy, they attacked and overpowered them in the darkness, and took a hundred and eighty of them prisoners. These

¹ The war is usually divided into three periods, as follows: 1. From the beginning to the Peace of Nicias (431-421 B.C.), often designated as the Ten Years' War, or the Attic War, from the frequent invasions of Attica by the Peloponnesians; 2. From the Peace of Nicias to the defeat of the Sicilian Expedition (421-413 B.C.); 3. From the Sicilian disaster to the dismantling of the defenses of Athens (413-404 B.C.), called the Deceleian War, from Decelea, a stronghold in Attica seized and held by the Spartans during this part of the struggle. This last period is also sometimes called the Ionian War, because so much of the fighting took place in Ionia.

captives they afterwards murdered, in violation, as the Thebans always maintained, of a sacred promise that their lives should be spared.

The women and children were now removed from Plataea to Athens, and a few Athenian troops sent thither to help the Plataeans hold the place.

This wretched affair at Plataea precipitated the war (431 B.C.). The preparations on either side were now pushed forward with increased zeal and energy. There was great enthusiasm, Thucydides tells us, on both sides of the Isthmus, particularly among the young men, who, unlike King Archidamus of Sparta (p. 279), having never seen war, were eager for its new experiences and excitements.

The Peloponnesians invade and ravage Attica (431 B.C.). — As soon as the news of the affair at Plataea had reached Sparta, all her allies were at once summoned to send their contingents in haste to the Isthmus, prepared for a campaign in Attica. A great army was soon collected there, under the command of the Spartan king Archidamus.

Before beginning his march against Athens, Archidamus, thinking that perhaps the Athenians would now, upon the approach of danger, be more ready to grant the demands of the Spartans, sent a herald to Athens. The Athenians, who had made a public resolve never to treat with their enemies while in arms, would not allow the herald even to enter the gates of the city, and told him that he must be beyond the borders of Attica before night. As he crossed the frontier, he turned to the Athenians who had been his escort and said solemnly, "This day will be to the Hellenes the beginning of great sorrows."¹

The return of the herald thus peremptorily ordered off the Athenian soil, was the signal for the march of the Peloponnesian army towards the Athenian frontier.

Meanwhile Pericles, carrying out the general plan of campaign that had been resolved upon by the Athenians under his advice,

¹ Thucyd. ii. 12.

had gathered all the inhabitants of the villages, towns,¹ and scattered farm-houses of Attica, within the walls of the capital. The people brought with them their household goods, even "the wood-work of their homes." Their cattle they transported to Eubœa and other places of safety. Everything that could not be carried away was abandoned to the enemy.

"The removal of the inhabitants," says Thucydides, "was painful ; for the Athenians had always been accustomed to reside in the country. Such a life had been characteristic of them more than of any other Hellenic people from very remote times."² The historian explains this characteristic by telling how in early times the people lived in separate communes, and thus acquired country habits and a love of country life, which they retained even after they were united into one great city by Theseus.

Some of the immigrants had homes of their own within the city walls ; others were received into the homes of relatives or friends ; but by far the greater part, less fortunate, were forced to seek resting-places on unoccupied lots, in the temples and the towers of the Long Walls, and at the Peiræus. Even a vacant spot beneath the Acropolis, known as the Pelasgian ground, upon which a curse rested, and respecting which the Delphian oracle had said, "Better the Pelasgian ground left waste," was occupied in the emergency.³

Into the plain thus deserted, as it had been a generation before at the time of the Persian invasion, the Peloponnesians marched, just at the season when the grain was ripening, and as they advanced towards Athens ravaged the country far and near. Even the barbarians had not wasted it more ruthlessly. From the walls of the city the Athenians could see the flames of their burning houses, which recalled to the old men the sight they had witnessed from the island of Salamis just forty-nine years before.

¹ Some of the so-called townships or demes embraced large towns. Thus Acharnæ furnished 3000 heavy-armed men to the Athenian army, and so could not have had a free population of less than 8000 or 10,000.

² ii. 15.

³ Thucyd. ii. 17.

This destruction of their property before their very eyes naturally frenzied the people, and they began to upbraid Pericles, and demanded that he should give up his cowardly policy of crouching behind walls, and lead the army out to meet the enemy in open battle.

Perceiving that the people were beside themselves with anger, Pericles turned a deaf ear to all their abuse, and refused to comply with their demands, but sent out bodies of cavalry to protect the property near the city walls. The failure of provisions finally compelled the Peloponnesians to withdraw from the country. They retreated through Bœotia, and from the Isthmus the contingents of the different cities scattered to their homes.

The Athenians set aside a Reserve: their Fleet harries the Peloponnesian and other Shores.—After the departure of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians in a meeting of the Ecclesia voted to set aside one thousand talents of the treasure in the Acropolis and to keep a reserve of a hundred triremes, this sum of money and these boats to be used only in case of an attack on Athens by sea. Whoever should even propose to use the money thus set aside for any other purpose than that designated was to be put to death.

Before the withdrawal of the Peloponnesian army from Attica the Athenians had sent out a fleet of one hundred triremes to sail around the Peloponnesus and do what injury it could along the shores. The fleet ravaged the shores of Laconia, Messenia, and Elis, and then, strengthened by fifty ships from Corcyra, harassed the Corinthian colonies along the Acarnanian coast. After receiving the towns of the island of Cephallenia into the Athenian alliance, the fleet returned home.

The Athenians had also sent a smaller squadron of thirty ships towards the north. This squadron wasted the shores of Bœotia and Locris. Before the close of the summer, the islet of Atalante, just off the coast of Locris, was garrisoned and thus made a sort of watch-post to protect Eubœa against the Locrian pirates.

They expel the Æginetans and ravage Megara.—But the most important measure of the Athenians during the first summer

of the war was the expulsion of the Æginetans from their island, on account of the part they had taken in instigating the war (p. 277). A part of the exiles were given lands by their friends the Spartans at Thyrea, a place on the frontier of Laconia towards Argolis, while others sought new homes in various parts of Hellas. The island thus cleared of its population was occupied by Athenian settlers.

The only land expedition undertaken by the Athenians during this summer was one under the lead of Pericles into the territory of the Megarians, which was ravaged. As this expedition did not set out until towards the close of the season, the fleet that had been coasting around the Peloponnesus and was now returning home was able to join it. This union of land and sea forces made this army of invasion the largest, Thucydides asserts, that the Athenians ever had "in one place." It consisted of ten thousand heavy-armed men besides a large body of light-armed troops. It was not simply the largest army that Athens had gathered up to this time, but the largest she was fated ever to muster; for the very next year pestilence joined with war to waste beyond repair the strength of the imperial city.

Funeral Oration of Pericles.—It was the custom of the Athenians to bury with public and imposing ceremonies the bones of those who fell in battle. In the funeral procession the bones of the dead of each tribe were borne in a single chest on a litter, while an empty litter covered with a pall was carried for those whose bodies had not been recovered. The remains were laid in the public cemetery, outside the city gates. The only time that the Athenians departed from this custom was after the battle of Marathon, when the dead were buried on the field where they had fallen, as a special tribute to their valor and self-devotion (p. 157). After the burial of the remains, some person chosen by his fellow-citizens on account of his special fitness for the service delivered an oration over the dead, extolling their deeds and exhorting the living to an imitation of their virtues.¹

¹ Thucyd. ii. 34.

It was during the winter following the campaign we have described that the Athenians celebrated the funeral ceremonies of those who had fallen thus far in the war. Pericles was chosen to give the oration on this occasion. This funeral speech, as reported by Thucydides, is one of the most valuable memorials preserved to us from antiquity. All the circumstances under which the oration was pronounced lent to it a peculiar and pathetic interest.

The speaker took advantage of the occasion to describe the institutions to which Athens owed her greatness, and to picture the glories of the imperial city for which the heroes they lamented had died. He first spoke of the fathers from whom they had inherited their institutions of freedom, and their great empire, and then passed on to speak of the character and spirit of those institutions through which Athens had risen to power and greatness. The Athenian government, he said, was a democracy; for all the citizens, rich and poor alike, participated in its administration. There was freedom of intercourse and of action among the citizens, each doing as he liked; and yet there was a spirit of reverence and respect for law. Numerous festivals and games furnished amusement and relaxation from toil for all citizens. Life in the great city was more enjoyable than elsewhere, being enriched by fruits and goods from all the world.

The speaker praised, too, Athens' military system, in which the citizen was not sacrificed to the soldier as at Sparta; and yet Athens was alone a match for Sparta and all her allies. He extolled the intellectual, moral, and social virtues of the Athenians, which were fostered by their free institutions, and declared their city to be "the school of Hellas" and the model for all other cities.

Continuing, the speaker declared that Athens alone of all existing cities was greater than the report of her in the world; and that she would never need a Homer to perpetuate her memory, because she herself had set up everywhere eternal monuments of her greatness. "Such is the city," he exclaimed impressively, "for whose sake these men nobly fought and died; they could not bear the

thought that she might be taken from them ; and every one of us who survive should gladly toil on her behalf."

Then followed words of tribute to the valor and self-devotion of the dead whose sepulchres and inscriptions were not the graves

and the memorial stones of the cemetery — "for the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous men," and the memorials of them are "graven not on stone but in the hearts of mankind." Finally, with words of comfort to the relatives of the dead, the orator dismissed the assembly to their homes.¹

"Thus did Pericles represent to the Athenian citizens the nature of their state, and picture to them what Athens should be. Their better selves he held before them, in order to strengthen them and to lift them above themselves, and to inspire in them self-devotion and



Fig. 31. THE MOURNING ATHENA.²
(From a photograph.)

constancy and bravery. With new courage turned they from

¹ Thucyd. ii. 35-46, for the whole oration.

² A bass-relief recently excavated on the Acropolis of Athens. Dr. Charles Waldstein thinks that this sculpture may "have headed an inscription containing the names of those who had fallen in battle, which record was placed in some public spot in Athens or on the Acropolis. Our Athene-Nike would then be standing in the attitude of mourning, with reversed spear, gazing down upon the tomb-

the graves of the fallen to their homes, and went forward to meet whatever destiny the gods might have ordained."¹

That funeral day was, indeed, one of the great days in ancient Athens.

The Plague at Athens (430 B.C.). — Very soon had the Athenians need to exercise all those virtues which the orator had admonished them to cherish; for upon the return of the next campaigning season, the Peloponnesians, having mustered again two-thirds of all their fighting forces, broke once more into Attica and ravaged the land anew, giving to the flames such villages and farm-houses, chiefly in the southern and eastern parts of the district, as had escaped destruction the previous year. The Athenians, adhering to their policy of avoiding a battle in the open field, remained behind their walls, enduring as best they might the sight of the smoke of their burning homes drifting over the plain.

The walls of Athens were unassailable by the hostile army; but unfortunately they were no defense against a more terrible foe. A pestilence broke out in the crowded city, and added its horrors to the already unbearable calamities of war. Thucydides was himself a sufferer from the disease, and gives in his history a very careful account of the scourge. The plague is thought to have originated in Egypt; to have spread from there over the Persian empire, and finally to have entered Athens through the Peiræus, whither it probably was brought by ships coming from infected ports. From the historian's description of the symptoms shown by the victims of the disorder, it is believed that the disease was a malignant form of typhoid fever. So frightful was the mortality

stone which surmounts the grave of her brave sons." As to the possible connection of this relief with the funeral oration of Pericles, Dr. Waldstein says: "Though I do not mean to say that the inscription which it surmounted referred immediately to those who had fallen in the campaign of 431 B.C., I still feel that the most perfect counterpart in literature is the famous funeral oration of Pericles as recorded by Thucydides." See his interesting article entitled "Funeral Orations in Stone and Wood," *Harper's Magazine*, June, 1892.

¹ Curtius, *Griech. Gesch.* ii. 408 (6th ed.).

that the unburied dead and the dying filled the streets, the squares, the houses, and even the temples. Those who did care for their dead buried them in whatever burial-place was nearest, disregarding wholly the rights of property, or they flung the bodies upon pyres that others had built for burning their own dead.

A singular manifestation of human nature evoked by the panic and distress, and one which has been repeatedly observed under similar circumstances, is noticed by Thucydides. Men became reckless and bold in defying human and divine law, and, plunging into shameful orgies, gave themselves up to illicit pleasures and indulgences of every kind, as if resolved to get the most possible out of the few days remaining to them.

The religious-minded recalled the oracles that had foretold the event, and reflected that the calamity had not befallen them without the foreknowledge of the gods. There was the recent oracle of Apollo to the effect that he would take part in the war and help the Lacedæmonians (p. 279) — who at the very time that the disease was wasting the Athenians within the walls, were wasting their fields outside; and there was also an earlier oracle, recalled by the older men, which declared that “a Dorian war would come and a plague with it.”¹

The plague passed into the Peloponnesus, but it did not develop there in a malignant form. We may infer from this that the chief cause of its virulence at Athens was the crowded and consequently unsanitary condition of the city. Fully one-fourth of its population was swept away.

The Athenian Campaigns during the Second Year.—Even while the plague was raging in the city and the Peloponnesians were ravaging the surrounding country, Pericles, as he had done the preceding year, sent out a fleet of one hundred Athenian triremes, together with fifty Chian and Lesbian ships, to again harrow the coasts of the Peloponnesus. Accompanying the expedition were transports bearing three hundred horsemen, who were to land at convenient places and make raids inland. The

¹ Thucyd. ii. 54.

expedition ravaged the shores of Argolis, and, after destroying a town on the coast of Laconia, returned home.

During this same summer another expedition was sent to the Thracian shore, to aid the army besieging Potidæa (p. 277). But the germs of the plague were carried in the ships, and the disease developed with such virulence in the Athenian camp as to carry off in forty days fifteen hundred men out of a force of four thousand hoplites.

The various misfortunes of the year dispirited the Athenians, and once more they became furious at Pericles and began to abuse him as being the cause of all their sufferings. In their desperation they insisted that ambassadors should be sent to Sparta to seek terms of peace. Envoys were sent, but the embassy resulted in nothing.

Thereupon Pericles, with the view to calling the people to themselves, summoned a meeting of the Ecclesia. After first reproving them for their unjust reproaches and their unreasonable outbursts of passion, he appealed to their better selves, — to them as they had felt and resolved on that day when they stood with him around the graves of the fallen of the first year of the war and recalled what manner of city it was for which they were to do and to suffer, — and thus gradually brought them to a better temper and a more resolute mind, and induced them to take a more hopeful and reasonable view of their affairs. They resolved to persist in the prosecution of the war, but, according to Thucydides, still retained enough ill feeling against Pericles to fine him for the counsel he had given them in the matter. Straightway, however, with their characteristic inconsistency and changeableness, recognizing that he was the ablest and most reliable man among them, they again elected him general, and entrusted to his hands the full control of the public business.

Meanwhile, ravaging here and fighting there were going on, until the operations of the second year of the war were ended by the surrender of Potidæa to the Athenians. By the terms of the surrender all the inhabitants of the city were forced, in the midst

of the winter season, to go out and find new homes where they could, and the empty city was filled with settlers from Athens. Its fidelity for the future was insured.

The Death of Pericles (429 B.C.). — In the third year of the war the plague reappeared at Athens, though it did not rage with the violence which had marked its course the preceding year. But Pericles, who had been the very soul and life of Athens during all these dark days, fell a victim to the disease. The plague had previously robbed him of his sister and his two sons. The death of his younger son had bowed him in grief, and as he laid the usual funeral wreath upon the head of the dead boy, for the first time in his life, it is said, he gave way to his feelings in a passionate outburst of tears. In dying, the great statesman is reported to have said to those standing about him that he regarded his best title to honored remembrance to be that "he had never caused an Athenian to put on mourning."

After the death of Pericles the leadership of affairs at Athens fell to a great degree into the hands of unprincipled demagogues. The mob element got control of the Ecclesia, so that hereafter we shall find many of its measures characterized neither by virtue nor wisdom.

The Revolt of Mytilene (428–427 B.C.) : **the Athenians blockade the City.** — The most important matters of the three years immediately following the death of Pericles were the revolt from Athens of Mytilene, on the island of Lesbos, and the siege and destruction of Plataea by the Peloponnesians. We shall first relate the circumstances of the Mytilenæan revolt, and then give an account of the fall of Plataea.

In the fourth year of the war (428 B.C.), the whole island of Lesbos, except the town of Methymna on the northern shore, revolted from Athens. The chief city of the island was Mytilene, and this place was the centre of the movement. The Mytilenæans had been making preparations to revolt ever since the beginning of the war. They had been strengthening the defenses of their city, building ships, contracting for supplies from the region of the

Euxine, — and of course carrying on secret negotiations with Sparta. In the midst of their preparations, their designs were betrayed to the Athenians.

The Athenians, upon the receipt of this intelligence, were greatly troubled; for the navy of the Mytilenæans was one of the largest in Hellas, and their revolt at just this time, when all the resources of Athens were taxed to the utmost, was a very serious matter. Envoys sent to Mytilene having confirmed the worst reports as to what was going on there, the Athenians seized the ten Mytilenæan triremes which were serving in the Athenian navy and imprisoned their crews, and then dispatched hurriedly to Lesbos a fleet of forty ships, thinking to take the Mytilenæans by surprise.

A secret messenger from Athens, however, warned the Mytilenæans of their danger, and when the Athenian fleet appeared before Mytilene, its walls were manned, its harbor was blocked, and the inhabitants were standing on the defense. The Athenian generals, as their force was insufficient to enable them to regularly invest the place, agreed to a truce with the inhabitants. As soon as the Mytilenæans had secured this respite, they sent an embassy to Athens to represent to the Athenians that the rumors in circulation respecting their intention to revolt were wholly unfounded. Foreseeing, however, that this story would receive no credence at Athens, they at the same time secretly sent messengers to Sparta to ask for assistance.

The Mytilenæan Envoys at Olympia. — Now it chanced that when the envoys to Sparta reached that place, the Spartans were on the eve of their departure for the games at Olympia, and they invited the envoys to go up with them, and lay the matter before a council of the allies at that place. The envoys accepted the invitation, and at the council there of the Peloponnesian allies pleaded the cause of the Mytilenæans. They rehearsed how, after the battle of Plataea, they had joined the Delian League in order to help free the Greeks that were still enslaved by the Persians, and how as a result they had been themselves virtually enslaved by Athens. They were not slaves in name, it was true; they were

called allies, but the alliance was really so unequal that they had no will of their own : they must obey Athens as though she were a master. And then any moment they might lose even the name of allies, and become slaves both in name and fact, as had all the other once free allies of the league, with two or three exceptions. It was this intolerable condition of their once independent city that had led them to revolt. The envoys closed their speech by representing their cause as the cause of all the once free cities now held in slavery by the Tyrant-city, and by appealing to the Spartans to become the liberators of Hellas.¹

➤ **The Peloponnesians resolve to attack Athens in Aid of the Mytilenæans ; their Attempt miscarries.** — The petition of the envoys was straightway granted. The opportunity was too good a one for striking a heavy blow at the power of Athens for the Peloponnesians to allow it to slip by unimproved. The Mytilenæans were admitted as allies to the Peloponnesian league, and the confederates were summoned to hurry their contingents to the Isthmus.

The plan of the Peloponnesians was to drag their ships over the Isthmus of Corinth, and attack Athens both by sea and land, as they thought that the absence of the Athenian fleet at Lesbos — for the Athenians were now blockading Mytilene — must leave the city in a measure defenseless on the side of the sea.

But the Athenians soon undeceived them. Suspecting what the Lacedæmonians had in mind, they got ready in haste a hundred ships, manned them in part with resident aliens, and then paraded their strength in front of the Isthmus. They also landed a force on the neighboring Peloponnesian shore and ravaged the land.

At the same time that they were confronted at the Isthmus by this display of the enemy's strength, the Spartans received intelligence that a large Athenian squadron was harrying the coast of the Peloponnesus farther to the south. There seemed to be no end to the number of ships the Athenians could man : here was a

¹ Thucyd. iii. 9-14, for the whole speech.

fleet a hundred strong at the Isthmus, another at Lesbos, and still a third cruising about the Peloponnesus. Despairing of the success of an attack by sea on Athens, especially since their allies, who were busy getting in their crops, had not yet sent their contingents to the Isthmus, the Lacedæmonians abandoned their plans and went home.

The Mytilenæans are forced to surrender (427 B.C.). — Meanwhile the war had flamed out at Lesbos. The Mytilenæans had made an attempt to capture Methymna, the city in the north of the island which held to Athens, but had failed in the endeavor; and now they were being besieged in their own city by sea and land. The Athenians had drawn about the city a wall, strengthened in places by towers or forts, so that nothing could be carried in or out of the town.¹

The blockade was maintained during the winter. When the campaigning season of the fifth year of the war opened, the Peloponnesians sent a fleet of forty ships under the command of Alcidas to the assistance of the Mytilenæans, and at the same time, in order to divide the attention of the Athenians, made another raid into Attica. Once more the country was ravaged, this time more thoroughly and systematically than ever before. Every green thing, the plants and trees as well as the growing grain, seems to have been destroyed, in so far as it was possible to do so.

But the succour dispatched for Lesbos failed to reach the island in time to save the Mytilenæans. As day after day passed, and the expected ships did not come, the Mytilenæan nobles, being confronted by a revolt of the common people, who were desperate from hunger, and who, moreover, felt that they had no stake in the war, which, as a matter of fact, was being prosecuted in

¹ The cost of investing a city in this manner was heavy. So great was the outgo at the present time that the Athenians found themselves under the necessity of resorting to unusual measures to meet the requirements of the treasury. For the first time in the history of the city the people levied upon themselves a property tax of two hundred talents (about \$240,000), and dispatched twelve ships to gather tribute from the allies. Thucyd. iii. 19.

the interests of the oligarchs alone, surrendered to the Athenians, on the condition, however, that the generals should not of themselves inflict punishment upon any of the inhabitants, but should allow the Mytilenæans to send an embassy to Athens for the purpose of making terms directly with the Athenian people. They hoped to find there friends to plead their cause. On these conditions the gates of Mytilene were opened to the Athenians, and the proposed embassy was allowed to proceed to Athens.

Debate at Athens over the Fate of the Prisoners: Cleon.—

The Athenians were in a revengeful mood, as the revolt of the Mytilenæans seemed to them not only a most perfidious act on the part of allies whom they had always treated well, but one that the security of the empire demanded should be severely punished. Accordingly they executed at once Salæthus, the leader of the revolt, whom the Athenian general Paches had sent on with the envoys, and at the instigation of the demagogue Cleon, passed a decree to the effect that the other captives at Athens and all the men of Mytilene, six thousand in number, should without exception be put to death, and the women and children sold into slavery. A galley was at once dispatched to carry to the general at Mytilene orders for the immediate execution of the sentence.

By the next morning, however, the Athenians had repented of their hasty and cruel resolution. To make no distinction between the guilty and the innocent, they themselves, now that they had come to their better selves, recognized to be monstrous. The Mytilenæan envoys and their friends, since now the Athenians were accessible to reason, succeeded in persuading the magistrates to call a second meeting of the Ecclesia for the purpose of reconsidering the barbarous decree.

The citizens having again assembled, Cleon addressed them in a violent speech, taunting them for their inconsistency and woman-heartedness, and reminding them that their rule was a despotism, — there was no disguising the fact, — and that they must depend upon fear and not love for the obedience of their subjects and

allies. To pardon the Mytilenæan rebels, he insisted, was to invite all their allies to revolt, and to ruin the Athenian empire. And there was no occasion to prate about making a distinction between the innocent and the guilty; they were all alike guilty. The Athenians, if they were going to rule, must have nothing to do with pity, or forgiveness, or mercy, or right. They must take vengeance upon their enemies whether it be right or wrong; the Mytilenæans must be made an example of, if Athens was to maintain her empire. "When virtue is no longer dangerous," — thus Cleon talked to his listeners, — "then you may be as virtuous as you please."¹

In listening to this demagogue we realize what Athens lost when death robbed her of her wise counsellor Pericles. We tremble for her future with such men as Cleon prominent in her councils.

Cleon was followed by Diodotus, who had opposed the first decree, and who now spoke in favor of its repeal. He did not carry the discussion to high moral or humanitarian grounds, but advised leniency in dealing with the Mytilenæans on the ground of expediency. "The question for us, rightly considered," he said frankly, "is not, What are their crimes? but, What is for our interest?" He then endeavored to show that it would not be expedient for the Athenians to deal with the Mytilenæans in the way proposed by Cleon. To put them to death would not deter others of the subjects of Athens from revolting; for all experience went to prove that severe penalties never deter men from doing what hope, or interest, or passion prompts them to undertake.

The better policy for the Athenians to pursue, Diodotus urged, was to inflict upon the Mytilenæans simply a moderate punishment; then, if ever they should have to blockade another rebellious city, the inhabitants would not fight so desperately as they would did they know that there was no hope or mercy for them if they were overcome.

The speaker also represented to the Athenians that they would commit a grave error should they mete out the same punishment to

¹ Thucyd. iii. 37-40.

the common people in Mytilene as to the nobles, even if they were equally guilty, which was not the case ; for it was to their action that the Athenians owed the surrender of the city. Indeed, in all the cities of their empire the popular party favored the Athenian rule, and were in opposition to the aristocratic party, which everywhere was hostile to Athens. Now the Athenians should foster this division in the cities by punishing severely in the present case the leading oligarchs who were the authors of the revolt, and whom Paches had already sent to Athens, and by letting all the others go free.¹

The moderate counsel of Diodotus prevailed ; but the strength of Cleon's following was shown by the fact that the repeal of the earlier decision was carried by the barest majority. A swift trireme was instantly dispatched to bear the reprieve to the Athenian general at Mytilene. The galley carrying the first order had now been out twenty-four hours, and it was feared that the reprieve might after all reach the island too late. The Mytilenæan envoys provided the crew of the trireme with the most nourishing food, and promised them a large reward if they overtook the first ship. With every nerve tense by virtue of the nature of their errand, and with strength inspired by the hoped-for reward, the crew, taking their food at the oars, urged their galley across the Ægean with incredible swiftness, and reached the island just in time to stay the execution of the first edict.

The second resolution of the Athenians, though more discriminating than the first decree, was severe. The Athenian general had sent to Athens over a thousand of the leading citizens of Mytilene. All these were put to death. The walls of Mytilene were thrown down, and the Mytilenæan navy appropriated by the Athenians. The lands of the whole island, save those belonging to the town of Methymna, were divided into three thousand portions, of which a tenth was set aside for the gods, and the remainder given to Athenian citizens, who were chosen

¹ Thucyd. iii. 42-48.

by lot, and who formed a sort of military settlement on the island.¹

The Siege of Platæa by the Spartans (429-427 B.C.).—The same year that witnessed the suppression and punishment of the Lesbian revolt, saw the utter destruction of Platæa by the Peloponnesians.

It will be recalled that after the unsuccessful attempt of the Thebans at the beginning of the war to capture this place (p. 282), the women and children were removed, and an Athenian force sent to the town to help the Platæans garrison it, as it was too important an outpost towards Thebes to be allowed by the Athenians to fall into the hands of their enemies.

In the summer of the third year of the war (429 B.C.) the Spartan king Archidamus, instead of again ravaging Attica, led an army into the territory of the Platæans, intending to lay it waste. The Platæans, upon the appearance of the Lacedæmonian army, sent an embassy to Archidamus, reminding him how, by the united voice of all the Greeks who fought at Platæa against the barbarians, Platæa had been declared a free and independent city and its territory pronounced sacred and inviolable; and how the Spartans themselves had taken the oath to punish any one who should dare to break the peace of the land (p. 222). They adjured him in the name of the witnessing gods to refrain from committing the wrong and sacrilege he contemplated.²

The answer of Archidamus to the envoys was that the Platæans should use the independence which was granted them at the time of the great war for freedom, in helping the Peloponnesian confederates to liberate those cities which Athens had enslaved; for that was the aim and purpose of the war which Sparta and her allies were now waging against Athens. If they did not wish,

¹ These settlers were cleruchs, like those we have seen sent to Chalcis and other places. They did not cultivate with their own hands the lands received; these were tilled by the native Lesbians, who paid the new proprietors a fixed rent. The Mytilenæans held several towns on the Asiatic shore adjacent to Lesbos. Their possessions there now also fell into the hands of the Athenians.

² Thucyd. ii. 71.

nowever, to aid the liberators, they must at least remain neutral; they could not expect to side actively with the destroyers of the common liberties of the Greeks, and yet be allowed to shelter themselves behind the alleged inviolability of their territory.

The Platæans explained that they really were not free to act as they chose in the matter, since their wives and children were in the hands of the Athenians, and also through fear of the Thebans, who had once attempted to seize their city, and might do so again. They must have a protector; but that protector's wish was perforce law to them.

To these representations Archidamus proposed that they should mark the boundaries of their territory, count their fruit-trees, and take a careful inventory of all their goods, and then deliver everything into the hands of the Spartans, who would hold the property till the end of the war, and then return it to them, together with a fair rent for its use, in just the condition that they had received it. Meanwhile they themselves might go where they pleased.¹

The Platæans asked permission to make known these proposals to the Athenians, and get their advice. Permission being granted, the Platæans sent envoys to Athens to lay the matter before them. The Athenians returned to the Platæans, by the hands of the envoys, this message: "Platæans, the Athenians say that never at any time since you first became their allies, have they suffered any one to do you wrong, and they will not forsake you now, but will assist you to the utmost of their power; and they conjure you by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to forsake the Athenian alliance."²

The fidelity of the Platæans to their old friends and patrons was equal to the sacrifice that was required of them. Not deeming it prudent to put their envoys in the power of the enemy, they announced to Archidamus from their walls that they could not exchange their old for new allies.

The siege now began. The minute account which Thucydides

¹ Thucyd. ii. 72.

² Thucyd. ii. 73.

gives of the siege operations is valuable because of the light it throws upon the state at this time among the Greeks of the art of besieging cities.

The Peloponnesians first built a palisade, constructed of the trunks of fruit-trees, around the town, so that no one could pass in or out. They then raised opposite a certain point of the wall a great mound of earth and logs. The whole army labored upon this mound for over two months, the work going on day and night under Spartan overseers.

The Plateans, when the rising mound began to threaten to overtop the city wall, carried the wall at this point higher, tearing down their houses to get timber and brick. And so the mound and the wall went up together. The daily gain of the mound, however, was retarded by a shrewd device of the Plateans. They dug a hole through the city wall at the point where the mound rested against it, and drained, as it were, the earth into the city. The sinking of the mound revealed to the Peloponnesians what was going on, and they put a stop to it by filling the gaping hole with clay and reeds. The Plateans now dug a tunnel which opened under the mound some distance from the wall, and began anew to draw away the earth. This went on for a considerable time before discovery, and meanwhile the mound, despite the day and night labor of the Peloponnesians, grew very slowly.

Still another device of the besieged to meet the threatened danger from the mound was this: Behind that section of the wall which was likely to be commanded soon by the mound, they built an inner wall, in the form of a crescent, so that should the Peloponnesians get possession of the outer one, they would find themselves in front of a new rampart.

At the same time that the Peloponnesians were carrying forward the work on the mound, they were bringing up against the walls heavy battering-rams. The Plateans disabled these in various ways. They caught them in nooses and drew them up, or broke the heads of the rams by dropping heavy logs upon them, just as they were being swung against the wall.

Making but little progress with their mound and engines, the Peloponnesians tried to set fire to the town. They piled a great mass of branches of trees upon the mound, and threw others over the city walls so as to make a great heap of material ready to flame up like tinder, and then set the whole afire. "A flame arose," says Thucydides, "of which the like had never before been made by the hand of man." Notwithstanding that there was such an unheard-of conflagration, the Plataeans escaped with the loss of only a part of their homes ; for a timely thunder-storm, it is said, rescued them from their imminent peril.¹

Despairing of taking the city in any of these ways, the Peloponnesians now built round the place a double brick wall, strengthened with towers and moats, and, having set a strong guard to watch the city, withdrew their main army. There were imprisoned in the city four hundred Plataeans and eighty Athenians, together with a hundred and ten women to prepare their food. All the rest of the inhabitants, as has been related, had been taken to Athens.

As winter came on (428-427 B.C.), provisions began to fail within the city, and the Plataeans in their desperation resolved to make an attempt to force their way out. Taking advantage of the darkness of a stormy night, when the driving rain and sleet had caused the guards to somewhat relax their vigilance, two hundred and twenty of the garrison broke over the enemy's wall, and succeeded, almost without exception, in reaching Athens in safety.

The Surrender: the Trial: the Destruction of Plataea (427 B.C.).—The following summer those still left within the city, two hundred and twenty-five in number, whose courage had not been equal to the bold attempt of their companions, pressed by hunger and the assaults of the enemy, surrendered to the Spartans. Their fate was to be decided by Spartan judges, but no one was to be punished without "just cause."

Being brought before the five commissioners who had been sent from Sparta, each Plataean was asked this question : "Have you

¹ Thucyd. ii. 75-77.

rendered any service to Sparta or her allies during the present war?" Two advocates, previously chosen, made answer for all.

They said that the Spartans had betrayed the confidence which the Plateans had reposed in them. They had expected a legal trial, in which accusations to which they might reply would be brought against them; but the form of the question put to them convinced them that they were condemned beforehand in the minds of their judges. They saw in it all the hand of their mortal enemies, the Thebans. Nevertheless, they must say something. And so they pleaded the services that, if not in the present war, at least in earlier wars, they had rendered Hellas, and their claim upon the gratitude of all the Hellenes. They bore their part, and more than their part, in the great war of freedom against the barbarians: though they had no interest on the seas, they fought at Artemisium, and again in the battle in their own land when the gods granted the Greeks their greatest victory. And the Spartans ought not to forget how, when they were in great distress through the revolt of the Helots at the time of the earthquake, the Plateans sent a third of all their soldiers to help them.¹

The advocates then rehearsed the circumstances under which the Plateans had entered into the Athenian alliance; and defended their conduct in refusing the proposals of Archidamus—for it were base in the Plateans to betray their benefactors.

The speakers then arraigned the Thebans for their outrageous attempt to seize the city of the Plateans, which act was the source of the present trouble; and recalled their traitorous conduct at the time of the Persian War. The Spartan judges ought not to sacrifice the Plateans at the instigation of such men. They must render a just and impartial decision, or the reputation the Spartans had borne for uprightness and impartiality would be lost; for this thing was not being done in a corner, but in the face of all the world. "Mankind will not endure," said the speaker, "to see spoils taken from us, the benefactors of Hellas,

¹ See p. 242.

dedicated by our enemies in the common temples. Will it not be deemed a monstrous thing that the Lacedæmonians should desolate Plataea; that they, whose fathers inscribed the name of the city on the tripod at Delphi in token of her valor,¹ should, for the sake of the Thebans, blot out the whole people from the Hellenic world? For to this we have come at last. . . . The Plataeans, who were zealous in the cause of Hellas even beyond their strength, are now friendless, spurned and rejected of all . . . Yet once more, O Lacedæmonians, for the sake of those gods in whose name we made a league of old, and for our services to the cause of Hellas, relent and change your minds, if the Thebans have at all influenced you: in return for the wicked request they make of you, ask of them the righteous boon that you should not slay us to your dishonor. . . . Before you pass judgment, consider that we surrendered ourselves, and stretched out our hands to you; the custom of Hellas does not allow the suppliant to be put to death. Remember too that we have ever been your benefactors. Cast your eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers slain by the Persians and buried in our land, whom we have honored by a yearly public offering of garments and other customary gifts . . . Reflect: when Pausanias buried them here, he thought that he was laying them among friends and in friendly earth. But if you put us to death, and make Plataea one with Thebes, are you not robbing your fathers and kindred of the honor they enjoy, and leaving them in a hostile land inhabited by their murderers? Nay more, you enslave the land in which the Hellenes won their liberty; you bring desolation upon the temples in which they prayed when they conquered the Persians; and take away the sacrifices which your fathers instituted, from the city which ordained and established them." Then with this last appeal to their judges,—"You are liberating the other Hellenes; do not destroy us,"—the Plataeans closed their defense.²

¹ See p. 221.

² Thucyd. iii. 53-59, for the whole defense. The speech is a remarkable one. It is full of historical reminiscences, and betrays in every line the feeling of

The Thebans were now given an opportunity to speak. They explained and defended their feeling of enmity towards the Plateans by telling how they had disloyally separated themselves from their kinsmen the Bœotians, and allied themselves with the people of Attica. They admitted that they joined Xerxes in the Persian War. But that happened through the government of their city being at that time in the hands of a clique friendly to Persia. They had no other choice. In any event, they were fighting on the right side now. And the Plateans need not take so much praise to themselves for having fought against the barbarians: that came about from their being allies of Athens, and compelled to follow her lead. They excused the attempt they had made to seize Platea by saying that they had been invited to take possession of the city by some of the best citizens, who wanted to see the foreign alliance with Athens annulled, and their city brought into its proper and natural relations to the other cities of Bœotia. They also brought counter-charges against the Plateans, especially for the recent murder of the Theban prisoners, whose lives were under the protection of a solemn agreement and a sacred oath, and called upon the judges, paying no attention to what the accused had said about "stretching out their suppliant hands," to pronounce against them the sentence they richly deserved as haters of their kindred, breakers of treaties, and murderers.¹

The Spartan judges, prejudiced in favor of their Theban allies, gave judgment against the Plateans. Two hundred were put to death, and with them twenty-five Athenians who had helped to defend the city. The women were given into slavery. The city with all its territory was delivered into the hands of the Thebans. They soon levelled all the houses to the ground, and out of the material built a vast inn, intended for the use of the cultivators of the surrounding fields, as well as for the accommodation of pilgrims

abhorrence with which the action of the Spartans was regarded by the historian, and by all right-feeling men in Greece.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 61-67.

to the place. A great temple dedicated to Hera proclaimed the sanction of the gods as to all that had been done.

Sedition at Corcyra (427 B.C.). — The city of Corcyra, whose contention with Corinth had been one of the proximate causes of the war (p. 270), became about this time the scene of a most violent domestic revolution, which issued in massacres that appalled even the Greeks themselves, accustomed as they were to the shedding of each other's blood in their party quarrels.

The trouble arose through an attempt of the oligarchs to overthrow the government of the democracy. A terrible battle was fought in the streets of the city. Even the women took part in the fight, and flung down tiles from the roofs of the houses upon the heads of the combatants. Finally, the oligarchs, hard pushed, set the city afire, and it narrowly escaped complete destruction. The people, however, ultimately got the upper hand. They fell upon the oligarchs wherever they chanced to find them, and put them to death.

Ostensibly the oligarchs were killed because they had attempted to destroy the democratic constitution of the city; "but in fact," says Thucydides, "some were killed from motives of personal enmity, and some because money was owing to them, by the hand of their debtors. Every form of death was to be seen, and everything and more than everything that commonly happens in revolutions happened there. The father slew the son, and the suppliants were torn from the temples and slain near them; some of them were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus, and there perished."¹ The oligarchs that escaped the massacre, some five or six hundred in number, collected in a brigand band, and, entrenching themselves on a hill in the island, sallied thence and harried the surrounding country.

The General Demoralizing Effects of the War. — The sedition at Corcyra was only a local manifestation of a species of infectious madness which, bred by the war, seems to have seized upon the whole Hellenic world. Everywhere in the Greek cities there

existed the same conditions that in Corcyra had first developed the contagion. Every city, like Corcyra, held within its walls two parties, the democratical and the oligarchical, of which the former sought to carry its ends by calling in the Athenians, while the latter looked for help to the Peloponnesians. The result of this political situation was a state of things within each city to which we can find no parallel in the experiences of modern nations, except perhaps in the cities of France in the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution, where the situation in both its domestic and foreign aspects was not unlike that in Greece at the time of the Peloponnesian War.

Thucydides draws a terrible picture of the condition of the Hellenic world thus torn at once by the passions of war, the enmities of party, and the violence of personal hatred. Words, says the historian, changed their meaning. What was once regarded as virtue was now looked upon as vice. "He who could outstrip another in a bad action was applauded. . . . The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood. . . . Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. Any agreements sworn to by either party, when they could do nothing else, were binding as long as both were powerless. But he who on a favorable opportunity first took courage and struck at his enemy when he saw him off his guard had greater pleasure in a perfidious, than he would have had in an open, act of revenge. . . ." ¹

The Area of the War is widened : Situation in the Western Colonies. — The war not only grew more bitter, but it spread more widely. Before the end of this same year, the fifth since the first invasion of Attica, the cities of both Sicily and Italy had become involved. It was the same in these colonial lands as in the mother country : here, one city was at war with another ; there, within the same walls, democrats were arrayed against aristocrats ; here again, it was Dorian against Ionian ; while there, once more, the intermingling of racial, political, and personal causes of contention created a confused battle without rational ground or purpose.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 82, 83.

In Sicily, Dorian Syracuse was at war with Ionian Leontini. In the main, the Ionian colonies were on the side of Leontini, while the Dorian towns were the allies of Syracuse. The Athenians, interested in controlling the resources of these western regions, sent a fleet to aid the Leontines and their allies; the Peloponnesians, likewise anxious to secure Dorian ascendancy in this colonial world of the West, lent assistance to the Syracusans and their confederates.

The military movements in these western regions, the immediate results of which were of no great moment, we will pass without notice, and proceed to narrate the circumstances attending an affair in the home land which had a very important bearing upon the course of events.¹

The Athenians seize and fortify Pylos on the Messenian Shore (425 B.C.). — In the summer of the seventh year of the war, the Athenians equipped a squadron of forty ships, under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, for service in the Sicilian waters. The generals were instructed, as they passed Corcyra on their voyage out, to give the popular party there such assistance as they could against the oligarchs in the hill fortress (p. 306); for it was known that the Peloponnesians had dispatched a powerful fleet to the island to help the exiled nobles to regain possession of the government.

Demosthenes, the leader of the Ambracian expedition of the previous year (see note below), accompanied the fleet, having been especially authorized by the Athenians, upon his urgent solicita-

¹ The military operations of the sixth year of the war (426 B.C.) were not of great importance. During the year the Athenians sent out three fleets. One under Demosthenes sailed round the Peloponnesus to the western coast of Greece, and there, joined by the Acarnanians (see map), made an unsuccessful attack upon the Ætoliæ; but later, in union with the Acarnanians, gained a great victory over the allied forces of the Ambraciots and the Peloponnesians (battle of Olpæ, 426 B.C.). Demosthenes then returned home with his ships freighted with three hundred armors as a part of the Athenian share of the spoils of the Ambraciots. A second fleet was sent out under Nicias. This ravaged the island of Melos, and then, sailing to the Eubœan strait, made a foray into Bœotia. Still a third fleet was sent out to Sicily. This expedition accomplished nothing.

tion, to employ the armament, while it was passing around the Peloponnesus, in any way that he might deem best. This commission, in the discretionary authority with which it clothed Demosthenes, was like that with which the Athenians had once before entrusted Miltiades (p. 158) ; but it was destined to have a more fortunate and honorable issue.

Arriving off the Laconian coast, the Athenian generals learned that the Peloponnesian fleet was already at Corcyra. This news made Eurymedon and Sophocles anxious to hurry on with all possible speed so that their aid might not come too late to the Corcyræans. But Demosthenes now revealed to them what he had had in mind from the first. This was to establish a fortress at Pylos, a rocky promontory on the Messenian shore, not more than forty-six miles from Sparta. The idea of Demosthenes was that the fort would afford a sort of rallying-point and stronghold for the discontented Messenians, and would effect a permanent blockade of Laconia on that side.

A tedious storm which compelled the Athenian ships to remain some days at the harbor of Pylos gave Demosthenes time to argue the matter with the generals and the soldiers. The generals, persuaded that the project was irredeemably foolish, would not listen to him, but the private soldiers took to the idea ; and the time hanging heavily on their hands, they set themselves to building a fort on the headland, becoming so interested in the work that, in the absence of proper tools, they even made hods of their backs for carrying the mortar.

Intelligence of what the Athenians were doing at Pylos was carried to Sparta. The matter did not at first cause the Spartans at home much uneasiness, as they imagined that whenever they were ready to do so, they could easily drive off the trespassers : besides nothing could be done at once, since the Peloponnesian army was away on its usual raid into Attica. So the Athenians were allowed to complete their work without molestation. When it was done, Demosthenes was left with five ships to hold the place, while the remainder of the fleet went on to Corcyra.

When the Peloponnesian army beyond the Isthmus learned of the fortification of Pylos, it straightway returned home, since it was accomplishing but little in Attica, and the Spartans particularly felt concern regarding this new move of the enemy.

The Spartans, trying to dislodge the Enemy, are shut up in Sphacteria. — If any of the Spartans, as is asserted, at first made light of this occupation of their coast by the Athenians, they all very soon began to realize that they had a serious matter on hand. They collected at once, for the driving-out of the intruders, all their own forces, summoned the allies to muster their contingents

in haste, and recalled from Corcyra the fleet destined for Sicily. Demosthenes, learning of the preparations of the Peloponnesians to attack him, sent a hasty message to the general of the Athenian fleet requesting him to return at once to his relief.



The Peloponnesian fleet and army having assembled at Pylos, the Athenian garrison was besieged by sea and land. Lying in the entrance to the harbor at Pylos is a small island, named by the ancients Sphacteria. Upon this islet the Spartans landed a body of hoplites with their attendant

Helots. Their intention was to block up the passage to the harbor on either side of the island, and thus prevent the entrance of the Athenian fleet, whose arrival they were expecting.

On the third day of the siege the Athenian ships arrived with succor for Demosthenes. On the following day they sailed into the harbor, — the entrance to which the Peloponnesians had not yet blocked, — attacked and defeated the enemy's fleet, and thus enclosed and imprisoned on the island of Sphacteria the men who had been stationed there.

When the news of the situation at Pylos was carried to Sparta,

there was great excitement ; for among the men shut up in the island were many of the most influential citizens of the city. Despairing of being able to rescue them, the Spartans resolved to conclude a truce with the Athenian generals, and to send to Athens to seek terms of peace.

The conditions of the truce were, that the Lacedæmonians should give up to the Athenians all their ships at Pylos and on the Laconian coast, which, however, were to be restored at the end of the truce, without diminution or harm ; and that the Athenians should allow the Spartans to carry to the men on the island daily supplies of food.

The Spartans sue for Peace at Athens. — The truce having been arranged, Spartan envoys set out for Athens to negotiate respecting a permanent peace. In return for the surrender of the men on the island, they offered to the Athenians, in the name of the Spartan state, peace and a friendly alliance. They urged the Athenians, now that they had it in their power to do so, to put an end to the war that was wasting all Hellas, and dwelt upon the advantages that would accrue to both Sparta and Athens from the alliance they offered. “ If you and we are at one,” they said, “ you may be certain that the rest of Hellas, which is less powerful than we, will pay to both the greatest deference.”¹

These terms were such as should have been at once accepted by the Athenians. But the reception that these reasonable proposals met shows how completely the management of Athenian affairs had fallen into the hands of unprincipled politicians.

The demagogue Cleon, who wished the war to go on, since its continuance would afford chances for his advancement, persuaded the Ecclesia to reject the offer of the ambassadors, and to propose terms which he knew would not and could not be accepted by the Spartans. These terms were that the men at Sphacteria should give themselves up to be brought to Athens ; and that the Spartans should restore to Athens certain places which she had ceded to Sparta at the time of the ‘Thirty Years’ Truce (p. 252, n.).

¹ Thucyd. iv. 20.

The result was the return of the envoys to Sparta and the breaking-off of the negotiations.

The truce was now at an end. In accordance with its terms, the Spartans demanded the return of their ships. But the Athenians, pointing to a clause of the treaty which read, "If either party violate this agreement in any particular, however slight, the truce is to be at an end," accused the Spartans of having violated the agreement in several particulars, and refused to give up the vessels. When we notice the trivial character of the charges which the Athenians preferred, we are inclined to believe that the insertion in the treaty of the clause they quoted was all a device to enable them to retain the ships without an open violation of the agreement. At all events, the Spartans felt that they had been outrageously dealt with in the matter. This affair was not one of the least of the many roots of bitterness that nourished the inappeasable enmity of the Spartans towards the Athenians.

The Athenians send Cleon to Pylos. — The islet of Sphacteria now became the centre of the war. The Athenians kept triremes constantly cruising round the island throughout the day, and at night, unless the sea was boisterous, the whole fleet lay in an unbroken circle about it. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians watched the fort, and harassed its defenders by incessant attacks.

The Athenians had hoped to starve the men at Sphacteria into a quick surrender ; but a multitude of Helots, inspired by the offer of large sums of money together with freedom, busied themselves, at great risk of life, in provisioning the imprisoned men. Some who were skilful divers swam across the harbor, avoiding the Athenian ships as best they could, and dragging after them skins filled with food ; others, when the roughness of the waters made it impossible for the besiegers to watch the side of the island towards the sea, ran their loaded boats recklessly through the surf, caring nothing if their ships were wrecked, as all such losses were made good by the Spartans.

The Athenians at home began to grow impatient. The summer was passing, and if winter should come before the capture of the

men on the island, the siege would have to be abandoned ; for it would be impracticable during the stormy season to maintain a fleet and army on the exposed shore of Messenia. There was now a growing regret that the proposals of the Spartan ambassadors had not been accepted. The people were angry at Cleon for the advice he had given them, and began to give expression to their feelings. Cleon had the assurance to pronounce exaggerated and false the reports that were being brought from Pylos. The messengers who had brought the latest gloomy tidings being in Athens, answered Cleon by suggesting to the people that, if they thought their report was false, they should send messengers of their own to see how things stood. The Athenians, acting upon this suggestion, chose for one of the commissioners Cleon himself.

Cleon knew very well that the report of the messengers was truthful, and that it would never answer for him to allow the proposed commission to be undertaken. Therefore he changed his tactics. He advised the people not to waste valuable time in sending commissioners, but to dispatch at once additional ships, and then, if affairs at Pylos really were in as desperate a shape as represented, the assistance would be timely. He added, aiming his sarcasm at one of his enemies, Nicias, that "if the generals were good for anything, they might easily sail to the island and take the men, and that this was what he would certainly do himself if he was general."¹

What followed is a valuable commentary upon the Athenian character. Nicias at once took Cleon at his word, and in the assembly of the Ecclesia formally resigned his command in his favor. Cleon, having had no idea that matters would take such a turn, now tried to retreat from his ridiculous position ; but the people, who were getting great amusement out of the situation, insisted upon it that Cleon should be general and lead the expedition. There was nothing else for Cleon to do, if he would not be hopelessly discredited, but to accept the command, and lead out a fleet to Pylos. The Athenians gave him such ships and troops

¹ Thucyd. iv. 27.

as he desired, and he set sail from Athens with the boast that in twenty days he would be back bringing with him the Spartans alive — or having left them dead on the island. The Athenians laughed. “Nevertheless,” says Thucydides, “the wiser sort of men were pleased when they reflected that of two good things they could not fail to obtain one — either there would be an end of Cleon, which they would have greatly preferred, or, if they were disappointed in this, he would put the Lacedæmonians into their hands.”¹

Cleon captures the Spartans. — Having arrived at Pylos, Cleon, not by good generalship, but through good fortune, actually did accomplish what astonished the whole Hellenic world, himself probably included. He found Demosthenes just on the point of making an attack upon the island, — as a fire kindled by accident had burned off most of the forest upon it and thus made such an attempt practicable, — and he had the good sense to make Demosthenes his colleague and approve his plans. The attack was made. After an obstinate fight, the Spartans, being crowded toward one end of the island, were completely surrounded.

They must now either surrender or die. Both Cleon and Demosthenes were anxious to take them prisoners to Athens, and accordingly offered them terms of surrender. They asked for permission to consult with their fellow-citizens on the mainland. In reply to their question as to what they should do, they received this message: “Act as you think best, but do not dishonor yourselves.”

After receiving this answer, they held a council, and decided to surrender. There were remaining of the four hundred and twenty heavy-armed men who had landed on the island, two hundred and ninety-two, of which number about one hundred and twenty were Spartans, some of them, as has been said, members of the best families at Sparta. All the prisoners were carried to Athens.

The Significance of the Event. — The surrender of Spartan soldiers had hitherto been deemed an incredible thing, and

¹ iv. 28.

hence the derisive laughter with which the Athenians had met the boastful promise of Cleon. "Nothing which happened during the war," declares Thucydides, "caused greater amazement in Hellas ; for it was universally imagined that the Lacedæmonians would never give up their arms, either under the pressure of famine or in any other extremity, but would fight to the last and die sword in hand."¹

It was difficult for men to persuade themselves that these Spartans who had given up their arms were really of the same mould as those who had died fighting. This feeling was reflected in the question of the man who tauntingly asked one of the Spartan prisoners, "Where are your brave men—all killed?" He replied, "The arrow would be a valuable weapon if it picked out the brave."

The men who had surrendered were not less brave than those whom the enemy's arrows had killed. The real significance of the affair was the revelation it made of the relaxing at Sparta of that tense military discipline and spirit which had given the Spartans such a place and reputation in the Hellenic world. It was the beginning of the end.² In passing from Thermopylæ to Pylos, we cross the divide which separates the heroic and worthy from the degenerate and unworthy period of Spartan history. For the Spartans were simply and exclusively fighters ; and the moment they ceased to reverence the supreme virtue of the soldier, their mission was ended, and there was for them thenceforth no work or place in the world.

The prisoners were held at Athens as a sort of hostages for the security of Attica in the future, the Spartans being informed that if they made another invasion of the country all the captives should be put to death. Pylos was garrisoned with Athenian and Messenian troops, and as a rendezvous for Messenian exiles and patriots and a harboring-place for runaway Helots, became a

¹ iv. 40.

² Yet only the beginning. For a later exhibition of the genuine Spartan spirit see p. 410.

thorn in Sparta's side. So distressed indeed were the Spartans that they felt constrained to enter again into negotiations with the Athenians respecting terms of peace. But the Athenians held too advantageous a position to feel inclined to offer to their enemy terms which they could accept. So nothing came of the negotiations.

The End of the Corcyraean Revolution (425 B.C.).—The same summer that witnessed the end of the affair at Pylos saw also the end of the Corcyraean troubles. The Athenian generals Eurymedon and Sophocles, who after the surrender of the men at Sphacteria had returned with their fleet to Corcyra, there aided the democrats in forcing a surrender of the oligarchs entrenched among the hills of the island (p. 306). The terms of the surrender were that the oligarchs should not be handed over to the popular party, but that their fate should rest in the hands of the Athenian people. As the captives could not be sent to Athens at once, they were put on a little island, with the understanding that if any of them attempted to escape all should be given up to the democratic party at Corcyra.

The leaders of this party devised a trick for the undoing of the captives. They sent persons to them who, representing themselves as friendly to them, pretended to reveal a plot whereby they were to be delivered over to their enemies in the city. They then urged them to try to escape from the island, and offered to provide them ships for the attempt.

The captives fell into the trap, made an attempt to escape, were of course taken in the act by the Athenians, and then, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, handed over to the Corcyraean democrats. The Corcyraeans put them to death in a mode worthy the instincts and ingenuity of savages. "They took the prisoners and shut them up in a large building; then leading them out in bands of twenty at a time, they made them pass between two files of armed men; they were bound to one another, and were struck and pierced by the men on each side, whenever any one saw among them an enemy of his own; and there were

men with whips, who accompanied them to the place of execution and quickened the steps of those who lingered.”¹

After sixty had been massacred in this manner, those remaining inside the building, becoming informed of what was going on, refused to leave the place, and barricaded the doors. Their enemies thereupon tore holes in the roof and flung tiles and shot arrows down among the captives until all either were killed by the missiles or had in despair put an end to their own lives.

This was the end of what was known as the “Corcyraean Sedition.” It could but be the end, for the popular party had now annihilated their enemies.

Cythera seized by the Athenians (424 B.C.).—Another misfortune similar to that which they had suffered in the occupation of Pylos by their enemies, befell the Spartans the year after that event.

The island of Cythera, lying just off the shore of Laconia, had from early times been in the hands of the Spartans, and was by them carefully guarded, since it was a sort of watch-post for the Laconian shore, and a favorably situated call-station for ships from Egypt and the African coast.

Against this island the Athenians sent a fleet of sixty vessels. The expedition was successful and the place was made a second Pylos. Laconia was virtually blockaded; its shores were incessantly harassed, and the whole land kept in a state of constant terror and alarm. The Spartans became disheartened, inasmuch as misfortune was a new experience for them, and believing that fate was against them, they moved, if at all, with hesitation and timidity.

The Athenians defeated at Delium (424 B.C.).—But the gloom that had settled upon the affairs of the Spartans was the darkness that precedes the dawn. Matters soon began to assume a brighter look. Both in Bœotia and on the Thracian shore the Athenians met with defeat and loss.

Some leaders of the democratic party in Bœotia had secretly

¹ Thucyd. iv. 47.

planned a general revolution in the cities there, whereby power was to be wrested from the hands of the oligarchs, popular constitutions were to be established, and the whole country thus revolutionized was to be transferred from the Peloponnesian to an Athenian alliance. Communications were entered into with the Athenians, who were to assist the revolutionists by invading Bœotia both from the side of the Corinthian Gulf and that of Eubœa. The Athenians were to make their attacks simultaneously, and the Bœotian democrats were to act in concert with them and betray certain places into their hands. *EMOST HENES*

Upon the eve of its accomplishment the plot became known to the Spartans, who warned their Bœotian friends. The places that were to have been betrayed into the hands of the Athenians were at once secured, and every precaution taken against the conspirators.

The Athenians, however, notwithstanding that the original plans had thus been marred, made a threatening invasion of Bœotia from the side of Eubœa. With an army embracing all their forces, — citizens, metics, and strangers, — under the lead of Hippocrates, they seized Delium, on the Bœotian shore close to the boundary between Bœotia and Attica, and fortified it, proposing to establish a permanent garrison there, and thus make of it a sort of Bœotian Pylos. In the construction of their fort, the Athenians utilized the walls of a temple of Apollo that stood on the spot, and used the stones and brick of neighboring houses which they tore down, as well as the vines and trees of the surrounding vineyards and orchards.

While the Athenians were occupied with this work, the Bœotians were mustering near by at Tanagra all their available forces. By the time these had gathered, the Athenians had finished their fort and their main army was on its march towards home, having already crossed the frontier into Attica. After some hesitation, the Bœotians resolved to follow the Athenians into their own territory, and to punish them not only for their intrusion into Bœotia, but also for their desecration of the sacred precincts of Apollo.

Surely the god whose temple had been so impiously violated would help them.

The two armies came together on the border between Bœotia and Attica. The opposing forces were unusually large. The Bœotians had about seven thousand heavy-armed and over ten thousand light-armed men, a thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. The Theban troops were drawn up twenty-five deep. The Athenians, as we have seen, had marched out in full strength. They had seven thousand heavy-armed men drawn up seven deep, and of other troops a number much greater than the corresponding forces of the enemy, but unfortunately these were ill-armed.

After a hard fight along the greater part of the opposing lines, and much pushing and crowding of the deep-ranked hoplites, the Athenians at one point were forced back and at another thrown into a panic by an unexpected attack of cavalry,—and the day was lost. The fugitives scattered in all directions, some fleeing to the hills and others to the sea-shore and to Delium. The defeat was complete. Almost a thousand Athenians lay dead on the field, together with their general Hippocrates.

After the battle the Athenians sent a herald to the Bœotian camp asking permission to bury their dead. On the ground that they had trespassed on holy soil, had desecrated the temple of Apollo, and used for common purposes the holy water, the request was refused them—unless they should give up Delium. To the Bœotian charges of impiety, the Athenians urged the necessities of war as their excuse for having done the things complained of, and said they did not believe the gods themselves would judge very harshly such trespasses. They had not acted in a spirit of irreverence.

The Bœotians now attacked the fort at Delium, and after a siege of seventeen days succeeded in taking it. As soon as the Bœotians had regained possession of Delium, they allowed the Athenians to gather and care for their dead.

The Spartan Brasidas suggests a New Plan of Campaign against Athens.—The arena of the war now shifts to the Thra-

cian shore, and assumes a somewhat different character. Up to this time Sparta had in general restricted her operations to an annual raid into Attica, which, while annoying to the Athenians, left their war strength essentially unimpaired. In the meantime the Athenians, through the occupation of Pylos, Cythera, and other places, had established a permanent blockade of the Peloponnesus. Seven years of the war had now passed since the first blow was struck, and so far from Sparta's promise to emancipate the cities enslaved by Athens having been fulfilled, she herself was being held in close siege, with more than a hundred of her citizens in captivity at Athens.

From this humiliating condition Sparta was rescued by the ability and energy of her general Brasidas, who had distinguished himself at Pylos. Brasidas saw clearly that if Sparta was ever to bring the war to a successful termination, she must at once adopt a wholly new policy in its prosecution. Athens was unassailable by land — five resultless campaigns beyond the Isthmus had demonstrated this. Besides, a repetition of these expeditions was now prevented by the threat of the Athenians to put to death the Spartan prisoners should Attica again be invaded. Athens must be reached through her allies and colonies. The tributary cities of her empire were ready to revolt, as witnessed the revolution at Potidæa and at Mytilene. Could they be assured of effective help from the Peloponnesians, they would all instantly throw off the hated yoke, and strike for independence.

But this empire of the Athenians was a maritime empire, and was maintained by the naval power of Athens ; hence Sparta could do nothing in the way of carrying out the policy suggested, without a fleet equal to that of the enemy. Brasidas proposed to create such a fleet out of the resources of the Athenian empire itself. His plan was to stir to revolt some group of the tributary cities of Athens, and then, working from this centre of defection, to spread the revolt as widely as possible.

For the initiation of his policy, Brasidas chose the Thracian shore, one of the most important of the possessions of Athens ; for

from the prosperous tribute-paying cities here Athens drew large revenues, while the forests that covered the mountains supplied in great abundance timber for the building of her ships. To this region he could lead troops by land, and when once it had been separated from the Athenian empire, — and already some of the cities there were in open revolt against Athens and asking the Peloponnesians for aid, — its inexhaustible resources could be used by the Spartans for the creation of a fleet to be employed in aiding the islands of the *Ægean* and the coast towns of *Asia Minor* to free themselves from Athens. These emancipated cities could be depended upon to join their ships to those of the liberators, and the united armaments of the Hellenic world would then be turned against the Tyrant-city. We shall see that this is exactly what happened in the end.

Brasidas stood alone, or almost alone, at Sparta. Most of the Spartans regarded his plan as partaking of the adventurous. It was, indeed, in its wide outlook rather an Athenian than a Spartan conception. And Brasidas had something of the Athenian in his mental make-up. In his restless, enterprising, energetic disposition, he departed widely from the Spartan type, and as closely approached the Attic. Moreover, he possessed the gift of eloquence, a peculiarly Athenian endowment, and something rare in a Lacedæmonian.

But Brasidas had asked only for a force of seven hundred Helots, — Spartan citizens could not of course be taken on so long an expedition as Brasidas proposed, — and as the Spartans were at this time, on account of the occupation of *Pylos* and *Cythera* by the enemy, in momentary fear of a revolt of the Helots, they were not unwilling to grant his request, and thereby get rid of the most dangerous of this class of the population. If nothing else was accomplished, it was thought possible that the expedition might result in the Spartans getting possession of one or more cities which, in the next negotiations for peace, might be offered in exchange for *Pylos* and the other places in possession of the Athenians.

Accordingly, Brasidas was furnished with his little servile army, and set out on his adventurous undertaking, which was not altogether unlike Hannibal's in the great fight between Carthage and Rome. There was this difference, however: Hannibal's expectation that when once he had carried the war into Italy the allies and colonies of Rome would hail him as a liberator, was bitterly disappointed; while Brasidas' hope, better founded, was reasonably realized, and hence the success of his policy to carry the war among the allies of the enemy ensured.

Brasidas in the Thracian Region (424-423 B.C.). — It was in the summer of the year 424 B.C. that Brasidas set out from the Isthmus for the Thracian shore with a force of seventeen hundred heavy-armed men, seven hundred being the Helots that the Spartan state had furnished him, and the remainder mercenaries whom he had picked up in different parts of the Peloponnesus. He traversed Boeotia and then marched on through Thessaly, being escorted by some of the chief men of the country. The little army came near being stopped here, however, and turned back by the common people, who were irritated by this march of an armed force through their land, and especially so since it was aimed at the Athenians, for whom the Thessalians had always entertained the most friendly feelings. But the smooth speech of Brasidas and a swift march carried him safely through the Thessalian territory into the country subject to Perdiccas, king of Macedonia.

After having given somewhat dubious assistance to Perdiccas against some enemies of his, Brasidas proceeded to Acanthus in Chalcidice, one of the most important of the tributary cities of Athens in those regions. The people of Acanthus were divided in their opinion in regard to the policy of admitting the Peloponnesians within their walls. Such a step meant rebellion against Athens, and all that that implied. The fate of Mytilene was yet fresh in memory, and the Acanthians were not sure that the Peloponnesians would be able to save them, any more than they had saved the Mytilenæans, from the vengeance of the Athenians.

However, they finally consented to allow Brasidas to come alone into the city for the purpose of talking the matter over with them.

Brasidas represented to them that he had been sent among them by the Spartans in order to make good the promises that the Peloponnesians had made at the beginning of the war, to the effect that they would emancipate all the cities enslaved by Athens. That the Spartans had not redeemed their promise sooner was because the war had not gone as prosperously with them as they had hoped it might. But he was now come, having made a long and dangerous journey to redeem that promise, and offered himself to them as their liberator. He assured them that the Lacedæmonians would respect their independence, and that no one party in the city need fear that they would be delivered up to their political enemies: he had not come among them to be "the tool of a faction." The liberty that he brought them was liberty for all, not for a few. But if they refused to accept the freedom he offered them, and open their gates to his army, then he would be forced to regard them as the enemies of Sparta and her allies, and would at once proceed to ravage their fields and make war upon them in every way; for it could not be endured that they should be allowed to stand in the way of the work of emancipating the Hellenes which Sparta and her allies had undertaken.¹

The Acanthians were persuaded, — the love of liberty and the fear of having their vineyards destroyed concurring to bring them to the resolve to revolt from Athens and join the Peloponnesian alliance. The gates of the city were thrown open to the army of Brasidas — and that day saw the beginning of the end of the sea-empire of Athens. Before the end of the summer Stageirus, another tributary city of Athens, following the example of Acanthus, revolted, and joined the Peloponnesians.

The following winter Brasidas, strengthened by the forces of the Chalcidian cities that had now joined him, marched against Amphipolis, on the banks of the Strymon. Arriving in front of the city, Brasidas, by offering reasonable terms of surrender,

¹ Thucyd. iv. 85-87.

quickly brought the inhabitants to the resolve to open their gates to him. He hastened the negotiations, for the reason that the Athenian general Thucydides, the historian, was at the island of Thasos, only a few hours distant, with a squadron of seven ships, and he feared lest, if there were any delay, these ships might bring reinforcements to the place. Thucydides, as soon as he received intelligence of the movements of Brasidas, set sail for Amphipolis, but arrived too late to save the city. It was on account of this failure¹ that the Athenians banished him, and thus afforded him the opportunity to write his invaluable history of the war—another illustration of the uses of adversity.

A Broken Truce (423 B.C.).—The revolt from Athens now spread rapidly and widely. Many cities in Chalcidice joined Brasidas, and the Athenians, becoming alarmed for their remaining possessions in that region, manifested a readiness to listen to proposals for peace. The Spartans, notwithstanding the scales had turned so decidedly in their favor, were still as desirous as ever for a peace, in order that they might secure the release of the captives at Athens. A truce for a year was agreed upon, during which time the terms of a permanent peace were to be arranged. Each party was to retain during the truce all the places in its possession.

As soon as the truce had been ratified, heralds were dispatched to the Thracian shore to publish it there. Now it chanced that during the interval between the ratification of the truce and the arrival of the heralds in Chalcidice, the city of Scione had revolted from the Athenians and joined Brasidas. The Athenians demanded that this city be given back to them, since the revolt had occurred after the conclusion of the truce. Brasidas refused to surrender the place. The Athenians were furious, and refusing to listen to the Lacedæmonians, who wished to have the matter referred to arbitrators, voted to send instantly an expedition against Scione, and to put to death every man within the walls of the city.

Meanwhile another Chalcidian town, Mende, encouraged by the

¹ Whether or not Thucydides was really to blame for the failure does not appear.

affair at Scione, had likewise revolted from Athens, and had been received by Brasidas into the Peloponnesian alliance. This, since previous to the transaction the truce had been published in Thrace, was in open and flagrant violation of its terms; but Brasidas was now maintaining that the Athenians had broken the agreement, and that in consequence it was not binding upon him. The Athenians were now angered beyond measure, and pushed forward energetically their preparations for retaking both places.

The Battle of Amphipolis (422 B.C.): Death of Cleon and Brasidas. — The forces collected for the enterprise were placed under the command of Nicias and Nicostratus, and in a short time were on the Thracian coast. Fortunately for the Athenians, Brasidas had been called away into Macedonia by his ally Perdiccas to aid him against his old enemies. Before his return, the Athenians had recovered the town of Mende, and were besieging Scione.

This was the situation on the Thracian shore when the truce came to an end. Upon its expiration, the Athenians sent an additional fleet of thirty ships to Chalcidice. This armament was under the command of Cleon, who had from the first opposed the truce, and for whose war-policy the conduct of the Peloponnesians in Thrace had made the Athenians almost unanimous.

Cleon recovered Torone, sold the women and children into slavery, and sent the men as prisoners to Athens. Leaving a garrison in the place, he sailed for Amphipolis. Here the Athenians and their allies, in what is known as the battle of Amphipolis (422 B.C.) suffered a decisive defeat. Cleon himself was killed, and Brasidas was mortally wounded.

The Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.). — The greatest obstacles in the way of returning peace — the ambition of Brasidas and the demagogism of Cleon — were now removed. Conservative and peace-loving men, King Pleistoanax at Sparta and Nicias at Athens, were now supreme in the councils of their respective states. And the people, too, both at Sparta and at Athens, were in a mood to listen to moderate and sensible advice. The disasters of Delium

and Amphipolis had made the Athenians amenable to reason ; their self-confidence had been thereby rudely shaken. Moreover, the revolt of so many of their Thracian allies made them apprehensive lest the spirit of rebellion should spread among their other tributary cities.

The Spartans, on their side, were more than ever inclined towards peace ; for in addition to all the reasons urging them thereto at the time of the ratification of the recent truce, came the fact that a thirty years' truce with Argos was now on the eve of expiring, and they feared that the Argives, who refused to renew the treaty on acceptable terms, would take advantage of the circumstances to join the Athenians, and attempt to regain their lost ascendancy in the Peloponnesus.

No negotiations for peace were opened, which, after many embassies back and forth, resulted in what is known as the Peace of Nicias, because of the prominent part that general had in bringing it about. The treaty provided for a truce of fifty years. The essential condition was that each party should give up to the other all prisoners and captured places.

In addition to this provision, there were the usual clauses relative to the free use of all the common temples. Any persons in the surrendered places who wished to migrate were to be allowed to do so, and to take their property with them. Any controversy that might arise was to be decided by arbitration.

The winter of the tenth year of the war was just ending as the peace was concluded. The war had brought no manifest gain to either the Peloponnesians or the Athenians, but, on the contrary, had inflicted upon both parties heavy losses, and stirred up hatreds which were destined to render nugatory all the provisions of the peace now nominally established.

REFERENCES. — Jowett's *Thucydides*, ii.-iv. ; also v. 1-26. Plutarch, *Life of Nicias*. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. iii. pp. 53-208. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. v. pp. 1-404; (twelve volume ed.), vol. vi. pp. 75-426. Cox, *Lives of Greek Statesmen*: "Kleon," "Brasidas," and "Demosthenes."

CHAPTER XIX.

FROM THE PEACE OF NICIAS TO THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

(421-416 B.C.)

The Allies of Sparta are dissatisfied with the Treaty. — The key to the main part of the history of the seven years between the Peace of Nicias and the setting-out of the great Athenian expedition to Sicily is found in the dissatisfaction of the allies of Sparta with the provisions of that treaty, and the exploiting of this situation by Argos ; that is to say, the taking advantage of it by her to regain her ancient ascendancy in the Peloponnesus.

Chief among the dissatisfied Spartan confederates were the Corinthians. They were angry because certain places¹ had not been given back to them, and accused Sparta of having sacrificed her allies to the advancement of her own interests. Specially bitter, also, was the feeling against Sparta among her newly acquired allies or dependents in the Thracian region : for Sparta had undertaken, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, to restore to Athens Amphipolis and the Chalcidian cities which, as a result of the expedition of Brasidas, had been freed from Athenian control ; but the inhabitants of these places, indignantly rejecting the treaty, had refused to be transferred to their former masters.

The Spartans, interested in the maintenance of the treaty because they were anxious to secure the release of the Spartan prisoners, and also because they were suspicious of the intentions

¹ Sollium and Anactorium, Corinthian towns on the Acarnanian coast which the Athenians had captured during the war.

of the Argives, earnestly urged their confederates to comply with the terms of the peace ; but they were deaf to all entreaties. Fearing that hostilities might break out anew, with Argos in addition to all her other enemies in the field against her, Sparta now hastily entered into a private alliance with the Athenians to force the dissenting allies to accept the treaty (421 B.C.). At this time the Spartans taken at Sphacteria were given up ; the Athenians, however, retained possession of Pylos.¹

Argos takes Advantage of the Situation and makes herself the Head of a new Peloponnesian League. — We have seen that the Corinthians were in an irritated state of mind, which boded no good for Sparta. It was they who had stirred up the hostilities at the beginning, and it was they who now fanned the embers of the war into a raging flame again. They went to Argos, and persuaded the Argives that it was an opportune time for them, by placing themselves at the head of a league of all the Hellenic cities opposed either to Sparta or to Athens, to regain their ancient ascendancy in the Peloponnesus.

Circumstances did indeed seem to favor such an undertaking. Sparta's military reputation had received a severe blow by the affair at Pylos, as well as by her entire conduct of the war, while her undisguised selfishness in the arrangements of the recent treaty, through the distrust and indignation it had created among her confederates, had shattered the basis of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Moreover, Argos had taken no part in the wasting war of the last ten years, but had all this while been steadily developing her public and private resources. Therefore the Argives were quite ready to embark in the ambitious project proposed by the Corinthians.

The commissioners whom the Argives sent among the cities

¹ The Athenians refused to surrender this place, for the reason that the Spartans, who the lot had decided should make restitution first, had failed in persuading or forcing their allies to restore the places they had acquired in the course of the war, and to observe the other provisions of the treaty. But since the Spartans had already given up all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, they could fairly claim the surrender of the Spartans held by the Athenians. Thucyd. v. 35.

ill-disposed to Sparta to propose to them an alliance with Argos, met with a friendly reception. The Arcadian Mantineans straightway seceded from the Lacedæmonian confederacy, and entered into an alliance with the Argives. They were influenced to this step by the circumstance that during the war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians they had been making some conquests in the lands around them, and were now afraid that Sparta, relieved of all fear of Athens, would compel them to give up these new acquisitions.

This act of the Mantineans caused great excitement throughout the Peloponnesus. The other members of the old Peloponnesian league were ready to follow the example of Mantinea; for they had persuaded themselves that Sparta and Athens were conspiring together to set up a double-headed tyranny in Hellas. Sparta, unfortunately for herself, never succeeded in inspiring her allies with confidence in her professions as a liberator.

The Eleans, who were angry with the Spartans on account of some real or imagined wrong, were the next to secede from the Lacedæmonian league and to join the Argive alliance. Next the Chalcidian cities entered the growing league; and a short time afterwards the Athenians, without formally renouncing the recent private convention with Sparta, also joined the new confederacy.

Alcibiades and the Athenian-Argive Alliance.—The Athenians had entered the new alliance under somewhat peculiar circumstances, upon which, because of the connection of this matter with later events, it will be profitable for us to dwell for a moment.

It becomes necessary for us here to introduce a new leader of the Athenian demos, Alcibiades, who played a most conspicuous part, not only in Athenian but also in Hellenic affairs, from this time on to near the close of the Peloponnesian War. Alcibiades was a young man of noble and even alleged heroic lineage,—he traced his descent from Ajax,—and of aristocratical associations. He was versatile, brilliant, and resourceful; but unscrupulous, reckless, and profligate. He was a pupil of Socrates, but he failed

to follow the counsels of his teacher. His escapades kept all Athens talking. But his astonishing orgies only seemed to attach the people more closely to him, for he possessed all those personal traits which make men popular idols. His influence over the democracy was unlimited. By the unscrupulous employment of



Fig. 32. *ALCIBIADES.*

the various arts known to the successful demagogue, he was able to carry through the Ecclesia almost any measure that it pleased him to advocate.

The more prudent of the Athenians were filled with apprehension for the future of the state under such guidance. The noted misanthrope Timon gave expression to this feeling when, after Alcibiades had secured the assent of the popular assembly to one of his impolitic measures, he said to him: "Go on, my brave boy, and prosper; for your

prosperity will bring on the ruin of all this crowd." And it did, as we shall see.

Now it was largely through the influence of this new leader that the Athenians had been led to join the new Peloponnesian league. He had a personal grievance against the Spartans because he imagined they had not shown him proper consideration in consulting Nicias and others instead of him in the negotiations attending the recent truce; and he resolved to make them realize that they had made a serious mistake in preferring others to him.

So when the Spartans (420 B.C.) sent envoys to Athens to dissuade the Athenians from entering the Argive alliance, to which step ambassadors from Argos were at this moment urging them, Alcibiades set to work to ruin the Spartan embassy and to get the Athenians to join the anti-Spartan confederacy. He reached his ends by means of a trick. The envoys had informed the members

of the council that they had been invested with full power to deal with all matters in dispute between Athens and Sparta. Alcibiades was afraid that if they should make the same statement before the Ecclesia, the people would be led to enter into negotiations with them, and that the Argive ambassadors would get no hearing. Accordingly he went secretly to the Spartan envoys and told them that, if they would, when brought before the Ecclesia, deny that they had given them full power to conclude a treaty, and say that they had authority only to discuss matters and to report thereon to the Spartans at home, he would throw his influence in their favor and secure the prosperous issue of their embassy.

The Spartans consented to do as Alcibiades advised. So when they came before the Ecclesia, and were asked as to the extent of their powers, they made a statement exactly contradictory to that which they had previously made to the council. Hereupon Alcibiades arose, and instead of making good his promise to the envoys, denounced them as men with dishonest intentions, who could "not tell the same story twice alike." Of course the envoys were utterly discredited, and the Athenians would have nothing further to do with them.¹

Alcibiades now easily managed the remainder of the business, and soon brought it about that the Athenians had entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Argos and her allies, which was "to continue for a hundred years both by sea and land, without fraud or hurt." Such were the circumstances under which Athens became a member of the new Argive confederacy.²

The Battle of Mantinea (418 B.C.) re-establishes Sparta's Hegemony in the Peloponnesus. — It now began to look as though the hegemony in the Peloponnesus was about to be transferred from Sparta to Argos, from the city of Menelaus to the land of Agamemnon. The Spartans began to realize that if they would retain their old position of leadership, they must bestir

¹ Thucyd. v. 43, 45.

² The Corinthians, because the new alliance had now become offensive as well as defensive, withdrew from it as Athens entered.

themselves. In the summer of the year 418 B.C., mustering their own forces and the contingents of such states as still remained faithful to them, they invaded Argolis with a great army. A false movement brought the Argive army into a position where it was completely surrounded by the enemy and wholly at their mercy. But the Spartan king Agis, instead of pressing his advantage, weakly granted to the Argives an armistice, and then caused the various contingents of his army to disperse to their several homes.

When Agis reached Sparta, he just escaped having his house pulled down, and a heavy fine imposed upon him by the infuriated people, because he had let slip an opportunity such as the Spartans could not expect fortune ever again to afford them of annihilating their old enemy and rival. Agis entreated the people not to inflict upon him the punishment they had in mind, and promised to repair his mistake by some worthy achievement when he again met the enemy. They yielded to his entreaties; but unwilling to trust to his judgment again, elected a board of ten counsellors, whom he must consult in all military affairs.

An opportunity was soon afforded Agis to make good his promise. The Argives, under the persuasion of Alcibiades, treacherously broke the truce the king had concluded with them, and were soon again in the field against Sparta, and threatening Tegea, her most important Arcadian ally. Sending messengers to the Corinthians and the other Spartan confederates to hurry with their several contingents to Mantinea in Arcadia, Agis hastened with the whole available force of Laconia to the same place of muster. Near Mantinea, Agis found the Argives with the Athenians drawn up to receive him. After some delay, yet before the confederates of Sparta had arrived from the Isthmus, the battle was joined. The Lacedæmonians moved their lines slowly and evenly to the music of the flute. Their steadiness and valor carried the day. The Argives and their allies were utterly routed. More than a thousand of their dead covered the field. Agis had atoned for his former error.

The battle of Mantinea was the most important after that of Delium (p. 317) which had thus far marked the war. It ruined forever the hopes of Argos of regaining her ancient leadership in the Peloponnesus. It restored to Sparta that ascendancy which recent circumstances had so nearly destroyed. It wiped out the disgrace of Sphacteria, and did much to re-establish the greatly impaired military reputation of the Spartans.¹

The Fall of Melos (416 B.C.). — The period whose history we are following closed with a most barbarous transaction on the part of the Athenians.

The pleasant island of Melos, which is one of the westerly lying of the Cyclades, was the only island in the Ægean, with the exception of Thera, that was not at this time included in the Athenian empire. The Melians were Dorians and regarded Sparta as their mother city.

The Athenians determined to take possession of this island, being moved thereto by several motives. They wished to round out their dominions and secure a "scientific frontier" for their sea-possession in that part of the Ægean. Furthermore, the events of the last few years had shown them that their empire on the sea was not unassailable, and they feared lest the Spartans

¹ After the battle of Mantinea the oligarchical party at Argos brought the city into alliance with Sparta and overthrew the democratic constitution. The people, however, soon afterwards planned a successful uprising against the oligarchs, and those whom they did not kill they drove into exile (417 B.C.). Then, renewing the alliance with Athens, they began with great zeal to build long walls, like those of the Athenians, from their city to the harbor, five miles distant, in order that they might, if attacked by the Lacedæmonians on the land side, have free communication by the sea. But the Argives were not so fortunate as the Athenians were in their wall-building operations; there was no Themistocles at Argos to manage the matter. Before the work was done the Lacedæmonians with their allies were upon them, although it was in the midst of the winter season. The unfinished walls were levelled to the ground, but the city itself defied the enemy. The next summer the Athenians sent Alcibiades with a fleet of twenty ships to Argos to remove from the city persons dangerous to the democracy. Three hundred citizens who were regarded with suspicion by the popular party because of their Spartan sympathies, were arrested, and distributed among different islands belonging to Athens in the Ægean.

might some time, working through the Dorian population of the island, get possession of it, and make it the basis of operations against the neighboring islands subject to Athens.

Again, the independence of the Melians made the other islanders subject to Athens discontented and restless ; they could not see why they should pay tribute to Athens while the Melians went free. Hence for this reason the Athenians resolved to reduce the island to the same condition as the others.

Added to these motives was a desire for more lands, like the Eubœan and Lesbian fields, for distribution among Athenian citizens ; and, perhaps what weighed more than all else, a thirst to revenge upon some Dorian people the wiping-out by the Spartans of the Plataean state (p. 302).

So the Athenians in the summer of 416 B.C. sent an expedition to the island, and commanded the Melians to at once acknowledge the suzerainty of Athens. The demand, if we may here trust Thucydides' account, was based on no other ground than Athenian imperial interests and the right of the strong to rule the weak. "For of the gods we believe," — thus Thucydides makes the Athenian envoys speak, — "and of men we know, that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will. This law was not made by us, and we are not the first who have acted upon it ; we did but inherit it, and shall bequeath it to all time."¹

The conviction of the Athenians as to this lust of dominion being a law of human nature seems to have been complete ; and surely the conduct of the nations of modern Europe in dealing with weaker states goes far towards justifying the Athenians in speaking so positively of its inborn nature and hereditary character.

The Melians, relying on the righteousness of their cause and the help of their Lacedæmonian kinsmen, refused, at the bidding of Athens, to surrender their independence, which, according to their traditions, they had enjoyed for seven centuries.

So the city of Melos was blockaded by sea and beset by land, and in a few months, neither the gods nor the Lacedæmonians

¹ Thucyd. v. 105.

bringing help, the whole island was in the hands of the Athenians. All the men were at once put to death, and the women and children sold into slavery. The island was then repopulated by settlers sent out from Athens.

The Athenians had now rounded out their dominions in the Ægean ; and Plataea was avenged. But the Hellenic world never forgave the Athenians for the crime — which was one of the worst, because so unprovoked and so deliberately planned, committed by either party during the Peloponnesian War.

REFERENCES. — Jowett's *Thucydides*, v. 27-116. Plutarch, *Life of Alcibiades*. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. iii. pp. 285-321. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. v. pp. 405-515; (twelve volume ed.), vol. vii. pp. 1-118.

CHAPTER XX.

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

(415-413 B.C.)

The People of Egesta ask Aid of Athens.—In the seventeenth year of the war the Athenians resolved upon an undertaking that was freighted with the most momentous consequences not only to themselves, but to the whole Hellenic world. This was an expedition to Sicily.

The immediate occasion of their sending out this expedition was an appeal for help from the city of Egesta against the Dorian city of Selinus. These places were situated on the western coast of Sicily, and were engaged in a quarrel over some border land and some other trivial matters. Syracuse was giving aid to the people of Selinus, and the Egestæans, being hard pressed, had sent envoys to Athens to plead for assistance. They based their request on the ground of alleged relationship; but appealed also to the enlightened self-interest of the Athenians by representing to them that if the Dorian Syracusans should be allowed to get all Sicily in their hands, then they would without question join their kinsmen the Peloponnesians against Athens, and overwhelm the whole Ionian race.

The Athenians sent an embassy to Sicily to look into the situation there. The report they brought back was favorable; and weight was added to what they said by certain envoys from Egesta who had accompanied them on their return. These envoys had brought with them silver enough to pay the expenses of a fleet of sixty ships for a month; together with promises of

much more from the heaps of money the Egestæans had stored up in their treasury and in their temples. Being persuaded by these things, the Athenians voted to send to Sicily a fleet of sixty vessels, under the command of Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus.¹

Debate in the Athenian Assembly in regard to the Expedition. — The resolution to engage in the tremendous enterprise seems to have been taken lightly by the Athenians, which was quite in keeping with their usual way of doing things; but a few days after their first vote, a second meeting of the Ecclesia having been called for the purpose of making arrangements for the equipment of the armament, Nicias, who was opposed to the undertaking, tried to persuade the people to reconsider their original vote, and give up the project. This opened the flood-gates of a regular Athenian debate.

Nicias stated the reasons why he thought the proposed expedition should be abandoned. His first point was that the situation at home was such as to render it very unwise for them to send so far away a large part of their fighting force. The treaty with Sparta was still in force, to be sure; but only nominally. The Lacedæmonians, chafing under a treaty that was extorted from them by their misfortunes, only awaited a pretext and a favorable opportunity — such as the departure of the proposed expedition, or some misfortune to it, would afford — to attack Athens. The Chalcidian cities were in open and unpunished revolt. Other allies were watching for a favorable moment to rebel. The resentments of old enemies were not extinguished: they were everywhere smouldering, and ready at any time to flame into wasting war. The Athenians should secure well their present empire before attempting to conquer a new one in the western world. The difficulty they were experiencing in maintaining their possessions in Chalcidice ought to suggest to them the certainly greater

¹ The generals were instructed not only to assist the Egestæans, but also, if possible, to restore the Leontines to their city, from which they had been driven by the Syracusans, and in general to do whatever promised to further the interests of Athens in the island. Thucyd. vi. 8.

difficulty they would have in retaining their hold upon any new territory they might secure in the more remote regions of Sicily.

In regard to what the Egestæan envoys had said respecting a union of the western Greeks and the Peloponnesians against Athens, the speaker maintained that there was no danger of any such alliance. He said that the Sicilian Greeks would never intermeddle in the affairs of the Greeks in the home land for fear of stirring all the states there, Dorian as well as Ionian, to unite against them.

Nicias then reminded the Athenians that there were still great unfilled gaps in their ranks made by the plague, and by a war that had known scarcely any real intermission during sixteen years. The finances of the state, too, needed to be husbanded. And in this connection the speaker expressed his distrust of the money promises of the Egestæans. The Athenians might take his word for it, they would have not only all the fighting to do, but also all the bills to pay.

The speaker now proceeded to pay his attention to Alcibiades, who was the real instigator of the whole movement. "I dare say," said the venerable Nicias, "there may be some young man here who is delighted at holding a command, and the more so because he is too young for his post; and he, regarding only his own interests, may recommend you to sail; he may be one who is much admired for his stud of horses, and wants to make something out of his command which will maintain him in his extravagance. But do not you give him the opportunity of indulging his own magnificent tastes at the expense of the state. Remember that men of his stamp impoverish themselves and defraud the public. An expedition is a serious business, and not one which a mere youth can plan and carry into execution."¹

The old statesman and general then appealed to the citizens of experience and mature judgment not to allow grave public affairs to be thus toyed with by this harebrained youth, and those like him, with whom he had filled the benches of the assembly. He

¹ Thucyd. vi. 12.

appealed to them, by a fearless holding-up of their hands, to avert from Athens the greatest danger that had ever threatened the city. He appealed to them not to permit, at the dictation of personal ambition and greed, the fleet of Athens to cross the Ionian Sea, the natural boundary of the Athenian empire towards the west, in a foolish search after some more self-seeking and treacherous allies.¹

This speech of Nicias summarizes the arguments that should have weighed with the Athenians in deterring them from embarking in the hazardous undertaking that they had in mind. But from the speeches that followed, and their reception by the assembly, it was evident that the veteran general had not carried his audience with him. He was supported by a few speakers, but the most opposed his conservative policy.

The leader of the war party, as has already appeared, was Alcibiades. He made himself the mouth-piece of his party, and replied to Nicias in a violent and demagogic speech. He began by defending himself against what Nicias had said in regard to his personal habits. He maintained that instead of being found fault with because of his so-called extravagance, he deserved to be praised; for he was really gaining great distinction for the state, as when he represented the Athenians at the Olympic games, and sent seven chariots into the lists — the like of which had never been done before by any private person — and won two prizes. By his magnificent expenditures, he also counteracted the impression that had gone abroad that the Athenians were almost bankrupted by the war. The energy, moreover, which he had displayed, redounded to the glory of Athens, for this created "an impression of power." His munificence in the bringing-out of choruses, and in the discharge of other duties of citizenship, reflected honor on the city: "There is some use," he said, "in the folly of a man who at his own cost benefits not only himself, but the state." He expected to be envied and hated and abused during his lifetime, as other illustrious men had been; but like

¹ Thucyd. vi. 9-14, for the entire speech.

them he would leave behind a reputation which would make many anxious to claim relationship to him. Athens would be proud of him, — after he was gone, — as she was proud of other great citizens who had preceded him. As to his capacity for the management of public business, had he not demonstrated this in the way in which he handled the Argive alliance ?¹ The whole thing led, to be sure, to the defeat at Mantinea ; but if the Lacedæmonians did gain a great victory, they were badly frightened, and had hardly yet recovered.

All this he had already achieved, and he was yet young — he admitted the charge. But “do not be afraid of me,” he added, “because I am young ; but while I am in the flower of my days, and Nicias enjoys the reputation of success, use the services of us both.”

Alcibiades then urged the citizens to abide by their first resolution. He represented the Greeks of Sicily as a “motley crew,” unpatriotic, inconstant, disunited, undisciplined, with few heavy-armed troops, and hence wholly incapable of making any stand against an Athenian army. Moreover, the barbarians in the island, unfriendly to the Syracusans, would join the Athenians.

Referring to what Nicias had said in regard to the unsettled state of Athenian affairs at home, the speaker maintained that Sparta, even if disposed to attack Athens during the absence of the fleet, could do nothing more than make a bootless invasion by land ; for the Athenians would leave behind for the defense of the empire as many ships as Sparta could possibly muster. There was no danger of anything untoward happening at home while the expedition was away.

Alcibiades then closed by telling the Athenians that if they wished to rule, instead of being ruled, they must maintain that enterprising and aggressive policy that had won for them their empire. To adopt Nicias’ policy of inaction and indolent repose was simply to give up their imperial position. Let old and young unite, he said, in lifting Athens to a yet greater height of power

¹ See p. 329.

and glory. With Sicily conquered, the Athenians would probably become lords of the whole Hellenic world.¹

Alcibiades evidently had the ear of the meeting. Nicias perceived this, and realizing that to address arguments to the understanding of the people in their present martial mood would be useless, changed his tactics, and in a second speech strove to frighten them from the undertaking by dwelling upon the size and expense of the armament they must place at the disposal of their generals.

Expressing himself as willing to acquiesce in the will of the majority, Nicias proceeded to speak of the populousness and wealth of the Sicilian cities which the Athenians would have arrayed against them. In opposition to what Alcibiades had said in regard to their lack of good infantry, he maintained that they had large forces of heavy-armed as well as light-armed troops, a formidable cavalry, and numerous war-ships. Syracuse had a large treasury always well filled by the contributions of various tribute-paying subjects. Moreover, the fertile fields of the island provided an abundance of grain for the population, so that the control of the sea by the Athenians would avail them nothing. Consequently they must send out something beside a fleet; they must equip a large land force of both heavy-armed and light-armed men. They must arrange to import for their troops regular supplies of food, for they could not depend upon provisions being furnished by the islanders.

They must also take plenty of money; "for as to the supplies of the Egestæans," said Nicias, "which are said to be awaiting us, we had better assume that they are all imaginary." They must leave nothing to fortune; but make prudent provision for any likely contingency. If they thought that he was exaggerating the magnitude of the task they were undertaking, and was asking for an unreasonably large armament, he would resign his command and they might choose another general in his place.²

This speech produced just the opposite effect upon the meeting

¹ Thucyd. vi. 16-18.

² Thucyd. vi. 20-23.

from that which Nicias had hoped. The vastness of the enterprise, the magnificent proportions of the armament needed, as pictured by Nicias, seemed to captivate the imagination of the susceptible Athenians, and they were more eager than ever to embark in the undertaking. The proposed colossal size of the armament appeared to inspire all with a feeling of confidence in the success of the expedition ; its very magnitude was an insurance against defeat and failure. The expedition further presented itself to the ardent imagination of the youth as a sort of pleasure and sight-seeing excursion among the wonders of the land of the "Far West." Others saw in the undertaking opportunities for personal advancement and enrichment. Still larger numbers of the poorer class were won to the enterprise by the prospect of employment and pay. Those who had no mind of their own in the matter or were opposed to the undertaking were carried away or were silenced by the enthusiasm of the others ; and so it came about that, almost without a dissenting voice, the assembly voted for the expedition, and called upon Nicias to give an estimate of the ships and troops required. He told the people that anything like an accurate estimate could not be given off-hand, but that they should have not less than one hundred triremes of their own, and at least five thousand hoplites in all, and a proportional number of light-armed troops. They must also have a force of Cretan horsemen.

The assembly at once voted that the commanders of the expedition be vested with discretionary authority as to the number of the forces to be collected as well as in regard to all the preparations, which were straightway set on foot.

The Mutilation of the Hermæ.—The preparations were well advanced and the expedition was on the eve of its departure, when the numerous statues of Hermes, scattered throughout the city, were one night grossly mutilated. This sacrilegious act naturally produced a terrible excitement. The motive of the outrage could only be guessed at ; and of course all kinds of disquieting surmises and rumors were set afloat. It was thought by some to be the

work of persons opposed to the expedition, who, by thus awakening the superstitious fears of the people, sought to prevent the sailing of the fleet.

Alcibiades did not escape suspicion. No direct evidence indeed connected him with the present outrage, but certain persons, under the stimulus of the offer of large rewards for information, testified that he, with some of his boon companions, had been guilty of the impiety of mimicking in secret the sacred rites of the Eleusinian mysteries (p. 44). The enemies of Alcibiades spread abroad exaggerated reports about this matter, and in addition boldly charged him with the mutilation of the statues. The thing was so in keeping with the mad escapades in which it was common for Alcibiades to indulge, that many were ready to believe that he had had a hand in the affair. His object, so his enemies maintained, was to create a revolution in the interest of the oligarchy.

It is not probable that Alcibiades was guilty of the crime laid at his door. He protested his innocence, and demanded that he be given a trial at once. But his enemies knew very well that if he were tried while the army was still at home, he would certainly be acquitted; for he was very popular with the soldiers. Accordingly they insisted upon the postponement of the trial, urging that the expedition which was now ready to sail ought not to be delayed. It was their plan to secure his recall and trial under circumstances more favorable to obtaining a verdict against him.

The Departure of the Expedition from the Peiræus. — It was midsummer (415 B.C.) when all the preparations for the sailing of the expedition were completed. The war-ships of the greater part of the allies, together with the transports and other vessels, were to collect at Corcyra, where the Athenians were to join them with their own fleet, and then the united armament was to strike across the sea to the nearest Italian shore, and so on to Sicily.

The day of the departure of the Athenian fleet from the Peiræus was one of the great days in ancient Athens. It was yet early morning when the soldiers and sailors poured down from the upper city into the harbor town and began to man the ships.

"The entire population of Athens," says Thucydides, who must have been an eye-witness of the stirring scene which he describes, "accompanied them, citizens and strangers alike. The citizens came to take farewell, one of an acquaintance, another of a kinsman, another of a son; the crowd as they passed along were full of hope and full of tears; hope of conquering Sicily, tears because they doubted whether they would ever see their friends again, when they thought of the long voyage on which they were sending them. At the moment of parting the danger was nearer; and terrors which had never occurred to them when they were voting the expedition now entered into their souls. Nevertheless their spirits revived at the sight of the armament in all its strength and of the abundant provision which they had made. The strangers and the rest of the multitude came out of curiosity, desiring to witness an enterprise of which the greatness exceeded belief."¹

Athens had sent out larger fleets than the one which she was now dispatching to Sicily, but never one so costly and so splendidly equipped. Not only had the public treasures of the state been lavished on the armament, but private citizens had vied with each other in the decoration of their ships, and in the completeness and magnificence of their personal outfit.

Not without invocation to the gods for the success of the expedition did the fleet set out from the Peiræus. "When the ships were manned, and everything required for the voyage had been placed on board, silence was proclaimed by the sound of the trumpet, and all with one voice, before setting sail, offered up the customary prayers; these were recited, not in each ship, but by a single herald, the whole fleet accompanying him. On every deck, both officers and men, mingling wine in bowls, made libations from vessels of gold and silver. The multitudes of citizens and other well-wishers who were looking on from the land joined in the prayer. The crews raised the Pæan, and when the libations were completed, put to sea."²

¹ Thucyd. vi. 30.

² Thucyd. vi. 32.

Anxiously did those remaining behind watch the departing ships until they were lost to sight. Could the anxious watchers have foreseen the fate of the splendid armament, their anxiety would have passed into despair: "Athens itself was sailing out of the Peiræus, never to return."

The Syracusans discuss the Prospect of the Expedition ever coming. — The great expedition against Sicily was now launched. Rumor had preceded it. But the Syracusans were incredulous, and could not convince themselves that the reports which reached them as to what the Athenians were doing and intending were really true. However, as rumor continued to follow rumor a meeting of the popular assembly was at last called, in order that the matter might be given attention.¹

One of the speakers was a citizen of Syracuse named Hermocrates. He had, or thought that he had, the latest and most reliable information. He anticipated the incredulity of his hearers, saying that he did not expect to be believed when he told them that the expedition was "really coming." Nevertheless it was a fact, and not a groundless rumor started for a political purpose. The Athenians were really on the water, on their way there. And they were not coming simply to give disinterested help to the Egestæans; that was what they were giving out, to be sure; but the objective point of the expedition was Syracuse, with an eye to the whole of Sicily.

The speaker then urged the Syracusans to at once take measures of defense. He advised them to renew all their old alliances in the island and to form all the new ones they could. The Italian cities could, he believed, be induced to join Syracuse, or at least be persuaded to remain neutral. And the Carthaginians, also, might be persuaded to come into an alliance against Athens; for they were

¹ The government of Syracuse at this time was a democracy. At the time of the Persian War, as we have seen, the city was in the hands of the tyrant Gelo (p. 178). This despot was followed by his brother, Hiero I. (478-467), upon whose death there followed a period of turbulence, which issued in the establishment of popular rule. The most of the other cities of Sicily and Magna Græcia at about this same time drove out their tyrants, and set up democratic institutions.

threatened equally with the Syracusans by the ambition of the Athenians, who were revolving in mind nothing less than to make themselves masters of the western part of the Mediterranean as they were already lords of the eastern portion. An alliance with the Carthaginians would be worth most to the Syracusans : "for they," said the speaker, "have an abundance of gold and silver, and these make war, like other things, go smoothly." Envoys should also be sent to Sparta and Corinth to entreat them to send a fleet to Sicily, and at the same time to make a diversion in Greece by renewing there the war against Athens and her allies.

But Hermocrates did not think the Syracusans should content themselves with these preparations against the threatened attack ; he advised the sending of a strong fleet to intercept the Athenian armament at Tarentum, on the coast of Italy, and to offer them battle there. The moral effect of such a display of fearlessness and energy on the part of the Syracusans would be worth everything to them, even though the fleet should accomplish nothing more than to annoy and delay the enemy. The speaker believed, however, that merely intelligence to the effect that the Syracusans were guarding with a fleet the Italian coast would be sufficient to prevent the Athenians from setting out from Corcyra. The watch-fleet need not be large — rumor would increase its size.¹

This speech of Hermocrates created a great stir in the meeting. Some were amused, regarding the whole thing as a jest ; others refused to regard it as an alarming matter even if the Athenians were coming ; and still others were certain that the rumors were being circulated by conspirators who were planning revolution. Among the last was a favorite leader of the democrats, named Athenagoras. He replied to Hermocrates.

"He is either a coward or a traitor," thus began Athenagoras, "who would not rejoice to hear that the Athenians are so mad as to come hither and deliver themselves into our hands. The audacity of the people who are spreading these alarms does not surprise me, but I do wonder at their folly if they cannot see

¹ Thucyd. vi. 33, 34.

that their motives are transparent. . . . And now, what is the meaning of these rumors? They do not grow of themselves; they have been got up by persons who are the troublers of our state." The speaker then went on to show how improbable it was that the Athenians, men of good sense and large experience, would embark on such a mad adventure as these rumors represented them as having actually undertaken. To leave behind them such a crowd of enemies as they had in Greece, and go out in their boats to a remote island to stir up more enemies, would be a piece of foolishness of which they were incapable.

But even if the reports should turn out to be true, and the Athenians were really coming, still, the speaker insisted, there was no occasion for alarm. The Sicilians could make a better stand against Athens than the Peloponnesians; Syracuse alone was more than a match for the entire army that was said to be coming. The Athenians could not bring cavalry with them, and could get few or no horses in the island; but without cavalry they would be at the mercy of the Syracusans on the land.

The reports, however, Athenagoras went on to say, were false. They had been circulated by scheming, ambitious leaders of the oligarchical party, whose object it was to frighten the people into giving into their hands the management of the defense of the state. It was all a plot to overthrow the democratic constitution of the city, and to set up an oligarchical government.

The speaker then proceeded to denounce the oligarchs and oligarchy, where a few monopolize all the public offices and enjoy all the privileges of the community, and to praise democracy, where all have an equal interest and share in all the good things of the state. He concluded with a warning to the conspirators, and with a confession of faith in the ability of the people to circumvent all the schemes of the oligarchs to get power in their hands, and to preserve intact all the free institutions of the city.¹

The debate was at this point cut short by the generals, who, seeing that it was degenerating into a personal controversy, dis-

¹ Thucyd. vi. 36-40.

missed the assembly, after having, through one of their number, given the people assurance that whatever measures of defense prudence might dictate would be taken by them, whose business it was to look after the security of the state.

This discussion, while valuable to us as an exhibition of the mutual relations of political parties at Syracuse, serves further to introduce to us the greatest statesman, Hermocrates, to be found at this time among the Sicilian Greeks. As the representative of the oligarchical party, he was naturally distrusted by the leaders of the democratical party; but he was a man of statesmanlike views and of correct judgment, and was withal a sincere patriot, whose outlook was not bounded by the interests of Syracuse, but included the whole of Sicily.

The Athenians sail from Corcyra to Italy.—We must now return to watch the progress of the Athenian armament. All the ships had now mustered at Corcyra. The allied fleet consisted of a hundred and thirty-four triremes and two penteconters, bearing thirty-six thousand soldiers and sailors, of whom over five thousand were hoplites. The fleet carried only thirty horsemen. A multitude of merchant vessels and craft of every kind, some in the public service as transports, others on private enterprise and adventure, accompanied the expedition.

The fleet was formed into three detachments, each under command of one of the three generals. This was in order that the divisions, sailing one after another at intervals of a few days, might experience no difficulty in finding provisions and anchoring-places as they cruised along the Italian shore. From Corcyra, the fleet struck across to the nearest Italian land, the promontory of Iapygia, and hugged the shore as it worked on towards Sicily.

The Greek cities along the coast held themselves absolutely neutral. They allowed the expedition anchorage and water, but would neither permit the soldiers to enter their gates, nor sell them supplies of any kind. At Tarentum and Locri, even the privilege to anchor and take water was denied.

At last the several detachments of the fleet came together in

the harbor of Rhegium, situated on the strait running between Italy and Sicily. Here a market was opened to them; and dragging their ships from the water, they encamped and rested.¹

A Discouraging Beginning: the Athenian Generals hold a Council of War. — While the fleet was lying at Rhegium, the Athenian envoys who had been sent in advance to Egesta to investigate the situation there returned, bringing the report that the boasted wealth of the Egestæans was, as Nicias had surmised (p. 341), wholly imaginary, and that thirty talents was all the money the Athenians would receive from that source.

This was a discouraging beginning for the Athenians, — here within sight of Sicily to learn that the very men whom they were on the way to help had grossly deceived them in regard to their resources and promised help. Added to this disappointment was the refusal of the Rhegians to join them. As these people had always been friendly to the Athenians, their resolution to remain neutral was both unexpected and disheartening.

There was a division of opinion among the Athenian generals as to the best course for them under the changed circumstances to pursue. Nicias, timid and conservative in counsel as was his wont, advised undertaking as little as honor would permit. He thought they should carry out the original resolution in regard to an attack upon Selinus, forcing the Egestæans to pay what they had promised to contribute towards the maintenance of the fleet, and then, unless some good opportunity presented itself for their doing something to advance Athenian interest in the island, to return home. Lamachus was in favor of an immediate attack upon Syracuse, before the inhabitants had time to put their city in a state of defense.

The proposals of Alcibiades were neither so timid as those of Nicias nor so bold as those of Lamachus. He advised that they first make friends of the people of Messene,² which would give the Athenians a good harbor, and put them in possession of a strategic position which virtually commanded all Sicily. Alliances should

¹ Thucyd. vi. 42-44.

² Attic form of Messana.

next be formed with as many of the Hellenic states and the native tribes of the island as possible, the subjects of the Syracusans instigated to revolt, and then attacks be made both upon Selinus and Syracuse, unless both cities conceded to the demands of the Athenians.

The plan of Alcibiades was adopted. He himself went to Messene to solicit an alliance; but the Messenians rejected his proposals. The Athenians now sailed with a portion of their fleet to Naxos, which opened its gates to them. They also got possession of the neighboring important city of Catana, where they collected their whole armament.¹

The Recall of Alcibiades. — Just as the Athenians had secured a good foothold on the island, and were in a position to push forward operations against Syracuse, the sacred ship *Salaminia* arrived at Catana from Athens with a summons to Alcibiades to return home to stand trial for alleged impiety in the matter of the recent sacrilegious outrages at Athens (p. 342).

We have already referred to the mutilation of the *Hermæ* at Athens, in which act Alcibiades was accused of having had a hand. After the departure of the fleet, the excitement over the affair grew constantly more intense. Many arrests were made, and on the strength of the statements of one of the prisoners, who turned informer, a number of persons were executed. They were doubtless the victims of public panic and perjured testimony.

But the end had not yet been reached. The enemies of Alcibiades were determined to accomplish his ruin, although the testimony in regard to the mutilation of the *Hermæ* had in no way implicated him in that outrage. They drew attention anew to the profanation of the mysteries, in which Alcibiades was, with more reason, accused of having participated, and insisted that this was a part of the same plot against the democracy.

Various circumstances gave a color of truth to this interpretation of the affair. A body of Lacedæmonians had appeared off the Isthmus, ostensibly on their way to Boeotia, but really, it was

¹ Thucyd. vi. 46-52.

maintained, to give support to the conspirators in Athens. The appearance of this force had produced great excitement, and throughout one night all the men of Athens were under arms, watching against they hardly knew what danger. Intelligence, too, had come from Argos to the effect that the friends of Alcibiades in that city were plotting to overthrow the recently re-established democracy there (p. 333, n.). This was regarded as a part of the conspiracy against the democracy at Athens. Furthermore, in the new light which these matters threw upon the situation, the whole Sicilian expedition appeared as a part of the deep-laid plot. Alcibiades had planned this in order to get the Athenian army out of the way while the conspiracy was being consummated at home.

Thus the people, living in an atmosphere of suspicion, saw everything in a distorting light. With the public mind in this state, and with the greater part of the friends of Alcibiades away with him on the fleet, it had been easy for his enemies to secure the decree ordering his return. The blow fell not only upon Alcibiades but upon the whole expedition; for no one save Alcibiades could carry out successfully the plan of campaign that had been determined upon, and which was the only one that could now be followed, since the favorable moment for the execution of the plan of Lamachus (p. 349) had passed. And the ruin of the expedition meant the ruin of Athens. Thus far-reaching were the consequences of the mutilation of the *Hermæ* destined to be.

The persons who were sent in the *Salaminia* to summon Alcibiades to Athens, were instructed not to arrest him, as this might cause a dangerous excitement among the friends of the accused in the army, but to allow him to return in his own vessel, in company with the state-ship. This arrangement afforded Alcibiades an opportunity to escape, which he did not fail to improve; for he well knew that a trial at Athens, in the present state of public feeling there, meant his certain condemnation. Consequently at Thurii, in Italy, to which place he had accompanied the *Salaminia*, he slipped away from his escort, and escaped in a merchant-ship to the Peloponnesus. There we shall meet him

presently, doing all in his power, through traitorous counsel to the Spartans, to ruin the very expedition that he himself had planned.

When the Salaminia appeared at the Peiræus without Alcibiades, the Athenians straightway passed upon him the sentence of death.¹

Operations of the Athenians in Sicily before the First Winter.

—The Athenian army in Sicily effected but little of importance before the setting-in of winter. The generals made an expedition to the western side of the island, in order to investigate the state of affairs there. They made some attacks on native coast-towns which were hostile to the Athenians and their Egestæan allies, and took some prisoners, on the sale of whom upon their return they realized a hundred and twenty talents (about \$144,000).

Before the winter was fully set in, the Athenians also made an attempt against Syracuse. They had recourse here to a stratagem. By means of a false communication to the Syracusans, they led them to believe that a sudden early morning attack upon the Athenian camp at Catana, which was represented as wholly unprepared for such a movement, would result in the capture of the entire army. The Syracusans resolved to act upon the suggestion. Accordingly one night they marched out with their entire force towards Catana.

At the same time the Athenians, perfectly informed as to the movements of the enemy, sailed out of the harbor of Catana with all their ships and men, and bore down upon Syracuse. Easily effecting a landing, they established themselves in a sort of fortified camp close to the city walls. The dawn revealing to the Syracusans, now at Catana, the deserted camp of the Athenians, they hastened back to the defense of their own city. A sharp battle ensued, in which the Athenians were victorious; but they were not able to press their advantage on account of the enemy's cavalry, and their own lack in this respect. Consequently, after they had buried their dead, fifty in number, they sailed back to the eastern side of the island, and finally went into winter quarters first at Naxos and afterwards at Catana.²

¹ Thucyd. vi. 53, 60, 61.

² Thucyd. vi. 62-71, 78.

How the Athenians and Syracusans passed the Winter.—The Athenian generals utilized the winter months in making preparations for the renewal of the war in the spring. Their experiences thus far on the island had convinced them that in order to be able to cope with the Syracusans on equal terms, they must have a



(From Grote's Greece.)

cavalry force. Hence they sent to Athens for horsemen, and for increased grants of money for the army.

At the same time embassies were sent to various Sicilian cities for the purpose of drawing them into an alliance with Athens. The natives of the interior, the Sicels, were won over. Embassies were also sent to Carthage and the Tyrrhenian cities.

The Syracusans were also busy throughout the winter preparing for the expected renewal of the war with the opening of spring. Their defeat beneath their own walls had taught them some lessons, which they now turned to profit. Hermocrates told them plainly that they had too many generals,¹ and that nothing could be effected until they were willing to entrust the control of the army to a few commanders of ability and experience. The people recognized the truth there was in what Hermocrates said, and, in accordance with his suggestion, reduced the number of their generals to three, of which number he was chosen one. At the same time, acting in this matter also upon his advice, they sent envoys to Corinth and Sparta, to urge them not only to renew the war in Greece against Athens but also to send an armament to Sicily.²

The Syracusans also extended and strengthened the walls of their city. They further constructed forts, palisades, and various harbor defenses, and thus in every way possible secured the city against attack landward and seaward.

The Debate at Camarina. — Nor did the Syracusans neglect their allies. Hearing that the Athenians were laboring with the inhabitants of Camarina to induce them to desert the Syracusan for an Athenian alliance, they sent to that city an embassy, of which Hermocrates was the head, to counteract the influence of the Athenian emissaries. The Syracusans found in Camarina an Athenian embassy, headed by Euphemus. The Camarinæans having called an assembly to consider the matter, an opportunity was given both to Hermocrates and to Euphemus to address the people.

Hermocrates spoke first. He said that the Athenians pretended that they had come to restore the Leontines to their city.³ But

¹ They had fifteen, as it seemed to the Syracusans more democratic to manage their military matters through a numerous commission than to lodge so much power in the hands of one general or of a few who might use it to overthrow the constitution.

² Thucyd. vi. 72, 73.

³ See p. 337, n.

the Athenians were not to be trusted when they offered their services as liberators. At the time of the Persian War they held themselves out as the liberators of Greece from the barbarians. The cities trusted them, placed themselves under their leadership, and what was the outcome? They soon discovered that they had escaped from one master simply to fall into the hands of another, "who might be cleverer, but certainly made a more dishonest use of his wits." And now these Athenians, who had enslaved the cities of the mother land, had come to Sicily to reduce the cities there likewise to slavery — their expedition thither had no other aim or purpose, notwithstanding all their pretensions. The Greeks of Sicily, if they would not share the fate of their kinsmen elsewhere, must be united among themselves; for it was through lack of union that the cities of Eastern Hellas had fallen under the power of Athens. The speaker appealed especially to the Camarinæans as Dorians not to betray their kinsmen into the hands of Ionian enemies.¹

The Athenian envoy, Euphemus, then addressed the assembly. He admitted that the Athenians were human — that in the Persian War they fought for themselves as well as for the other Greeks; and that they had enslaved their kinsmen, the Ionians, in and about the Ægean Sea, but maintained that they had a right to do so inasmuch as Athens was their mother city, and further because by their willing submission to the barbarians they had endangered the liberty of all Hellas. The Athenians, in a word, had built up their empire as a means of defense: first, against the Persians; and second, against the Peloponnesians. They certainly could not be blamed for taking every precaution to preserve their own liberty and independence.

Refraining from laying claim to any uncommon virtue for the Athenians, Euphemus then said that they were come to Sicily, not as disinterested helpers of their allies, but for the purpose of making their empire more secure — not to enlarge it, but to make it safe against attack from that quarter. "Let no one imagine," he said,

¹ Thucyd. vi. 76-80.

“that your welfare is no business of ours; for if you are preserved, and are strong enough to hold out against the Syracusans, they will be less likely to aid the Peloponnesians, and so to injure us. Thus you become at once our first concern.”¹

In reply to what Hermocrates had said about the improbability of the Athenians, the enslavers of the rest of Hellas, coming as liberators to Sicily, Euphemus pointed out how the Athenians would be perfectly consistent in freeing the Sicilian cities while making subjects of those at home. The Athenians in this would be acting consistently, because in each case following their own interests. In the *Ægean*, as he had explained, the interests of the Athenians required them to have subject cities, but in Sicily strong and independent allies, who could hold their own against Syracuse, and keep her employed at home. Therefore the Camarinæans need not distrust the intentions of the Athenians in Sicily. The speaker closed by warning them that if they joined with the Syracusans against the Athenians and compelled them to withdraw from the island, the time would certainly come when they would repent of their course; for as soon as the fear of the Athenians was removed from before the eyes of the Syracusans, that moment they would enslave every city in Sicily.²

The Camarinæans, by all these arguments of the two speakers, were cast into a state of great perplexity. They were not perfectly convinced that the Athenians did not really intend to make Sicily a part of their empire; and on the other hand they knew that there was much truth in what Euphemus had said in regard to what the Syracusans would do if the Athenians were once driven from the island. Therefore they were at a loss to decide which party they would better help. They escaped from the dilemma by replying to the embassies that they would remain neutral. They gave this answer, however, with a sort of mental reservation that they would lend Syracuse a little aid—not enough really to amount to anything, but just enough to make her favorably dis-

¹ Thucyd. vi. 84.

² Thucyd. vi. 81–87, for the entire speech.

posed towards them should she chance to be the final victor, which they deemed likely.¹

Alcibiades at Sparta. — At Corinth the Syracusan envoys met with a warm reception, and were promised assistance. Moreover, when the ambassadors, having fulfilled their mission at Corinth, set out for Sparta, they were accompanied by Corinthian commissioners, who were instructed to unite with the Syracusans in urging the Lacedæmonians to at once renew the war against Athens in Greece, and at the same time to send an armament to Sicily along with the forces which the Corinthians proposed to send out in the spring.

At Sparta, the embassies found Alcibiades and other Athenian exiles. Alcibiades made himself at once the friend of the envoys, and did everything he could to render their mission to Sparta a success. In a speech before the Spartan assembly, he revealed all the designs and plans of the Athenians. He said that their purpose was to conquer one after the other Sicily, Italy, and Carthage, and then to turn the united forces of all these lands, increased by barbarian mercenaries from Iberia and other countries, against the Peloponnesus. The additional ships they would require for the investment of the Peloponnesus they intended to build in Italy, where timber for ship-building was abundant; while the money they would need, they expected to get through tribute levied upon the Sicilian and Italian cities.

The surest way, Alcibiades then told the Spartans, in which to wreck these plans of the Athenians was to send to Sicily at once a force of heavy-armed men, and above all a good Spartan general, who alone would be worth a whole army; for the Sicilians, disunited and jealous of each other, needed to have some one among them in whom all would have confidence, and to whom all would defer. He represented to the Spartans the necessity of acting promptly in the matter, for Syracuse, isolated as she was, could not long hold out against the Athenians; and if they once got possession of that place, it would not be a difficult thing for them to carry out the remainder of their designs.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 88.

Alcibiades also urged upon the Spartans the importance of resuming hostilities against Athens at home, in order to prevent the Athenians from sending reinforcements to their generals in Sicily. As a part of their plan of campaign in Greece, they should seize and garrison Decelea, a strong and commanding position in Attica, only fourteen miles from Athens. He informed the Spartans that the Athenians were in constant fear lest their enemies should do just this thing. The occupation of this place by a Peloponnesian force would be much more annoying and disastrous to the Athenians than the occupation of Pylos by the Athenians had been to the Lacedæmonians. Decelea would be a thorn in Athens' side. Secure in this stronghold, the Spartans could annoy and keep in terror a large part of the Attic plain. It would be an asylum for runaway slaves, just as Pylos was for Messenian Helots. A Decelean garrison would also cut off the Athenians from the revenue they derived from their silver mines at Laurium. Finally, the fortification of Decelea would encourage the subject cities of the Athenians to refuse payment of tribute, and even to openly revolt; for when they saw the Peloponnesians thus boldly carrying the war to the gates of Athens, they would prevision the speedy overthrow of the Athenian power.

Alcibiades then besought the Spartans to consider his counsel without prejudice because of any harm he might have done them in the past, and to command his services. "The more harm I did you as an enemy," said he, "the more good can I do you as a friend."¹

Whatever hesitation the Spartans may have felt in regard to resuming the war against Athens and carrying on hostilities both at home and in Sicily was overcome by the representations and persuasions of Alcibiades, and they resolved to fortify Decelea, as he had advised, and to send to Sicily their ablest general, Gylippus, with instructions to push the war there with the utmost vigor.²

¹ Thucyd. vi. 89-92, for the whole speech.

² Thucyd. vi. 93.

Operations of the Athenians before Syracuse during the Summer of the Year 414 B.C. — In the spring of the year 414 B.C. the Athenian forces in Sicily, after having committed some ravages in the territory of the Syracusans and their allies, settled down at Syracuse, resolved to subject the city to a regular siege. In furtherance of this purpose, they began the construction of a wall, which was intended to shut in the city on the land side; and later in the summer erected works calculated to facilitate their naval operations. The Syracusans built counter-walls, and hindered in every way they could the progress of the enemy's works.

There were several engagements in front of the walls, in which the Athenians were victorious, the little cavalry force of six or seven hundred which they had gathered enabling them to meet the Syracusans in the open field on something like equal terms. In one of these fights Lamachus was killed, and the sole command devolved upon Nicias.

In spite of all the efforts of the Syracusans, the Athenians carried forward steadily the work on their walls. Everything moved prosperously with the besiegers. Reinforcements came to them — now that the prospects of their taking the city were so bright — from the Sicels in the interior of the island and from the Tyrrhenians. The Syracusans began to lose hope, and even opened with Nicias negotiations for peace, which, however, came to nothing. Suspicious of their generals, they deposed them, and chose others in their stead.

The Arrival in Sicily of Gylippus. — At this moment, when everything was looking so discouraging to the Syracusans, Gylippus arrived. While on his way from Sparta, before he reached Italy, Gylippus had received from time to time exaggerated reports of the victories of the Athenians before Syracuse, and of the progress of their investing walls, and had abandoned all hope of saving Sicily, but hoped that he might still prevent the Italian cities from falling into the hands of the enemy.

But upon arrival at Locri in Italy, Gylippus received more accurate information of the state of things at Syracuse, and learned

that the double investing wall of the Athenians was not completed, as had been reported, so that it was yet possible to throw reinforcements into the city. Thereupon he hastened to the northern coast of Sicily, and collecting from Himera, Selinus, and Gela, and from among the native tribes of the interior, a force of about three thousand men, hurried across the island to Syracuse. He arrived just as the Syracusans, in their disheartenment, were about to call a meeting of the assembly to consider the question whether they should not surrender.

The arrival of Gylippus put at once a different look upon affairs. He defeated the Athenians in a hard-fought battle in front of the city, and drove them behind their works. The so called "cross-wall," which the Syracusans had been laboring upon, was now in the course of a single night carried beyond the line of the wall which the Athenians were building around the city. This counter-work rendered it impossible for the Athenians to make complete their investment of the city on the land side.

The rising hopes of the Syracusans were now given fresh encouragement by the arrival in their harbor of the Corinthian ships. They straightway began to equip vessels of their own, in order to be able to meet the Athenians on the sea as well as on the land. Gylippus himself undertook an embassy to the Sicilian cities and states of the interior with the object of forming alliances and securing reinforcements.¹

Doleful Letter from Nicias to the Athenians at Home.—Such was the situation at Syracuse upon the approach of winter. Nicias was disheartened, and sent to Athens one of the most doleful letters that the Athenians ever received from a general in the field. He told how, everything going prosperously with them at first, the situation was suddenly and completely changed about by the coming of the Spartan Gylippus, so that they who were supposed to be the besiegers were really the besieged. They were doing nothing on their siege-works, because they were forced to stand on the defensive; and besides, the cross-wall of the

¹ Thucyd. vii. 1-7.

enemy made it impossible to complete the investment, unless these counter-works could be captured. But it would require a large force to do this. The ships, he said, since they had no opportunity to draw them upon the land and air them, had become water-logged; while at the same time the enemy were getting together a navy, and would soon attack them on the water, where hitherto they had been safe. The servants and the soldiers who had come for the sake of the pay, also were running off. They were able to effect their escape easily because, Nicias explains, "Sicily is a large place." Many of the soldiers had persuaded their captains to accept slave substitutes, and they themselves had gone into the trading business. "The most hopeless thing of all," Nicias adds, "is that, although I am general, I am not able to put a stop to these disorders, for tempers like yours are not easily controlled."¹

Nicias then pointed out the danger his army was in of starving, since the enemy had only to gain over the cities of Italy, upon which the Athenians had now to rely for their supplies of food, and that would make an end of it. And all this was likely to happen, for the desperate condition of the Athenian army was an encouragement to these cities to espouse openly the cause of the Syracusans. Moreover, the arrival of a Peloponnesian army was expected, so that the Athenians must send out another armament fully as large as that now in Sicily. "You should also send a general to succeed me," Nicias concluded, "for I am sick, and cannot remain here. . . . I could have written you tidings far more cheering than these, but none more profitable."²

This letter stirred the Athenians to activity. Although it was now mid-winter, they at once sent Eurymedon to Sicily with ten ships and a large amount of money, together with assurances to Nicias that his fellow-citizens had not forgotten him, and that more help would come in the spring.

¹ This complaint reveals to us how difficult a thing it was to maintain discipline in an Athenian army.

² Thucyd. vii. 11-15.

During the remainder of the winter both the Athenians and the Peloponnesians were busy making preparations for the campaign of the ensuing summer. The Athenians also kept a fleet of twenty ships cruising around the Peloponnesus in order to prevent any ships of the enemy slipping out to Sicily.

The Spartans formally renew the War against Athens and fortify Decelea (413 B.C.). — Early in the spring of the year 413 B.C. the Spartans under their king Agis invaded Attica, which for a number of years had been exempt from their visits, and repeated the devastations that had marked the opening years of the war. Having completed their ravages, they began the fortification of Decelea, in accordance with the advice of Alcibiades (p. 358).

In thus invading the territory of Athens, the Lacedæmonians of course openly violated the provisions of the Peace of Nicias. But they did not regard themselves as being, nor were they, the first to break the truce; for the preceding year the Athenians, in flagrant violation of the peace, had ravaged a part of the shore of Laconia.

So the "Fifty Years' Truce" came to an end, after only seven years had passed from the time it was solemnly ratified by the oaths of the Spartans and the Athenians. Of course the truce had been from the very first nominal rather than real; yet until the despoiling of the Laconian coast by the Athenians, Sparta and Athens had both carefully refrained from invading each other's territory, notwithstanding their hostile forces had met often enough on the soil of their allies. But now it becomes open and avowed war, with all Hellas without reserve from the Ægean to the Tyrrhenian sea for its arena.

The fortification of Decelea was the master-stroke of the Spartans during the war. Thucydides says that the occupation of this place by the enemy was "a chief cause" of the final fall of Athens. The garrison so completely devastated the surrounding country that all the sheep and cattle of the Athenians perished, while a great multitude of their slaves escaped. The overland route from the Eubœan straits, by which a large part of the food

supplies of Athens was ordinarily brought to the city, was blocked, and everything had now to be brought in by ship. The citizens, moreover, were in constant fear of a surprise, for Decelea was within sight of Athens, and were worn out with watching their walls night and day. Indeed, from the time of the occupation by the enemy of Decelea on to the end of the war Athens was in a state of siege.

The Athenians send Reinforcements to Nicias (413 B.C.). — Notwithstanding the dangers that were threatening them at home, the Athenians, with the opening of the spring, and even while the Peloponnesians were in Attica at work upon their fortifications at Decelea, sent Charicles with a fleet of thirty ships to do what mischief he could round the Peloponnesus, and at the same time dispatched Demosthenes with sixty-five ships to carry the promised reinforcements to Nicias at Syracuse.

On his way around the Peloponnesus, Demosthenes aided Charicles in ravaging Laconia. Together they fortified a spot on the southernmost shore of the country, which was to serve as a sort of second Pylos. Demosthenes then went on to Corcyra. Here he met Eurymedon, who was on his way home from Syracuse, bearing news in regard to the state of things there. Eurymedon gave up his journey to Athens, and at once united with Demosthenes in collecting men and supplies from the Corcyræans, and from other allies of the Athenians on the adjoining mainland. With the armament thus reinforced, they crossed the Ionian Sea to the Iapygian shore, and then proceeded along the coast, picking up men and ships as they were able at the various ports. Strengthened by these reinforcements, the generals finally sailed into the harbor of Syracuse with a fleet of between seventy and eighty ships, carrying five thousand hoplites, together with a large number of light-armed troops and siege supplies in great variety and abundance.

The Athenians meet with Reverses before Syracuse : the Generals in Council. — The arrival of Demosthenes was timely. The Syracusans, to whom intelligence had been brought of the

approach of the new Athenian fleet, had been making determined attacks upon Nicias both on the water and on the land, hoping to overwhelm his forces before he should receive the expected reinforcements. In a two days' sea fight, in which eighty Syracusan engaged seventy-five Athenian ships, the Athenians were finally worsted, and lost seven vessels with their crews.

Gylippus, encouraged by the results of this naval engagement, was about to make also an attack on the enemy by land, when the arrival of the new Athenian forces changed the situation. The Athenians at once assumed the offensive, for Demosthenes was resolved not to repeat the mistake of Nicias and allow the enemy time to recover from the fright that his arrival had caused. He planned an attack on the cross-wall, and also another on Epipolæ, a sort of table-land overlooking the city proper. Both attempts miscarried, the attack on Epipolæ, which was made in the night, resulting in a confused fight, and the repulse of the Athenians with serious loss. Many perished by leaping from the cliffs; others, fleeing into the country, were hunted down by the enemy's cavalry. It was an irreparable disaster—and the beginning of the end. For the Athenians were now thoroughly disheartened, since they had to bear, not only the losses of battle, but also the ravages of sickness resulting from their camp being established on wet and unhealthy ground.

A council of the Athenian generals was held. Demosthenes advised the immediate withdrawal of their forces while the way of retreat by the sea was open to them. He thought it the part of wisdom to save their strength for the defense of Athens, since the capture of Syracuse was now manifestly impossible. He was supported in these views by Eurymedon. But Nicias could not make up his mind to retreat. He was in communication with certain persons in Syracuse, who kept giving him assurances that something would be done within the city to bring about its surrender, and he was thus led to still hope against hope. Then he could not bear the thought of returning to Athens without having accomplished anything. He recognized that things were in a bad way

in the Athenian camp, but was persuaded that they were in a still worse shape with the Syracusans. The outcome of the council was that nothing was done, the Athenian army simply remaining inactive in camp.

The Fatal Eclipse. — Large reinforcements now came to the Syracusans from the different parts of Sicily, and also from the Peloponnesus. These last had eluded the Athenian ships that watched the western shores of Greece in order to intercept ships of the Peloponnesians on their way to Syracuse, by crossing to Africa and coasting along the African shore to a point opposite Sicily, and then putting across to the island.

Nicias was now ready to yield to the wishes of the other generals, and preparations were at once made for the retreat. Just as the ships were about to weigh anchor, there occurred an eclipse of the moon. This portent caused the greatest consternation among the Athenian troops. They interpreted it as an unfavorable omen, and demanded that the contemplated retreat should be given up. Nicias unfortunately was a superstitious man, having full faith in omens and divination. He sought now the advice, not of his colleagues, but of his soothsayers. They pronounced the portent to be an unfavorable one, and advised that the retreat be delayed thirty-seven days.¹

Never did a reliance upon omens more completely undo a people. The salvation of the Athenians depended absolutely upon their immediate retreat. The delay prescribed by the diviners was fatal. It seems the irony of fate that the Athenians, who of all the peoples of antiquity had most completely freed themselves from superstition, who more than any other men had learned to depend in the management of their affairs upon their own intelligence and judgment, should perish through a superstitious regard for omens and divination.

An Enumeration of the Forces gathered in and around Syracuse. — The Syracusans again attacked the Athenians by sea and land. In a third fight in the harbor, they defeated the Athe-

¹ Thucyd. vii. 50.

nian fleet, inflicting upon it great damage ; while in another fight on the land, they gained a decisive victory. Encouraged by these successes, they now proceeded to block the mouth of the harbor ; for whereas hitherto they had thought only of driving the Athenian ships away, now they hoped to be able to destroy or capture the armament altogether.

At this point in his account of the great expedition, before passing to the final catastrophe, Thucydides, with true dramatic instinct, pauses to name the peoples and to enumerate the forces gathered in and around Syracuse either to share in its spoils or to help in its defense, in order to impress upon his readers the magnitude of the approaching calamity as it touched the Athenians and its significance as it concerned the whole Hellenic world.

The Athenians had drawn with them to the siege their Ionian, Æolian, and Dorian subjects, tributaries and allies from all the islands and coast cities of the Ægean, as well as from the Ionian islands and the cities and tribes of the western coast lands of Greece. They had also attracted to their service Cretan and Arcadian and Ætolian mercenaries. The Argives had followed them, seeking in Sicily a revenge upon the Spartans which they could not get at home ; while several of the Greek cities of Italy and Sicily had strengthened them with their contingents. Many barbarian tribes of both Sicily and Italy, led by friendship for the Athenians or prompted by enmity towards the Syracusans, or drawn by pay, also swelled the number of the Athenian forces. The Syracusans were aided in the defense of their city by the Dorian peoples of the Sicilian cities of Camarina, Gela, Selinus, and Himera, together with some of the native tribes of the island. From Greece proper, they were assisted first and foremost by the Spartan Gylippus, who was worth a whole army ; by a force of Lacedæmonian freedmen and Helots, by the Corinthians, the Sicyonians, the Bœotians, Arcadian mercenaries, and others.

So many nations, Thucydides asserts, had never before up to this time gathered around any single city.¹

¹ Thucyd. vii. 57, 58.

Last Fight in the Harbor. — The prospect of destroying the whole armament of the Athenians, and thereby not only averting from themselves threatened enslavement but gaining the glory of fatally laming the enslavers of the other Greeks, inspired the Syracusans with the utmost courage and energy.

The entrance to the harbor which the Syracusans had resolved to block up in order to imprison the Athenian fleet was about a mile wide. It was closed by means of craft of every kind anchored close alongside each other, thus forming a sort of floating bridge across the channel, with only a narrow passageway left open for the entrance and departure of ships.

The Athenians must now, since their provisions were failing, fight their way out either by sea or by land. They resolved to put all their men, save those needed to guard the baggage, on board the ships, and make a desperate attempt to break through the blockade at the mouth of the harbor, and thus open a way of escape by the sea. Failing in this, they proposed to burn their ships, cut their way through the surrounding enemy, and march to some friendly city.

Before the manning of the ships, Nicias addressed the soldiers in a speech as full of encouragement as the disheartening situation allowed. After having pointed out the chances in their favor in a new sea-fight, and addressed a few words to the allies, he made a final appeal to the Athenians in these words: "Let me remind you that there are no more ships like these in the dockyards of the Peiræus, and that you have no more recruits fit for service. In any event but victory your enemies here will instantly sail against Athens, while our countrymen at home, who are but a remnant, will be unable to defend themselves against the attacks of their former foes reinforced by the new invaders. You who are in Sicily will instantly fall into the hands of the Syracusans, and your friends at Athens into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. In this one struggle you have to fight for yourselves and them. Stand firm therefore now if ever, and remember one and all of you who are embarking that you are both the fleet and the army of your

country, and that on you hangs the whole state and the great name of Athens.”¹

The ships were now manned, and the fleet pushed directly for the passageway through the line of boats moored at the mouth of the harbor, the intention of the Athenians being to fight their way out at this point. Here they were withstood by the Syracusan ships, and a terrific struggle followed. The number of ships engaged on both sides was about two hundred, so that soon the fight filled the whole harbor. All the modes of sea-fighting were practised. The crews of ships discharged upon each other showers of missiles of every kind, — darts, arrows, and stones. Two vessels would grapple each other, and then the fight became a hand-to-hand contest as on land. Again the hostile ships dashed at full speed into each other, and in this way many were broken to pieces and sunk. The crash of the colliding ships, the shouts of the combatants, the groans of the wounded, the cries of those on shore, — all this created a scene of indescribable confusion and horror.

As the fight went on, it became more and more evident that the Athenians would be unable to force their way out of the harbor. Finally they gave way, and such as could ran their ships upon the shore and fled to the camp.²

The Athenians after some Delay begin their Retreat. — Nicias and Demosthenes were minded to man what ships could be collected and to try once more to force their way out to sea, but the panic among the sailors was too great. They refused to go on board the ships. There was now no other course open save retreat by land. It was resolved to set out that same night; but being misinformed in regard to the state of the roads, the Athenians remained in camp that night, and also the following day. This delay destroyed whatever chance there remained to them of escape after the defeat in the harbor; for during this interval Hermocrates and Gylippus were busy blocking the roads, and setting guards at all the fords of the rivers and in the passes of the hills.³

¹ Thucyd. vii. 64.

² Thucyd. vii. 70, 71.

³ Thucyd. vii. 72-74.

Finally the Athenians, having made such preparations as they were able for their march, set out on their retreat. "They were," says Thucydides, whose words alone can picture the distress of the scene, "in a dreadful condition: not only was there the great fact that they had lost their whole fleet, and instead of their expected triumph had brought the utmost peril upon Athens as well as upon themselves, but also the sights which presented themselves as they quitted the camp were painful to every eye and mind. The dead were unburied, and when any one saw the body of a friend lying on the ground, he was smitten with sorrow and dread, while the sick and wounded who still survived, but had to be left, were even a greater trial to the living, and more to be pitied than those who were gone. Their prayers and lamentations drove their companions to distraction . . . so that the whole army was in tears. There was also a general feeling of shame and self-reproach,—indeed they seemed not like an army, but like the fugitive population of a city captured after a siege; and of a great city too: for the whole multitude who were marching numbered not less than forty thousand.¹

The End of the Tragedy.—Nicias, whose hesitating, wavering policy and faith in omens had contributed so largely to the disaster, was at his best at this moment of unutterable distress and dejection. He tried to reanimate the courage of the soldiers, and bade them not despair, because the jealousy of the gods (p. 54)—if it was that which had brought about their dreadful fall—must certainly be disarmed by the sight of their pitiable condition, and they might hope now for Heaven's pity and help.

Moving in two divisions, one under the lead of Nicias and the other under that of Demosthenes, the Athenians crossed the river Anapus, and hurried on towards Catana. The Syracusans impeded in front their march, and harassed them by constant attacks on flank and rear. The first day they advanced only a little over four miles, and on the next only half as far. On the third day they made only a slight advance, being forced to engage in

¹ Thucyd. vii. 75.

incessant fighting with the enemy. The fourth day's march brought them to a pass in the hills, which the enemy had blocked with a wall. They attempted to force their passage, but failed. The next day — the fifth — they advanced only three-quarters of a mile. The following night, leaving their camp-fires burning, they resumed their flight, changing their course so that it was directed towards the southern shore of the island instead of in the direction of Catana.

In the night march a panic occurred, and the two divisions in which the army was moving became widely separated, that led by Demosthenes being in the rear. About noon the next day this division, which was pushing forward after the other in great disorder, was overtaken by the Syracusan cavalry, and before night harassed into a surrender, which was made on the condition that their lives should be spared. The number that surrendered was about six thousand.

The Syracusans now hastened after the other division of the army. Soon overtaking the fugitives, they pressed upon and harassed them. Nicias endeavored in vain to secure from the enemy honorable terms of surrender. The little river Assinarus marked the end of this part of the tragedy. As the fugitives rushed in tangled crowds into the stream in a frantic endeavor to cross, they were slaughtered in heaps by their pursuers, who from the high bank threw down missiles upon them, or following them into the water, cut them down without resistance. Nicias now resolved to put an end to the dreadful slaughter by an unconditional surrender to Gylippus. The killing now ceased, and the survivors were allowed to give themselves up as prisoners. Some, however, escaped, and, after long wanderings about the country, reached the friendly city of Catana.

The prisoners, about seven thousand in number, were crowded in deep, open stone-quarries around Syracuse, in which prison-pens hundreds soon died of exposure and starvation. Most of the wretched survivors were finally sold into slavery.

The generals Nicias and Demosthenes were both executed.

Gylippus would have been glad to have taken Demosthenes alive to Sparta, knowing that a view in the plight of a prisoner of the man who had brought upon them the disgrace of Pylos, would be a peculiarly grateful sight to the Spartans ; but the Syracusans and their allies would not have it so. Nicias apparently was the victim of his wealth, since his enemies, fearing that if left alive he would secure release through bribery, insisted upon his being put to death.¹

The tragedy of the Sicilian Expedition was now ended. Two centuries were to pass before Sicily was again to become the arena of transactions equally significant for universal history. Then another imperial city was to seek in Sicily, with Heaven more propitious, the path to universal dominion.

REFERENCES. — Jowett's Thucydides, vi. and vii. Plutarch, *Lives of Nicias and Alcibiades*. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. iii. pp. 321-413. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. v. pp. 516-558; *ib.* vol. vi. pp. 1-84; (twelve volume ed.) vol. vii. pp. 118-162 and 163-250. For a connected history of the Sicilian Greek cities, see Freeman's *The Story of Sicily*. Creasy, *Decisive Battles of the World*, ch. ii., entitled "Defeat of the Athenians at Syracuse, B.C. 413." Cox, *Lives of Greek Statesmen*: "Nikias" and "Hermocrates."

¹ Thucyd. vii. 76-87.

CHAPTER XXI.

FROM THE SICILIAN DISASTER TO THE FALL OF ATHENS:
THE DECELEAN WAR.

(413-404 B.C.)

How the Intelligence of the Disaster in Sicily was received at Athens. — There was never any official report made to the Athenians at home respecting the fate of their fleet and army in Sicily; for there was no one left who could make such a report. Several weeks passed before the news of the disaster reached Athens; and when finally chance survivors of the catastrophe came in with the terrible intelligence, the Athenians treated as ridiculous fabrications their reports of what had happened in the island. It was no wonder that the Athenians refused to believe the stories of the fugitives; the tidings were simply incredible.

Finally, however, the Athenians were forced to recognize the truth of the reports. Their first incredulity now gave way to mingled feelings of anger, grief, and fear. Their first emotions, when at last they really comprehended the magnitude and completeness of the disaster that had befallen their city, seem to have been feelings of furious wrath against the orators, soothsayers, oracle-mongers, and all who had advised or encouraged the undertaking, forgetting that it was they themselves who, in spite of the advice of Nicias and others, had voted the expedition.¹

But even anger had to make place for grief. It was the young men especially who had eagerly pushed forward for a place in the departing ships. There was scarcely a family in Athens that did

¹ Thucyd. vii. 1.

not mourn a son or near relative, while all mourned neighbors and friends and fellow-citizens. And the cause of grief was not simply that relatives and friends had not returned; all the circumstances attending their fate made the grief of those remaining the deeper and more inconsolable. Uncertainty shrouded the fate of friends; the dead lay without the indispensable rites of burial; the living, reserved to a worse fate, were suffering the horrors of imprisonment in the quarry-mines of Syracuse, or were already toiling in slavery.

A panic of fear, too, had seized upon the people. Nor were their apprehensions ungrounded. They saw their city stripped of its men and ships, and thus defenseless in the midst of a world of enemies. They thought nothing else than that the Syracusans and their confederates would sail straightway to the Peiræus. They expected that their subject allies everywhere on the islands and along the continental shores would take advantage of the destruction of the Athenian navy and at once revolt. In imagination they saw all their old deadly enemies, the Bœotians, the Corinthians, the Spartans, and all the others, — they realized now in their helplessness how many enemies they had made, — already at their city gates.

What contributed greatly to this feeling of helpless fear was the fact that the city, as we have seen, was already virtually in a state of siege by land, through the occupation of Decelea by the Peloponnesians (p. 362). The enemy in this position commanded both the roads leading to Eubœa, and thus cut off the Athenians from land communication with that island, whence they drew a considerable part of their food supplies. The sea-path was indeed still open, but that was long and dangerous. Attica was not only lost to Athens, but was practically transformed into a Laconian land. A considerable part of the plain in the neighborhood of Decelea was in the permanent possession of the enemy, while the larger portion of the remainder was constantly harried by the marauding bands of the hostile garrison, who drew from the country their supplies. Moreover, the nearness of the enemy

made it necessary for the Athenians to keep watch on their walls day and night, and thus they were harassed and wearied by unrelieved anxiety and unintermitted watching.

Measures adopted by the Athenians for maintaining the War.

—After a time the vehemence of their first feelings gave place in the Athenians to a calmer temper, and gradually, since the expected enemy did not appear, to a more hopeful mood; and with most admirable courage they set to work to retrieve their seemingly irretrievable fortune.

One of their first measures was the appointment of a sort of committee of public safety or council of ten persons of elderly age,¹ whose duty it should be to devise measures for the public defense. As it is probable that all important measures were first considered by this Board of Elders before submission to the Ecclesia, it is apparent that this reform amounted practically to a fundamental change in the constitution. The events of the past few months had discredited and humbled the extreme democratical party. All recognized that the real source of the calamity which had befallen the city was the ease with which ill-conceived measures, even measures touching the very existence of the empire, might be brought forward by restless and ambitious demagogues and under the impulse of excitement hurried to a decisive vote. The new council remedied, in a measure at least, this acknowledged weakness in the democratical constitution. Its proposal and adoption indicate at once the activity and strength of the oligarchical party, and the at least momentarily dejected, self-distrustful, and pliant mood of the democracy.

Measures were now concerted for the raising of a new army, for the awful disaster had swept away more than one-third of the effective fighting-force of the city. Counting their allies, the Athenians had lost in Sicily sixty thousand men.² To fill, in so far as possible, the great gaps in their ranks, they now, as in the crisis before the battle of Salamis, passed a decree recalling from ban-

¹ Bearing the title of *Probuli*, Πρόβουλοι.

² Curtius, *Griech. Gesch.* ii. 679, 680.

ishment all save such as had actually joined the enemy. The garrisons on the Peloponnesian shore, save the one at Pylos, were called home to help man the walls of the city. The promontory of Sunium was fortified, and a garrison established there to guard the sea-way to Eubœa and to watch the slaves in the state mines at Sunium.

And as with the army, so was it with the fleet. It had been practically swept out of existence. Nearly two hundred ships had been lost on the Sicilian shores. The harbor of the Peiræus was almost empty. With the exception of a small squadron lying at Naupactus, in the Corinthian Gulf, and a few other vessels, the Athenians were without a war-ship. But they now set energetically to work to repair their loss. Ship timber was brought from Macedonia and Thrace, and the docks of the Peiræus soon presented a scene of bustling activity. The spring following the disaster saw a considerable fleet of new ships ready to challenge again the enemy on the seas.

The treasury, too, was empty. The Athenians, confident of their success in Sicily and their enrichment by the spoils of the war and the acquisition of new tribute-paying subjects, had spared nothing in the way of expense in fitting out their armament. They had risked all on a single throw of the die of fortune — and had lost. And not only had they sunk vast sums of money, public and private, in the undertaking, but the misfortune had deprived them of a large part of their regular income. The occupation of Decelea by the enemy not only impoverished the Athenian landlords, but also cut off the city from various sources of revenue which in ordinary times were drawn from the courts and markets. Furthermore the tribute from the allies had become a more precarious source of revenue, and was collected with increased difficulty.

These financial embarrassments were met first by the adoption of measures of rigid economy in the public affairs. The appropriations for festivals, sacrifices in the temples, and the plays in the theatres were cut down as much as possible. Then in place of

the tribute hitherto paid by the subject cities, a duty of five per cent was imposed upon all imports and exports at the harbors of the allies. It was thought that this could be collected with less difficulty than the tribute and would besides prove more remunerative.¹

In the spring of the year following the disaster, Chios having revolted and the loss of all Ionia being threatened, the Athenians voted to use for the building and manning of ships the thousand talents kept by the advice of Pericles as a reserve on the Acropolis, to be used only in case Athens should be attacked by sea (p. 285). In using this reserve the Athenians may have been violating the letter, but certainly not the spirit, of the decree creating the fund; for though Athens was not at this moment the direct object of a sea-attack, still the provisioned moment of imminent danger to the life of the state had now come. The danger was as threatening and immediate as though the enemy's fleet were at the entrance to the Peiræus.

The Situation at Sparta and among her Allies. — Having now noticed the situation of Athens, we must direct our view to her enemies and observe more closely the number, strength, and relations of the cities and states against which she was preparing her defense. A glance over the Mediterranean world reveals Athens isolated in a sea of enemies. We see Greeks and barbarians, moved by diverse passions and motives, — revenge, jealousy, hope of regaining lost liberty, desire of retaining threatened independence, or prospect of a share in the spoils and glory of victory, — uniting their forces for her destruction.

Sparta, with lost prestige regained by the achievements of her general Gylippus, was of course the recognized head and centre of the alliance. In her king Agis she had an active, capable, and ambitious leader, who, invested with extraordinary war-powers, was in command at Decelea. The importance to the enemy of the occupation of this Attic stronghold we have already noticed

¹ The Athenians were disappointed in their expectations in regard to this innovation, and after a short trial of the new system of duties returned to the old plan of assessments and tribute.

(p. 373). Such a determining influence did the possession of the place by the Peloponnesians exercise upon the remainder of the war that this latter portion of it is known as the Decelean War.

In alliance with Sparta were all her old confederates in Greece proper, chief among whom were the Bœotians and the Corinthians, with their war strength, unlike that of Athens, still unshattered.

But the attack of the Athenians upon Sicily had drawn the western portion of the Hellenic world into the struggle, and Syracuse was now preparing an armament to aid the Peloponnesians in what it was thought would be a short and final campaign. Party feeling there, however, for the war was naturally redounding to the advantage of the aristocrats, since Hermocrates was a member of that party, prevented Syracuse from playing in the coming war a part in correspondence with her real strength and resources. Besides, the Egestæans, left without friends in the island through the driving out of the Athenians, had invited the Carthaginians to their aid, and this new enemy kept the Syracusans busied at home, or at least divided their attention, and diverted a portion of their forces from the war of revenge in Greece.

In the East, the Persians were again active, and were laying claim to the larger part of the Athenian empire as their share of the spoils. Taking advantage of the destruction of the Athenian fleet, Darius II., who at this time held the Persian throne, asserted his title to all the lands that his ancestors had ever held, even for a moment. Since at the time of the great invasion the Persians had pressed into Greece as far as the Isthmus, and had received earth and water from all the coast cities on the way, as well as from the islands of the Ægean, it followed that his claims covered the chief part of the Athenian possessions.

As a practical assertion of his claims, Darius was now demanding of his satraps in Asia Minor — Tissaphernes, governor of the middle and southern provinces, and Pharnabazus, governor of the Hellespontine and northern districts¹ — the tribute due from

¹ Pharnabazus held the regions on the Hellespont, together with Phrygia, Bithynia, and Cappadocia.

the Greek cities of the coast, which had been so long wrongfully diverted from Susa to Athens. This demand of the king upon his satraps created a new situation on the frontier between Persia and Hellas. It meant a renewal, under changed conditions, of the old struggle begun in Ionia two generations before.

For the satraps must collect the tribute, now being gathered by the Athenian collectors, or answer to their master for their failure. To reach the desired end, the Athenians must be driven out. Since the Persian power had fallen so low that no help could be looked for from Susa, the satraps must find in their own provinces, and in the assistance of Greek allies, the means of attaining their ends. Naturally they turned to Sparta. The negotiations and treaties between Persia and Sparta, effected through the mediation of Alcibiades, we shall notice later. Our present aim is merely to get the situation clearly before us.

Now there arose, as was natural, a rivalry between the two satraps, for the alliance and help of the Spartans. Tissaphernes labored to secure their assistance first. The cities of Ionia and the adjacent islands, particularly the important island of Chios, were ready to revolt, and he urged that it would be better to begin the work of driving out the Athenians, on this part of the coast. He offered to bring up the Phœnician fleet and join it to the Peloponnesian armament, and to provide for the monthly pay of the crews of the Greek ships.

Pharnabazus exerted himself to outbid Tissaphernes in offers of money, and urged the Spartans to join in driving out first the Athenians from the Hellespontine region, the loss of which on account of their Euxine trade would, he argued, give a much severer blow to their power than would the loss of Ionia.

Alcibiades, now at Sparta, favored the suit of Tissaphernes and the Chians; for these islanders, contemplating revolt, had sent an embassy to the Spartans for aid. Influenced by him, the Spartans were led to promise to send help first to Ionia. They voted forty ships for the enterprise, which were to set out with the opening of the spring.

But the best allies of Sparta were after all to be found, not in her Hellenic confederates or among the Asiatic barbarians, but within the cities themselves of the Athenian empire. Everywhere the oligarchical party, since the Sicilian disaster, had lifted its head, and was ready to form any kind of alliance, with Spartan or with Mede, if only could be compassed the ruin of the Athenian democracy. We shall soon see this party at work both in the subject cities of Athens and within the walls of Athens itself.

Such was the situation throughout the Mediterranean world during the winter following the destruction of the Athenian fleet and army before Syracuse.

The Revolt of Chios and other Allies of Athens : Activity of Alcibiades : Military Operations of the Summer (412 B.C.). — With the opening of the spring of the year 412 B.C., the twentieth of the war, the Peloponnesians began to carry out the plans which they had matured during the winter, by dragging twenty-one of their ships across the Isthmus from the Corinthian Gulf, intending to send them to Chios in accordance with their promise to the Chian conspirators to give them aid in their proposed revolt from Athens.¹ But the Athenians were on the alert. Putting out after the ships, they drove them into a roadstead on the coast of Argolis, and blockaded them there.

Alcibiades, who was at Sparta, fearing that this miscarriage would discourage the Chian conspirators and delay the concerted rising, prevailed upon the Spartans to send him straightway to Chios, promising to raise a revolt against Athens not only in that island but throughout Ionia. Arriving at Chios, Alcibiades, keeping back the truth in regard to the misfortune that had befallen the squadron that had set out from the Isthmus, represented to the Chian conspirators that the five ships accompanying him were the advance squadron of a large Peloponnesian fleet on its way to the island. Relying upon his representations, the Chians at once revolted from Athens.

¹ During the winter Chios had been secretly received into the Peloponnesian alliance.

The defection of Chios was a heavy blow to the Athenians. This island was the most important of all their allies, and its example was sure to be followed by others. Notwithstanding the loss in ships which the Chians had sustained while fighting alongside their suzerain in the Sicilian waters, they still possessed fifty-three ships ready manned for service.

At the instigation of Alcibiades, Erythræ, opposite Chios on the mainland, now also revolted, and then in quick succession Clazomenæ, Miletus, and other cities followed her example. Thus the empire of Athens in Ionia crumbled to pieces at the word and touch of Alcibiades. His purpose was to spread the revolt as widely as possible among the Ionian states, and then to raise against Athens her allies in the region of the Hellespont.

Having set the Ionian revolt in full course, Alcibiades next busied himself in effecting an alliance between Tissaphernes and Sparta. The negotiations here issued in a treaty which Tissaphernes arranged in the name of the Great King (412 B.C.). The chief point of the treaty was the recognition by Sparta of the claims of the Persians upon all the lands ever held by the Persian kings. The treaty further bound the contracting parties to a defensive and offensive alliance.

The acknowledgment by Sparta of any such claims as those put forward by the Persian king was of course a most shameful betrayal by her of the very cities to which she was holding herself out as a liberator. The Persian claims were denounced by all right-minded Hellenes as monstrous, and the compact as infamous. The treaty was afterwards modified, some of its clauses which were most offensive to Hellenic feeling being softened; but Sparta in having ever become a party to such an alliance had published to the Hellenic world the hollowness of her professions as the defender of the autonomy of the Greek cities and the upholder of their liberties.¹

¹ It is not improbable that the articles of the treaty were framed by Alcibiades himself, who aimed to forge a double-edged weapon which he could use either against Athens or Sparta as circumstances should determine. He certainly did use it against each in turn. Curtius, *Griech. Gesch.* ii, 6 (6th ed.).

While the incendiary Alcibiades was thus employed among the allies of Athens and with Tissaphernes, the Athenians were putting forth strenuous efforts to quench the conflagration he was spreading and to save their endangered possessions in and around Ionia. Fortunately for them, the island of Samos was by the democratic party there held firm in its allegiance. The oligarchical party had just made an attempt to carry the island over to the side of the Peloponnesians, but the people had risen against them, and had killed or driven into exile the chief conspirators. Hereupon the Athenians, moved by gratitude and considerations of policy, had given to the Samians their independence, — that is, lifted them from the status of tribute-paying subjects to that of equal allies. It was this island, thus secured in its loyalty to Athens, which was made by the Athenians the headquarters for their navy and army, and their watch-station in the *Ægean*.

Having gathered at Samos their forces, the Athenians began a campaign against the revolted cities. Lesbos, which the Chians had persuaded to join in the revolt, was reconquered; Clazomenæ also was regained; the fields of Chios were ravaged, and Miletus was blockaded. It was now towards the close of summer, and the Athenians were making every effort to force the place to surrender before the coming of winter, and thus to give a crushing blow to the rebellion. And it is probable that they would have succeeded in taking the city in spite of the efforts of the Spartans and their allies to save it, had not just at the critical moment the Syracusan Hermocrates appeared upon the scene with twenty-two Sicilian ships. They were now forced to raise the blockade and to withdraw to Samos. Thus the summer ended with the revolt only half suppressed. The versatile Alcibiades was now preparing to give affairs another turn.

The Conspiracy of the Four Hundred (411 B.C.). — Alcibiades had succeeded in making in his new surroundings at Sparta and later in Ionia many enemies, political and personal. Receiving warning that his life was in danger in the Spartan camp, he fled to the court of Tissaphernes, where he found a friendly reception, and

very soon came to exercise a great influence over the satrap. He told him that his policy should be to make an ally of neither Sparta nor Athens, but to keep them engaged in wasting one another's strength, and allow neither to gain a decided supremacy in Greece.

This advice was followed, for it fell in exactly with Tissaphernes' own view of the situation. The satrap kept promising the Spartans that he would bring up the Phœnician fleet (p. 378), but always found some excuse for breaking his promise. Money for the pay of the troops was doled out with exasperating parsimony ; yet sufficient was advanced to prevent an open rupture with the Peloponnesians.

But Alcibiades' real aim was to secure a return to Athens. To pave the way for his recall, he now began to stir up trouble among the Athenians, with the view to making himself indispensable to the popular party. Taking advantage of the hatred entertained by the oligarchs towards the democracy, Alcibiades began to intrigue with the leading Athenians at Samos. He represented to them that if they would change the government of their city to an oligarchical form, he would be able to bring the Persians over to the side of Athens ; but neither he nor the Great King could have anything to do with a "villanous democracy." Many were won over to the side of the conspirators. From the camp at Samos the conspiracy spread to Athens. The same arguments that had been used at Samos were plied with the people here : By changing their constitution, they would get back Alcibiades, make Tissaphernes a friend, get unlimited supplies of Persian gold, and be enabled to overcome the Lacedæmonians. Surely all this was worth a little sacrifice of sentiment respecting government by the people. And then, what else could Athens do? Could anybody suggest a better course under the circumstances?

The conspiracy was ripened in the oligarchical clubs at Athens, and the plot was consummated by means of a system of terrorism. All opposition was silenced by assassination. Under the impulsion of terror, the public assembly was led to vote away the democratical constitution and to set up an oligarchical one in its stead. All

civil magistracies were abolished, and a Council of Four Hundred was formed, in whose hands was the direction of all public affairs. These councillors were, indeed, when they thought occasion required, to call an assembly of five thousand of the better-to-do citizens—such as could furnish their own arms. But there was no list of such citizens published, and the provision meant nothing. The government was in the hands of the four hundred oligarchs, whose power was unlimited.

Before the conspiracy had been carried to this point, Alcibiades had broken with the oligarchs. Indeed, we cannot suppose that any of his representations to them were sincere. His aim was to get things in a tangle at Athens so that he should be needed to straighten them out. But before they found out that Alcibiades was trifling with them, the oligarchs had gone too far to retrace their steps, and so had carried through the plot in the violent way we have seen.

The Recall of Alcibiades and the Fall of the Four Hundred (411 B.C.).—With the conspiracy consummated in Athens, envoys, headed by the general Peisander, who had taken a prominent part in bringing about the revolution in the city, were sent to Samos to win the army to the cause. But the army would have none of it. They refused to recognize the new government. They gathered in a regular assembly, declared themselves to be the true Athens, took an oath to maintain the democracy, deposed such of their officers as they suspected of being concerned in the plot, elected two new leaders, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, and then, upon the proposal of these generals, sent for Alcibiades to come to them.

This invitation was what Alcibiades had been scheming and waiting for. He came to Samos, and after four years' exile stood once more among his fellow-countrymen. It was a favorable moment for reconciliation, for those around him were like himself exiles. He made a speech to the army, in which he lamented his hard fortune and his unjust banishment, and represented in glowing colors what he could do for the Athenians—were he given the

opportunity — through making Tissaphernes and the Great King their friends. The soldiers were completely won over by the words of Alcibiades, and forgetting and forgiving the past, voted his recall, and gave him the command of the army with absolute power (411 B.C.) ; thereby well illustrating what the poet Aristophanes said respecting the disposition of the Athenians towards the spoiled favorite, — “They love, they hate, but cannot live without him.”

The army now demanded to be led at once against the oligarchs in Athens ; but Alcibiades dissuaded the soldiers from this movement by representing to them that to leave Samos would be to allow all Ionia and the Ægean islands to fall into the hands of the Peloponnesians. Thucydides thinks that Alcibiades in this matter rendered Athens a great service.¹

To the envoys of the Four Hundred who came to Samos, Alcibiades said that some of the reforms they had effected were well enough, but that the new council must be abolished. This message sowed discord, as Alcibiades knew it would, in the ranks of the oligarchical party ; for a reaction was already setting in at Athens. The issue was that the Four Hundred were deposed without the intervention of the army, the people themselves, who had become suspicious, and not without cause, that the oligarchy were plotting to deliver the city into the hands of the Peloponnesians, rising against the new government and overthrowing it. Some of the leaders of the revolution escaped to Decelea ; others were arrested, tried, and executed.

In the re-establishment of the democracy, not all the changes that had been effected in the constitution by the oligarchy were disturbed. Thus the arrangements respecting the public assembly were allowed to stand. The number remained nominally and for a while (until 410 B.C.) at five thousand, and embraced only those

¹ Thucyd. viii. 86. Not only were the cities of Ionia and of the Ægean held for the empire, but probably a terrible massacre at Athens was averted ; since for the soldiers to have gone to the capital in the mood in which they then were, meant almost certainly the filling of the streets of the city with the victims of party hatred and civil war.

able to furnish themselves with arms. Neither were the salaries of civil magistrates, which had been abolished, restored. Thus the revolution resulted in the changing for a time of the extreme into a moderate democracy. "This government, during its early day," says Thucydides, "was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed within my memory. Oligarchy and democracy were duly attempted."¹

The government at home now passed a vote of reconciliation with Alcibiades and his army, and once more the Athenians, without visible schism, stood united against their outer foes.

The Loss to Athens of Eubœa. — Besides the other evils which the usurpation of the Four Hundred had inflicted upon Athens was the loss of Eubœa; for, taking advantage of the revolution in the capital, the Peloponnesian fleet had made a descent upon this island, destroyed an Athenian squadron of thirty-six triremes which had hurried out from the Peiræus in its defense, and raised all the Eubœan cities² in successful revolt against Athens.

The defection of Eubœa was a severe loss to Athens, as since the Peloponnesians had held possession of Decelea the Athenians had made the island a sort of storage-place for their cattle, slaves, goods, and general supplies. Consequently the news of the loss of the island, coming as it did at the moment when the army at Samos was in revolt and Athens itself in the hands of Laconizing oligarchs, struck the Athenians with dismay. They feared that the Peloponnesians would at once, before measures of defense could be concerted, make an attack upon the Peiræus, now bare of ships, and at a blow bring all to an end. But the Spartans, slow and timid as usual, let the opportunity slip, thus once more proving themselves, in the phrase of Thucydides, "the most convenient enemies whom the Athenians could possibly have had."

Transference of the Seat of War from Ionia to the Hellespont. — The same year that witnessed the overthrow of the Four Hundred at Athens saw the transference of the war from the Ionian

¹ viii. 97.

² Save Oreos (Histizea), an Athenian cleruchy.

coast to the shores of the Hellespont. The growing distrust of Tissaphernes which the Peloponnesians entertained, ripened into a full conviction of his insincerity and untrustworthiness as an ally, and they resolved to waste no more time waiting for his ever-renewed promises to bring up the Phœnician fleet for the reinforcement of their armament, but to turn to Pharnabazus, the satrap of the Hellespont, accept the proposals of alliance which he had been holding out (p. 378), and work with him in destroying the Athenian power in the north. This change of policy having been decided upon, the Peloponnesian squadron was gradually mustered in the Hellespont, and before mid-summer the cities of Abydos, Lampsacus, and Byzantium were in the hands of the Peloponnesians. Thus all the possessions of the Athenians both on the Propontis and the Hellespont were threatened, and their connection with the Euxine, now doubly important since the loss of Eubœa, was endangered.

The Athenians, under their generals Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, followed the Peloponnesian ships, and near Abydos, having drawn them into a fight, inflicted upon them an overwhelming defeat.¹ This was the first important victory that the Athenians had won since the Sicilian disaster, and it filled Athens with great joy. Once more the Athenians were on the heights, and they saw the horizons that had so long been dark clearing, and the former splendor and greatness of their city restored.²

Alcibiades as a General (411-408 B.C.). — During a period of about four years following the great victory of the Athenians off Abydos, events gathered about the person of Alcibiades, who during this time rendered Athens splendid service as a general.

After the sea-fight at Abydos, both fleets remained inactive for some months, and then the Peloponnesian general Mindarus, having received reinforcements, again offered the Athenians battle.

¹ Battle of Abydos or of Cynossema, 411 B.C.

² Just after the battle of Cynossema the history of Thucydides breaks off abruptly in the twenty-first year of the war. Our chief guide from this on to the end of the war is the *Hellenica* of Xenophon.

The fight lasted throughout an entire day,¹ and the victory was already declaring itself for the Peloponnesians, when Alcibiades, who had been cruising in the Southern Ægean, suddenly appeared, and turned the battle in favor of the Athenians. Thus did fortune seem to prearrange things for the first appearance of her favorite upon the theatre of the war in a dramatic and impressive manner. All the credit of the victory was given to him, and he became once more the popular hero at Athens.

Fortune for a time smiled upon him. The following year, at the head of a fleet of eighty-six ships, he gained a splendid victory over the united fleets of the Peloponnesians and the Syracusans at Cyzicus (410 B.C.). The Athenians captured thirty-six ships, took many prisoners, and a vast booty. The Syracusans had been driven to burn their ships themselves, to prevent their capture by the enemy.

Other successes followed, and before the end of the year 408 B.C. Alcibiades had captured Byzantium, and restored to Athens control of all the shores of the Hellespont and the Propontis. Her pathway to the Euxine was once more open.

Alcibiades' Return to Athens (408 B.C.).—The moment for Alcibiades' return to Athens was now come; for before this he had not dared to trust himself among his fellow-citizens at home. But now, crowned with victories, and recognized as the savior of his country, he deemed it safe to gratify his longing to look once again upon his native city.

Surrounded by the ships of his victorious fleet, which were loaded with booty, decked with trophies, and retarded in movement by the captured vessels they had in tow, Alcibiades entered the Peiræus. Yet even at this moment he had doubts as to the reception that would be accorded him, and did not leave his ship until he saw a group of relatives and friends ready to greet him. But he need not have felt any distrust. He was received by the people with the most extravagant demonstrations of joy and admiration. He was crowned with flowers, and by public decree

¹ The so-called second sea-fight at Abydos (411 B.C.).

the curses that had been pronounced upon him were annulled, his property which had been confiscated was given back, and he was made sole commander of the fleet and army with unlimited authority.

Before setting out upon a new campaign, Alcibiades took part in a significant celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries (p. 44). For seven years, ever since the occupation of Decelea by the Peloponnesians, the annual procession from Athens to Eleusis had been made by sea, and hence had been robbed of many of its most attractive features. Alcibiades resolved to lead the procession by the usual festival road. Doubtless his chief object in this was to give a practical refutation to the charges that had been brought against him in regard to his profanation of the Mysteries (p. 343), and to reinstate himself in the favor of the priests of Eleusis. Accordingly the road was carefully guarded, as an attack upon the procession by the Peloponnesians from Decelea was feared, and the solemn procession was escorted in greater than usual magnificence along the sacred way. No unfortunate occurrence marred the celebration, and Alcibiades was, through the success of the festival, raised still higher in the popular estimation.

Alcibiades suffers Defeat and is deposed from his Command (407 B.C.) — But it was a very precarious pre-eminence that Alcibiades was for the moment enjoying. The past had indeed been formally forgiven; but, after all, that past could neither be obliterated nor forgotten. The slightest untoward circumstance might call it all up afresh, reawaken the old distrust, lend new countenance to the enemies of Alcibiades, and give a wholly different set to the current that was just now running so strongly in his favor.

Even had Alcibiades not misconducted himself, things were now assuming on the side of the enemy a shape which threatened to bring to an end his remarkable run of fortune. Just at this time the shifty satrap Tissaphernes, whose double-dealing was ruining the cause of the Great King, was superseded by Cyrus, a son of the reigning monarch Darius II.; and at the same time

the Spartan forces were placed under the command of a new admiral, named Lysander, a general of pre-eminent ability. The new Persian satrap and the new Spartan general worked together zealously for the vigorous prosecution of the war against Athens, Cyrus assuring Lysander that what money was needed for manning the Peloponnesian ships should be forthcoming even if he had to break up and coin into money the gold and silver throne on which he sat.¹

The new energy thus infused into the war on the side of the Persians and their Peloponnesian allies, boded ill in any event for the Athenian cause. But the prosperous course of Alcibiades was interrupted not so much by this enhancement of the effective force of the enemy against whom he contended, as by his own imprudence and folly. He directed the fleet with which he had been entrusted against the revolted islands of the *Ægean*. After an attack upon the island of *Andros*, which he failed to reduce to submission, he himself sailed for the *Ionian* coast for the ill-advised purpose of raising forced contributions from the subject allies of Athens there, leaving meantime the command of the main fleet, now stationed at *Samos*, in the hands of one of his incapable favorites, *Antiochus* by name. His instructions to him upon his departure had been not to risk a battle with the enemy under any circumstances; but *Antiochus* disobeyed his orders, drew the Spartan general *Lysander* into an engagement in front of *Ephesus* (battle of *Notium* 407 B.C.), and suffered a serious defeat.

This affair served for the final undoing of Alcibiades. His enemies violently accused him before the people at Athens of a traitorous abuse of the authority with which they had generously invested him, and of general misconduct. All the old feelings of mistrust were reawakened, and the people, now furious in their anger against the favorite of the hour before, deposed him from his command. Ten new generals, of whom *Conon* was chief, were elected to take his place.

¹ *Plut. Lysander*, 9.

Alcibiades now withdrew to the Thracian Chersonese, where he had a castle or fortress well stored with treasure, and engaged in private war against the neighboring hostile tribes of Thrace.¹

The Battle of Arginusæ (406 B.C.) : the Condemnation of the Athenian Generals. — The most important engagement of the following year was the great sea-fight between the Peloponnesian fleet of a hundred and twenty ships under Callicratidas, and the Athenian fleet of a hundred and fifty ill-equipped vessels, at the islets of Arginusæ, which lie between Lesbos and the Asian shore. The Athenians were victorious, but they lost twenty-five ships with the greater part of their crews. The Peloponnesians lost about seventy vessels, and their commander, Callicratidas, who in the mêlée was knocked from his galley and drowned.

The splendid victory was marred by a great misfortune and a great crime. After the battle forty-seven of the Athenian ships had been detailed to rescue the crews of the wrecked galleys, while the remainder pursued the fleeing enemy. A severe storm arising, the rescuing party was unable to reach the wrecks, and the crews perished. Although no one seems to have been to blame, at least criminally to blame, for the misfortune, still the assembly at Athens, at the instigation of a certain senator, Callixenus by name, by a hurried and illegal vote, notwithstanding the protest of the philosopher Socrates, who happened at the time to be one of the presiding officers (Prytanes) of the Ecclesia, condemned eight of the generals in command of the fleet to death, and carried the decree into effect as to the six who were present in the city. Among the generals executed was Pericles, the son of Pericles the great statesman.

This action of the Athenians was another of the crimes of the democracy, and one of which the people afterwards bitterly repented. They are said to have followed with their special resentment the accuser of the generals, Callixenus, who, hated and shunned by all, finally died a miserable outcast.

¹ Some years later he was killed in Asia Minor, one account says by political, but another by personal, enemies (404 B.C.).

Capture of the Athenian Fleet by Lysander at Ægospotami (405 B.C.). — The year following the condemnation of the Athenian generals the war was virtually ended by the surprise and capture of the Athenian fleet at Ægospotami, (Goat's River), on the Hellespont, by the Spartan general Lysander.

This overwhelming misfortune to Athens was the result of the most shameful incapacity and neglect of duty, if not of downright treachery, on the part of the Athenian generals. The situation of the hostile fleets just before the capture was this. The Athenian fleet, comprising a hundred and eighty ships, lay about two miles from Sestus, while the Peloponnesian squadron, somewhat smaller than the Athenian, lay opposite it at Lampsacus. The width of the channel between the fleets was not quite two miles. The Athenians got their food supplies at Sestus, almost all of the soldiers going thither together for their meals, leaving their ships meanwhile on the beach.

Now the castle of Alcibiades (p. 390) was in this very neighborhood, and he, perceiving the exposed situation of the Athenian fleet, warned the generals of the danger they were incurring; but his admonition was insolently rejected.

Lysander, watching his opportunity when the Athenians were away at Sestus for their evening meal, made one day a dash across the narrow strait, and captured, almost without a blow being struck, a hundred and seventy of the Athenian ships lying on the shore. Only eight or ten galleys, which were wholly or partly manned, escaped.

The crews ashore taking their evening meal must have amounted to not less than thirty-six thousand men. An unknown number of these were made prisoners. "Never," says Grote, "was victory more complete, or more thoroughly disgraceful to the defeated generals, taken collectively, than that of Ægospotami." It is not impossible, as has already been intimated, that there was treachery in the Athenian camp; but if there was, it never came to light.

All of the prisoners save the native Athenians were released; these were led out and, to the number of four thousand it is said,

put to death, the usual rites of burial being denied their bodies. The excuse offered for this massacre was that the Athenians had thrown some prisoners from a precipice, and also that they had determined to cut off the right hand of all the prisoners they might make. Probably there was no truth in these accusations, but they served as a pretext for the barbarous act.

It is worthy of note here that the Greeks had advanced beyond that state of barbarism in war where the life of the prisoner is taken merely for the sake of taking it, and had begun to recognize the right of the vanquished at least to life,—though not to liberty,—unless this right had been forfeited by some special act of treachery, cruelty, or disregard of the generally recognized laws of war.

The Fall of Athens (404 B.C.).—Among the few Athenian vessels that escaped capture at the hands of Lysander was the state-ship *Paralus*, which hastened to Athens with the tidings of the terrible misfortune. It arrived in the night-time, and from the *Peiræus* the awful news, published by a despairing wail, spread up the Long Walls into the upper city. “That night,” says Xenophon, “no one slept.”¹ All knew that the fate of Athens was sealed.

Notwithstanding the hopelessness of the situation, the Athenians, hushing their quarrels, began forthwith to put the city in preparation for a siege, thinking to be able at least to delay fate a little. The victorious Lysander, after having received the surrender of Byzantium and Chalcedon, moved southward, proclaiming freedom to the subjects of Athens on the way, and revolutionizing the governments in all the cities in the interest of Sparta and the oligarchical party. All the Athenian settlers or cleruchs in Lesbos and Eubœa and other islands were dispossessed of their homes and lands and ordered to go to Athens, Lysander’s idea being that the more people he drove within the walls of the city the more quickly he should be able to starve it into surrender. On the other hand, the exile Æginetans, Melians, and others, who had been

¹ Xenophon. *Hellen.* ii. 2, 3-4.

driven from their cities by the Athenians, were gathered and restored to their old homes.

While Lysander was still thus busied in the *Ægean*, he sent word to King Agis at Decelea and to Sparta of his progress towards Athens. Straightway all the Peloponnesians, says Xenophon, save the Argives, turned out in a body under the Spartan king Pausanias, and hurried across the Isthmus to Athens, eager to share in the glory of the capture of the Tyrant-city. At the same time King Agis marched down with the troops that formed the garrison at Decelea, and the united forces encamped before the gates of Athens in the gardens of the Academy. Lysander came up to the Peiræus with a hundred and fifty ships and shut the city in by way of the sea.

The Athenians, hemmed in now on every side, were, after several months' resistance, forced by famine to seek terms of surrender. The Spartans called a council of their allies to decide respecting their fate. The Thebans, Corinthians, and others insisted upon the total destruction of Athens, and the sale of the inhabitants into slavery. The Spartans, however, withstood these extreme measures, declaring with apparent magnanimity that they would never consent thus "to put out one of the eyes of Greece," strengthening the argument of the metaphor by urging in behalf of Athens the great service she had rendered Hellas in the struggle with the barbarians. The real motive, doubtless, of the Spartans in sparing the city was their fear lest, with Athens blotted out, Thebes or Corinth should become too powerful, and the hegemony of Sparta be thereby endangered.

The final resolve of the conference was that the lives of the Athenians should be spared, but that they should be required to demolish their Long Walls and those of the Peiræus, to give up all their ships save twelve, to allow their exiles to return, and to bind themselves to do Sparta's bidding both by sea and by land.

The Athenians were forced to surrender on these hard and humiliating conditions. Straightway the victors dismantled the harbor at Peiræus, burning the unfinished ships on the docks, and

then began the demolition of the Long Walls and the fortifications, the work going on to the accompaniment of festive music and dancing; for the Peloponnesians, says Xenophon, looked upon that day as the beginning of liberty for the Hellenes.¹

The long war was now over. The dominion of the imperial city of Athens was at an end — and the great days of Greece were past.

The Results of the War. — “Never,” says Thucydides, commenting upon the lamentable results of the Peloponnesian War, “never were so many cities captured and depopulated. . . . Never were exile and slaughter more frequent, whether in the war or brought about by civil strife.”² Greece never recovered from the blow which had destroyed so large a part of her population.

Athens was merely the wreck of her former self. The harbor of Peiræus, once crowded with the ships of the imperial city, was now empty. The population of the capital had been terribly thinned. Things were just the reverse now of what they were at the time of the Persian invasion, when, with Athens in ruins, Themistocles at Salamis, taunted with being a man without a city, could truthfully declare that Athens was there on the sea (p. 199). Now the real Athens was gone: only the empty shell remained. And with her was gone every good hope of the Greek cities ever being gathered into a nation, and an end thereby placed to their never-ceasing contentions and wars.

Not Athens alone, but all Hellas, bore the marks of the cruel war. Sites once covered with pleasant villages or flourishing towns were now pasture land. But more lamentable than all else was the effect of the war upon the intellectual and moral life of the Greek race. The Grecian world had sunk many degrees in morality; while the vigor and productiveness of the intellectual and artistic life of Hellas, the centre and home of which had been Athens, were impaired beyond recovery. The achievements of the Greek intellect, especially in the fields of

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* ii. 2, 23.

² i. 23.

philosophic thought, in the century following the war, were, it is true, wonderful ; but these triumphs merely show, we may believe, what the Hellenic mind would have done for art and general culture, had it been permitted, unchecked, and under the favoring and inspiring conditions of liberty and self-government, to disclose all that was latent in it.

REFERENCES. — Plutarch, *Life of Alcibiades*. Jowett's Thucydides, viii. Breaks off abruptly in the twenty-first year of the war (411 B.C.). Xenophon, *Hellenica*, bk. i.; also bk. ii. chs. 1 and 2. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. iii. pp. 414-586. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. vi. pp. 185-451; (twelve volume ed.), vol. vii. pp. 353-402; *ib.* vol. viii. pp. 1-231.

PART FIFTH.

FROM THE END OF THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR TO THE CONQUEST OF GREECE
BY THE ROMANS.

(404-146 B.C.)



CHAPTER XXII.

THE SPARTAN HEGEMONY.

(404-371 B.C.)

The Character of the Period. — Throughout the Peloponnesian War Sparta had maintained that her only purpose in warring against Athens was to regain for the Grecian cities the liberty of which Athens had deprived them. But no sooner was the power of Athens broken than Sparta herself began to play the tyrant, and set up in Greece a despotism far more unendurable than any that Athens had ever maintained.

The cities freed from the rule of Athens, instead of being left free to manage their own affairs, were at once made the subjects of Sparta. Their democratic governments were overthrown and authority was placed in the hands of oligarchical councils or bands, generally composed of ten persons, and hence known as *decarchies*, whose tyranny was supported by Lacedæmonian

garrisons. Further, Spartan governors, called *harmosts*, officers who exercised the arbitrary authority of Persian satraps, were sent to the different cities. The experience of Athens under the rule of the board of oligarchs into whose hands Lysander delivered the city may be taken as typical of the experiences of the other cities whose affairs the Spartans regulated in like manner.

The Thirty Tyrants at Athens (404-403 B.C.). — One of the conditions exacted by Lysander of the Athenians upon their surrender was that they should allow the return of the oligarchical exiles. This measure was intended by Lysander to pave the way for the abolition of the democratic government, and it worked just as he had planned. Upon the return of the oligarchs, the democracy was overthrown, and in its place was set up an oligarchical government, administered by a board of thirty persons, at the head of which was Critias. These men instituted such an infamous tyranny that they were known as the Thirty Tyrants. Their rule was a perfect reign of terror, and was supported by a Lacedæmonian garrison established on the Acropolis. Not only were the political enemies of the tyrants murdered, but wealthy citizens and foreign residents were put to death merely that their riches might be seized upon. Hundreds were driven from the city, and found an asylum in the surrounding states, even the Thebans being moved to sympathy and opening their gates to the exiles.

The tyranny was too atrocious to endure long. Among the exiles was Thrasybulus, who had found an asylum in Bœotia. Collecting a small band of followers, he seized Peiræus, a thing easy to do, since the place was now without walls. Here he was attacked by the Tyrants. Thrasybulus made a stand on the hill of Munychia. The assaulting columns of the Thirty were driven back with heavy loss, Critias himself being among the slain.


A little while after this the victorious exiles took possession of Athens, and brought to an end the infamous rule of the oligarchs. They had held possession of the government for only a few months, but in that short time are said to have caused the death

of more Athenians than the combined enemies of Athens had destroyed during the last ten years of the Peloponnesian War. The old democratic constitution, somewhat modified however, was soon re-established, and the exiles were recalled (403 B.C.). The memory of the Thirty Tyrants was assigned to eternal execration.


The Expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks (401-400 B.C.). — Shortly after these transactions at Athens there took place an affair of momentous consequences in Asia. This was the famous expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks through the heart of the dominions of the Great King. The circumstances of this remarkable exploit were these.

It will be recalled that towards the close of the Peloponnesian War, Cyrus, the brother of the Persian king Artaxerxes II., was made satrap in Asia Minor in place of Tissaphernes (p. 388). It will also be remembered that he had given zealous aid to the Peloponnesians against Athens. Now this Cyrus, feeling that he had been unjustly excluded from the throne by his brother,¹ was secretly planning to seize it for himself. The time for such an undertaking was opportune. The Greek cities were swarming with men nursed in war, whom the end of the struggle between Sparta and Athens had thrown out of employment, and who were eager to enter as mercenaries the service of any one who was able to offer them good pay. The superior qualities of the Greek soldiers Cyrus well understood, and he was anxious to enlist a body of them in his enterprise. Consequently he sent deputies to Sparta to remind the Spartans of the obligation they were under to him for the aid he had rendered them in the recent war, and to ask their co-operation in his proposed undertaking. The appeal of Cyrus was favorably considered by the Spartans, and they gave orders to their generals to aid him in setting on foot his expedition.

¹ Cyrus, though younger than his brother, claimed the throne on the ground that he had been born while his father Darius was actually king, whereas Artaxerxes had been born before the accession of Darius, and consequently while he was still a private person.



THOUSAND GREEKS.



The army which Cyrus gathered from various quarters comprised over a hundred thousand barbarians and about thirteen thousand Greek mercenaries under the lead of the Spartan exile Clearchus. With this force—with the exception of some of the Greek troops who joined the expedition a little later—Cyrus set out from Sardis in the spring of the year 401 B.C., and directed his course eastward across Asia Minor. He had concealed from his soldiers, and also from all his generals save Clearchus, the real object of the expedition. When after many days' journeying the Greeks divined, from the direction of their march, that they were being led against the Great King, they rebelled and refused to advance farther, but were finally pacified and persuaded to go on by their general Clearchus.

The march of the expedition through the southeastern passes of Asia Minor and over the Mesopotamian plains was, strangely enough, unimpeded by the Persians, and Cyrus had penetrated to the very heart of the Persian empire, before, at Cunaxa in Babylonia, his farther advance was disputed by Artaxerxes with an army numbering, it is said, eight hundred thousand men. In the battle which here followed, the barbarian troops of Cyrus were scattered at the first onset of the enemy; but the splendid conduct of the Greeks won the day for their leader. Cyrus, however, exposing himself in a rash attempt to cut his way through the Persian ranks to the spot where his brother had stationed himself, was slain; and a short time after the battle Clearchus and the other Grecian generals, having been persuaded by the satrap Tissaphernes, who pretended to be kindly disposed towards the Greeks, to attend a council, were treacherously seized and sent as prisoners to Artaxerxes, by whom they were put to death.

The Greeks, in a hurried night meeting, now chose new generals to lead them back to their homes. The chief of these was Xenophon, the popular historian of the expedition. Under his direction, the Greeks made one of the most memorable retreats in all history. They traversed the hot plains of the Tigris, and then, in the midst of the winter season, crossed the snowy passes of the

mountains of Armenia, being harassed almost constantly by the hostile natives of the regions through which they were marching. Finally, after almost incredible hardships, the head of the retreating column reached the top of a mountain ridge whence the waters of the Euxine appeared to view. A great shout, "The Sea! the Sea!" arose and spread back through the column, creating a tumult of joy among the soldiers, weary with their seemingly endless marching and fighting.

The Greeks had struck the sea at the spot where stood the Greek colony of Trapezus (now Trebizond), whence they finally made their way, partly by land and partly by water, to the Hellespontine region, where we meet them later fighting the battles of Hellas against the Persians.

The march of the Ten Thousand is regarded as one of the most remarkable military exploits of antiquity. Its historical significance is derived from the fact that it paved the way for the later expedition of Alexander the Great. This it did by revealing to the Greeks the decayed state of the Persian empire, and showing how feeble was the resistance which it could offer to the march of an army of disciplined soldiers. Thus the memorable retreat forms the prelude to the still more memorable campaign of the Macedonian.

The Condemnation and Death of Socrates (399 B.C.). — While Xenophon was yet away on his expedition, there happened in his native city one of the saddest tragedies in history. This was the trial and condemnation to death by the Athenians of their fellow-citizen Socrates, the greatest moral teacher of pagan antiquity.

The double charge upon which he was condemned was worded as follows: "Socrates is guilty of crime, — first, for not worshipping the gods whom the city worships, but in introducing new divinities of his own; next, for corrupting the youth. The penalty is death."

We are surprised that such a man as Socrates should have been the object of such a prosecution in tolerant, free-thinking, and

freedom-loving Athens. But his prosecutors were moved by other motives beside zeal for the national worship. Socrates during his long life, — he was now an old man of seventy years, — spent as an uncompromising teacher of truth and righteousness, had made many personal enemies. He had exposed by his searching questions the ignorance of many a vain pretender to wisdom, and stirred up thereby many lasting resentments. He had disturbed many pious people by the unconventional way in which he talked about the popular gods. The fact that Alcibiades and Critias had both been disciples of his was used to show the dangerous tendency of his teachings. Socrates again had offended many through his opposition to the Athenian democracy ; for he did not always approve the way the Athenians had of doing things, and told them so plainly. He favored, for instance, the limitation of the franchise, and ridiculed the Athenian method of selecting magistrates by the use of the lot, as though the lot could pick out the men best fitted to govern. But the people, especially since the events of the year 404 B.C., were very sensitive to all criticism of this kind which tended to discredit their cherished democratic institutions.

The trial was before a dicastery or citizen court (p. 262), composed of over five hundred jurors. Socrates made no serious attempt to secure a favorable verdict from the court, steadily refusing to make any unbecoming appeal to his judges for clemency. Instead of doing this, he embraced the opportunity to tell the jurors some wholesome truths ; and after he had been pronounced guilty, when called upon, according to custom, to name the penalty which he would have the court inflict,¹ he told the court that he thought he deserved to be supported for the rest of his life at the public expense at the Prytaneum. He finally, however, yield-

¹ The way of fixing the penalty in an Athenian court was this: the accuser named a penalty (in this case the prosecutor had named death) and then the condemned was at liberty to name another. The jury then chose between the two. They must impose one or the other penalty ; they were not at liberty to choose a third.

ing to the entreaties of his friends, proposed a penalty of thirty minæ.¹ The dicasts, irritated by the words and manner of Socrates, pronounced against him by a majority vote the extreme sentence of death.

It so happened that the sentence was pronounced just after the sacred ship that yearly bore the offerings to Delos in commemoration of the deliverance of the Athenian youth from the Cretan Minotaur (p. 18) had set sail on its holy commission, and since by a law of the city no one could be put to death while it was away, Socrates was led to prison, and there remained for about thirty days before the execution of the sentence. This period Socrates spent in serene converse with his friends upon those lofty themes that had occupied his thoughts during all his life. The last conversation of the master with his disciples, upon the immortality of the soul, has been preserved to us in the *Phædo* of Plato. When at last the hour for his departure had arrived, Socrates bade his friends farewell, and then calmly drank the cup of poison hemlock.

The Spartan King Agesilaus and the War in Asia Minor against the Persians (399-394 B.C.).—We must now turn from Athenian matters to view the affairs of the Greeks in Asia Minor.

Momentous consequences naturally issued from the unsuccessful attempt of Cyrus to dethrone his brother. Tissaphernes, who had won the special gratitude of King Artaxerxes for the great service he had rendered him in the campaign against Cyrus, was now given, in addition to his own satrapy, all those provinces over which Cyrus had ruled. He straightway made preparations to chastise the Greek cities of the coast which, through friendship or active co-operation, had aided Cyrus in his attempt to seize the Persian throne. These cities appealed to Sparta to defend them against Persian vengeance.

The Spartans sent the assistance solicited. After the war had been maintained for some time, with no very decisive results for

¹ A mina was equivalent to about \$18 or \$20.

either party,¹ new vigor was infused into it on the Spartan side by the appearance upon the scene of the Spartan king Agesilaus. This man was consumed by an ambition to emulate the exploits of Agamemnon. He believed, relying on what the Ten Thousand Greeks had achieved, that he should be able to march to Susa and overthrow completely the Persian power. Agesilaus was an able commander, and inflicted a decisive defeat upon Tissaphernes, who was superseded in his government by another,² and beheaded. The success of Agesilaus threatened to make an end of the Persian authority in Asia Minor. Just at this moment the ephors were constrained to recall him to the defense of Spartan interests in Greece proper.

The Corinthian War (395–387 B.C.).—Unable to cope with the Spartans in the open field in Asia, the Great King, in order to secure their withdrawal, had resorted to the device of stirring up trouble for them at home. This it was easy to do, for the tyrannical course of Sparta had won for her universal fear and hatred. The emissaries of Artaxerxes, by means of persuasions and bribes, succeeded in forming a coalition of the chief states of European Greece against her. There now began a long and tedious struggle known as the Corinthian War (395–387 B.C.), in which the Spartans, with the few allies that remained true to them, contended against the united forces of Corinth, Athens, Thebes, Argos, and other Greek states, together with the troops and ships of Persia.³

One of the most important battles of the war was the naval

¹ The Spartans were at first commanded by Thimbron. Displaying incapacity as a general, he was soon superseded by Dercyllidas, who was in turn superseded by Agesilaus.

² Thithraustes.

³ The chief engagements of the war were the following: the battle of Haliartus, in Bœotia, (395 B.C.), in which the Spartan Lysander was killed; the battle of Corinth (394 B.C.), which resulted in a victory for the Spartans; the sea-fight of Cnidus, off the Carian coast (394 B.C.), in which the Athenian admiral Conon gained a decisive victory over the Spartan fleet; the battle of Coronea, in Bœotia (394 B.C.), where Agesilaus in a stubborn fight defeated the Thebans and their allies.

engagement off Cnidus (394 B.C.), in Caria, where the Athenian fleet under Conon, allied with the Persian, almost annihilated the Spartan fleet under Peisander. This victory practically destroyed the maritime empire which Sparta had built up since the battle of Ægospotami. It led to a partial restoration of the power of Athens, for Conon now succeeded in persuading the satrap Pharnabazus to aid the Athenians with men and money in the rebuilding of the fortifications of the Peiræus and the Long Walls. The restoration of their walls seemed to the exultant and hopeful Athenians the pledge of the restoration of their fallen empire.

But this restoration of the defenses of Athens naturally stirred the jealousy of her new allies, so that their zeal in the prosecution of the war against Sparta slackened, while at the same time it awakened the fears of the Spartans, who, after maintaining the struggle for some years longer, resolved to save their authority in Greece proper by making peace with the Persians.

The Peace of Antalcidas (387 B.C.). — In pursuance of this resolution they sent to Susa an ambassador named Antalcidas, through whose efforts were arranged the articles of a treaty, which is called after him the Peace of Antalcidas. By the terms of this treaty, famous because so infamous, all the Greek cities of Asia Minor, as well as the island of Cyprus and the island-city of Clazomenæ, were handed over to the Persians. Three islands — Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros — were given to Athens. All the other islands, and the states of the Grecian mainland, were left each in a condition of isolated independence. No city was to rule over others or to exact tribute from them. The edict of King Artaxerxes closed as follows: "Whosoever refuses to accept this peace, him I shall fight, assisted by those who are of the same mind [which meant the Spartans], by land as well as by sea, with ships and with money."

Thus were the Asian Greeks betrayed by Sparta into the hands of the barbarians. Thus were the hated Persians, through her shameful betrayal of Hellenic interests, made the arbiters in Greek affairs. In strong contrast to the selfish conduct of Sparta

at this moment stands that of Athens when, with absolute destruction impending over her, she indignantly rejected the proposal of Mardonius to betray for her own advantage the liberties of the other Grecian cities (p. 210).

Sparta forces the Terms of the Peace upon the Other Grecian Cities, but disregards them herself. — Sparta regarded herself as the executor of the Peace. One of its articles said that every city should be autonomous, — that no city should rule over another; and Sparta now set about enforcing this provision of the treaty, not with a view to giving liberty to cities that were being held in unwilling subjection by more powerful neighbors, but solely for the purpose of breaking up all unions and federations that might place a check upon her ambition and tyranny.

Under the operation of the treaty, the Bœotian league fell to pieces. The Spartans saw to it that the dissolution was complete, and that there should be no chance for Thebes to revive her presidency of the Bœotian towns. Spartan garrisons and har-masts were established in Orchomenus and Thespiæ, and the government in these and other places put in the hands of oligarchs friendly to Sparta. Plataea was restored, and a Spartan garrison placed in the town. Thus all Bœotia was broken up into petty states wholly dependent upon Sparta.

From the dissolution of the Bœotian league the Spartans proceeded to the dissolution of the Arcadian city of Mantinea. The articles of the Peace did not of course have any relation to individual cities, but the Spartans, nevertheless, stretched its terms so as to make them apply to the case in hand. The Mantineans had been guilty of no hostile act towards Sparta, but were, the Spartans imagined, not friendly in their feelings towards them. Accordingly they ordered them to tear down their walls. The Mantineans refusing to comply with this mandate, the Spartans laid siege to the town, and soon forced it to surrender. The city was now broken up into five unwall'd villages, four fifths of the inhabitants being forced to tear down their houses in the old town and put them up again out in the country.

The Olynthian confederacy was next dissolved. This was a most important union of Macedonian and Grecian towns in the Chalcidian region. It was a free and equal federation of cities, somewhat like the old Confederacy of Delos. The towns had adopted common laws, sanctioned intermarriage between their citizens, and adopted liberal regulations respecting residence and commerce. The confederates were rapidly extending their union among the cities, barbarian and Hellenic, of the northern shore, and were about to send envoys to Thebes and Athens to invite their alliance. It was one of the most promising attempts that had yet been made to create an Hellenic nation out of the isolated cities of Hellas.

But the towns of Acanthus and Apollonia, not wishing to give up their own laws or any part of their autonomy, refused to join the union; and when the Olynthians threatened to force them to do so, they dispatched envoys to inform the Spartans of what was going on in Chalcidice, and to entreat them to break up the league before it became too powerful to be opposed. The Spartans resolved at once to put an end to the confederacy. A force was dispatched to the Thracian shore, and the prosperous and promising league was broken up (379 B.C.).

The Spartans had committed many sins against Hellenic liberties, but none that drew after it a more lamentable train of consequences than this. The Olynthian league, had it been allowed to consolidate itself, might have proved a bulwark to Greece against the encroachments of the kings of Macedonia.

The military movements of the Spartans against the Olynthian confederacy connect themselves with a shameful act of perfidy committed by them against the Thebans. As the Spartan general Phœbidas was marching through Bœotia on his way to Chalcidice, he, at the instigation of some Theban oligarchs, and consumed by a desire to do some great thing, made a secret descent upon Thebes, while the inhabitants were engaged in the celebration of a festival, and seized and garrisoned the citadel (382 B.C.). All Greece stood aghast at the perfidious, high-

handed proceeding, and looked to see the Spartans at home repudiate the act of their general. They did so in this way: they fined Phœbidas for his conduct, and deposed him from his command, but retained possession of the stolen citadel.

The Liberation of Thebes by Pelopidas (379 B.C.) and the Revival of the Bœotian League (374 B.C.).—Even Xenophon, the admirer and steady friend of the Lacedæmonians, was constrained to see in the misfortunes that now began to befall Sparta the divine retribution upon her for her violation of her solemn pledge to leave the Grecian cities free, and above all for her crime in seizing the citadel of the Thebans.¹

As if to meet the requirements of ideal justice, the avengers of the wrongs of Thebes were raised up from among those very persons whom that traitorous act had made exiles from their native city. Among those exiles who had found an asylum at Athens was Pelopidas, a Theban of distinguished family, and a man of generous enthusiasms and firm resolution. Taking with him six other exiles, Pelopidas entered Thebes by stealth, and by means of a stratagem slew the leaders of the oligarchical party. The people were then called to arms, the Lacedæmonian garrison was compelled to withdraw from the citadel, and the government was taken into the hands of the popular party.

The efforts of the Spartans to regain possession of the city were unsuccessful; and even their garrisons in the other Bœotian towns were finally expelled by the Thebans, who were now being led by Epaminondas, a devoted friend of Pelopidas and the greatest statesman and commander that Thebes ever produced. Under his inspiration the old Bœotian league was revived, with Thebes as the presiding city. This restoration of the ancient confederacy was attended by another reversal of fortune for the unfortunate Plataeans. They were expelled from their recently restored town, and once more it was levelled to the ground.

Athens forms a New Confederacy.—The liberation of Thebes and the succeeding revolution in Bœotia marked the beginning

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* v. 4, I.

of a new chapter in Grecian history. Encouraged by the event, Athens formed a new confederacy like the old Delian League. The union numbered at last over seventy members. Even Thebes joined it. The confederacy was to rest on principles of absolute equality and justice. Its affairs were to be directed by an assembly composed of representatives of all the allied cities. The members were to make contributions to a common fund; but there was to be no more tribute-collecting by Athens. Furthermore, the Athenians solemnly bound themselves not to establish any cleruchies in the territories of their allies.

The allies carried on hostilities against Sparta by sea and by land, the Thebans succeeding in driving out the Spartans, as has just been related, from all the Bœotian towns, and the Athenians being successful in constantly adding to the membership of the new league.


The Congress at Sparta (371 B.C.).—But it was not to be expected that Athens and Thebes would long work together as yoke-fellows. Athens became jealous of the growing power of Thebes, and resolved to make peace with the Lacedæmonians. A congress of the Grecian cities was convened at Sparta.

It was agreed that the provisions of the Peace of Antalcidas, which provided for the autonomy of every Grecian city, should be carried out in good faith by all parties. Sparta was to withdraw her harmosts and garrisons from all towns where she had established them. The treaty drawn on these lines was sworn to by Athens and her allies separately. The Spartans took the oath for themselves and for their allies. The Thebans at first took the oath for themselves; but afterwards wished to take it for all the Bœotians, Epaminondas contending that Thebes had as good a right to speak for all Bœotia as Sparta had for Laconia or Athens for all the townships of Attica. But Agesilaus would not allow the record to be changed, and when the Thebans insisted upon this being done, he angrily erased their name from the treaty. Thus peace was concluded without the Thebans having any part in it.

The Battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.). — The Spartans now ordered their king Cleombrotus to march into Bœotia and compel Thebes to restore independence to the various Bœotian towns. The Thebans marched out and met the invaders at Leuctra, not far from Thespiæ. The Spartans had no other thought than that they should gain an easy victory over the Thebans; and it was generally expected that Thebes would now be broken up into villages as Mantinea had been, or perhaps destroyed utterly.

But the military genius of Epaminondas had prepared for Hellas a startling surprise. He had introduced in the arrangement and movement of his battle-line one of the greatest innovations that mark the advance in the art of war. Hitherto the Greeks had fought drawn up in extended and comparatively thin opposing lines, not more than twelve ranks deep. The Spartans at Leuctra formed their line in the usual way. Epaminondas, on the other hand, massed his best troops in a solid column fifty deep, on the left of his battle-line, the rest being drawn up in the ordinary extended line. With all ready for the attack, the phalanx was set in motion first, the centre of the line next, and the right wing last, so that the solid column should strike the enemy's line before the centre or right should come into action. The result was that the phalanx ploughed through the thin line of the enemy "as the beak of a ship ploughs through a wave," — and the day was won.

The column had been launched at that part of the enemy's line which was held by the Spartans themselves under the command of King Cleombrotus. Of the seven hundred that formed the Spartan contingent, four hundred were killed, including the king himself.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA,
371 B.C.

This was the first time the Spartans had lost a king on the field of battle since the death of Leonidas at the Pass of Thermopylæ.

The manner in which the news of the overwhelming calamity was received at Sparta affords a striking illustration of Spartan discipline and self-control. It so happened that at the moment the messenger arrived bearing the intelligence, the Spartans were celebrating a festival known as the Gymnopædia. The ephors would permit no interruption of the entertainment. They merely sent lists of the fallen to their families, and ordered that the women should make no lamentation nor show any signs of grief. "The following day," says Xenophon, "those who had lost relatives in the battle appeared on the streets with cheerful faces, while those whose relatives had escaped, if they appeared in public at all, went about with sad and dejected looks."¹ Historians have very naturally been led to contrast this scene at Sparta with that at Athens upon the night of the receipt of the news of the disaster of Ægospotami (p. 392). The contrast impresses us with the wide interval which separated the Athenian from the Spartan.

The moral effect of the battle was greater perhaps than that of any other battle ever fought in Greece, except possibly that of Marathon. It was the first time that a Spartan army with its king had been fairly beaten in a great battle by an enemy inferior in numbers. The Spartan forces at Thermopylæ headed by their king had, it is true, been annihilated, — but annihilation is not defeat. Consequently the impression which the event produced throughout Greece was profound. The prestige of Sparta was destroyed. Her empire was brought to an end. Thebes was now supreme.

REFERENCES. — Plutarch, *Lives of Lysander, Agesilaus, and Artaxerxes*. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. iv. pp. 9-346. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. vi. pp. 451-533; *ib.* vol. vii. pp. 81-172 (on Socrates); *ib.* vol. vii. pp. 173-348 (on the Expedition of Cyrus); *ib.* vol. vii. pp. 450-550; *ib.* vol. viii. pp. 1-178; (twelve volume ed.), vol. viii. pp. 231-316 and 399-496; *ib.* vol. ix. pp. 1-180 and 284-388; *ib.* vol. x. pp. 1-188. Sankey, *The Spartan and Theban Supremacies* (Epoch Series).

¹ Xenoph. *Hellen.* vi. 4, 16.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE ASCENDENCY OF THEBES.

(371-362 B.C.)

The Humiliation of Sparta.—The defeat on the field of Leuctra was but the first of a series of humiliations which now came to Sparta thick and fast. Many of her allies or dependents turned from her and sought alliance with either Thebes or Athens. Through the influence of the Thebans, the Amphictyons imposed upon her an immense fine of five hundred talents for her impious conduct in seizing and retaining, in flagrant violation of Hellenic law, the citadel of Thebes. The Spartans did not pay the fine, but its imposition expressed the general condemnation of their conduct.

A more signal humiliation came to them in connection with their relations to Mantinea. It will be recalled that one of Sparta's most tyrannical acts was the breaking-up of that city into villages (p. 405). Immediately upon the receipt of the news from Leuctra the Mantineans assembled and began to rebuild their old city. King Agesilaus, whose personal relations to the Mantineans had always been friendly, went to Mantinea in behalf of Sparta, and entreated the Mantineans to delay work upon their walls until the Spartans had given their assent for their restoration. This assent, he assured them, would be given without delay; and, besides, the Spartans would contribute towards the expense of the rebuilding of the defenses. But even this humble suit of the Spartans was rejected by the Mantineans, and the walls of the city were restored without the Spartans being allowed even the poor satisfaction of giving their formal consent to the operation.

Epaminondas ravages Laconia (370 B.C.) — The Spartans were destined to a still more bitter humiliation. They were to see their hitherto inviolable territory invaded and ravaged by their enemies.

The victory of the Thebans at Leuctra had lifted Thebes at once to a commanding position in Greece. Almost all the states of Central Greece now entered into an alliance with her. So many were her allies, and so eager were all to inflict punishment upon Sparta for all her past acts of usurpation and despotism, that Epaminondas was able to raise an immense army, numbering, it is said, sixty or seventy thousand, for the invasion of the Peloponnesus.

The chief object of the expedition, as we shall learn presently, was to aid the Arcadians in forming a confederacy for defense against Sparta; but yielding to the wishes of his allies, Epaminondas marched through Arcadia and into Laconia, which he ravaged from the northern mountains to the sea on the south, following the course of the Eurotas. He even threatened Sparta itself with assault, but the readiness of the Spartans for an attack, and the knowledge that they would make a desperate defense of their city, caused him prudently to refrain from attacking them thus at bay. The Spartan women had never before seen the camp-fire of an enemy; and the sight of the hostile army is said to have excited them to frantic demonstrations of distress.

The Founding of Megalopolis (370 B.C.). — With Laconia ravaged and the Spartans subjected to the humiliation of seeing their bitterest enemies encamped in front of their city, Epaminondas returned to Arcadia. The Arcadians, as we have intimated, were at this moment stirred by an impulse towards union. Up to this time they had lived, for



Fig. 33. COIN OF THE ARCADIAN CONFEDERACY.

the most part, in isolated and independent villages. In all their country there were only a few walled towns, of which

Tegea and Mantinea were chief. Largely because of this state of things, Sparta had been able to hold the different towns and villages in subjection, and compel them to do her bidding. But now the sentiment of co-operation and union had seized upon the Arcadian villages, and they were resolved, without giving up wholly their local independence, to surrender so much of it as might be necessary for the formation of a union which, so far as concerned all foreign affairs and other matters of common concern, should make them one powerful federal state.

Taking advantage of their newly awakened enthusiasm for a national union, Epaminondas was enabled to do for Arcadia something like what King Theseus is said to have done for Attica (p. 102). He united forty of the Arcadian villages or townships into a single city, which he named Megalopolis (Great City). Neither Tegea nor Mantinea could be made the nucleus of the new town on account of local jealousies. The walls of the city were about five miles in circuit. It is not probable that all the people from the forty townships moved to the new capital; but the greater part seem to have done so. Thus almost in a day was a great city created, and the Arcadians, entrenched behind the walls of their capital, were rendered secure against the encroachments of Sparta.

The Founding of Messene and the Liberation of the Messenians (370 B.C.). — From Arcadia Epaminondas marched into Messenia with the view to liberating the Messenians. On the slopes of Mount Ithome, the stronghold of the Messenians in their early heroic struggles with Sparta (p. 70), he founded a new city which he called Messene, whose citadel, perched upon the very top of the mountain, was united by walls to the town itself. The emancipation of the Messenians from their Spartan masters was proclaimed, and Messenia, which for three hundred years had been a part of Laconia, was separated from Sparta and made an independent state. In thus restoring independence to the Messenians, Epaminondas was merely enforcing against Sparta the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas (p. 404), the articles of which

she had herself dictated, and which said that all the Grecian cities should be left free and independent.

The Helots and Periœci, converted by the proclamation of emancipation into freemen, engaged in the work of building the new city of Messene, which was to represent their restored nationality. The walls went up amidst music and rejoicing. Messenian exiles, the victims of Spartan tyranny, flocked from all parts of the Hellenic world, to rebuild their homes in the home land.

This emancipation and restoration of the Messenians forms one of the most interesting transactions in Grecian history. Two years after their liberation (in 368 B.C.), a Messenian boy was crowned as a victor in the foot-race at Olympia. For three hundred years the Messenians had had neither lot nor part in these national games, for only free Hellenes could become contestants. How the news of the victory was received in Messenia is not recorded, but we probably should not be wrong were we to imagine the rejoicings there to have been unlike anything the Grecian world had ever seen before.

The liberation of Messenia was a terrible blow to Spartan pride, and an unmeasured loss and damage to her power. It was intolerable to her in the Peloponnesian War to have a hostile garrison entrenched at a single point on the Messenian coast (p. 308). Now all Messenia had become an asylum for runaway Helots from Laconia, and the residence and stronghold of her former subjects, embittered by centuries of hard bondage.

Thus had Epaminondas in a few short months effected one of the greatest revolutions in Grecian history. In his own words, he "had liberated all the Greek cities, restored independence to Messenia, and surrounded Sparta with a perpetual blockade."

In the spring of the year following his entrance into the Peloponnesus, Epaminondas recrossed the Isthmus and returned to Thebes.

The Humbled Spartans sue for Help at Athens.—In their extremity the humbled Spartans brought themselves to sue for help at Athens. "When after the loss of your fleet at Ægospotami you

were on the verge of ruin," they said in substance to the Athenians, "and the Thebans wished to destroy you, then we saved you [p. 393]. Requite to us now the service we rendered you then." The appeal, conjoined with the Athenians' jealousy of the daily growing power and influence of Thebes, availed to move the Athenians to go to the rescue of their imperilled enemy, even as in Cimon's time they had sent them help against their revolted Helots (p. 242).

The strength which the Athenian alliance brought to Sparta, together with the aid extended to her by a few of her old allies who still stood loyally by her in her misfortune, enabled her to maintain the struggle with Thebes and her allies on something like equal terms.¹

The Thebans extend their Influence in the North. — About the time that Epaminondas was effecting such changes in the Peloponnesus, his friend Pelopidas was extending the influence of Thebes in the North. At this time, Alexander, tyrant of Pheræ in Thessaly, was holding the other Thessalian cities in unwilling subjection.² Some of them rose against him and called upon Thebes to help deliver them from his tyranny. Pelopidas led a Theban force into the country, and compelled Alexander to grant freedom to the revolted towns (368 B.C.). He then marched against the regent of Macedonia, who had been interfering in Thessalian affairs, and forced him to enter into an alliance with Thebes and to give hostages. Among these hostages was a young Macedonian prince named Philip, of whom we shall hear much, later on, as king of Macedon. Thus the expedition of Pelopidas resulted in both Thessaly and Macedonia being brought into dependent relations to Thebes.

The year following these achievements Pelopidas was sent as

¹ During the years 369 and 367 B.C. Epaminondas made his second and third expeditions beyond the Isthmus, but accomplished nothing of importance.

² This tyranny had been established by Jason of Pheræ, who had reduced all Thessaly to a state of dependence. Jason was a man of unusual ability, and seemed about to anticipate the Macedonian sovereigns in the conquest of both Greece and Asia, when he was struck down by assassins (370 B.C.).

an envoy to Susa to secure the recognition by the Great King of Thebes instead of Sparta as the head of the Greek cities and the practical executor of the articles of the Peace of Antalcidas. Thebes secured all she desired. This appeal to the Persian king, whereby he was recognized as the rightful arbiter in Greek affairs, was the most censurable act of the Thebans during their period of supremacy. But in going to Susa, the Thebans were merely walking in a path worn by the Spartans and other Greeks.

It was shortly after this embassy, apparently, that Pelopidas, while on some public mission to the cities of Thessaly, was arrested and imprisoned by Alexander of Pheræ. The Thebans sent a large army to effect, if possible, the rescue of their general; but the expedition failed of its purpose. A second expedition, however, led by Epaminondas, was more successful, and the hero was brought back to Thebes in triumph. Shortly afterwards, while leading an avenging army against Alexander, Pelopidas was killed (364 B.C.).

In the death of Pelopidas the Thebans were deprived of their best citizen and their ablest general after Epaminondas, and the Thessalians lost a champion whom they greatly loved and honored as the founder of their liberties.

The Battle of Mantinea and the Death of Epaminondas (362 B.C.).—In the year 362 B.C., Epaminondas made his fourth¹ and what proved to be his last expedition into the Peloponnesus. Arriving with his army in Arcadia and learning that the Spartans under their aged king Agesilaus were marching northward in full force to meet him, Epaminondas hurried across the mountains into Laconia, thinking to seize Sparta, which in Xenophon's phrase was now "like a nest unprotected by the parent birds." But Agesilaus, being informed of the movements of the enemy, hastened back to Sparta, fortunately arriving there before the Thebans.

Finding the city thus in a fair state of defense, Epaminondas, though his troops actually penetrated the unwall'd town at certain points, did not deem it wise to attack the Spartans posted in the

¹ See p. 415, n. 1.

entrances to the streets and on the roofs of the houses; but abandoning the idea of capturing the place, retreated into Arcadia, whither he was followed by the Spartans. Here, near Mantinea, the hostile armies finally joined battle. Among the chief allies of the Spartans were the Athenians and the Mantineans, who had broken away from the Arcadian union.

Epaminondas employed the same tactics on this field as had given him the victory at Leuctra (p. 409), and with the same result. But the victory was dearly purchased with the life of Epaminondas, who, at the moment of victory, fell mortally wounded with a spear-thrust in the breast.

How remarkable was the ascendancy of Epaminondas over his soldiers, and how completely he had become the very soul and life of the Theban army, are shown by the fact that the blow which struck him down, so absolutely paralyzed the Theban troops that, as the fatal intelligence ran through their ranks, they instantly stopped short in their victorious advance, and thus failed to gather the fruits of the victory they had won.

Epaminondas in a dying condition was borne from the field. Having received assurance, in reply to his inquiries, that his shield was safe and that victory rested with the Thebans, he asked by name for two officers to whom he purposed to entrust the command of the army. He was told that both were among the slain. "Then," said he, "you must make peace with the enemy." Having said this, he calmly directed that the spear-head, which had remained fixed in the wound, should be withdrawn from his breast, and his life went out with the flow of blood.

In accordance with the dying counsel of Epaminondas, the victorious Thebans and their allies negotiated a peace with the enemy. Its basis was that everything should remain just as it then was. Particularly were both Megalopolis and Messene, monuments of the policy and genius of Epaminondas, to be recognized as free and autonomous cities. The peace was agreed to by all the states on both sides, save by the Spartans, who angrily and obstinately refused to recognize the independence of Messene.

The Situation in Greece after the Death of Epaminondas. —

The hegemony of Thebes ended on the day that Epaminondas was borne to the tomb. There was none among her citizens capable of maintaining for her the leadership in Greece which her great commander and statesman had won.

All the chief cities of Greece now lay in a state of exhaustion or of helpless isolation. Sparta had destroyed the empire of Athens;¹ Thebes had broken the dominion of Sparta, but had seemingly exhausted herself in the effort. There was now no city energetic, resourceful, unbroken in spirit and strength, such as was Athens at the time of the Persian War, to act as leader and champion of the Grecian states. Yet never was there greater need of such leadership in Hellas than at just this moment; for the Macedonian monarchy was now rising in the North, and threatening the independence of all Greece.

In a succeeding chapter we shall trace the rise of this semi-barbarian power, and tell how the cities of Greece, mutually exhausted by their incessant quarrels, were reduced to a state of dependence upon its sovereign. But first we shall turn aside for a moment from the affairs of the cities of Greece proper, in order to cast a glance upon the Greeks of Magna Græcia and Sicily.

REFERENCES. — Plutarch, *Life of Pelopidas*. Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. iv. pp. 349-524. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. viii. pp. 178-365; (twelve volume ed.), vol. x. pp. 188-383. Sankey, *The Spartan and Theban Supremacies* (Epoch Series).

¹ Athens had indeed made herself the centre of a new confederacy (see p. 407.) and had recovered some of her old possessions, but she was, after all, only the shadow of her former self.




Fig. 34. COIN OF THEBES.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE GREEKS OF WESTERN HELLAS.

(413-336 B.C.)

The Carthaginians lay waste Hellenic Sicily.—It will be remembered that it was the inhabitants of Egesta who invited the Athenians into Sicily, to aid them against the neighboring city of Selinus (p. 336). Shortly after the destruction of the Athenian armament before Syracuse, these same people appealed to the Carthaginians to come to their aid against the same old enemy.

The Carthaginians came with a great army of a hundred thousand men under the lead of Hannibal, a grandson of a certain Hamilcar who seventy years before this had been defeated and slain by the tyrant Gelo on the memorable field of Himera. Selinus was besieged by them, and after a brave resistance was finally taken by storm. The inhabitants were either massacred or carried away into slavery, and the walls and temples of the city destroyed (409 B.C.).

Hannibal next led his barbarians against Himera. The Syracusans sent a force to aid in manning its walls; but later, apprehending an attack on their own city by the Carthaginians, they resolved to abandon the defense of the place. Accordingly the old men, the women, and the children were sent away in boats, but before the vessels had time to return for those left behind, the enemy burst into the town. In revenge for the death of his ancestor, Hannibal offered up to his gods an awful holocaust of three thousand of his prisoners, and razed the city to the

ground (409 B.C.). The dismay created throughout the Hellenic world by this wiping-out by the Western barbarians of this ancient and powerful Greek city was like that created by the destruction of Miletus by the Eastern barbarians, just at the beginning of the Persian Wars (p. 146).

A few years later the Carthaginians laid siege to Agrigentum, which was at this time one of the most populous and prosperous cities of the Hellenic world. The magnificence of its public buildings, and the wealth and luxury of its inhabitants, were simply fabulous. A large Syracusan army aided in the defense of the city. A long and stubborn resistance was ended by threatened famine. The inhabitants escaped massacre by a hurried flight under cover of the darkness of night. Two hundred thousand fugitives, men, women, and children, made up the pitiable procession. The homeless multitude found asylum among the various Greek communities in the island, the most of the refugees, however, finding shelter at Leontini. All who had not been able to join the night march were massacred by the enemy. The spoils of the city were immense. One article of the vast booty secured by the barbarians was the brazen bull of the tyrant Phalaris (p. 96), which was carried as a trophy to Carthage (406 B.C.).

Thus in the course of three years did the barbarians, finding their opportunity in the dissensions and lack of effective union among the Greek cities, succeed in blotting out several of the largest and most prosperous of the Hellenic communities of Sicily. Throughout a considerable part of the island Hellenic civilization, planted centuries before, was practically uprooted. As we shall see, the land afterwards recovered in a measure from the terrible blow, and enjoyed a short bloom of prosperity; nevertheless the resources and energies of this part of the Hellenic world, like those of Central Greece through the unhappy causes we have recounted in other chapters, were permanently and irremediably impaired.

Dionysius I., Tyrant of Syracuse (405-367 B.C.).—The alarm, distress, and anarchy occasioned by the invasions of the Cartha-

ginians afforded the opportunity at Syracuse for a man of low birth, named Dionysius, to usurp the government. Having been elected virtual dictator by the people to meet the invaders, Dionysius succeeded in converting his office into a tyranny, after the manner of the earlier tyrants (p. 90). His career as despot of the city was long and remarkable, embracing a period of thirty-eight years. His activity was so extraordinary and his undertakings so varied and intermingled, that, in the very brief account of his reign which we are able to give, it will be in the interest of clearness for us to group his operations without regard to strict chronological order.

A large part of the prolonged reign of Dionysius was occupied in ever-renewed attempts to drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily. He engaged in four distinct wars or campaigns against these intruders. The struggle was marked by every vicissitude of fortune. At one time, the Carthaginians held possession of the greater part of Sicily and seemed about to seize Syracuse itself; at another, Dionysius had succeeded in expelling them from every place in the island, save Lilybæum and Drepana, cities on the western shore (391 B.C.). Time and again the Greeks were saved from threatened destruction only by the breaking out of a terrible pestilence in the camp of the enemy, which swept them away by thousands. The issue of the protracted struggle, so far as the territorial relations of the Greeks and Phœnicians in the island were concerned, was that at the end of the rule of Dionysius the frontier between the Carthaginian provinces and the Greek territory was the same as at the beginning of his tyranny, except as to Agrigentum, which Dionysius had succeeded in permanently recovering from the barbarians.

At the same time that Dionysius was carrying on his campaigns against the foreigners, he was reducing the free Greek cities, Naxos, Catana, Leontini, and the others, to a state of dependence upon himself. All were conquered and incorporated in the empire of the tyrant.

But Dionysius did not confine his operations to Sicily. With his

power fairly consolidated in the island, he turned his attention to Magna Græcia. The Greeks here were just at this time maintaining a hard struggle with the barbarian Italian tribes, the Lucanians and others, who were pressing down from the north and threatening to sweep out of existence the Greek colonies that fringed the southern shores of the peninsula. While these cities were thus being harassed on the side of the land, Dionysius attacked them on the side of the sea. He conquered them all, from Rhegium to Croton. Many of the cities he destroyed as ruthlessly as though he were a barbarian without Hellenic sympathies and instincts. Some of the inhabitants he sold into slavery, others he transported to Sicily to swell the population of his capital, Syracuse. Even the temples he robbed of their treasures. The act which most shocked the Greek world was his sale to the Carthaginians, for the immense sum of one hundred and twenty talents, of the costly robe of the goddess Hera, of which he had made a prize at her temple near Croton.

The conquered Italian lands were incorporated in the empire of the tyrant, which now embraced practically all of Western Hellas. Thus upon the ruins of a vast number of once free and prosperous Greek cities, Syracuse was raised to a position of power and influence corresponding to that which Athens had so recently held in Eastern Hellas.

Nor were the tyrant's plans of conquest and spoliation confined to Sicily and Italy. With the cities of Magna Græcia subjugated, he interfered in the affairs of Epirus and those of Greece proper, sending thither several armaments at different times ; and it is said that he even revolved in mind an attack upon Delphi and the seizure of the vast treasures at that holy place.

But the military operations of Dionysius exhibit only one phase of his many-sided activity. The tyrant possessed a Pericles' love of art, and during his rule he adorned Syracuse with many splendid public buildings, meeting the expense of their erection by crushing taxes levied on his subjects, and the confiscation of the riches of the wealthy. While embellishing the city, he strengthened and

extended vastly its walls, and enlarged its dockyards and arsenals, thus making the city in its outward appearance the worthy capital of his really imperial dominions. Since Athens was now dismantled, Syracuse was at this time probably the most splendid and powerful city in the whole Hellenic world.

Dionysius was also a patron of literature and philosophy. Plato was for a time a guest at his court; but the views of the philosopher, or his way of presenting them, seem to have been displeasing to the tyrant, who caused him to be sold as a slave, from which condition he was ransomed by a friend. Dionysius was himself a poet of no mean ability, and composed a tragedy



Fig. 35. COIN OF SYRACUSE.

entitled the *Ransom of Hector*, to which the Athenians awarded the first prize at the Dionysiac festival.

The tyrant particularly aspired to be the recipient of the honors and prizes awarded at the great festivals at Olympia. He wrote poems to be recited to the crowds that gathered there, and sent chariots to run in the races. In the year 384 B.C. he sent an unusually magnificent embassy to represent him at the games. His ambassadors at this time were insulted, and were even threatened with personal violence by the people. Various circumstances contributed to the vehemence of the feelings of the Olympian visitors against Dionysius. There was the general abhorrence of tyrants ingrained in the Greek mind. And there

was the special enormity of the crimes of the Syracusan despot against Greek freedom, witnessed to by the crowds of exiles, the victims of his unbearable tyranny, who filled the cities of Eastern Hellas. Besides all this, the critical condition at large of the Greek world at just this moment created a special sensitiveness to Panhellenic sentiment in all generous and large-minded Greeks. It was only three years before this Olympic festival that the disgraceful Peace of Antalcidas had abandoned the Greeks of Asia to the Persian king (p. 404). And now the freedom of the Western Greeks had been extinguished by the tyrant of Syracuse. The seriousness of the situation was vividly pictured by the great orator Lysias, who, in denouncing the tyrant to the crowds at Olympia, exclaimed, "The Hellenic world is on fire at both ends." It did seem as if Grecian Freedom was about to utterly perish — and that, too, at the hands of her own unworthy children.

The object of universal detestation, Dionysius carried his life in his hands. The state of constant apprehension in which he lived is illustrated by the story of the Sword of Damocles. A courtier named Damocles having expressed to Dionysius the opinion that he must be supremely happy, the tyrant invited him to a sumptuous banquet, assigning to him his own place at the board. When the courtier was in the midst of the enjoyments of the table, Dionysius bade him look up. Turning his eyes towards the ceiling, Damocles was horrified at the sight of a sword, suspended by a single hair, dangling above his head. "Such," observed Dionysius, "is the life of a tyrant."

The Damoclean sword did not fall during the lifetime of Dionysius. He ended his life by a natural death, and transmitted his power to his son, who ascended the throne as Dionysius the Younger.

Dionysius the Younger. (367–343 B.C.).—The young Dionysius lacked the ability of his father to play the tyrant, and left the government at first very largely in the hands of his father-in-law, Dion, a man of philosophic tastes, and in some

respects a dreamer. Through his influence Plato was once more brought to Syracuse, and introduced to Dionysius. The philosopher urged the despot to change his tyranny into a regulated monarchy, and to give freedom to the cities of his empire. For a time the tyrant seemed to yield to the influence of his teacher, but very soon the breath of calumny poisoned his mind against both Dion and Plato, the former of whom he was made to believe was plotting to undermine his power. Dion was exiled; Plato was permitted to return to Greece.

Freed from the restraints of philosophy, Dionysius plunged into reckless dissipation, and began to exhibit the more ignoble traits of his character. The general detestation of the despot created by his course enabled Dion to bring his rule to an end. Returning from exile with a small force, at a moment when the tyrant happened to be away in Italy, Dion was received by the people with acclamation as their deliverer. When Dionysius returned from Italy, he discovered himself shut out from his own capital. Only the island of Ortygia was held for him. Leaving a garrison to maintain this stronghold, Dionysius sailed away to Locri in Italy (356 B.C.). Shortly after his departure Ortygia surrendered into the hands of Dion.

Dion, notwithstanding all the wise instruction in the science of government which he had received from his tutor Plato, failed utterly in the administration of affairs. He did not restore freedom to the people, but gave them reason to suspect that he purposed to set up a tyranny. This suspicion soon ripened into a conspiracy against him, and he was finally assassinated (353 B.C.).

Taking advantage of the anarchy which followed the murder of Dion, Dionysius returned to Syracuse and succeeded in recovering his lost throne (346 B.C.). But most of the Sicilian Greek cities which had been subject to him had, during the troublous period, broken away from the Dionysian empire, and were now living each under its own despot. The Carthaginians were once more disturbing the island. Everything was in confusion, and distress among the people was universal.

Timoleon the Liberator (344-336 B.C.): the Golden Era of the Sicilian Greek Cities.—Under the stress of these circumstances the Syracusans sent an embassy to Corinth, their mother city, for help, to enable them to free themselves from the tyrant Dionysius. The Corinthians listened favorably to the appeal, and sent to the succor of the Syracusans a small force under the lead of Timoleon, a man who at home had shown his love for liberty by consenting to the death of his own brother when he attempted to make himself tyrant of Corinth.

Timoleon, sailing to Syracuse, found the tyrant already hard-pressed by his enemies in Ortygia. His arrival determined Dionysius to surrender the stronghold. The only condition that he asked was that he should be allowed to retire to Corinth with his movable property, under a guarantee of personal safety. In that city the tyrant passed the remainder of his life, filling a part of his enforced leisure by giving instruction in reading and music.

Having freed Syracuse from her tyrant, Timoleon next engaged in fight with the Carthaginians, who were once more intent upon the conquest of Sicily. At the Crimisis River, with a force of less than twelve thousand, he inflicted upon a vast barbarian army, numbering seventy thousand men, gathered from all the barbarian countries of the West,—Libya, Numidia, Iberia, and Italy,—a defeat as complete and memorable as that which the same enemy had received two generations before at the hands of Gelo on the field of Himera (p. 419). Two hundred chariots, a thousand breastplates, and ten thousand shields were a part of the spoils of the battle-field (about 340 B.C.).

At the same time that Timoleon was engaging the barbarians, he was giving attention to the despots who were holding in slavery the various Greek towns of the island. These he expelled, and restored freedom to the cities which they had been ruling. To Syracuse he gave a popular form of government, and, as a sign that the Dionysian tyranny had come to a final end, caused the stronghold of the despots on the island of Ortygia to be razed to the ground, and buildings for courts of justice to be erected on the spot.

Syracuse and the other Sicilian Greek cities now entered upon the golden era of their history. The desolation that reigned throughout Sicily when Timoleon first entered the island can with difficulty be pictured. Plutarch tells us that cattle and horses were pastured in the streets and market-places of the once populous cities, while deer and other wild animals were hunted in the deserted suburbs. A few years before Timoleon embarked on his expedition, Plato had expressed a fear that the Hellenic race would become extinct in Sicily.

Under the reign of liberty and order instituted by Timoleon, the empty cities began to fill with inhabitants. Exiles flocked back from all quarters. Corinth, mindful that Syracuse was her own daughter colony, gathered from all parts of Eastern Hellas colonists for the repopling of the city. At one time ten thousand emigrants sailed together for Sicily. Syracuse is said to have received not less than sixty thousand immigrants. The ruined or half-decayed cities throughout the island were recolonized. This great influx of population, and the new and unwonted courage and energy infused into the people by the beneficent measures of Timoleon, brought to Hellenic Sicily a period of remarkable expansion and prosperity.

With his great work of freeing and repopling Sicily accomplished, Timoleon resigned his authority, and retired to private life. He remained at Syracuse, being the object of an almost idolatrous affection and devotion on the part of the people for whom he had done so much. As he advanced in years, his eyesight failed, and he finally became totally blind. Yet it was to him that the Syracusans still turned for counsel in all emergencies of state. Whenever a matter of great moment was under discussion in the general assembly, he was drawn in a car into the theatre, where the meeting was in progress, and the advice which he on such occasions proffered was almost invariably acted upon. He died in the year 336 B.C., loved and revered by all the Sicilian Greeks as their liberator and benefactor.¹

¹ Plut. *Timoleon*.

The Later Fortunes of the Greek Cities of Sicily and Magna Græcia. — The golden age of the Grecian cities of the West came to an end shortly after the death of Timoleon. In the year 316 B.C., the noted Agathocles made himself tyrant of Syracuse. He reigned for twenty-eight years. After his death a period of discord followed, and then the government fell into the hands of another celebrated tyrant, Hiero II. (about 270–216 B.C.), who became the firm ally of Rome in her struggle with Carthage. Soon after the death of Hiero, as a punishment for its having forsaken the Roman for a Carthaginian alliance, the Romans extinguished the independence of the city, and made it a part of their empire (212 B.C.).

The Italian cities, which had regained their independence at the time that Timoleon destroyed the power of the Dionysian dynasty, were many of them soon afterwards conquered by the native Italian tribes. But some of the leading cities of the coast — Rhegium, Locri, Croton, and Tarentum — managed, with the aid of Sparta and the rulers of Epirus, to beat off the enemy, and to retain their freedom, until the rise of the power of Rome, by which city they were all finally conquered and absorbed. Tarentum was the last to yield to the growing power of the imperial city (in 272 B.C.).

Having made this hasty review of the course of events in Western Hellas, we must now return to Greece proper, in order to trace further the fortunes of the cities of the home land.

REFERENCES. — Plutarch, *Lives of Timoleon and Dion*. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. viii. pp. 366–495; *ib.* vol. ix. pp. 1–194; (twelve volume ed.), vol. vi. pp. 383–512; *ib.* vol. xi. pp. 1–197. Freeman, *The Story of Sicily* (Story of the Nations).

CHAPTER XXV.

THE RISE OF MACEDONIA: REIGN OF PHILIP II.

(359-336 B.C.)

The Macedonians and their Rulers. — We have reached now the threshold of a new era in Grecian history. A state, hitherto but little observed, at this time rose suddenly into prominence and began to play a leading part in Greek affairs. This state was Macedonia, a country lying north of the Cambunian mountains and back of the Chalcidian promontories. In the present chapter we shall sketch briefly the rise of this new power in the North, and tell how before its growing might first the Greek cities on the northern shore of the Ægean and then those of Greece proper were overwhelmed, and the days of Greek liberty brought to an end.

The peoples of Macedonia were for the most part mountaineers, who had not yet passed beyond the tribal state.¹ They were a hardy war-like race, possessing the habits and the virtues of country people. They were Aryans and close kindred to the Hellenes, but since they did not speak pure Greek and were backward in culture, they were looked upon as barbarians by their more refined city kinsmen of the South.

The ruling race in the country, however, were of Hellenic stock. They claimed to be descended from the royal house of Argos, and this claim had been allowed by the Greeks, who had permitted them to appear as contestants in the Olympian games, — a privi-

¹ There were, however, a few towns in Macedonia, of which Ægæ and Pella, each of which was in turn the seat of the royal court, were of chief note.

lege, it will be recalled, accorded only to those who could prove pure Hellenic ancestry. The government maintained by these Hellenic or semi-Hellenic rulers was a sort of limited monarchy, somewhat like that existing among the Greeks in the Heroic Age. Their efforts to spread Greek art and culture among their subjects, combined with intercourse with the Greek cities of Chalcidice, had resulted in the native barbarism of the Macedonian tribes being overlaid with a thin veneer of Hellenic civilization.

The Youth of Philip of Macedon.—Macedonia first rose to importance during the reign of Philip II. (359–336 B.C.), generally known as Philip of Macedon. He was a man of pre-eminent ability, of wonderful address in diplomacy, and of rare genius as an organizer and military chieftain.

Several years of Philip's boyhood were passed by him as a hostage at Thebes (p. 415). This episode in the life of the prince had a marked influence upon his after-career; for just at this time Epaminondas was the leading spirit among the Thebans, and in the companionship of this consummate military tactician and commander it was that Philip learned valuable lessons in the art of war. The *Macedonian phalanx*, which Philip is said to have originated, and which holds some such place in the military history of Macedonia as the *legion* holds in that of Rome, was simply a modification of the Theban phalanx that won the day at Leuctra and again at Mantinea.

Nor was this all. Besides the knowledge which he acquired of military affairs, the quick and observant boy gained during his enforced residence at Thebes an insight into Greek character and Greek politics which served him well in his later diplomatic dealings with the Greek cities.

In view of the influence which the lessons and experiences of this period of exile exerted upon the activities and policies of Philip's maturer years, it has been well likened to the voluntary exile in Western Europe of the youthful Tzar Peter. The "new ideas" and the new ambitions which both carried back home marked the beginning of a new era in the history of their respec-

tive countries.¹ There is, indeed, a very striking parallel in many respects between the career of Philip of Macedon and that of Peter the Great of Russia.

The death of his brother Perdiccas brought Philip to the Macedonian throne in the year 359 B.C. With affairs settled at home and his kingdom consolidated, the ambition of the youthful king led him to endeavor to subject to his authority the Grecian cities. He worked towards this end not so much through the employment of open force as through intrigue, bribery, and artful diplomacy. In the use of these weapons he could have given instruction to the crafty Themistocles.

Philip extends his Dominions in Chalcidice and Thrace.—Philip's first encroachments upon Greek territory were made in the Chalcidian region. He coveted particularly the possession of Amphipolis, which was the gateway from Macedonia into Thrace. This city had been founded by the Athenians, and at one time formed a part of their great empire. But in the early years of the Peloponnesian War it had been set free by the Spartan Brasidas (p. 323), and since then had maintained its independence, notwithstanding that the Athenians had made repeated efforts to resubjugate it. The Olynthians also were interested in the town, since they wished to include it in the new Chalcidian confederacy of which they were the head.

Consequently both Athens and Olynthus were unwilling that the city should fall into the hands of Philip, and were on the point of joining their forces in order to thwart his designs upon the place, but were kept from doing so by the lying promises made secretly by him to each of them. Being left unopposed in his operations, Philip easily made prize of the city (358 B.C.).

Philip next captured the important city of Pydna, on the Thermaic Gulf. Afterwards he wrested Potidæa from Athens, and just to create enmity between the Athenians and the Olynthians, possible allies against him, gave the city to the latter.

The western portions of Thrace were next conquered by Philip

¹See *Curteis, Rise of the Macedonian Empire*, p. 23.

and added to his growing dominions. In this quarter he founded the well-known city of Philippi.¹ His Thracian conquests gave Philip control of the rich gold mines of this region, and furnished him with the means which he later so freely used to corrupt and bribe the leaders of the Grecian cities.

Revolt against Athens of her Allies: the Social War (357-355 B.C.).—One reason why Athens had remained so inactive while the Macedonian power was making such dangerous advances on the Thracian shore was her preoccupation with affairs nearer home. In the very midst of Philip's operations, several of the most powerful of the members of the new Athenian confederacy (p. 407) had risen against the Athenians, who, forgetful of all the severe lessons of the past, were attempting to play the tyrant in the new league, just as they had done in the old Delian confederacy.

This struggle between Athens and her allies is known as the Social War² (357-355 B.C.). A threat on the part of the Persian king to enter the war on the side of the revolted cities constrained the Athenians to agree to a peace which left their former allies, Chios, Rhodes, Cos, and Byzantium, free and independent states. Thus at this critical moment in the history of the Grecian cities was fatally impaired the strength of the only league which could hope to offer effective resistance to the encroachments upon Hellenic territory of the semi-barbarian power rising in the North.

Demosthenes and his Olynthiac Orations: Philip destroys Olynthus and Other Chalcidian Cities (348 B.C.).—The Athenian orator Demosthenes was one of the few who seemed to understand the real designs of Philip. His penetration, like that of Pericles, descried a cloud lowering over Greece—this time from

¹ Philippi was the first European city in which the Gospel was preached. The preacher was the Apostle Paul, who went over from Asia in obedience to the vision in which a man of Macedonia seemed to stand and pray, "Come over into Macedonia, and help us."

² One of the most noted Athenian generals at this time was Chabrias. He was killed in the fighting on the island of Chios.

the North. With all the persuasion of his wonderful eloquence, he strove to stir up the Athenians to resist the encroachments of the king of Macedon. He hurled against him his famous *Philippics*, speeches so filled with fierce denunciation that they have given name to all writings characterized by bitter criticism or violent invective.

Demosthenes was opposed in his war policy by a considerable peace party at Athens, among the leaders of which were Phocion and Æschines. Phocion was an upright and incorruptible man, and an able and trusted general, who opposed Demosthenes for the reason that he thought the interests of Athens would be best served through the maintenance of friendly relations with Macedonia. Æschines was a gifted orator, who, without doubt corrupted by Macedonian gold, traitorously used his influence at Athens to promote the plans of Philip.

The field of Philip's aggressions at just this time was the Chalcidian peninsula. He was intent upon the destruction of Olynthus and her confederacy. Demosthenes, as we have intimated, appears to have been almost the only man at Athens who recognized the significance of the struggle on the Thracian shore. He saw clearly that the fall of the Greek cities there meant the fall, sooner or later, of the cities of continental Greece.



Fig. 36. DEMOSTHENES.

In three speeches, known as the Olynthiac orations, he strove to arouse his countrymen to a sense of the imminency of the danger which was threatening. The burden of the three orations was, It is better for us to fight Philip in Chalcidice than in Attica. If Philip takes Olynthus, he will soon be here. The speeches are filled with complaining comparisons between the alert and patriotic spirit evinced by the Athenians in earlier times when the Persians were at the gates of Greece, and the languid, pusillanimous temper of the citizens now when the Macedonians were threatening the northern passes of the land. In the second speech, the orator endeavors to encourage the Athenians to action by showing that Philip's power was rather apparent than real. "It is impossible," he says, "to build up an empire by injustice, perjury, and falsehood."

The eloquence of Demosthenes was all in vain. The Athenians could not be stirred to timely and effective action. Olynthus fell into the hands of Philip (348 B.C.), and with it all the other cities of the Chalcidian confederacy, thirty-two in all. Many of the towns were destroyed and a great part of their inhabitants sold into slavery.

Philip and the Second Sacred War (355-346 B.C.).—Up to this time Philip had not come directly in contact with the states of Greece proper. But shortly after he had added the Chalcidian lands to his empire, he acquired in the following way a voice and vote in the affairs of the cities of continental Greece.

The Phocians had put to secular use some of the lands which, at the end of the First Sacred War (p. 54), had been consecrated to the Delphian Apollo. Taken to task and heavily fined for this act by the other members of the Delphian Amphictyony, the Phocians deliberately robbed the temple, and used the treasure in the maintenance of a large force of mercenary soldiers. Thus they were enabled to hold out against all their enemies, chief among whom were the Thebans. The Amphictyons, not being able to punish the Phocians for their impiety, were forced to ask help of Philip, who gladly rendered the assistance sought.

The first campaign of Philip against the Phocians and their allies miscarried. After having gained a great battle in Thessaly (352 B.C.), he marched into Central Greece, but at Thermopylæ was turned back by the Athenians, who were holding that pass in force. Five years after this, however, Philip, having through the bribery of Æschines and other Athenian leaders secured the neutrality of Athens, again marched southward into Central Greece. The Phocians were constrained to yield to superior force. A heavy punishment was inflicted upon them by the Amphictyonic council. All their cities, save one, were broken up into villages, and the inhabitants were forced to pay a large annual tribute to the Delphian Apollo, whom they had robbed.

The place which the Phocians had held in the Delphian Amphictyony was given to Philip, upon whom was also bestowed the privilege of presiding, in connection with the Thebans and Thessalians, at the Pythian games. The position which he had now secured was exactly such as Philip had coveted, since he could use it to make himself master of all Greece.

Philip's Attempt to seize Byzantium foiled by the Athenians (339 B.C.). — A little later Philip was with his army in Eastern Thrace, warring against barbarians and Greeks alike, in an endeavor to extend his dominions to the Hellespont and the Bosphorus. Among the Greek cities in this quarter to which he laid siege was Byzantium. The Athenians, however, who were vitally interested in keeping out of Philip's hands this gateway to the Euxine, since they drew from thence their supplies of corn, aided the Byzantines in the defense of their city, and Philip was forced to raise the siege.

The Battle of Chæronea (338 B.C.). — Though Philip had failed in his attempt to reach the water-way to the northern world through Thrace, he succeeded in reaching it through Greece proper. Soon after his discomfiture before Byzantium, he brought into dependence upon himself the cities of continental Greece, and thereby also secured control of all the Greek cities on the Bosphorus and the Hellespont.

The circumstances under which Philip attained to this double aim of his ambition were these : The Amphictyons, in their meeting for the year 339 B.C., instigated by the Athenian orator Æschines, pronounced the Phocians of Amphisssa guilty of sacrilege in building upon and cultivating certain lands which at the end of the Second Sacred War had been dedicated to the Delphian Apollo, and decreed that they should be punished. The Phocians resisted the execution of the sentence, and the outcome was the Third Sacred War (339–338 B.C.). As in the earlier struggle between the Amphictyons and the Phocians (p. 434), Philip was now called upon to chastise the offenders. He gladly embraced the opportunity thus afforded him to extend and strengthen his authority in Greece. Indeed, it seems probable that Æschines, working in the interest of Philip, had stirred up the trouble merely to create an opportunity for him to intermeddle in Grecian affairs.

Philip marched his army into Central Greece ; but instead of proceeding at once to mete out punishment to the trespassers upon the holy ground, he seized and began to fortify Elatea, a town in Phocis. This procedure plainly revealed his purpose of invading Attica through Boëotia. When the news of his movements was carried to Athens, the city was thrown into a state of the greatest alarm and excitement. A meeting of the Ecclesia was hastily summoned. Demosthenes was the only man who had a clear line of action to recommend. He urged that the city be at once put in a state to withstand a siege, and that an embassy be sent to Thebes to solicit an alliance with Athens.

All that Demosthenes advised was done by the Athenians. They prepared for determined resistance behind their walls, and sent to Thebes an embassy, of which Demosthenes was the most influential member, on the mission proposed. The Thebans, notwithstanding their immemorial hatred of the Athenians, were persuaded by Demosthenes to join with them in opposing the progress of the Macedonian intruder.

After some delay, the united forces of Athens and Thebes, augmented by small contingents from some of their allies, met

Philip at Chæronea, in Bœotia. The battle was stubbornly fought, but finally went against the Athenians and their allies, who were driven from the field with heavy loss. The Theban Sacred Band went down to a man before the Macedonian phalanx, led by the youthful Alexander, the son of Philip, who on this memorable field began his great career as a commander.

The result of the battle was the subjugation of all Greece to the authority of the Macedonian foreigner. The Athenians were treated leniently by Philip, who returned to them without ransom the Athenian prisoners he had taken ; but they were forced to give up to him the Thracian Chersonese, and to acknowledge him as chief and leader of the Greeks. The Thebans were treated with less consideration. An end was put to their authority over the smaller Bœotian towns, and a Macedonian garrison was placed in their citadel. The Spartans, who stubbornly refused to acknowledge Philip's suzerainty, were punished by being stripped of much of the territory they still retained, which was given to neighboring states. Byzantium was constrained to enter into a treaty with the conqueror which gave him the coveted control of the gateway to the Euxine.

The Congress at Corinth : Plan to invade Asia (338 B.C.). — Soon after the battle of Chæronea, Philip convened at Corinth a council of the Grecian states. All were represented in the congress, save Sparta. At this meeting was adopted a constitution, drafted by Philip, which united the various Grecian cities and Macedonia into a sort of federation, with Macedonia of course as the leading state. Differences arising between members of the federation were to be referred for settlement to the Amphictyonic assembly.

But Philip's main object in calling the congress was not so much to promulgate a federal constitution for the Greek cities, as to secure their aid in an expedition which he had evidently long been meditating for the conquest of the Persian empire. The exploit of the Ten Thousand Greeks (p. 398) had made manifest the feasibility of such an undertaking as that now proposed. The

plan was endorsed by the congress. Every Greek city was to furnish a contingent for the army of invasion. Philip was chosen leader of the expedition, and invested with what was substantially the authority of a dictator over the war-forces of Greece.

All Greece was now astir with preparations for the great enterprise. By the spring of the year 336 B.C. the expedition was ready to move, and the advance forces had already crossed over into Asia, when Philip, during the festivities attending the marriage of his daughter, was assassinated by a young noble, who sought thus to avenge a personal affront. His son Alexander succeeded to his place and power (336 B.C.).

Results of Philip's Reign. — The achievements of Philip made possible the greater achievements of his son. He paved the way for Alexander's remarkable conquests by consolidating the Macedonian monarchy, and organizing an army which was the most effective instrument of warfare that the world had yet seen.

But the most important outcome of Philip's activity and policy was the union of the Macedonian monarchical and military system with Hellenic culture. This was the historical mission of Philip. Had not Hellenic civilization been thus incorporated with the Macedonian system, then the wide conquests of Alexander would have resulted in no more good for humanity than those of a Tamerlane or a Zinghis Khan. And, on the other hand, Greek culture, had not this union been effected by Philip, would have remained comparatively isolated, would never have become so widely spread as it did among the peoples and races of antiquity.

In the words of the historian Ranke, "The Greeks, had they remained alone, would never have succeeded in winning for the intellectual life which they had created a sure footing in the world at large." Greece conquered the world by being conquered. It was Hellenic institutions, customs, and manners, Hellenic language and civilization, which the extended conquests of Alexander spread

throughout the Eastern world. It is this which makes the short-lived Macedonian empire so important a factor in universal history.

REFERENCES. — Plutarch, *Lives of Demosthenes and Phocion*. Demosthenes, *Olynthiacs*, *Philippics*, and the *Oration on the Crown*. Curteis, *The Macedonian Empire* (Epoch Series). Curtius, *History of Greece*, vol. v. Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. ix. pp. 195-504; (twelve volume ed.), vol. xi. pp. 197-522. Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History*, ch. vii., "Practical Politics in the Fourth Century."



Fig. 37. COIN OF PHILIP II. OF MACEDON.

CHAPTER XXVI.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

(336-323 B.C.)

The Youth of Alexander: Beginnings of his Reign. — Alexander was only twenty years of age when he came to his father's throne. Those traits of temper and mind which marked his manhood and which fitted him to play so great a part in history, were foreshown in early youth — if we may believe the tales that are told of his sayings and doings as a boy. The familiar story of the vicious steed Bucephalus, which none either dared to mount or to approach, but which was subdued in a moment by the skilful handling of the little prince, reveals that subtle magnetism of his nature by which he acquired such wonderful influence and command over men in after years. The spirit of the man is again shown in the complaint of the boy when news of his father's victories came to him: "Boys," said he to his playmates, "my father will get ahead of us in everything, and will leave nothing great for you or me to do."

Certain influences under which the boy came in his earliest years left a permanent impression upon his mind and character. By his mother he was taught to trace his descent from the great Achilles, and was incited to emulate his exploits and to make him his model in all things. The *Iliad*, which recounts the deeds of that mythical hero, became the prince's inseparable companion. After his mother's influence, perhaps that of the philosopher Aristotle, whom Philip persuaded to become the tutor of the youthful Alexander, was the most potent and formative. This

great teacher implanted in the mind of the young prince a love of literature and philosophy, and through his inspiring companionship and lofty conversation exercised over the eager, impulsive boy an influence for good which Alexander himself gratefully acknowledged in later years.

Troubles attending the Accession of Alexander. — For about two years after his accession to the Macedonian throne, Alexander was kept busy in thwarting conspiracies and suppressing open revolts against his authority. The barbarian tribes on the frontiers of Macedonia were restive under the yoke which Philip had imposed upon them, while the cities of Greece, as yet unaccustomed to the new rôle which they were expected to play as dependents or vassals of the Macedonian king, were ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to regain their lost independence.

The death of Philip seemed to announce the opportune moment. Straightway movements hostile to Macedonia were started in many of the Greek cities; but Alexander's alertness prevented these conspiracies from ripening into open revolt. With a large army he marched quickly into Greece, and overcoming all opposition, forced the Greek cities to acknowledge his suzerainty, and to invest him with the same supreme authority as commander-in-chief of their war-forces that they had conferred upon his father.




Fig. 38. ALEXANDER THE GREAT

With matters composed in Greece proper, Alexander returned to Macedonia, and proceeded to reduce to order the tribes on his northern frontier. In these early campaigns, which he pushed far into the northern wilds, he performed military exploits that cast into the shade the achievements of his father Philip. His prolonged absence from Macedonia gave rise in Greece to a report that he was dead. The Thebans rose in revolt, and called upon the Athenians to join them. Demosthenes favored the appeal, and began to stir up the Athenians and others to unite with the Thebans in freeing the Grecian land from the foreigners.

But Alexander was not dead. Before the Greek cities had settled upon any plan of concerted action, Alexander with his army was in front of Thebes. In a sharp battle outside the gates the Thebans were defeated and their city was captured. As a warning to the other Greek towns, Alexander razed the city to the ground, — sparing, however, the house of the poet Pindar, — and sold thirty thousand of the inhabitants into slavery. The Theban lands were given to various Bœotian towns, the old-time enemies of Thebes. Thus was one of the largest and most renowned of the cities of Greece wiped out of existence.

The destruction of Thebes produced the greatest consternation throughout Greece, for many of the cities were implicated in the attempted revolution which had brought that city to ruin. But having meted out vengeance to Thebes, Alexander dealt leniently with the other towns that had by public decrees or otherwise expressed hostility to him, and simply insisted upon the surrender or punishment of a few of the most active enemies of Macedonia. Demosthenes was one of the Athenian leaders whose surrender was demanded; but through the intercession of Phocion, who was held in special regard by Alexander, the orator was allowed to remain unmolested at Athens.

Alexander crosses the Hellespont: the Battle of the Granicus (334 B.C.). — Alexander was now free to carry out his father's scheme in regard to the Asiatic expedition. In the spring of



THE CAMPAIGNS AND THE EMPIRE OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT



334 B.C., with all his plans matured, he set out, at the head of an army numbering about thirty-five thousand men, for the conquest of the Persian empire. The sanguine spirit in which he embarked in this vast undertaking is shown by the following story. On the eve of his departure from Macedonia, he is said to have divided among his friends the larger part of the royal revenues. Being asked what he was going to reserve for himself, he replied, "My hopes."

Crossing the Hellespont, Alexander first proceeded to the plain of ancient Troy, in order to place a garland upon the supposed tomb at that place of his mythical ancestor Achilles. In accordance with an old custom, he ran three times naked round the tumulus. He also went up to Troy and there offered sacrifice to Athena.

Proceeding on his march, Alexander met a Persian army on the banks of the Granicus, over which he gained a decisive victory. Three hundred suits of armor, selected from the spoils of the field, were sent as a votive offering to the temple of Athena at Athens.

The victory at the Granicus laid all Asia Minor open to the invader. Almost all of the cities of the western coast now opened their gates without opposition to the conqueror; those that resisted were quickly reduced to submission. The provinces of Caria, Lycia, and Pamphylia, in the south, were next overrun, and all their cities and tribes brought to acknowledge the authority of the Macedonians.

The "Gordian Knot."—From Pamphylia Alexander marched northward across ice-covered mountains, into Phrygia, where his army was joined by reinforcements that had been gathered chiefly in Macedonia and Greece. At the ancient capital of the country, Gordium, was a temple of Zeus, where was to be seen the celebrated "Gordian Knot." Respecting this the following story is told: An oracle had commanded the Phrygians, in a time of great perplexity, to choose as their king the first person who should come to offer sacrifice to Zeus. The peasant Gordius

was the one whom chance designated. He was riding in a wagon when the people proclaimed him king.¹ Grateful to the gods for the honor that had fallen upon his house, Gordius consecrated the wagon as a memorial in the temple of Zeus.

It was gradually spread abroad that an oracle had declared that whoever should untie the skilfully fastened knot which united the yoke to the pole of the chariot should become master of Asia. Alexander attempted the feat. Unable to loosen the intricate knot, he drew his sword and cut it. Hence the phrase "cutting the Gordian knot," — meaning a short way out of a difficulty. The marvellous fulfilment of the prediction in the subsequent successes of Alexander gave new faith and credit to the oracle.

The Battle of Issus (333 B.C.). — At the northeast corner of the Mediterranean lies the plain of Issus. Here Alexander, marching forward from Phrygia, met a Persian army, numbering, it is said, six hundred thousand men. The battle which ensued was fought in a narrow plain between the mountains and the sea, where the cramped space deprived the Persians of the advantage they possessed of superiority in numbers, and resulted in their overwhelming defeat. The family of Darius, including his mother, wife, and children, fell into the hands of Alexander; but the king himself escaped from the field, and hastened to his capital, Susa, to raise another army to oppose the march of the conqueror.

Siege of Tyre (332 B.C.). — Before penetrating to the heart of the empire, Alexander turned to the south, in order to effect the subjugation of Phœnicia, that he might command the Phœnician fleets and prevent their being used either to sever his communication with Greece, or to aid revolts in the cities there against his authority. The island-city of Tyre, after a memorable siege, was taken by means of a mole, or causeway, built with incredible labor through the sea to the city. This mole was constructed out of the ruins of old Tyre and the forests of Lebanon. It still remains, uniting the rock with the mainland. When at last, with

¹ Some accounts, however, say that it was his son Midas—who was with his father—that was elevated to the throne.

the aid of the Sidonian fleet, the city was taken, after a siege of seven months, eight thousand of the inhabitants were slain, and thirty thousand sold into slavery—a terrible warning to those cities that should dare to close their gates against the Mace-



Fig. 39. DARIUS AT THE BATTLE OF ISSUS. (From a mosaic found at Pompeii and supposed to be a copy of a Greek painting.)

donian. The reduction of Tyre has been considered the greatest military achievement of Alexander.

After the fall of Tyre, the cities of Palestine and Philistia, with the sole exception of Gaza, surrendered at once to the conqueror. Gaza resisted stubbornly, but after a siege of three months was

taken, and its inhabitants were sold as slaves. Batis, the brave defender of the place, was fastened by Alexander to a chariot, and dragged until dead round the walls of the city. This was in imitation of the treatment said to have been accorded by Achilles to the body of Hector.

Alexander in Egypt.—With the cities of Phœnicia and the fleets of the Mediterranean subject to his control, Alexander easily effected the reduction of Egypt. The Egyptians, indeed, made no resistance to the Macedonians, but willingly exchanged masters.

While in the country, Alexander founded at one of the mouths of the Nile a city called after himself, Alexandria. Ranke believes this to have been the “first city in the world, after the Peiræus at Athens, erected expressly for purposes of commerce.” The city became the meeting-place of the East and the West ; and its importance through many centuries attests the far-sighted wisdom of its founder.

A less worthy enterprise of the conqueror was his expedition to the oasis of Siwah, located in the Libyan desert, where were a celebrated temple and oracle of Zeus Ammon. To gratify his own vanity, as well as to impress the superstitious barbarians, Alexander desired to be declared of celestial descent. The priests of the temple, in accordance with the wish of the king, gave out that the oracle pronounced Alexander to be the son of Zeus Ammon, and the destined ruler of the world.

The Battle of Arbela (331 B.C.).—From Egypt Alexander recommenced his march towards the Persian capital. While yet in Phœnicia, he had received from Darius proposals of peace and alliance. The Great King had offered a large ransom for his family, and a surrender of all the provinces of his empire lying west of the Euphrates, but Alexander had refused to make peace even on such terms.

Marching through Syria, Alexander directed his course eastward and crossed the Euphrates and the Tigris without opposition ; but on the plains of Arbela, not far from the ancient Nineveh, he found

his further advance disputed by Darius with an immense army, numbering, if we may rely upon our authorities, over a million men. It was a motley host, made up of various Asiatic barbarians, together with a large number of Greek mercenaries. Elephants and scythe-armed chariots stamped an Oriental character upon the vast array.

The army of Alexander amounted to only about forty-seven thousand foot and horse. But discipline counted for more than numbers. In the battle which was soon joined, the charge of the Macedonian cavalry and phalanx proved irresistible, and the vast Persian host was overthrown with enormous slaughter and scattered in flight. Darius fled from the field, as he had done at Issus, and sought safety behind the walls of the Median capital, Ecbatana.

The battle of Arbela was one of the decisive combats of history. It marked the end of the long struggle between the East and the West, between Persia and Greece, and prepared the way for the spread of Hellenic civilization over all Western Asia.

Alexander at Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. — From the field of Arbela Alexander marched south to Babylon, which opened its gates to him without opposition. To attach the Babylonians to himself, he restored the temples which Xerxes had destroyed, and offered sacrifices in the temple of Bel.

Susa was next entered by the conqueror. Here he seized incredible quantities of gold and silver (\$57,000,000, it is said), the treasure of the Great King. He also found here and sent back to Athens the bronze statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton¹ (p. 118), which had been carried off by Xerxes at the time of the invasion of Greece. Centuries afterwards these restored statues were to be seen in the Ceramicus.

From Susa Alexander's march was next directed to Persepolis, where he secured a treasure more than twice as great (\$138,000,000 according to some) as that found at Susa. Upon Persepolis Alexander wreaked vengeance for all Greece had suffered at the hands

¹ So Arrian, iii. 16. Other authorities, however, make it to have been some successor of Alexander who returned the statues.

of the Persians. Many of the inhabitants were massacred, and others sold into slavery; while the palaces of the Persian kings were given to the flames.¹

Alexander, having thus overthrown the power of Darius, now began to regard himself, not only as his conqueror, but as his successor, and was thus looked upon by the Persians. He assumed the pomp and state of an Oriental monarch, and required the most obsequious homage from all who approached him. His Greek and Macedonian companions, unused to paying such servile adulation to their king or leader, were much displeased at Alexander's conduct, and from this time on to his death intrigues and conspiracies were being constantly formed among them against his power and life.

The Pursuit and Death of Darius. — From Persepolis Alexander set out in pursuit of Darius, who, as we have seen, had escaped from the field at Arbela to the city of Ecbatana. As the Macedonians approached, the king fled, thinking to find a safe retreat in the remote northeastern provinces of his empire. But as Alexander pressed closely after the fugitive, one of the attendants of Darius, a general named Bessus, treacherously stabbed his master, and, fleeing, left him in a dying state by the wayside. By the time Alexander reached the spot, the king was dead. According to Plutarch, Alexander caused the body to be sent to the aged mother of Darius, in imitation of the surrender by Achilles of the body of Hector to his father Priam.

Conquest of Bactria and Sogdiana (329–328 B.C.). — Urged on by an uncontrollable desire to possess himself of the most remote countries of which any accounts had ever reached him, Alexander, after the death of Darius, led his army towards the east, and after subduing many tribes that dwelt about the southern shore of the Caspian Sea and among the mountainous regions of what is now known as Afghanistan, boldly conducted his soldiers over the snowy and dangerous passes of the Hindu Kush, and descended into the province of Bactria, in which region some have thought to

¹ Read Dryden's *Alexander's Feast*.

find the early home of the ancestors of the various peoples of Aryan race. Here Bessus, the murderer of Darius, had set up a kingdom, ruling as the successor of the Achæmenidæ. This kingdom was soon destroyed by Alexander, and Bessus himself, falling into the hands of the conqueror, was put to an ignominious death. After the reduction of Bactria, Alexander subdued the tribes of Sogdiana, a country lying still farther to the north. One of his greatest exploits in this region, was the capture of the Sogdian rock. Among the captives was a beautiful Bactrian princess, Roxana by name, who became the bride of Alexander.

Throughout these remote regions Alexander founded numerous cities, several of which bore his own name. One of them is said to have been built, wall and houses, in twenty days. These new cities were peopled with captives, and by those veterans who, because of fatigue or wounds, were no longer able to follow the conqueror in his swift campaigns.

Alexander's stay in Sogdiana was saddened by his murder of his dearest friend Clitus, who had saved his life at the Granicus. Both were heated with wine when the quarrel arose; after the deed, Alexander was overwhelmed with remorse.¹

Conquests in India. — With the countries north of the Hindu Kush subdued and settled, Alexander recrossed the mountains, and led his army down into the rich and crowded plains of India (327 B.C.). Here again he showed himself invincible, and received the submission of many of the native princes of the country.

The most formidable resistance encountered by the Macedonians was offered by a strong and wealthy king named Porus. Captured at last and brought into the presence of Alexander, his proud answer to the conqueror's question as to how he thought he ought to be treated was, "In a kingly way." Alexander gave him

¹ The Macedonian kingdom which grew out of the conquests of Alexander in Central Asia, lasted for about two centuries after his death; that is, these Bactrian countries were ruled by Hellenic princes for that length of time. Traditions of the conqueror still linger in the land, and coins, and plate with subjects from classic mythology, are frequently turned up at the present day.

back his kingdom, to be held, however, subject to the Macedonian crown.

Alexander's desire was to extend his conquests to the Ganges, but his soldiers began to murmur because of the length and hardness of their campaigns, and he reluctantly gave up the undertaking. To secure the conquests already made, he founded, at different points in the valley of the Indus, Greek towns and colonies. One of these he named Alexandria, after himself; another Bucephala, in memory of his favorite steed; and still another Nicæa, for his victories. The modern museum at Lahore contains many relics of Greek art, dug up on the site of these Macedonian cities and camps.

Rediscovery of the Sea-route from the Indus to the Euphrates. — It was Alexander's next care to bind these distant conquests in the East to those in the West. To do this, it was of the first importance to establish water-communication between India and Babylonia. Now, strange as it may seem, the Greeks had no positive knowledge of what sea the Indus emptied into, and only a vague idea that there was a water-way from the Indus to the Euphrates.¹ This important maritime route, once known to the civilized world, had been lost, and needed to be rediscovered.

So the conqueror Alexander now turned explorer. He sailed down the Indus to the head of the delta, where he founded a city, which he called Alexandria. This was to be to the trade of India what Alexandria upon the Nile was to that of Egypt. With this new commercial city established, Alexander sailed on down to the mouth of the river, and was rejoiced to find himself looking out upon the southern ocean.

He now dispatched his trusty admiral Nearchus, with a considerable fleet, to explore this sea, and to determine whether it communicated with the Euphrates. He himself, with the

¹ According to Arrian, when Alexander reached the Indus he at first thought that he had struck the upper course of the Nile. The presence in the river of crocodiles like those in Egypt, was one thing that led him to this conjecture. *Anabasis of Alexander*, vi. 1.

larger part of the army, marched westward along the coast. His march thus lay through the ancient Gedrosia, now Beluchistan, a region frightful with burning deserts, amidst which his soldiers endured almost incredible privations and sufferings.

After a trying and calamitous march of over two months, Alexander, with the survivors of his army, reached Carmania. Here, to his unbounded joy, he was joined by Nearchus, who had made the voyage from the Indus successfully, and thus "rediscovered one of the most important maritime routes of the world," the knowledge of which, among the Western nations, was never again to be lost.

To appropriately celebrate his conquests and discoveries, Alexander instituted a series of religious festivals, amidst which his soldiers forgot the dangers of their numberless battles and the hardships of their unparalleled marches, which had put to the test every power of human endurance.

And well might these veterans glory in their achievements. In a few years they had conquered half the world, and changed the whole course of history.

The Plans of Alexander : the Mutiny at Opis (324 B.C.). — As the capital of his vast empire, which now stretched from the Ionian Sea to the Indus, Alexander chose the ancient Babylon, upon the Euphrates. His designs, we have reason to believe, were to push his conquests as far to the west as he had extended them to the east. Arabia, Carthage, Italy, and Spain were to be added to his already vast domains. Indeed, the plans of Alexander embraced nothing less than the union and Hellenizing of the world. Not only were the peoples of Asia and Europe to be blended by means of colonies, but even the floras of the two continents were to be intermingled by the transplanting of fruits and trees from one continent to the other. Common laws and customs, and a common language, were to unite the world into one great family. Intermarriages were to blend the races. Alexander himself married a daughter of Darius III., and also another of Artaxerxes Ochus ; and to ten thousand of his soldiers,

whom he encouraged to take Asiatic wives, he gave magnificent gifts.

Not all the old soldiers of Alexander approved of his plans and measures, particularly since in these magnificent projects they seemed to be relegated to a second place. His Macedonian veterans were especially greatly displeased that he should enlist in his service effeminate Asiatics, and dress and equip them in the Macedonian fashion. They also disapproved of Alexander's action in wearing the Persian costume, and surrounding himself with Persian attendants. So when Alexander proposed to send back to Macedonia the aged and the maimed among his veterans, the soldiers broke out in open mutiny. Alexander caused the instigators of the sedition to be executed, and then made to the mutinous soldiers a speech such as they had never listened to before. He recalled to their minds how his father Philip had found them vagabond shepherds tending a few sheep on the mountain-sides in Macedonia, and had made them conquerors and rulers of all Thrace and Greece; and how he himself had made them conquerors of the empire of the Great King, the possessors of the riches of the world, and the envied of all mankind. He called them to witness how he had often watched through the night that they might sleep; how he had shared with them the fatigue of the march and the dangers of the battle, declaring that the front part of his body was covered with scars of wounds from all kinds of weapons — swords, arrows, stones and other missiles. Having thus spoken to them, he dismissed them, ordering them to depart at once for their homes.¹

By these words the mutinous spirit of the soldiers was completely subdued, and with every expression of contrition for their fault and of devotion to their old commander they begged for forgiveness and reinstatement in his favor. Alexander was moved by their entreaties, and gave them assurances that they were once more his companions and kinsmen. The reconciliation was cele-

¹ Arrian, vii, 9, 10.

brated by a magnificent banquet in which more than nine thousand participated.¹

The Death of Alexander (323 B.C.). — In the midst of his vast projects, Alexander was seized by a fever, brought on, doubtless, by his insane excesses, and died at Babylon, 323 B.C., in the thirty-second year of his age. His soldiers could not let him die without seeing him. The watchers of the palace were obliged to open the doors to them, and the veterans of a hundred battle-fields filed sorrowfully past the couch of their dying commander. His body was carried, first to Memphis, but afterwards to Alexandria, in Egypt, and there enclosed in a golden coffin, over which was raised a splendid mausoleum. His ambition for celestial honors was gratified in his death; for in Egypt and elsewhere temples were dedicated to him, and divine worship was paid to his statues.



Fig. 40. COIN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT.
(Stamped at Erythræ, in Ionia.)

His Character. — We must not pass this point without a few words, at least, respecting the character of this remarkable man, who, in a brief career of twelve years, changed entirely the currents of history, forcing them into channels which they would not have followed but for the influence of his life and achievements.

We cannot deny to Alexander, in addition to a remarkable genius for military affairs, an alert and comprehensive intellect. The wisdom shown by him in the selection of Alexandria in Egypt as the great depot of the exchanges of the East and the West

¹ It was soon after this meeting that Alexander's dearest friend, Hephaestion, died at Ecbatana. Alexander indulged in most extravagant expressions of grief. He caused a funeral pyre to be erected at a cost, it is said, of 10,000 talents (\$12,000,000), and instituted in memory of his friend magnificent funeral games. He even ordered the tops of the towers of the surrounding cities to be cut off, and the horses and mules to be put in mourning by having their manes docked.

has been amply demonstrated by the rare fortunes of that city. His plan for the union of Europe and Asia, and the fusion of their different races, might indeed seem visionary, were it not that the degree in which this was actually realized in some parts of his empire during subsequent centuries attests the sanity of the attempt. He had fine tastes, and liberally encouraged art, science, and literature. Apelles, Praxiteles, and Lysippus had in him a munificent patron; and to his preceptor Aristotle he sent large collections of natural-history objects, gathered in his extended expeditions. He had an impulsive, kind, and generous nature: he avenged the murder of his enemy Darius; and he repented in bitter tears over the body of his faithful Clitus. He exposed himself like the commonest soldier, sharing with his men the hardships of the march and the dangers of the battle-field.

But Alexander was, even judged by the moral requirements of his own time, a man of many faults. He indulged in shameful excesses, and gave way to outbreaks of passion that transformed a usually mild and generous disposition into the fury of a madman. The vindictive cruelty that he sometimes manifested in his treatment of prisoners can be only partially extenuated by a reference to the usages and the standard of humanity of the age. The contradictions of his life cannot, perhaps, be better expressed than in the words once applied to the gifted Themistocles: "He was greater in genius than in character."

Results of Alexander's Conquests. — The remarkable conquests of Alexander had far-reaching consequences. They ended the long struggle between Persia and Greece, and spread Hellenic civilization over Egypt and Western Asia. The distinction between Greek and barbarian was obliterated, and the sympathies of men, hitherto so narrow and local, were widened, and thus an important preparation was made for the reception of the cosmopolitan creed of Christianity. The world was given a universal language of culture, which was a further preparation for the spread of Christian teachings. Nor should we fail to recall the rediscovery of the maritime route from India to Europe, which the historian Ranke,

regarding its influence upon trade and commerce, views as one of the most important results of Alexander's expedition.

But the evil effects of the conquest were also positive and far-reaching. The sudden acquisition by the Greeks of the enormous wealth of the Persian empire, and contact with the vices and the effeminate luxury of the Oriental nations, had a most demoralizing effect upon Hellenic life. Greece became corrupt, and she in turn corrupted Rome. Thus the civilization of antiquity was undermined.

REFERENCES. — Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*. Dodge, *Alexander* (Great Captains). Mahaffy, *The Story of Alexander's Empire* (Story of the Nations). Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. ix. pp. 505-549; *ib.* vol. x. pp. 1-212; (twelve volume ed.), vol. xii. pp. 1-49 and 49-274. Creasy, *Decisive Battles of the World*, ch. iii., entitled "The Battle of Arbela, B.C. 331."

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE GRÆCO-ORIENTAL WORLD FROM THE DEATH OF
ALEXANDER TO THE CONQUEST OF GREECE
BY THE ROMANS.


(323-146 B.C.)

Partition of Alexander's Empire.—There was no one who could wield the sword that fell from the hand of Alexander. It is said that, when dying, being asked to whom the kingdom should belong, he replied, "To the strongest," and handed his signet ring to his general Perdiccas. But Perdiccas was not strong enough to master the difficulties of the situation.¹ Indeed, who is strong enough to rule the world?

Consequently the vast empire created by Alexander's unparalleled conquests was distracted by the wranglings and wars of his successors, and before the close of the fourth century B.C. had become broken into many fragments. Besides minor states,² four well-


¹ Perdiccas, in conjunction with his brother generals, ruled at first as regent for Philip Arrhidæus, an illegitimate brother of Alexander, who was proclaimed titular king. Later the government was administered in the name of Arrhidæus and Alexander the Younger, a posthumous son of Alexander by Roxana. Both the mother and the son were murdered some years later by Cassander, the ruler of Macedonia.


² Rhodes.—The city of Rhodes, on the island of the same name, became the head of a federation of adjacent island- and coast-cities, and thus laid the basis of a remarkable commercial prosperity and naval power. One of the chief incidents in the history of the city is the memorable siege it sustained by Demetrius Poliorcetes (the Besieger) about 305 B.C., who brought in vain against its walls the most powerful engines ever used by the peoples of antiquity in siege operations. The place the city held in the commercial world is shown by the fact that, when in 227 B.C. it was destroyed by an earthquake, it was re-established, in the interests of



KINGDOMS
of the
SUCCESSORS of ALEXANDER

C. B. C. 300.

Dominions of Ptolemy 



defined and important monarchies rose out of the ruins. After the rearrangement of boundaries that followed the decisive battle of Ipsus (fought in Phrygia, 301 B.C.), these principal states had the outlines shown by the accompanying map. Their rulers were Lysimachus, Cassander, Seleucus Nicator, and Ptolemy, who had each assumed the title of king. The great horn was broken; and instead of it came up four notable ones toward the four winds of heaven.¹

Lysimachus held Thrace and the western part of Asia Minor; Cassander governed Macedonia, and claimed authority over Greece;² Seleucus Nicator ruled Syria and the countries eastward to the Indus; and Ptolemy held sway over Egypt.

The kingdom of Lysimachus soon disappeared. He was defeated by Seleucus in the year 281 B.C., and his dominions were divided. The lands in Asia Minor were joined to the Syrian kingdom, while Thrace was absorbed by Macedonia. The other monarchies were longer-lived, but all were finally overwhelmed by the now rapidly rising power of Rome. In the following paragraphs we will trace in brief outline the fortunes of each, so long as they remained independent states. We shall aim to do nothing more than merely to indicate the place of each in universal history. In a separate paragraph, space will be found for a few observations

international trade, by the voluntary contributions of a great number of princes and free cities. But Rhodes was something more than a mere commercial emporium. It was one of the chief centres of Hellenistic culture, and acquired a wide fame through its schools of art and rhetoric. Julius Cæsar studied here under Rhodian teachers of oratory. When the Romans acquired influence in the East, in the second century B.C., they, moved by commercial jealousy, made Delos the favored trade-port in the Ægean. This undermined the prosperity of Rhodes and it sank into obscurity.

Pontus.—Pontus (Greek for *sea*), a state of Asia Minor, was so called from its position upon the Euxine. It was never thoroughly conquered by the Macedonians. It has a place in history mainly because of the lustre shed upon it by the transcendent ability of one of its kings, Mithridates the Great (120-63 B.C.), who spread the fame of the little kingdom throughout the world by his able, and for a long time successful, resistance to the Roman arms. But his wars with Rome belong rather to the history of that city than to the annals of Greece.

¹ Dan. viii. 8.

² Cassander never secured complete control of Greece, hence this country is not included in his domains as these appear upon the map.

on the history of the cities of Greece proper during the period under review.

Macedonia (323-167 B.C.). — The story of Macedonia from the death of Alexander on to the conquest of the country by the Romans is made up largely of the quarrels and crimes of rival aspirants for the crown that Philip and Alexander had worn. During a great part of the period the successive Macedonian kings¹ were exercising or attempting to exercise authority over the cities of Greece. Respecting the extent of their power or influence in the peninsula, we shall find it more convenient to speak a little further on.

Macedonia was one of the first countries east of the Adriatic to come in hostile contact with the great military republic of the West. Towards the close of the third century B.C. the Macedonian king Philip V. incurred the special resentment of the Romans for having entered into an alliance with the Carthaginians in the Second Punic War. After much intrigue and a series of wars, the country was finally brought into subjection to the Italian power. The decisive battle was fought on the field of Pydna, 167 B.C., at which time the Macedonian throne was held by Perseus, son of Philip V. Some years later (in 146 B.C.) the conquered country was made into a Roman province.

Greece: the Achæan and Ætolian Leagues. — From the subjection of Greece by Philip of Macedon to the absorption of Macedonia into the growing dominions of Rome, the Greek cities of the

¹ Rulers of Macedonia from Philip III. to Perseus: —

	B.C.
Philip III., Arrhidæus (Perdiccas regent)	323-316
Cassander	316-296
Philip IV.	296-295
Demetrius I., Poliorcetes	294-287
Pyrrhus	287-286
Lysimachus and others	286-277
Antigonus Gonatas	277-239
Demetrius II.	239-229
Antigonus Doson (guardian of Philip V.)	229-220
Philip V.	220-178
Perseus	178-167

peninsula were, as we have seen, much of the time at least under the real or nominal suzerainty of the Macedonian kings. But the Greeks were never made for royal subjects, and consequently they were in a state of chronic revolt against this foreign authority.

Thus, no sooner had they heard of the death of Alexander than several of the Grecian states arose against the Macedonian general Antipater and carried on with him what is known as the Lamian War¹ (323-321 B.C.). The struggle ended disastrously for the Greeks, and Demosthenes, who had been the soul of the movement, was forced to flee from Athens. He took refuge in a temple of Poseidon on an island² just off the coast of the Peloponnesus; but being pursued thither by the agents of Antipater, he put an end to his own life by means of poison (322 B.C.).³

The next matter of moment in the history of Greece was an invasion of the Gauls (279 B.C.), kinsmen of the Celtic tribes that about a century before this time had sacked the city of Rome. The fighting strength of Macedonia having been drained into the East, the passes of the Balkan were practically unsentinelled, and thus the way was opened for the irruption into the peninsula of these frightful hordes. After having inflicted terrible suffering upon Macedonia, the savage marauders, trooping southward, forced the Pass of Thermopylæ, as the Persians had done just two hundred years before, and then, like those earlier invaders, made an attempt to rob the temple of Apollo at Delphi. Just what happened there we do not know. Tradition relates that the god himself appeared, as he is declared to have done at the time of the Persian attack

¹ From the city of Lamia in Thessaly, where Antipater was besieged by the Greeks.

² Calauria, in the neighborhood of Trœzen.

³ The Athenian orator Hyperides was also among those proscribed by Antipater. He sought an asylum in the temple of Poseidon at Hermione, but was dragged thence by Antipater's agents, and put to a cruel death (322 B.C.). Phocion had as usual during the Lamian War acted in the interests of the Macedonians (p. 433). When, later, the democratic or Home Rule party regained power at Athens he was condemned to death by the Athenians as a traitor to Athenian liberties and forced to drink the poisonous hemlock. Some time afterwards the Athenians, reversing their unjust judgment, erected a monument to his memory.

(p. 192), and, aided by the goddesses Athena and Artemis, to have wrought terrible havoc in the ranks of the frightened barbarians. What is certain is that the raid on the sacred place was somehow foiled and that the invaders were shortly afterwards driven out of Greece. After their expulsion from the peninsula, the barbarians scattered, some of the tribes settling in Asia Minor, and there giving name to the province of Galatia.¹ The celebrated Greek sculpture, the *Dying Gaul*, popularly but erroneously called the *Dying Gladiator*, is a most interesting memorial of this episode in Greek history (see Fig. 41).

In the third century B.C. there arose in Greece two important confederacies or leagues, whose history embraces almost every matter of interest and instruction in the later political life of the Greek cities. One of these, called the Achæan league, included finally all the states of the Peloponnesus,² as well as some cities outside its limits; while the other, known as the Ætolian league, comprised many of the states north of the Corinthian Gulf.³ These late attempts at federation among the Grecian cities were one expression of that tendency towards nationalism that marks this period of Greek history. They were fostered by the intense desire of all patriotic Hellenes to free themselves from the hated arbitership of Macedonia. The Greeks had learned at last—but unhappily too late—that the liberty they prized so highly could be maintained only through union.

¹ It was to these people that St. Paul addressed one of his epistles. See his Epistle to the Galatians.

² Sparta was not a member of the league at first, but its jealous and bitter enemy. The Spartan king Cleomenes III. waged with the confederated states what is known as the *Cleomenic War* (224–221 B.C.). The league sought and obtained aid of Macedonia, and Sparta was defeated. Cleomenes had just effected important reforms at Sparta, which promised to give her a new lease of life. The lands had fallen into the hands of a few, and luxury had crept in. Cleomenes by a redistribution of the lands and the abolition of all debts endeavored to restore the old order of things. But the unfortunate war with the Achæan confederates destroyed the last hope of a Spartan restoration, and the city which for five centuries had been so prominent in Grecian history soon after this sank into permanent obscurity.

³ For a study of these confederations, the first of which was very much like our

The Achæan league (281-146 B.C.) assumed importance during the first half of the third century B.C. It was in its beginnings simply a revival of a very ancient religious union (amphictyony) of the cities of Achaia. It was one of the most successful efforts ever made to unite the Greek cities into a real federal state in which all the members should enjoy perfect equality of rights and privileges. The chief promoters of the movement were Aratus (271-213 B.C.) and Philopœmen (about 252-183 B.C.), both of whom were trusted generals of the league and men of



Fig. 41 THE DYING GAUL. (A memorial of the Gallic invasion of Greece in the third century B.C.)

eminent ability and enlightened patriotism. Pausanias calls Philopœmen "the last of the Greeks," and compares him to Miltiades, because his achievements, like those of the hero of Marathon, redounded to the benefit of all Greece.¹

The Ætolian league, established about 280 B.C., was composed, not of cities, but of tribes, — chiefly the half-civilized tribes of the mountainous regions of Central Greece. Its chieftains displayed little of the statesmanship evinced by the leaders of the Achæan league, and it never became prominent in Greek affairs save from a military point of view.

own federal union, consult Freeman's valuable work entitled *History of Federal Constitutions*.

¹ viii. 52.

United, these two confederacies might have maintained the political independence of Greece ; but that spirit of dissension which we have seen to be the bane of the Hellenic peoples caused them to become, in the hands of intriguing Rome, weapons first for crushing Macedonia¹ and then for destroying each other.

Upon the conquest of Macedonia by the Romans (167 B.C.), the Ætolian league seems to have been dissolved by them, on the ground that the Ætolians had been lacking in devotion to Rome. At the same time a thousand of the leading men of the cities of the Achæan league were, on the charge of having aided Perseus during the late war, transported to Italy for trial.² Without even being granted a hearing, the exiles were kept for seventeen years as sort of hostage-prisoners in the towns of Etruria. At the expiration of this period, the survivors were permitted to return home. They returned as bitter enemies of Rome, and were largely instrumental in inciting their countrymen to acts which soon led up to a war between them and the Romans. Corinth, the most splendid city at this time of all Greece, and the most important member of the Achæan league, was taken by the Roman army under Mummius, the men were killed, the women and children sold into slavery, the rich art treasures of the city sent as trophies to Rome, and its temples and other buildings given to the flames (146 B.C.). This was the last act in the long and varied drama of the political life of ancient Greece. Henceforth it constituted simply a portion of the Roman empire, and bore the name of Achaia.

¹ In the so-called Second War between Rome and Macedonia (200-197 B.C.) both the leagues gave aid to the Romans against the Macedonian king. At the battle of Cynoscephalæ (197 B.C.) the Macedonians suffered a severe defeat, and were forced to give up their suzerainty over Greece. The Roman general Flamininus, at the Isthmian games of the year 196 B.C., proclaimed amidst indescribable demonstrations of joy on the part of the Greeks the freedom of the Grecian cities. But the Greeks soon realized how little proclamations of freedom by the Romans meant. They had escaped from the yoke of Macedonia only to find themselves subjected to the heavier yoke of Rome. But it must be admitted that they were now unfit for freedom ; Rome saved them from themselves.

² Among these prisoners was the historian Polybius. See p. 519.

Syria, or the Kingdom of the Seleucidæ (312-65 B.C.).¹—This kingdom, during the two centuries and more of its existence, played an important part in the civil history of the world. Under its first king it comprised nominally almost all the countries of Asia conquered by Alexander, thus stretching from the Hellespont to the Indus; but in reality the monarchy embraced only Asia Minor, Syria, and the old Assyria and Babylonia. Its rulers were called Seleucidæ, from the founder of the kingdom, Seleucus Nicator.²

Seleucus Nicator (312-281 B.C.), besides being a ruler of unusual ability, was a most liberal patron of learning and art. He is declared to have been “the greatest founder of cities that ever lived.” Throughout his dominions he founded a vast number, some of which endured for many centuries, and were known far and wide as centres of trade and Hellenistic civilization.

Upon the Tigris, as a rival to Babylon, he built Seleucia, which grew rapidly into a capital of six hundred thousand inhabitants. In its customs, manners, and government, it was essentially a Greek city transplanted from Europe. As Seleucia rose, Babylon sank into obscurity, and soon disappeared from history. Six other cities in different parts of the empire of Seleucus bore the name Seleucia, after himself; sixteen he called Antioch, in honor of his

¹ For the sake of following to the end the fortunes of the Seleucidæ and the Ptolemies we carry our account of Syrian and Egyptian affairs a little beyond the date (146 B.C.) which we have set as the limit of our narrative.

² These are the names of the Seleucidæ:—

	B.C.
Seleucus I., Nicator, founder of the kingdom	312-281
Antiochus I., Soter	281-261
Antiochus II., Theos	261-246
Seleucus II.	246-226
Seleucus III., Ceraunus	226-223
Antiochus III., the Great	223-187
Seleucus IV., Philopator	187-176
Antiochus IV., Epiphanes (revolt of the Jews under Judas Maccabæus).	176-164
Antiochus V., Eupator	164-162
Several obscure names	162-69
Antiochus VIII., last of the Seleucidæ	69-65

father; five he named Laodicea, for his mother; still others he called Apamea, in honor of one of his wives. Antioch on the Orontes, in Northern Syria, became after Seleucia on the Tigris the capital of the kingdom, and obtained an influence and renown as a centre of population and trade which have given its name a sure place in history.¹

This colonization of Western Asia by Greeks was, as has already been remarked, one of the most noteworthy results of the Græco-Macedonian conquest. The founding of all these cities, however, as the historian Ranke observes, "must not be reckoned solely to the credit of Seleucus and Alexander. Their origin was closely connected with the main tendencies of Greek colonization. The Greeks had struggled long and often to penetrate into



Fig. 42. COIN OF ANTIOCHUS III. (THE GREAT).

Asia, but so long as the Persian empire remained supreme they were energetically repulsed, and it was only as mercenaries that they found admittance. This bar was now removed. Released from all restrictions and attracted by the revolution in politics, the Greeks now streamed into Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt."

The successors of Seleucus Nicator led the kingdom through checkered fortunes. On different sides provinces fell away and became independent states.² Antiochus III. (223-187 B.C.), called

¹ Antioch still remains; but most of the other cities are gone, with scarcely a trace left of their former existence. Thus the site of the great capital Seleucia, once the rival of Babylon, is now marked by just a few mounds and heaps of rubbish.

² The most important of these were the following:—

1. **Pergamus.**—This was a state in Western Asia Minor, which became inde-

"the Great," raised the kingdom for a short time into great prominence; but through attempting to make conquests in Europe, and further through giving asylum to the Carthaginian general Hannibal, he incurred the fatal hostility of Rome. Quickly driven by the Roman legions across the Hellespont, he was hopelessly defeated at the battle of Magnesia (190 B.C.), and a large part of Asia Minor fell into the hands of the Romans, who gave the most of it to their friend and ally Eumenes II., king of Pergamus (see note below). After the battle of Magnesia the Syrian kingdom was of very little importance in the world's affairs.

Antiochus IV., Epiphanes (176-164 B.C.), by the pillage and desecration of the temple at Jerusalem, drove the Jews to successful revolt, under the lead of the heroic Maccabees. They retained their independence until the intervention in Syrian affairs by the Romans. Other rulers kept the kingdom in constant contention with the states of Asia Minor on the west, with the Bactrians and the Parthians on the east, and with Egypt on the south. At last, brought again into collision with Rome, the country was overrun by Pompey the Great, and became a part of the Roman Republic, 63 B.C.

Kingdom of the Ptolemies in Egypt (323-30 B.C.).—The Græco-Egyptian empire of the Ptolemies was by far the most

pendent upon the death of Seleucus Nicator (281 B.C.). Under the patronage of the Romans, it gradually grew into a powerful kingdom, which at the time of Eumenes II. (197-159 B.C.) embraced a considerable part of Asia Minor. Its capital, also called Pergamus, became a most noted centre of Greek learning and civilization, and through its great library and university gained the renown of being, next to Alexandria in Egypt, the greatest city of the Hellenistic world. Parchment was here first largely used for books in the place of Egyptian papyrus, the exportation of which the rulers of Egypt at this time forbade. In 133 B.C. Attalus III., after killing all his heirs, ended a life of folly by bequeathing his kingdom to the Roman people, who immediately took steps to secure the prize, and made it into a province under the name of Asia.

2. **Parthia.**—Parthia was a powerful non-Aryan state that grew up east of the Euphrates, in the lands that formed the heart and centre of the old Persian empire (from about 255 B.C. to 226 A.D.). Its kings were at first formidable enemies of the rulers of Syria, and later of the Romans, whom they never allowed to make any considerable conquest beyond the Euphrates.

important, in its influence upon the civilization of the world, of all the kingdoms that owed their origin to the conquests of Alexander. The founder of the house and dynasty was Ptolemy I., surnamed Soter¹ (323-283 B.C.). Ptolemy was a general under Alexander, and seemed to possess much of his great commander's ability and restless energy, with a happy freedom from his worst faults. His descendants ruled in Egypt for nearly three centuries,² a most important period in the intellectual life of the world. "A large part of the thoughts," says Gardner, "which dominate the world's views in philosophy, religion, and science, saw the light in Alexandria."

Upon the partition of the empire of Alexander, Ptolemy had received Egypt, with parts of Arabia and Libya. To these he added by conquest Cœle-Syria, Phœnicia, Palestine, Cyrene, and Cyprus. Following the usage of the time, he transported a hundred thousand Jews from Jerusalem to Alexandria, attached them to his person and policies by wise and conciliatory measures, and thus effected, in such measure as was possible, at this great capital of the Nile, that fusion of the races of the East and the West which was the dream of Alexander.

The possession of the forests of Mount Lebanon, and the command of the artisans of Phœnicia, enabled Ptolemy to realize his plan of making Egypt a naval power, and the emporium of the carrying trade between Asia and Europe. Alexandria became the

¹ That is, *Deliverer*, a name given him by the Rhodians in gratitude for military aid that he rendered them.

² The names, and dates of the reigns, of the rulers of the Græco-Egyptian kingdom are as follows:—

	B.C.
Ptolemy I., Soter	323-283
Ptolemy II., Philadelphus	283-247
Ptolemy III., Euergetes	247-222
Ptolemy IV.	222-205
Ptolemy V.	205-181
Ptolemy VI.	181-146
Several obscure names	146-51
Cleopatra, last of the line	51-30
Egypt becomes a part of the Roman empire	30

great depot of exchange for the productions of the world. At the entrance of the harbor stood the Pharos, or lighthouse, — the first structure of its kind, — which Ptolemy built to guide the fleets of the world to his capital. This edifice was reckoned one of the Seven Wonders.

But it was not alone the exchange of material products that was comprehended in Ptolemy's scheme. His aim was to make his capital the intellectual centre of the world — the place where the arts, sciences, literatures, and even the religions of the world should meet and mingle. He founded the famous Museum, a sort of college, which became the "University of the East," and established the renowned Alexandrian Library. He encouraged poets, artists, philosophers, and teachers in all departments of learning to settle in Alexandria by conferring upon them immunities and privileges, and by gifts and a munificent patronage. His court embraced the learning and genius of the age.

Ptolemy Philadelphus (283–247 B.C.) followed closely in the footsteps of his father, carrying out as far as possible the plans and policies of the preceding reign. To secure Egypt's commercial supremacy, the old Pharaonic canal uniting the Nile and the Red Sea was restored, and roads were constructed to facilitate the transportation of merchandise from the ports on that sea to the river. Philadelphus added largely to the royal library, and extended to scholars the same liberal patronage that his father had before him. It was under his direction that the important translation into Greek of the old Hebrew testament was made.¹

The surname Philadelphus (brother-lover) was given this Ptolemy on account of his tender devotion to his wife Arsinoë, who was also his sister. This usage of intermarriage among the members of the royal family — a usage in which the Ptolemies followed what was a custom of the ancient Pharaohs — was one of the causes of the contentions and calamities which at last overwhelmed the house with woes and infamy.

Ptolemy III. (247–222 B.C.) was called by the Egyptians

¹ This was the so-called Septuagint version. See p. 519.

Euergetes (benefactor), because in one of his wars—a war against the king of Syria, which led him beyond the Euphrates—he recaptured and placed again in their temples some statues of the Egyptian gods which the Persian conqueror Cambyses and the Assyrian Sargon had borne away as trophies. He was possessed of great military genius, and under him the dominions of the Ptolemies touched their widest limits; while the capital Alexandria reached the culminating point in its fame as the centre of Greek civilization.

Altogether the Ptolemies reigned in Egypt almost exactly three centuries (323–30 B.C.). Those rulers who held the throne for the last two hundred years were, with few exceptions, a succession of monsters, such as even Rome in her worst days could scarcely equal. These monarchs plunged into the most despicable excesses, and were guilty of every folly and cruelty. The usage of intermarriage, already mentioned, led to endless family quarrels, which resulted in fratricide, matricide, and all the dark deeds included in the calendar of royal crimes. The story of the beautiful but dissolute Cleopatra, the last of the house of the Ptolemies, belongs properly to the history of Rome, which city was now interfering in the affairs of the Orient. In the year 30 B.C., the year which marks the death of Cleopatra, Egypt was made a Roman province.

We have now traced the political fortunes of the Grecian cities through about six centuries of authentic history. In succeeding chapters, in order to render more complete the picture we have endeavored to draw of ancient Hellas, we shall add some details respecting Hellenic art, literature, philosophy, and society—details which could not well have been introduced in the foregoing chapters, without interrupting the movement of the narrative. Even a short study of these matters will help us to form a more adequate conception of that wonderful, many-sided genius of the Hellenic race which enabled Hellas, “captured, to lead captive her captor.”

REFERENCES.—Plutarch, *Lives of Aratus and Philopœmen*. Kingsley, “Alexandria and her Schools” (in *Sir Walter Raleigh and his Time*).

Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, ch. xv., entitled "The Successors of Alexander and Greek Civilization in the East." Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought from the Age of Alexander to the Roman Conquest*. Davidson, *The Education of the Greek People* (International Education Series), ch. viii., "Greek Education in Contact with the Great Eastern World." Grote, *History of Greece* (ten volume ed.), vol. x. pp. 213-326; (twelve volume ed.), vol. xii. pp. 274-331. Freeman, *History of Federal Government* (new edition, 1893), chs. v.-ix; gives particularly with great fulness the history of the Achæan league.



Fig. 43: COIN OF ATHENS: (Third century B.C.)

PART SIXTH.

GREEK ART, CULTURE, AND SOCIAL LIFE.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

GREEK ARCHITECTURE, SCULPTURE, AND PAINTING.

Introductory: The Greek Sense of Beauty.—The Greeks were artists by nature. They possessed an organization that was most exquisitely sensitive to impressions of the beautiful. As it has been expressed, “ugliness gave them pain like a blow.” Everything they made, from the shrines for their gods to the meanest utensils of domestic use, was beautiful. Beauty they placed next to holiness; indeed, they almost or quite made beauty and moral right the same thing. It is said that it was noted by the Greeks as something strange and exceptional that Socrates was good, notwithstanding he was ugly in feature.

The first maxim in Greek art was the same as that which formed the first principle in Greek morality—“Nothing in excess.” The Greek eye was offended at any exaggeration of parts, at any lack of symmetry or proportion in an object. The proportions of the Greek temple are perfect. Any deviations from the measurements or canons of the Greek artists are found to be departures from the ideal.

Clearness of outline was another requirement of Greek taste. The artistic Greek had a positive dislike of all vagueness or indistinctness of form. Contrast the clear-cut lines of a Greek temple with the vague, ever-vanishing lines of a mediæval Gothic cathedral.

It is possible that Nature herself taught the Greeks these first principles of their art. Nature in Greece never goes to extremes. The Grecian mountains and islands are never over-large. The climate is never excessively cold nor oppressively hot. And Nature here seems to abhor vagueness. The singular transparency of the atmosphere, especially that of Attica, lends a remarkable clearness of outline to every object. The Parthenon in its clear-cut features seems modelled after the hills that lie with such absolute clearness of form against the Attic sky.




Fig. 44. ARCHAIC MASONRY.

I. ARCHITECTURE.

Architecture of the Mycenæan Age. — The term "Pelasgian" was formerly applied to various remains of massive masonry found particularly in the lands of the Eastern Mediterranean. The origin of these works was a mystery to the Hellenes of historic times, who ascribed them to the giant Cyclops; hence the name "Cyclopean" that also attached to them.

These works exhibit three well-defined stages of development. In the earliest and rudest structures the stones are gigantic in size and scarcely touched by the chisel; in the next oldest the stones are worked into irregular polygonal blocks; while in the latest the blocks are cut into rectangular shape and laid in regular courses.

Within the last few years the spade of the archæologist has

uncovered on various sites of the Ægean lands, as at Troy, Mycenæ, and Tiryns, many additional memorials of this primitive architecture.¹ The age that erected these monuments is now very generally called the Mycenæan Age, for the reason that Mycenæ appears to have been one of the most important centres of this early wide-spread culture. What centuries witnessed the erection of the monuments whose remains we now look upon, and what was the relation of this prehistoric architecture to that of historic times, are still matters of doubt. Since the subject is still enveloped in such obscurity, and the conclusions thus far reached are barely more than conjectures, we shall do well, in the




Fig. 45. DORIC CAPITAL.



Fig. 46. IONIC CAPITAL.

present connection, to venture nothing further than the simple statement already made.²

Orders of Greek Architecture.—By the close of the sixth century Greek architecture had made considerable advance, and presented three distinct styles or orders. These are known as the Doric, the Ionic, and the Corinthian. They are distinguished from one another chiefly by differences in the proportions and ornamentation of the column.

The Doric column is without a base, and has a simple and massive capital (Fig. 45). The prototype of this order may be seen at Beni-Hassan, in Egypt. At first the Doric temples of the Greeks

¹ See pp. 24 n, and 25 n.

² For some remarks in regard to the possible connection between Mycenæan sculpture and that of historic Greece, see further on, p. 482.

were almost as massive as those of the Egyptian builders, but gradually they grew less heavy as they became permeated with the freer Greek spirit.

The Ionic column is characterized by the spiral volutes of the capital (Fig. 46). This form seems to have been borrowed from the Assyrians, and was principally employed by the Greeks of Ionia, whence its name.



Fig. 47. CORINTHIAN CAPITAL.

The Corinthian order is distinguished by its rich capital, formed of acanthus leaves (Fig. 47). This type is made up of Egyptian, Assyrian, and Grecian elements. The bell shape of the capital is in imitation of the Egyptian style. The addition of the acanthus leaves is said to have been suggested to the artist Callimachus by the pretty effect of a basket surrounded by the leaves of an acanthus plant, upon which it had accidentally fallen. This order was not much employed in Greece before the time of Alexander the Great.

The entire structure was made to harmonize with its supporting columns. The general characteristics of the orders are happily suggested by the terms we use when we speak of the "severe" Doric, the "graceful" Ionic, and the "ornate" Corinthian; or again, when we call the Ionic "the feminine," and the Doric "the masculine" type.

Greek Architecture chiefly Sacred : Early Grecian Temples. — Religion was the very breath of Greek architecture. It was religious feeling which created the noblest monuments of the architectural genius of Hellas. Hence in the few words which we shall

have to say respecting Greek architecture, our attention will be confined almost exclusively to the temples of Greece.

In the earliest times the Greeks had no temples, save the forests. The statues of the gods were first placed beneath the shelter of a tree, or within its hollow trunk. After a time, a building rudely constructed of the trunks of trees and shaped like the habitations of men marked the first step in advance. Then stone took the place of the wooden frame. With the introduction of a durable material, the artist was encouraged to expend more labor and care upon his work. At the same time he received helpful hints from the old builders of the East. Thus architecture began to make rapid strides, and by the century following the age of Solon at Athens there were many beautiful temples in different parts of the Hellenic world.

Temple of Artemis at Ephesus. - The temple of Artemis at Ephesus was one of the oldest, as well as one of the most famous, of the sacred edifices of the Greeks. The original structure was commenced about the beginning of the sixth century B.C., and, according to Pliny, was one hundred and twenty years in process of building. It was a good example of the Ionic order of architecture. Croesus gave liberally of his wealth to ornament the shrine. It was known far and wide as one of the Seven Wonders of the World.

In the year 356 B.C., on the same night, it is said, that Alexander was born, an ambitious youth, named Herostratus, fired the building, simply to immortalize his name. The roof of the structure was of cedar, and this, probably, was the only part destroyed. It was restored with even greater magnificence than at first. Alexander coveted the honor of rebuilding the temple, and proposed to the Ephesians to do so, provided that he be allowed to inscribe his name upon it. The Ephesians gracefully declined the proposal by replying that it was not right for one deity to erect a temple to another.¹ Alexander was obliged to content himself

¹ Alexander, it appears, made a similar offer to the priests of the temple of Athena Polias at Priene, a city of Caria, for a tablet has been found, upon which Alexander's name is engraved as dedicator. The slab may be seen in the British Museum.

with placing within the shrine his own portrait by Apelles. The value of the gifts and votive offerings to the temple was beyond all calculation: kings and states vied with one another in the cost and splendor of their donations. Painters and sculptors were eager to have their masterpieces assigned a place within its walls, so that it became a great national gallery of paintings and statuary.

So inviolable was the sanctity of the temple that at all times, and especially in times of tumult and danger, property and treasures were carried to it as a safe repository.¹ But the riches of the sanctuary proved too great a temptation to the Roman emperor Nero. He risked incurring the anger of its patron goddess, and robbed the temple of many statues and a vast amount of gold. Later (in 262 A.D.), the barbarian Goths enriched themselves with the spoils of the shrine. The temple itself fared but little better than the treasures it guarded. The Goths left it a ruin; and long after, some of the celebrated jasper columns were, by order of the emperor Justinian, carried to Byzantium, and there at this day uphold the dome of St. Sophia, once the most noted church, now the most famous mosque, in all the East. Other columns were taken to Italy and built into Christian churches there.²

¹ The Grecian temples were, in a certain sense, banks of deposit. They contained special chambers or vaults for the safe-keeping of valuables. The heaps of gold and silver relics discovered by Di Cesnola at Curium, in the island of Cyprus, were found in the secret subterranean vaults of a great temple. The priests often loaned out on interest the money deposited with them, the revenue from this source being added to that from the leased lands of the temple and from the tithes of war booty, to meet the expenses of the services of the shrine. We may liken the wealth of the ancient temples to that of the mediæval churches. "The gods were the wealthiest capitalists." Usually the temple property in Greece was managed solely by the priests, but the treasure of the Parthenon at Athens formed an exception to this rule. The treasure here belonged to the State, and was controlled and disposed of by the vote of the people. Even the personal property of the goddess, the gold drapery of the statue (see p. 489), which was worth about \$600,000, could be used in case of great need; but it must be replaced in due time, with a fair interest.

² The site of the temple was for many centuries lost, but in 1871 Mr. Wood, an excavator, uncovered portions of its ancient pavement, and brought to light fragments of sculpture, which may now be seen in the British Museum.

The Delphian Temple. — The first temple erected at Delphi over the spot whence issued the mysterious vapors (p. 48) was a rude wooden structure. In the year 548 B.C., the temple then standing was destroyed by fire. All the cities and states of Hellas contributed to its rebuilding. Even the king of Egypt, Amasis, sent a munificent gift. An immense construction fund was thus collected; for the temple was to exceed in magnificence anything the world had yet seen. The Athenian Alcmeonidæ, as will be recalled, were the contractors who undertook the rebuilding of the shrine (p. 119).

The structure was impressive both from its colossal size and the massive simplicity that characterizes the Doric style of architecture. It was crowded with the spoils of many battle-fields, with the rich gifts of kings, and with rare works of art. After remaining for many years secure, through the awe and reverence which its oracle inspired, it later, like the temple at Ephesus, suffered frequent spoliation. The greed of conquerors overcame all religious scruples. The Phocians robbed the temple of a treasure equivalent, it is estimated, to more than \$10,000,000 (see p. 434); and Nero is said to have plundered it of five hundred bronze images. But Constantine (emperor of Rome 306–337 A.D., and founder of Constantinople) was the Nebuchadnezzar who bore off the sacred vessels and many statues as trophies to his new capital then rising on the Hellespont.¹

¹ The French are at the present time (1895) carrying on excavations on the site of Delphi. The foundations of the ancient temple of Apollo have been laid bare; but, greatly to the disappointment of the excavators, no sculptures of value have been found. It is probable that the temple was literally stripped bare of its art treasures by the Romans. But though the spade has turned up so little of value on the site of the temple of Apollo, on other Delphian sites sculptures and inscriptions of the greatest interest and value have been brought to the light. Certain remains exhumed have been identified with the treasures of the Athenians, the Bœotians, and other communities. By far the most important discovery thus far made consists of a number of inscriptions containing hymns to Apollo, with the musical notation in connection with the words. One of these is supposed to be a composition commemorative of the miraculous deliverance of Delphi from the Gauls under Brennus in the third century B.C. (p. 459). This discovery makes a

The Athenian Acropolis and the Parthenon. — In the history of art there is no other spot in the world possessed of such interest as the flat-topped rock which constituted the Acropolis of Athens. We have seen that in early times the eminence was used as a stronghold. But later, the settlement having outgrown primitive conditions, the summit of the rock was consecrated to the temples and the worship of the deities, and came to be called "the city of the gods." During the period of



Fig. 48. THE PARTHENON. (From a photograph.)

Athenian supremacy, especially in the Periclean Age, as we have already learned (p. 263), Hellenic genius and piety adorned this spot with temples and statues that all the world has pronounced to be faultless specimens of beauty and taste.

The most celebrated of the buildings upon the Acropolis was the Parthenon, the "Residence of the virgin goddess Athena."¹

prized addition to our knowledge of Greek music. See an article entitled "Delphi," by Reginald Lister, in the *Nineteenth Century* for February, 1895.

¹ Already briefly described on p. 266.




Fig. 49. THE ACROPOLIS AT ATHENS. (Restored by G. Rehlender.)

It was built in the Doric order, of marble from the neighboring Pentelicus. This temple is regarded as the finest specimen of Greek architecture. The art exhibited in its construction is an art of ideal perfection. After standing for more than two thousand years, and having served successively as a Pagan temple, a Christian church, and a Mohammedan mosque, it finally was made to serve as a Turkish powder-magazine, in a war with the Venetians, in 1687. During the progress of this contest a bomb ignited the magazine, and more than half of the wonderful masterpiece was shattered into fragments. The front, though greatly impaired, is still standing, and is the most prominent feature of the Acropolis at the present time.¹ Even in its ruined state the structure constitutes the most highly prized memorial that we possess of the builders of the ancient world.²

Olympia and the Temple of Zeus Olympius.—The sacred plain of the Alpheus in Elis was, as we have learned, the spot where were held the renowned Olympian games. Here was raised a magnificent temple to Zeus Olympius, and round it were grouped a vast number of shrines, treasure-houses, porticos, and various other structures (see *Frontispiece*).

For many centuries these buildings adorned the consecrated spot and witnessed the recurring festivals. But in the fifth century of our era the Christian Emperor Theodosius II. ordered their destruction, as the monuments of paganism, and the splendid structures were given to the flames. Earthquakes, landslips, and the floods of the Alpheus completed in time the work of destruction and buried the ruins beneath a thick layer of earth.

¹ For short notices of other buildings at Athens, see above, pp. 235, 236, and 263-266.

² The subject of the wonderful frieze, designed by Pheidias, running round the temple was the procession which formed the most important feature of the Athenian festival known as the Great Panathenæa, which was celebrated every four years in honor of the patron goddess of Athens (p. 117). The larger part of the frieze is now in the British Museum, the Parthenon having been despoiled of its coronal of sculptures by Lord Elgin. Read Lord Byron's *The Curse of Minerva*. To the poet, Lord Elgin's act appeared worse than vandalism.

For centuries the desolate spot remained unvisited. Finally, in the year 1829, during the War of Greek Independence, the French made some diggings on the site; but the task and the honor of thoroughly excavating the chief remains was reserved for the German Government (1875-1881). The sites of no less than forty buildings were uncovered. Among these were the temple of Zeus Olympius and that of Hera. The sanctuary of Zeus was built in the Doric style and was richly decorated with sculptures. The Heraeum was a sort of museum-temple, where were reserved many precious relics, amongst which was the celebrated chest of Cypselus (p. 94). It was on the site of this building that was found the invaluable Hermes of Praxiteles (p. 492).

The Mausoleum at Halicarnassus. — This structure was another of the Seven Wonders of the World. It was a monumental tomb designed to preserve the memory of Mausolus, king of Caria, who died 352 B.C. Its erection was prompted by the love and grief of his wife Artemisia. The combined genius of the most noted artists of the age, among whom was the renowned sculptor Scopas, executed the wish of the queen. The monument was decorated with a multitude of statues and figures in relief; while surmounting it was the statue of Mausolus, standing in a marble chariot drawn by four horses.

The chief remains of the Mausoleum are numerous sculptures dug up on the site, and now preserved in the British Museum. These assure us that the admiration of the ancients was not accorded to this work without sufficient reason. It is the traditions of this beautiful structure that have given the world a name for all monuments of unusual magnificence raised in memory of the dead.

Theatres and Other Structures. — The Greek theatre was semi-circular in form, and open to the sky, as shown in the accompanying cut (Fig. 50). The structure comprised three divisions: first, the semicircle of seats for the spectators; second, the orchestra, or dancing-place for the chorus, which embraced the space between the lower range of seats and the stage; and third, the stage, a narrow platform for the actors.

The most noted of Greek theatres was the Theatre of Dionysus at Athens, which was the model of all the others. It was cut partly in the native rock on the southeastern slope of the Acropolis, the Greeks in the construction of their theatres generally taking advantage of a hillside. There were about one hundred rows of seats, the lowest one, bordering the orchestra, consisting, in later times, of sixty-seven marble arm-chairs. These were brought



Fig. 50. THE THEATRE OF DIONYSUS AT ATHENS. (From a photograph.)

to light by excavations made in the year 1862. The structure would hold thirty thousand spectators.

In this connection it will be appropriate to speak of the Choric Monument of Lysicrates, at Athens,¹ since it celebrated a dramatic victory won in 334 B.C. by Lysicrates as the leader of a chorus (see p. 548). The structure is small, being only thirty-four feet high. It is one of the earliest and most beautiful monuments left to us of the Corinthian order.

¹ Known also as the Lantern of Diogenes.

II. SCULPTURE AND PAINTING.

Beginnings of Greek Sculpture.—The relation of the sculpture of the Mycenæan Age—which may tentatively be assigned



Fig. 51. CHORAGIC MONUMENT OF LYSICRATES. (The uppermost part is a restoration.)

to the period between the sixteenth and the twelfth centuries B.C.¹—to that of the historic period in Greece is really unknown. It is possible that in the primitive art of that early time we may recognize the most archaic stage of the art of the age of Pheidias. It possibly represents the first artistic strivings of the Hellenic genius, the first rude beginnings of the most perfect art that the world has ever seen. But this is not yet a matter of knowledge. It is possible, as a recent critic has said, that the works of primitive art that have been exhumed at Hissarlik, Mycenæ, Tiryns, Orchomenus, and other places in the lands of the Eastern Mediterranean, have no closer historic relation to the later art of the Hellenes than

the specimens of carving and pottery dug from the mounds of the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi bear to the art of the race whose cities now fill those regions. Until this question has

¹ See p. 25, n. 1.

been settled beyond all possibility of doubt, the history of Greek sculpture must take its start in the seventh or sixth century B.C.

A second question, namely, What was the relation of Greek art of the sixth century to that of the Orient? admits of a more definite answer than can yet be given to the first. The earliest art in Greece to which we can without hesitation apply the term "Hellenic," exhibits distinct marks of Oriental influence. From both Egypt and Assyria, by the way of the countries of Asia Minor and through Phœnicia, the early Greek artist received models in gold, silver, ivory, and other material, decorative designs, and a knowledge of technical processes. But this was all. The Greek was never a servile imitator. His true artistic feeling caused him to reject everything unnatural and grotesque in the designs and models of the Eastern artists, while his kindling genius breathed into the rigid figures of the Oriental sculptor the breath of life, and endowed them with the beauty of the living form and the grace of suggested movement. From the beginning of the sixth century B.C. forward to the fifth we can trace clearly the growing excellence of Greek sculpture, until it blooms in the supreme beauty of the art of the Periclean Age.

Circumstances that hastened the Development of Greek Sculpture: Influence of the Gymnastic Art. — The Greeks in the most primitive times represented their gods by symbols, such as stones and pillars. Later, these were replaced by statues of wood. These figures were rude and stiff. Dædalus is said to have been the first to have improved upon these early forms. "The statues he made were like living beings; they saw, they walked. It was he who first opened their eyes, unbound their legs and their arms."¹

It was not a Dædalus, but a variety of concurring causes, which inspired the rigid forms of the early Greek artists with a living soul. As we have already said, the Greek artistic genius was first stirred

¹ Diodorus Siculus, quoted by Collignon, *Manual of Greek Archæology*, p. 104 (Wright's translation). Dædalus is, of course, only the Greek personification of the early growth and development of Greek sculpture.

by impulses and suggestions from the Orient. Then very early, as early as the eighth century B.C., bronze and marble were very generally substituted for wood. Through this change in the material wrought upon, the development of sculpture was quickened.

Still another circumstance hastened the advance of the art. It became usual, towards the latter part of the sixth century B.C., to set up images of the victors in the Olympian games. The grounds at Olympia became crowded with "a band of chosen youth in imperishable forms." Now, in representing the figures of the gods, it was thought, if not impious, at least presumptuous,




Fig. 52. THE WRESTLERS.

(" Particularly were the games promotive of sculpture, since they afforded the sculptor living models for his art." — Page 52.)

to change materially the conventional forms ; and thus a certain Egyptian rigidity was imparted to all the productions of the artist. But in the representation of the forms of mere men, the sculptor was bound by no conventionalism, being perfectly free to exercise his skill and genius in handling his subject. Progress and improvement now became possible.

In still another way did the Olympian contests and the exer-

cises of the gymnasia exert a most helpful influence upon Greek sculpture. They afforded the artist unrivalled opportunities for the study of the human form. "The whole race," as Symonds says, "lived out its sculpture and its painting, rehearsed, as it were, the great works of Pheidias and Polygnotus, in physical exercises, before it learned to express itself in marble or in color."¹

As the sacred buildings increased in number and costliness, the services of the artist were called into requisition for their adornment. At first the temple held only the statue of the god; but after a time it became, as we have already seen, a sort of national museum, — a repository of the artistic treasures of the state. The entablature, the pediments, the intercolumniations of the build-



Fig. 53. PERSEUS SLAYING THE GORGON MEDUSA. (A metope from Selinus, showing an early stage of Greek art.)

ing, and every niche of the interior of the shrine, as well as the surrounding grounds and groves, were peopled with statues and groups of figures, executed by the most renowned artists, and representing the national deities, the legendary heroes, victors at the public games, or incidents in the life of the state in which piety saw the special interposition of the god in whose honor the shrine had been raised.

The Archaic Period, down to the Persian War. — The oldest

¹ See Fig. 52; also Figs. 14 and 56.




Fig. 54. STELE OF ARISTION.
(Example of archaic Attic sculpture.)

remains of Greek sculpture are specimens of carvings in relief. Among the most important of these memorials are the sculptures from one of the temples of the ancient city of Selinus in Sicily. These date from about 600 B.C. The accompanying cut of a sculptured metope (Fig. 53) exhibits the imperfections of the sculptor's art at this period.¹ The figures are conventional and rigid, and show clearly the marks of Assyrian influence. A long interval separates these figures from the graceful forms of the frieze of the Athenian Parthenon.

Another interesting specimen of this archaic phase of Greek sculpture is seen in the "stele of Aristion" (Fig. 54), discovered in Attica in 1832, and which is regarded as one of the "first attempts of Attic sculpture." The carving is in low relief, and was painted, the color being still well preserved. The date of this work is placed at about 500 B.C. A sort of Assyrian rigidity still binds the limbs of the figure and a certain archaism of manner characterizes the whole, still there are suggestions of the grace and freedom of a truer and higher art.

Still a third monument of the art of the period preceding that of the bloom of Greek sculpture is preserved to us

¹ After the manner of this period, the sculptures were painted.

in the celebrated figures of the temple at Ægina, discovered in 1811, and now to be seen in the Museum of Munich (Fig. 55). The



Fig. 55. PEDIMENT OF THE TEMPLE AT ÆGINA. (A restoration.)

exact date of these sculptures is unknown, but they are believed to have been executed just after the battle of Salamis. They are

“the most beautiful specimens of Greek art in the archaic age now in existence.” Though in them art has not yet freed itself from the conventionalism and rigidity of the earliest types, still it is easy to see that the technical skill of the artist is growing, that his hand is becoming freer, and that his touch is more confident.



Fig. 56. THROWING THE DISCUS, OR QUDIT. (Discobolus.)

The Period of Perfection of Greek Sculpture: the Age of Pheidias.—Greek sculpture was at its best during the last half of the fifth century B.C. We can here do nothing more than mention three or four of the greatest sculptors that contributed to the glory of the age, and point out what the world regards as their masterpieces.

Myron, whose best work was probably executed about 460 B.C., was a contemporary of Pheidias. His works were chiefly in

bronze. They were strikingly life-like. One of his most celebrated pieces was the *Discobolus* or "Discus-thrower." The accompanying cut (Fig. 56) shows a copy in marble of the bronze original.¹

But the most pre-eminent sculptor of this period of perfection was Pheidias. His name was almost the only one among Greek sculptors which really lived in the memory and imagination of the Middle Ages. Pheidias was an Athenian, and was born about



Fig. 57. ATHENIAN YOUTH IN PROCESSION. (From the frieze of the Parthenon)

488 B.C. He delighted in the beautiful myths and legends of the Heroic Age, and from these often drew subjects for his art.

Pheidias being an architect as well as sculptor, his patron Pericles gave into his hands the general superintendence of those magnificent buildings with which he persuaded the Athenians to adorn their city. It was his genius which, as already

¹ Almost all the masterpieces of the Greek sculptors have perished ; they are known to us only through Roman copies. But to these copies are attributed by archaeologists a special value, since they represent, in the language of Furtwaengler, "that pick of the masterpieces of the classical epoch which pleased ancient taste and connoisseurship in the times of the highest culture."

mentioned, created the wonderful figures of the pediments and the frieze of the Parthenon.¹

The most celebrated of his colossal sculptures were the statue of Athena within the Parthenon, and that of Olympian Zeus in the temple at Olympia. The statue of Athena was of gigantic size, being about forty feet in height, and was constructed of ivory and gold, the hair, weapons, and drapery being of the latter material. One hand of the goddess rested upon a richly carved shield, while the other held aloft an ivory statue of Victory, itself a masterpiece. On her feet were golden sandals.

The statue of Olympian Zeus was also of ivory and gold. It was sixty feet high, and represented the god seated on his throne. The hair, beard, and drapery were of gold. The eyes were brilliant stones. Gems of great value decked the throne, and figures of exquisite design were sculptured on the golden robe. The colossal proportions of this wonderful work, as well as the lofty yet benign aspect of the countenance, harmonized well with the



Fig. 58. ATHENA PARTHENOS. (After a statue found at Athens in 1880, which is supposed to be a copy, executed in the second century of our era, of the colossal statue of Athena by Pheidias, described in the text.)

¹ That is to say, the designs were his; but a great part of the actual sculpturing must have been done by other hands, working under the direction of the master mind.

popular conception of the majesty and grace of the "father of gods and men." It was thought a great misfortune to die without having seen the Olympian Zeus.¹ The statue was in existence for eight hundred years. It is believed to have been carried to Constantinople, and to have perished there in a conflagration in the fifth century A.D.



Fig. 59. THE OLYMPIAN ZEUS BY PHEIDIAS.

Pheidias also executed other works both in bronze and in marble. He met an unworthy fate. First he was accused of having stolen a part of the gold put in his hands for the statue of Athena in the Parthenon. This charge was disproved by the golden drapery being taken from the statue and weighed. Then he was prosecuted on another charge. Upon the shield at the feet of the statue of Athena in the Parthenon, among the figures in the representation of a battle between the Athenians and the Amazons, Pheidias introduced a portrait of himself and also one of his patron Pericles. On account of this indiscretion, and also doubtless because of a jealous desire to discredit Pericles,²

certain persons at Athens caused the artist to be prosecuted on the charge of sacrilege. He died in prison (432 B.C.).

At the same time that Pheidias was executing his ideal representations of the gods, Polycleitus the Elder, whose home was at

¹ "Pheidias avowed that he took his idea from the representation which Homer gives in the first book of the *Iliad* in the passage thus translated by Pope:—

"He spake, and awful bends his sable brow,
Shakes his ambrosial curls, and gives the nod,
The stamp of fate and sanction of the god.
High heaven with reverence the dread signal took,
And all Olympus to the centre shook."

—BULFINCH'S *Age of Fable*.

When Pheidias had finished his work, so tradition tells, he prayed Zeus to give a token if the statue pleased him. Straightway a thunderbolt from heaven fell upon the temple floor, by which sign Pheidias knew that his work was accepted.

² See p. 256, n. 3.

Argos, was producing his renowned bronze statues of athletes. Among his pieces was one representing a spear-bearer, which was regarded as so perfect as to be known as "the Rule."

Polycleitus also executed some statues of gods and heroes, among which his *Hera* was regarded as his masterpiece. This was a gold and ivory statue of the goddess for her temple at Argos. It was surpassed in size and excellence only by the great creations of Pheidias.

Another name belonging to this period of bloom has been given a new lustre by the fresh art treasures which have been recovered through the extensive excavations begun in 1875 by German archæologists at Olympia, in Elis.¹ Among the sculptures exhumed is one of *Nike* or "Victory" (Fig. 60) by the artist Pæonius.

This beautiful statue was, according to a tradition current in the time of Pausanias,² set up at Olympia by the Messenians in commemoration of the loss and humiliation inflicted upon the



Fig. 60. RESTORED NIKE OR VICTORY OF PÆONIUS.
(Found at Olympia. After Boetticher.)

¹ See Boetticher's *Olympia*.

² Pausanias, v. 26.

Spartans, their age-long oppressors, by the affair at Sphacteria, during the course of the Peloponnesian War (p. 314).

Scopas, Praxiteles, and Lysippus (fourth century B.C.).— Though Greek sculpture attained its highest perfection in the fifth century, still the following century produced sculptors whose work possessed qualities of rare excellence. Among the names of this period those of Scopas, Praxiteles, and Lysippus hold a chief place.

Scopas (flourished about 395–350 B.C.) has already been mentioned as one of the sculptors who cut the figures that decorated the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus (p. 480). He also worked on the sculptures of a celebrated temple of Athena at Tegea, and to him is further ascribed by some the famous composition called the *Niobe Group*,¹ of which a well-known copy is to be seen to-day in the Museum at Florence.

But the most eminent sculptor of this period was Praxiteles (period of activity about 360–340 B.C.), of whom it has been said that he “rendered into stone the moods of the soul.” Among his chief pieces may be mentioned the *Cnidian Aphrodite*, the *Satyr*, *Eros*, and *Hermes*. The first of these, which stood in the temple of Aphrodite at Cnidus, was regarded by the ancients as the most perfect embodiment of the goddess of beauty. Pilgrimages were made from remote countries to Cnidus for the sake of looking upon the matchless statue. Many copies were set up in different cities. About two centuries ago, excavations at Rome brought to light a beautiful statue, supposed to be a copy of the original Cnidian Aphrodite, by Cleomenes, who lived during the first or second century B.C.²

The *Hermes* of Praxiteles was set up in the Heræum at Olympia. To the great joy of archæologists this precious memorial of antiquity was discovered by the German excavators of Olympia in

¹ Other authorities assign this work to Praxiteles.

² This is the so-called *Venus de Medici*. The name comes from the circumstance of the statue having been kept for some time after its discovery in the palace of the Medici at Rome.

1877, so that now we possess an undoubtedly original work of one of the great masters of Greek sculpture.¹

Lysippus, a native of Sicyon, is renowned for his works in bronze. His period of activity falls in the last half of the fourth century B.C. His statues were in great demand. Tradition avers, though doubtless with exaggeration, that fifteen hundred pieces of his work were to be counted in the various cities of Hellas. Many of his figures were of colossal size. Alexander gave the artist many orders for statues of himself, and also of the heroes that fell in his campaigns.²

The Pergamean School (third and second centuries B.C.).—We have already learned that Pergamus in Asia Minor became, during the



Fig. 61. HERMES WITH THE INFANT DIONYSUS. (An original work of Praxiteles, found in 1877 at Olympia.)

third century B.C., one of the centres of literary and artistic activity of the Græco-Oriental world (p. 464, n. 2). Among the memorials of this capital we have now a series of most interesting sculptures, which were exhumed on the ancient Acropolis during the years 1878–1886. The sculptures, which are in high relief and of colossal size, decorated the four sides of the substruction of a great altar dedicated to Zeus the Deliverer, in commemoration of the victory of the Greeks over the Gallic invaders of Asia

¹ Fig. 61.

² The statue of Sophocles, of which we give a cut on p. 510, is one of the most famous portrait statues of Lysippus.

Minor (p. 460). The altar is supposed to have been built by King Eumenes II. (197-159 B.C.). The subject of the sculpturings was the mythical contest of the gods with the earth-born giants, which struggle seemed to the Greeks the counterpart of their own terrific fight with the uncouth and savage Gauls. The reliefs are now in the Berlin Museum. Taken as a whole, they must be given a prominent place in the series of Greek sculptural monuments which the ravages of time have spared to us.



Fig. 62. A RESTORATION OF THE GREAT ALTAR OF ZEUS SOTER AT PERGAMUS.

The School of Rhodes.—The period which marked this great activity in art at Pergamus saw the rise also at Rhodes, at this time the commercial emporium of the Eastern Mediterranean (p. 456, n. 2), of a celebrated school of sculpture. The city became a great art centre, second only to Athens. Its streets and gardens and public edifices were literally crowded with statues. Hundreds met the eye on every hand. The island became the favorite resort of artists, and the school there founded acquired a wide renown.

Very many of the prized works of Grecian art in our museums were executed by members of this Rhodian school.

One of the most noted of the Rhodian sculptors was Chares, who was the designer of the celebrated *Colossus of Rhodes* (about




Fig. 63. THE LAOCOÖN GROUP.

280 B.C.). This work was reckoned as one of the Seven Wonders of the World.¹

But the most remarkable piece of sculpture attributed to the

¹ Its height was one hundred and seven feet, and a man could barely encircle with his arms the thumb of the statue. The expense of its erection (about

school of Rhodes is the celebrated group known as the *Laocoön*, found at Rome in 1506, and now in the Museum of the Vatican. This is generally thought to be the work of three Rhodian sculptors, — Agesander, Athenodorus, and Polydorus. The order for the work was probably given by the Roman emperor Titus (A.D. 79–81), as the group adorned his palace on one of the hills of Rome. Of this masterpiece it has been said that “it expresses physical pain and passion better than any other existing group of statuary.”¹

III. PAINTING.

Introductory. — Although the Greek artists attained a high degree of excellence in painting, still they never brought the art to that perfection which they reached in sculpture. One reason for this less perfect development of the art was that paintings were never, like statues, objects of adoration; hence less attention was directed to them.²

With the exception of antique vases, a few patches of mural decoration, and colored sculpturings, all specimens of Greek painting have perished.³ Not a single work of any great painter of

\$500,000) was met by the sale of spoils obtained by the Rhodians in war. After standing about half a century, it was overthrown by an earthquake. Nine hundred years later it was broken up and sold for old metal.

¹ Another noted marble group of the Rhodian school is known as the *Farnese Bull*, now in the Naples Museum. It was discovered in the sixteenth century in the Baths of Caracalla at Rome, whither it had been carried from Rhodes in the time of Augustus.

² The influence of religion upon the painter's art is illustrated by the Italian Renaissance, when painting entered the service of the Church. See *Mediæval and Modern History*, pp. 345, 346.

³ A word may here be said respecting the use of color by the Greeks in connection with sculpture and architecture. It is difficult for us to believe that they painted their statues and the surface of their stone buildings; but the recent discovery of statues and carved stones with the colors upon them still well preserved has placed the matter beyond all doubt. But in architecture, in later times especially, the Greek artist made only a moderate use of color. It was employed merely to bring out in stronger relief the sculptural features and to subdue the dazzling

antiquity has survived the accidents of time. Consequently our knowledge of Greek painting is derived chiefly from the description by the ancient writers of renowned works, and their anecdotes of great painters. These classical stories are always epigrams of criticism, and thus possess a technical as well as a literary and historical value. For this reason, we shall repeat some of them.

Polygnotus. — Polygnotus (flourished 475–455 B.C.) has been called the Prometheus of painting, because he was the first to give fire and animation to the expression of the countenance.¹ “In his hand,” it is affirmed, “the human features became for the first time the mirror of the soul.” Of a Polyxena,² painted by this great master, it was said that “she carried in her eyelids the whole history of the Trojan War.”

The Athenians conferred upon Polygnotus the rights of citizenship, and he, out of gratitude, painted upon the walls of some of their public buildings the grandest frescoes the world had ever looked upon. The fall of Ilium and the battle of Marathon were among the subjects he represented. On the walls of a building at Delphi, he painted a celebrated series of pictures representing the descent of Odysseus into Hades.

Zeuxis and Parrhasius. — These great artists lived and painted in the later years of the fifth century B.C. A favorite and familiar story preserves their names as companions, and commemo-

whiteness of the marble. Red and blue were the colors chiefly used, red being employed for backgrounds and blue for high and well-lighted surfaces.

¹ We possess many specimens of Greek vase painting earlier than the time of Polygnotus. But these exhibit the art in a comparatively rudimentary stage. “There was abundance of invention in attitudes and action. There was passionate love of accuracy in details of costume and of form. Art was essentially illustrative of the myths and legends which had so strong a hold on the imagination of the people. What it lacked was expression and dignity. It had the power of expression only so far as it is exhibited in action. The form of expression which reveals motives and character it had not.” — MURRAY, *Handbook of Greek Archaeology*, p. 361.

² Polyxena was a daughter of the Trojan Priam, famous for her beauty and sufferings. She was sacrificed as an atonement to the shade of Achilles.

rates their rival genius. Zeuxis, such is the story, painted a cluster of grapes which so closely imitated the real fruit that the birds pecked at them. His rival, for his piece, painted a curtain. Zeuxis asked Parrhasius to draw aside the veil and exhibit his picture. "I confess I am surpassed," generously admitted Zeuxis to his rival; "I deceived birds, but you have deceived the eyes of an experienced artist."

Zeuxis executed orders for paintings for sacred buildings in Greece and Italy, for his fame was not confined to a single land. In his latter years he refused all remuneration for his pieces, esteeming them beyond price in money.

Apelles.—Apelles, who has been called the "Raphael of antiquity," was the court-painter of Alexander the Great. He was such a consummate master of the art of painting, and carried it to such a state of perfection, that the ancient writers spoke of it as the "Art of Apelles." Among his masterpieces was a picture of Aphrodite, which represented the goddess rising from the waves, with her figure veiled in a mist of falling drops of water wrung from her hair. Centuries after the death of Apelles this painting was carried off to Italy by the Roman conquerors, and for a time adorned a temple at Rome, erected in honor of Julius Cæsar.

Several well-worn stories illustrative of the estimation in which he was held by his contemporaries are told of Apelles. One of these is respecting a contest between Apelles and some rival artists, in which horses were the objects represented.

Perceiving that the judges were unfriendly to him, and partial, Apelles insisted that less prejudiced judges should pronounce upon the merit of the respective pieces, demanding, at the same time, that the paintings be shown to some horses that were near. When brought before the pictures of his rival, the horses exhibited no concern; but upon being shown the painting of Apelles, they manifested by neighing and other intelligent signs their instant recognition of the companions the great master had created.

Still another anecdote has given the world one of its best proverbs. A cobbler criticised the shoe-latchet of one of the artist's

figures. Apelles, recognizing that what had caught the practised eye of the man was a real defect, straightway amended it. Then the cobbler ventured to offer some criticisms on one of the legs. Thereupon Apelles sharply rebuked him for passing outside his province, by replying, "Cobbler, keep to your last."

In the hands of Apelles Greek painting attained its highest excellence. After him the art declined, and no other really great name appears.

REFERENCES. — Collignon, *A Manual of Greek Archaeology* (translated from the French by John Henry Wright, 1886); has valuable references in connection with each chapter. Murray, *Handbook of Greek Archaeology* (1892) and *A History of Greek Sculpture* (revised edition, 1890), 2 vols. Perrot and Chipiez, *History of Art in Primitive Greece* (from the French, 1894), vols. i. and ii.; on "Mycenian Art." Mitchell, *History of Ancient Sculpture* (1883), pp. 137-660. Diehl, *Excursions in Greece* (from the French), ch. iv.; gives the results of excavations made on the Acropolis of Athens during the years 1882-1889. Furtwaengler, *Masterpieces of Greek Sculpture* (from the German). For additional references see Bibliography at the end of the book.

CHAPTER XXIX.

GREEK LITERATURE.

I. INTRODUCTORY.

The Greeks as Literary Artists. — In literature the Greeks far surpassed every other people of antiquity. The degree of excellence attained by them in poetry, in oratory, and in history has scarcely been surpassed by any modern people or race. Here, as in art, they are still the teachers of the world.

It was that same exquisite sense of fitness and proportion and beauty which made the Greeks artists in marble that also made them artists in Language. "Of all the beautiful things which they created," says Professor Jebb, "their own language was the most beautiful." This language they wrought into epics and lyrics and dramas and histories and orations, as incomparable in form and beauty as their temples and statues. The excellences of Greek literature — fitness, symmetry, proportion, clearness of outline — are the same as those that characterize Greek art.

Even the Greek philosophers arranged and expressed their ideas and speculations with such regard to the rules of literary art, that many of their productions are fairly entitled to a place in literature proper. Especially is this true of the earlier Greek philosophers, who wrote in hexameter verse, and of Plato, in whose works the profoundest speculations are embodied in the most perfect literary form. But as Greek philosophy, viewed as a system of thought, had a development distinct from that of Greek literature proper, we shall deal with it in a separate chap-

ter, contenting ourselves here with merely pointing out the unusually close connection in ancient Greece between philosophy and literature.

Periods of Greek Literature. — Greek literature, for the time covered by our history, is usually divided into three periods, as follows : (1) The Period before 475 B.C. ; (2) The Attic or Golden Age (475–300 B.C.) ; (3) The Alexandrian Age (300–146 B.C.).

The first period gave birth to epic and lyric poetry ; the second, to history, oratory, and, above all, to dramatic literature ; while the third period was one of decline, during which the productions of the preceding epochs were worked over and commented upon, or feebly imitated. Occasionally, however, a gleam of real genius brings back for a moment the splendors of the departing day.

II. THE PERIOD BEFORE 475 B.C.

The Homeric Poems : their Date and Authorship. — The earliest specimens of Greek poetry, as we have already learned (p. 57), are the so-called “Homeric poems,” consisting of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The first poem, which is by far the superior of the two, must be pronounced “the masterpiece of Greek literature ; perhaps of all literatures.” Before being committed to writing, it had probably been preserved and transmitted orally for several generations. It has been translated into all languages, and has been read with an ever fresh interest by generation after generation for more than two thousand years. Tradition avers that Alexander slept with a copy beneath his pillow,—a copy prepared especially for him by his preceptor Aristotle, and called the “casket edition,” from the jewelled box in which Alexander is said to have kept it. We preserve it quite as sacredly in all our courses of classical study.

The age in which the poem was written has been called the Childhood of the World. The work is characterized by the freshness and vitality of youth. The influence it exerted upon the men of Hellas is felt by the men of to-day. It has made warriors as

as well as poets. It incited the military ambition of Alexander, of Hannibal, and of Cæsar; it inspired Virgil, Dante, and Milton. All epic writers have taken it as their model.

Until the rise of modern German criticism, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were almost universally ascribed to a single bard named Homer, who was believed to have lived about the middle of the ninth or tenth century B.C., one or two centuries after the events commemorated in his poems. Though tradition represents many



Fig. 64. HOMER.

cities as contending for the honor of having been his birthplace, still he was generally regarded as a native of Smyrna, in Asia Minor. He travelled widely (so it was believed), lost his sight, and then, as a wandering minstrel, sang his immortal verses to admiring listeners in the different cities of Hellas.

But at the close of the last century (in 1795) the German scholar Wolf, after a critical study of the two Homeric poems, declared that they were not, either of them, the work of a single poet, but that each was made up of a large number of earlier short lays, or ballads. The work of uniting these separate pieces into the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, he believed to have been performed under the direction of the tyrant Peisistratus (see p. 118).

Wolf's theory opened a great "Battle of the Books." Since his day there has been no lull in the so-called "Homeric controversy." At present there are two chief theories respecting the origin of the poems. The one maintains that they are the work of many bards of different ages; the other regards them as essentially the creation of a single master-poet. The first theory supposes the *Iliad* to be a growth from a single comparatively short primary epic, the *Wrath of Achilles*, dating from pre-Dorian times.

It generally represents this archaic central epic as having been composed in Greece proper by Achaean minstrels, from thence carried by immigrants to Asia Minor, and there developed by Æolian and Ionian poets into the *Iliad* of later times. It ventures to name the eleventh, tenth, and ninth centuries B.C. as the probable time during which the epic, by successive expansions and additions, was gradually assuming its present form.¹

This same theory likewise represents the *Odyssey* as a sort of mosaic, pieced together out of pre-existing lays or epics; but the unity of the poem being so much more manifest than in the case of the *Iliad*, it supposes the work of arranging and uniting this pre-existing material to have been done by a single hand.

The second theory may be summarized in a few words. As stated by one of its ablest and most recent defenders, it maintains "that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are neither collections of short lays, nor expansions of an original brief epic, but that, on the whole, they are the composition of a poet, — the golden poet HOMER."²

The Hesiodic Poems. — Hesiod, who is believed to have lived towards the close of the eighth century B.C., was the poet of nature and of real life, especially of peasant life, in the dim transition age of Hellas. The Homeric bards sing of the deeds of heroes, and of a far-away time when gods mingled with men.³ Hesiod sings of common men, and of every-day, present duties. His greatest poem, a didactic epic, is entitled *Works and Days*. This is, in the main, a sort of farmer's calendar, in which the poet points out to the husbandman the lucky and unlucky days for doing certain kinds of work, gives him minute instructions respecting farm labor, descants upon justice, eulogizes industry, and intersperses among all his practical lines homely maxims of morality

¹ See Leaf, *Companion to the Iliad*.

² Lang, *Homer and the Epic*, p. 422. (1893.) It should be said that Andrew Lang, in the view put forward in this work, represents the poets and not the critics. His theory of the single authorship of the poems is not held by any considerable number of Homeric scholars.

³ Respecting the primitive civilization depicted in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, see above, p. 29.

and beautiful descriptive passages of the changing seasons. Virgil's *Georgics* was based upon the *Works and Days*.

Another work, called the *Theogony*, is also usually ascribed to Hesiod. This poem has been well described as being "an authorized version of the genealogy of the Greek gods and heroes."

Lyric Poetry: Pindar. — As epic poetry, represented by the Homeric and Hesiodic poems, was the characteristic production of the earlier part of the first period of Greek Literature, so was lyric poetry the most noteworthy product of the latter part of the period.

The Æolian island of Lesbos was the hearth and home of the earlier lyric poets. The songs of these Lesbian bards fairly glow and quiver with ardent passion. Among the earliest of these singers were Alcæus and Sappho (end of the seventh and first half of the sixth century B.C.). No higher praise of Alcæus is needed than mention of the fact that the Roman poet Horace was so pleased with his verses that he borrowed sometimes entire odes of the Lesbian bard.

The poetess Sappho (flourished about 610–570 B.C.) was exalted by the Greeks to a place next to Homer. Plato calls her the Tenth Muse. "Of all the poets of the world," writes Symonds, "of all the illustrious artists of literature, Sappho is the one whose every word has a peculiar and unmistakable perfume, a seal of absolute and inimitable grace." Although her fame endures, her poetry, excepting a few precious verses, has long since perished.

Anacreon (period of poetical activity about 550–500 B.C.) was a courtier at the time of the Greek tyrannies. He was a native of Ionia, but passed much of his time as a favored minstrel at the court of Polycrates of Samos (p. 95), and at that of the tyrant Hipparchus at Athens.¹

Simonides of Ceos (556–467 B.C.) lived during the Persian

¹ Only fragments of the poetry of Anacreon have come down to us. The *Anacreontea*, a collection of sixty short poems after the style of Anacreon, are spurious, having been composed by imitators of various periods of antiquity.

Wars. He composed immortal couplets for the monuments of the fallen heroes of Thermopylæ and Salamis. These epigrams were burned into the very soul of every person in Hellas.

But the greatest of the Greek lyric poets, and perhaps the greatest of all lyric poets of every age and race, was Pindar (522-448 B.C.). He was born at Thebes, but spent most of his time in the cities of Magna Græcia. Such was the reverence in which his memory was held that when Alexander, one hundred years after Pindar's time, levelled the city of Thebes to the ground on account of a revolt, the house of the poet was spared, and left standing amid the general ruin (p. 442). The greater number of Pindar's poems were inspired by the scenes of the national festivals. They describe in lofty strains the splendors of the Olympian chariot-races, or the glory of the victors at the Isthmian, the Nemean, or the Pythian games.

Pindar insists strenuously upon virtue and self-culture. With deep meaning, he says, "Become that which thou art"; that is, be that which you are made to be.

III. THE ATTIC OR GOLDEN AGE (475-300 B.C.).

Influences Favorable to a Great Literature. — The Golden Age of Greek Literature followed the Persian Wars, and was, in a large measure, produced by them. Every great literary outburst is the result of a profound stirring of the depths of national life. All Hellas had been profoundly moved by the tremendous struggle for political existence. Athens especially had hoped all, risked all, achieved all. Her citizens now felt an unwonted exaltation of life. Hence Athens naturally became the home and centre of the literary activity of the period.¹

The Attic literature embraces almost every species of composition, yet the drama, history, and oratory are its most characteristic forms. Especially favorable were the influences of the time

¹ Respecting the influence of race upon Attic culture, see above, p. 101.

for the production of great dramatic works. The two conditions, "intense activity and an appreciative audience," without which, it is asserted, a great drama cannot exist, met in the age of Pericles. Hence the unrivalled excellence of the Attic drama, the noblest production of the artistic genius of the Greeks.

The Greek Drama and Dramatists.

Origin of the Greek Drama.—The Greek drama, in both its branches of tragedy and comedy, grew out of the songs and dances instituted in honor of the god of wine—Dionysus.¹



Fig. 65. BACCHIC PROCESSION.

Tragedy (goat-song, possibly from the accompanying sacrifice of a goat) sprang from the graver songs, and comedy (village-song) from the lighter and more farcical ones. Gradually, recital and dialogue were added, there being at first but a

single speaker, then two, and finally three, which last was the classical number. Thespis (about 534 B.C) is said to have introduced this idea of the dialogue, hence the term "Thespian" applied to the tragic drama.

Owing to its origin, the Greek drama always retained a religious character, and further, presented two distinct features, the chorus (the songs and dances) and the dialogue. At first, the chorus was the all-important part; but later the dialogue became the more prominent portion, the chorus, however, always remaining an essential feature of the performance. Finally, in the golden age of the Attic stage, the chorus dancers and singers were care-

¹ The same as the Roman Bacchus.

fully trained, at great expense, and the dialogue and choral odes formed the masterpiece of some great poet,—and then the Greek drama, the most splendid creation of human genius, was complete.

The Subjects of the Tragic Poets.—The tragic poets of Athens drew the material of their plays chiefly from the myths and legends of the heroic age, just as Shakespeare for many of his plays used the legends of the semi-historical periods of his own country or of other lands. These legendary tales they handled freely, so changing, coloring, and moralizing them as to render them the vehicle for the conveying of great ethical lessons, or of profound philosophical ideas regarding the divine government of the world. Indeed the mission of the tragic poets was to harmonize the fuller knowledge, the truer religious feeling of the age, with the ancient traditions and myths,—to reveal the ethical truth which the old stories of the gods and heroes contained, or which they might be made to symbolize.

The Leading Idea of Greek Tragedy.—Symonds believes the fundamental idea of Greek tragedy to be the doctrine of Nemesis. This doctrine seems to have been evolved out of the old idea of the Divine Jealousy (p. 54). Just as we have softened and moralized the old Hebrew idea that all suffering is divine punishment for sin, evolving from it the Christian doctrine of affliction, which regards a large part of human troubles and sufferings, not as penal inflictions, but rather as trials intended as a means of spiritual development; in like manner the Greeks moralized their unethical views of the cause of sudden reverses of fortune, of sudden downfalls, and came to hold the doctrine that it is not mere prosperity itself which arouses the anger and opposition of the gods, but the pride and arrogance usually engendered in mortals by over-great prosperity.

To understand how the Greeks should have come to regard insolent self-assertion, or the unrestrained indulgence of appetite or passion as the most heinous of sins, we must recall once more the legend upon the front of the Delphian temple—"Measure in all things." As proportion was the cardinal element of beauty in art,

so wise moderation was the prime quality in virtue. Those who moderated not their desire of fame, of wealth, of dominion, were the most impious of men, and all such the avenging Nemesis failed not to bring, through their own mad presumption and over-vaulting ambition, to overwhelming and irretrievable ruin. The results of the Persian War confirmed the Greeks in this view of the moral government of the world; for had not they themselves seen most signally punished the unbridled ambition, the insolence, the presumptuous impiety, of the scourgers of the Hellespont and the destroyers of the temples of the gods?

We shall see in a moment how this idea inspired some of the greatest of the Greek dramas.

The Three Great Tragic Poets. — There are three great names in Greek tragedy, — Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. These




Fig. 66. ÆSCHYLUS.

dramatists all wrote during the splendid period which followed the victories of the Persian War, when the intellectual life of all Hellas, and especially that of Athens, was strung to the highest tension. This lent nervous power and intensity to almost all they wrote, particularly to the tragedies of Æschylus and Sophocles. Of the two hundred and fifty-eight dramas produced by these poets,

only thirty-two have come down to us; all the others have perished through the accidents of time.

Æschylus (525–456 B.C.) was more than Shakespearian in the gloom and intensity of his tragedies. He knew how to touch the hearts of the generation that had won the victories of the Persian

War ; for he had fought with honor both at Marathon and at Salamis. But it was on a very different arena that he was destined to win his most enduring fame. Eleven times did he carry off the prize in tragic composition. The Athenians called him the "Father of Tragedy." *Prometheus Bound* is one of his chief works—"one of the boldest and most original dramas," Ranke declares, "that has ever been written." The old Promethean myth which Æschylus makes the ground-work of this tragedy was immoral ; that is, it represents the Supreme Zeus as treating the Titan arbitrarily and unjustly.¹ But Æschylus moralizes the tale. He makes prominent Prometheus' faults of impatience and self-will, and shows that his sufferings are but the just penalty of his presumption and self-assertion.

Another of the great tragedies of Æschylus is his *Agamemnon*, thought by some to be his masterpiece. The subject is the crime of Clytemnestra (p. 25). It is a tragedy crowded with spirit-shaking terrors, and filled with more than human crimes and woes. Nowhere is portrayed with greater power the awful vengeance with which the implacable Nemesis is armed.²

The theme of Æschylus' *Persæ* was the defeat of Xerxes and his host, which afforded the poet a good opportunity "to state his philosophy of Nemesis, here being a splendid tragic instance of pride humbled, of greatness brought to nothing, through one man's impiety and pride." The poet teaches that "no mortal may dare raise his heart too high,"—that "Zeus tames excessive lifting up of heart."

Sophocles (about 496–405 B.C.) while yet a youth gained the

¹ In punishment for having stolen fire from heaven and given it to men, and for having taught them the arts of life, the Titan Prometheus is chained by Zeus to a lonely cliff on the remote shores of the Euxine, and an eagle is sent to feed upon his liver, which each night grows anew.

² The *Agamemnon* forms the first of a *trilogy* ; that is, a series of three dramas, the other pieces being entitled the *Choëphoræ* and the *Eumenides*. These continue the subject of the *Agamemnon*, so that the three really form a single drama or story. On the Greek stage, the several parts of the trilogy were performed successively the same day. This trilogy of Æschylus is the only one from the ancient stage of which all the parts have come down to us.

prize in a poetic contest with Æschylus (468 B.C.), Cimon being the chief umpire. Plutarch says that Æschylus was so chagrined by his defeat that he left Athens and retired to Sicily. Sophocles

now became the leader of tragedy at Athens. In almost every contest he carried away the first prize. He lived through nearly a century, a century, too, that comprised the most brilliant period of the life of Hellas. His dramas were perfect works of art.

The central idea of his dramas is the same as that which characterizes those of Æschylus; namely, that self-will and insolent pride arouse the righteous indignation of the gods, and that no mortal can contend successfully against the will of Zeus. But a new thought appears, which belongs rather to the Hebrew than to the Hellenic view of life; namely, the educative and purifying effect on character of suffering. The chief works of Sophocles are *Œdipus Tyrannus*, *Œdipus Coloneus*, and *Antigone*, all of



Fig. 67. SOPHOCLES.

which are founded upon the old tales of the royal line of Thebes (p. 19).

Euripides (480-406 B.C.) was a more popular dramatist than either Æschylus or Sophocles. Æschylus was too lofty, severe, and earnest a poet to be long favorite with the volatile and

pleasure-loving Athenians. They tired of him as they did of Aristides. Nor was Sophocles sensational enough to please them, after the state of exalted religious feeling awakened by the tremendous experiences of the Persian War had passed away. Euripides was a better representative than either of these of the Athenian in his normal mood. The Athenian cared more for æsthetics than for ethics.

The fame of Euripides passed far beyond the limits of Greece. Herodotus asserts that the verses of the poet were recited by the natives of the remote country of Gedrosia; and Plutarch says that the Sicilians were so fond of his lines that many of the Athenian prisoners, taken before Syracuse, bought their liberty by teaching their masters such of his verses as they could repeat from memory. Euripides is said to have written nearly one hundred plays, of which number, however, only seventeen remain to us. Almost all of these are based on incidents detailed in the Argonautic, Theban, and Trojan legends.




Fig. 68. EURIPIDES.

Comedy : Aristophanes. — Foremost among all writers of comedy must be placed Aristophanes (about 450-385 B.C.). He introduces us to the every-day life of the least admirable classes of Athenian society. Four of his most noted works are the *Clouds*, the *Knights*, the *Birds*, and the *Wasps*.

In the comedy of the *Clouds*, Aristophanes especially ridicules the Sophists, a school of philosophers and teachers just then rising into prominence at Athens, of whom the satirist unfairly makes Socrates the representative. But the points of the play were susceptible of a general application. "Everything that deceived, concealed, shifted, eluded, was symbolized by clouds."

The aim of the *Knights* was the punishment and ruin of Cleon, whom we already know as one of the most conceited and insolent of the demagogues of Athens.

The play of the *Birds* is "the everlasting allegory of foolish sham and flimsy ambition." "Cloud-Cuckootown," we quote the critic Symonds, "is any castle in the air or South Sea Bubble which might take the fancy of the Athenian mob." But while having a general application, it was aimed particularly at the ambitious Sicilian schemes of Alcibiades; for at the time the play appeared, the Athenian army was before Syracuse, and elated by the good news daily arriving, the Athenians were building the most gorgeous air-castles, and indulging in the most extravagant day-dreams of universal dominion.

In the *Wasps*, the poet satirizes the proceedings in the Athenian law-courts, by showing how the great citizen-juries were befooled by the demagogues.

But Aristophanes was something more than a master of mere mirth-provoking satire and ridicule: along with his exquisite sense of the humorous he possessed a nature most delicately sensitive to the finer emotions. Many of the choruses of his pieces are inexpressibly tender and beautiful.¹

History and Historians.

Poetry is the first form of literary expression among all peoples. So we must not be surprised to find that it was not until several centuries after the composition of the Homeric poems — that is, about the sixth century B.C. — that prose-writing appeared among the Greeks. Historical composition was then first cultivated. We can speak briefly of only three historians — Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon — whose names were cherished among the ancients, and whose writings are highly valued and carefully studied by ourselves.

¹ *Menander* (342-292 B.C.). — Menander was, after Aristophanes, the most noted of Greek comic poets. He was the leader of what is known as the New Comedy. His plays were very popular with the Romans.

Herodotus.—Herodotus (about 484–425 B.C.), born at Halicarnassus, in Asia Minor, is called the “Father of History.” He travelled over much of the then known world; visited Italy, Egypt, and Babylonia; and describes as an eye-witness, with a never-failing vivacity and freshness, the wonders of the different lands he had seen.* Herodotus lived in a story-telling age, and he is himself an inimitable story-teller. To him we are indebted for a large part of the tales of antiquity—stories of men and events which we never tire of repeating. He was over-credulous, and was often imposed upon by his guides in Egypt and at Babylon; but he describes with great care and accuracy what he himself saw. It is sometimes very difficult, however, to determine just what he actually did see with his own eyes and experience in his own person; for it seems certain, that, following the custom of the story-tellers of his time, he often related as his own personal adventures the experiences of others, yet with no thought of deceiving. In this he might be likened to our modern writers of historical romances.

The central theme of his great History is the Persian Wars, the struggle between Asia and Greece. Around this he groups the several stories of the nations of antiquity. In the pictures which the artist-historian draws, we see vividly contrasted, as in no other writings, the East and the West, Persia and Hellas.

The fundamental idea of the whole history, the conception which shapes and colors the main narrative, is the same as that which inspires the tragedies of Æschylus,—the doctrine of Nemesis. This is expressed in the admonition which Artabanus is represented as giving to his nephew Xerxes, when the king was meditating his expedition against Greece: “The god loves to cut down all towering things . . . the god suffers none but himself to be haughty. Rash haste ever goes before a fall; but self-restraint



Fig. 69. HERODOTUS.

brings blessings, not seen at the moment perhaps, yet found out in due time.”¹ Possessed by this idea, the historian becomes a dramatist, and his history a world-tragedy. In the ethical lesson it teaches, it is practically an expansion of the Æschylean drama of the *Persæ*.

Besides this leading Herodotean idea of Nemesis, there are two other important conceptions entering into the historian's philosophy of the universe. These are the notion of the Divine Envy (p. 54), and the general doctrine of the interference of the gods in human affairs. Herodotus had a naïve belief in omens, oracles,




Fig. 70. THUCYDIDES.

and miracles generally, and this leads him constantly to attribute to preternatural causes the most ordinary events of history. His belief in the old immoral doctrine of the Envy of the gods, — which he retains along with his maturer views of Nemesis, — causes him to delight in telling stories illustrative of the vicissitudes of life and the instability of fortune, as witness his tales of Polycrates and Croesus.²

Thucydides. — Thucydides (about 471–400 B.C.), though not so popular an historian as Herodotus, was a much more philosophical writer. He was born near Athens. An interesting story is told of his youth, which must be repeated, though critics have pronounced it fabulous. The tale is that Thucydides, when only fifteen, was taken by his father to hear Herodotus recite his history at the Olympic games, and that the reading and the

¹ Herodotus, vii. 10. Quoted by Professor Jebb, *Greek Literature*, p. 105.

² See above, pp. 94, 114, and 131.

accompanying applause caused the boy to shed tears, and to resolve to become an historian.

Respecting the manner in which Thucydides, in the course of the Peloponnesian War, incurred the displeasure of the Athenians and was sent into the exile which afforded him leisure to compose his history of that great struggle, we have already spoken (p. 324). Through the closest observation and study, he qualified himself to become the historian of what he from the first foresaw would prove a memorable war. "I lived," he says, "through its whole extent, in the very flower of my understanding and strength, and with a close application of my thoughts, to gain an exact insight into all its occurrences." As we have already learned,¹ Thucydides died before his task was completed. His work is considered a model of historical writing. In fairness, truthfulness, clearness, and philosophical insight, Thucydides has never been surpassed as a narrator and interpreter of events. Demosthenes read and re-read his writings to improve his own style; and the greatest orators and historians of modern times have been equally diligent students of the work of the great Athenian.

Xenophon. — Xenophon (about 445-355 B.C.) was an Athenian, and is known both as a general and a writer. The works that render his name so familiar are his *Anabasis*, a simple yet thrilling narrative of the expedition of the Ten Thousand Greeks (p. 398); and his *Memorabilia*, or "Recollections" of Socrates. This work by his devoted yet by no means brilliant pupil is the most faithful portraiture that we possess of that philosopher.

Xenophon's *Cyropædia*, or "Education of Cyrus," is essentially an historical romance, which portrays not alone the youth, but the whole life of Cyrus the Great, besides delineating the manners and institutions of the Persians. It has been classed with Plato's *Republic* and More's *Utopia*.

¹ See above, p. 386, n. 2.

Oratory.

Influence of Democratic Institutions.—The art of oratory among the Greeks was fostered and developed by the generally democratic character of their institutions. In the public assemblies of the free cities all questions that concerned the state were discussed and decided. The debates, as we have seen, were, in the democratic cities, open to all. The gift of eloquence secured for its possessor a sure pre-eminence, and conferred a certain leadership in the affairs of state. The great jury courts of Athens (p. 262) were also schools of oratory; for every citizen there was obliged to be his own advocate and to defend his own case.¹ Hence the attention bestowed upon public speaking, and the high degree of perfection attained by the Greeks in the difficult art of persuasion. "It was the prevalence of the habit of public speaking," says Grote, "that was one of the principal causes of the intellectual eminence of the nation generally." Almost all the prominent Athenian statesmen were masters of oratory.

Antiphon, Lysias, Isocrates, and Isæus.—Antiphon (480–411 B.C.) was regarded by the Greeks as the first of the ten Athenian orators. Lysias (458–? 378 B.C.), Isocrates (436–338 B.C.), and Isæus (b. about 420 B.C.) were all noted representatives of the art of political or forensic oratory, and forerunners of Demosthenes. We should call Isocrates a rhetorician instead of an orator, as his discourses (which for the most part were written for others to deliver) were intended to be read rather than spoken. The Roman Cicero was his debtor and imitator.

Demosthenes.—It has been the fortune of Demosthenes (385–322 B.C.) to have his name become throughout the world the synonym of eloquence. The labors and struggles by which, according to tradition, he achieved excellence in his art are held up anew to

¹ The oratory of the Athenian law-courts was not always, it must be confessed, of a very high order. To move the sympathies of the jurors, the speakers too often had recourse to the low arts of the demagogue. Yet in general these courts certainly developed a popular taste and aptitude for public speaking.

each generation of youth as guides of the path to success. His first address before the public assembly was a complete failure, owing to defects of voice and manner. With indomitable will he set himself to the task of correcting these. He shut himself up in a cave, and gave himself to the diligent study of Thucydides. That he might not be tempted to spend his time in society, he rendered his appearance ridiculous by shaving one side of his head. To correct a stammering utterance, he spoke with pebbles in his mouth, and broke himself of an ungainly habit of shrugging his shoulders by speaking beneath a suspended sword. To accustom himself to the tumult and interruptions of the public assembly, he declaimed upon the noisiest sea-shore.

These are some of the many stories told of the world's greatest orator. There is doubtless this much truth in them at least — that Demosthenes attained success, in spite of great discouragements, by persevering and laborious effort. It is certain that he was a most diligent student of Thucydides, whose great history he is said to have known by heart. More than sixty of his orations have been preserved. "Of all human productions they present to us the models which approach the nearest to perfection."

The latter part of the life of Demosthenes is intertwined with that of another and rival Athenian orator, Æschines. For his services to the state, the Athenians awarded to Demosthenes a crown of gold. Æschines, along with other enemies of the orator, attacked this measure of the assembly and brought the matter to a trial. All Athens and strangers from far and near gathered to hear the rival orators; for every matter at Athens, as we have seen, was decided by a great debate. Demosthenes made the grandest effort of his life. His address, known as the *Oration on the Crown*, has been declared to be "the most polished and powerful effort of human oratory." It was an unanswerable defense by Demosthenes of his whole policy of opposition to Philip of Macedon, and of his counsel to the Athenians to try doubtful battle with him on the fatal field of Chæronea (p. 435). The refrain that runs through all the speech is this: It is better to

have fought at Chæronea and to have left our dead on the lost field, than never to have undertaken battle in defense of the liberties of Hellas. It was ours to do our duty, the issue rested with the gods.¹ Æschines was completely crushed. He left Athens and became a teacher of oratory at Rhodes.²

Respecting the several orations of Demosthenes against Philip of Macedon, and the death of the eloquent patriot, we have already spoken (pp. 432 and 459).

IV. THE ALEXANDRIAN AGE (300-146 B.C.).

Character of the Literature.—The Alexandrian period of Greek literature embraces the time between the break-up of Alexander's empire and the conquest of Greece by Rome (300-146 B.C.). During this period Alexandria in Egypt was the centre of literary activity, hence the term "Alexandrian," applied to the literature of the age. The great museum and library of the Ptolemies afforded in that capital such facilities for students and authors as existed in no other city in the world.

But the creative age of Greek literature was over. With the loss of political liberty and the decay of faith in the old religion, literature was cut off from its sources of inspiration. Consequently, the Alexandrian literature lacked freshness, spontaneity, originality. It was imitative, critical, and learned. The writers of the period were grammarians, commentators, and translators—in a word, book-worms.

Works and Writers.—One of the most important literary undertakings of the age was the translation of the Old Testament of

¹ It should be borne in mind that the oration was given in the year 330 B.C., when the Macedonian power was supreme, with Alexander lord of both the East and the West.

² Æschines is said to have once gathered his disciples about him, and to have read to them the oration of Demosthenes that had proved so fatal to himself. Carried away by the torrent of its eloquence, his pupils, unable to restrain their enthusiasm, burst into applause. "Ah!" said Æschines, who seemed to find solace in the fact that his defeat had been at the hands of so worthy an antagonist "you should have heard the wild beast himself!"

the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek. From the traditional number of translators (seventy) the version is known as the *Septuagint*. This great work, as we have seen (p. 467), was carried on under the direction and patronage of Ptolemy Philadelphus.

It was also during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus that Manetho wrote, from the monuments, his history of Egypt. Just about the same time Berossus compiled, for one of the Seleucidæ, the chronicles of Chaldæa. We possess only fragments of these works, but these have a high historical value.

Among the poets of the period one name, and only one, stands out clear and pre eminent. This is that of Theocritus, a Sicilian idyllist, who wrote at Alexandria under Ptolemy Philadelphus. His idyls are beautiful pictures of Sicilian pastoral life.

During the Alexandrian period science was cultivated by Greek scholars with considerable success; but the names most noted in this department will more properly find a place in the following chapter on Greek philosophy and science.

Conclusion: Græco-Roman Writers.—After the Roman conquest of Greece, the centre of Greek literary activity shifted from Alexandria to Rome. Hence Greek literature now passes into what is known as its Græco-Roman Period (146 B.C.-527 A.D.).

The most noted historical writer of the first part of this period was Polybius (about 203-121 B.C.), who wrote a history of the Roman conquests from 264 to 146 B.C. His work, though the larger part of it has reached us in a mutilated state, is of great worth; for Polybius wrote of matters that had become history in his own day. He had lived to see the larger part of the world he knew absorbed by the ever-growing power of the Imperial City.

Diodorus Siculus (lived under Augustus Cæsar at Rome) was the author of a general history of the world. Herodotus had grouped all his material about the struggle between Greece and Persia, but Diodorus Siculus makes Rome the centre of the whole story. Already men were coming to regard Rome as the preordained head and ruler of the world.

Plutarch (b. about 40 A.D.), "the prince of biographers," will

always live in literature as the author of the *Parallel Lives*, in which, with great wealth of illustrative anecdotes, he compares or contrasts Greek and Roman statesmen and soldiers. The motive that led Plutarch to write the book, as we may infer from the partiality which he displays for his Grecian heroes, was a desire to let the world know that Hellas had once bred men the peers of the best men that Rome had ever brought forth.

REFERENCES.—Leaf, *Companion to the Iliad*; maintains that the *Iliad* is a growth from a single poem, added to from time to time by many hands. Lang, *Homer and the Epic* (1893); supports the theory of the single authorship of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Jebb, *Homer: An Introduction to the Iliad and Odyssey* (3d ed., 1888), and *The Growth and Influence of Classical Greek Poetry*; also his *Primer of Greek Literature* and *Attic Orators*, 2 vols. Church, *Stories from the Greek Tragedians*. Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, vol. i. pp. 1-114, for a very interesting sketch of the life of Herodotus and his merits and defects as a historian. Donaldson, *The Theatre of the Greeks*; a treatise on the history and exhibition of the Greek Drama. Felton, *Greece, Ancient and Modern*, vol. i. pp. 3-267, on the Greek Language and Poetry; *ib.* vol. ii. pp. 111-246, six lectures on the orators of Greece. Macaulay's essay, entitled "On the Athenian Orators." Mahaffy, *History of Classical Greek Literature*, 2 vols. Jevons, *History of Greek Literature*. A. E. Haigh, *The Attic Theatre*. "A description of the stage and theatre of the Athenians, and of the dramatic performances at Athens" (1889). We give this important book a place here, though it contains much matter of theatrical rather than literary interest. It is designed for the specialist.

CHAPTER XXX.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE.

Relation of Mythology to Philosophy: Use of Verse in Speculation. — Philosophy has been very aptly defined as mythology grown old and wise. Grecian mythology did not become sufficiently wise to be called philosophy until the sixth century B.C. About that time the Greeks began to think and to inquire in a philosophical manner respecting the phenomena and laws of the universe of mind and matter, giving the most attention at first, however, to the physical world. Having once entered upon this path, the Greek thinkers reached, almost at a bound, the loftiest heights of philosophical speculation.

All the earlier Greek philosophers were poet-philosophers; that is, they conveyed their instruction in verse, "dragging the hexameter," as one figures it, "along the pathway of their argument upon the entities, like a pompous sacrificial vestment." Heraclitus (about 536-470 B.C.) was the first prominent thinker to employ prose in philosophical discussions.

The Seven Sages: the Forerunners. — About the sixth century B.C. there lived and taught in different parts of Hellas many philosophers of real or reputed originality and wisdom. Among these were seven men, called the "Seven Sages," who held the place of pre-eminence. As in the case of the Seven Wonders of the World, ancient writers were not always agreed as to what names should be accorded the honor of enrolment in the sacred number. Thales, Solon, Periander, Cleobulus, Chilo, Bias, and Pittacus are, however, usually reckoned as the Seven Wise Men.¹

¹ All accounts agree in naming Thales, Solon, Bias, and Pittacus.

To them belongs the distinction of having first aroused the Greek intellect to philosophical thought. The wise sayings — such as “Know thyself” and “Nothing in excess” — attributed to them, are beyond number.

It will be noticed that several of the sages were tyrants or law-givers. This is not a mere coincidence ; it is explained by the fact that participation in active political life stirs and quickens the intellect.

The ethical maxims and practical proverbs ascribed to the Sages, while, like the so-called proverbs of Solomon, they contain a vast amount of practical wisdom, still do not constitute philosophy proper, which is a systematic search for the reason and causes of things. They form simply the introduction or prelude to Greek philosophy.

The Milesian or Ionic Philosophers. — The first Greek school of philosophy grew up in the cities of Ionia, in Asia Minor, where almost all forms of Hellenic culture seem to have had their beginnings. The founder of the system was Thales of Miletus (about 624-548 B.C.), who was followed by Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus.

One tenet held in common by all these philosophers was that matter and mind are inseparable ; or, in other words, that all matter is animate. They never thought of the soul as something distinct and separable from matter, as we do. Even the shade in Hades was conceived as having a body in every respect like that the soul possessed in the earthly life, only it was composed of a subtler substance. This conception of matter as being alive will help us to understand Greek mythology, which, it will be remembered, endowed trees, rivers, springs, clouds, the planets, all physical objects, indeed, with intelligence and will.

This sensate matter the philosophers held to be eternal, regarding creation and annihilation as both alike impossible.

But this animated matter appeared under four forms, — fire, air, water, and earth, the well-known “four elements.”¹ Out of these

¹ At first the elements numbered only three, — air, water, and earth, — fire being

four elements all things in heaven and earth were made. But the philosophers differed as to which of the four elements was the original principle, that is, the one from which all the others were derived; for the Greek mind could not rest until it had found unity. Thales believed water to be the first principle; Anaximenes urged that it was air; while Heraclitus taught that it was fire.¹

From the original element all the others were supposed to be derived by a process of rarefaction and condensation. (This notion is somewhat like the modern theory of astronomical evolution, which, from an original infinitely expanded gaseous nebula, produces by successive condensations the air, the water, and the solid rock of the various planets.) Rain was simply condensed air. The wood and flesh of the sacrifice, when consumed upon the altar, were merely transformed into fire (ether), which, seeking its own, naturally mounted to its native sphere—the empyrean. This philosophical notion helps us to understand the fundamental idea of the ancient sacrifices. The gods were pleased with the offerings, because these being converted into flame or ether, could be actually partaken of as food by the celestials.

Pythagoras. — Pythagoras (about 580 500 B.C.) was born on the island of Samos, whence his title of the “Samian Sage.” The most of his later years were passed at Croton, in Southern Italy, where he became the founder of a celebrated brotherhood or association. This was a sort of moral reform league, characterized by certain ascetic tendencies, and which exerted a wide and important influence upon the political affairs and the thought of the times.

Somehow the personality of Pythagoras deeply impressed the imagination of a later age, and he became the subject of a myth regarded as simply a kind of refined air. These elements of the ancient philosophers answer to the seventy or more elements of modern chemistry.

¹ By the term “fire” the ancient philosophers meant about what we understand by the term “ether” (which comes from the Greek word *αἰθήρ*, meaning “to burn”). The ether or fire formed a sphere above the air, ensphering it just as it in turn enspheres the earth.

or legend. The legend avers that he visited Egypt and other lands of the Orient, and thus became versed in all the wisdom of the East. It represents him later in the midst of his disciples at Croton, eliciting admiration and reverence through studied peculiarities of dress and manner. It tells how his pupils, in the first years of their novitiate, were never allowed to look upon their master ; how they listened to his lectures from behind a curtain ; and how in debate they used no other argument than the words *Ipse dixit*, "he himself said so."

How large an element of truth this legend contains, we have no means of determining. It is not improbable that Pythagoras visited Egypt, and that he brought from thence the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul as well as a knowledge of certain mathematical principles, which he is represented as teaching. But many of the doctrines ascribed to him were doctrines formulated later by his disciples, and given currency under his name. It is therefore impossible to state with positiveness what Pythagoras himself did teach. Pythagoreanism must be looked upon as the product of a school rather than of a single mind.

Among the speculations of the Pythagoreans, their teachings respecting metempsychosis and their astronomical opinions have excited the most interest in modern times. They taught the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul, an idea that may possibly, as tradition affirms, have been brought from Egypt by Pythagoras himself. In respect to astronomy, they held views anticipating by two thousand years those of Copernicus and his school. They taught that the earth is a sphere, and that it, together with the other planets, revolves about a central globe of fire, "the hearth or altar of the universe." Some of the school are further said to have held the advanced view that the earth rotates on its axis.

From the Pythagorean school comes the pretty conceit of the "music of the spheres." They imagined that the heavenly bodies were arranged in space at such intervals from each other as to form a sort of musical scale, and that by their swift motion they produced

harmonious notes. This celestial melody, however, was too refined for mortal ears.¹

The Pythagoreans, as we have intimated, were reformers as well as philosophers. Their zeal in reforming society and the state involved them in the political contentions of the time, and this resulted at last in the disruption of the brotherhood. But the doctrines of the school lived on long after the breaking-up of the Italian association, and exercised a great influence upon later systems of thought. In Alexandria, in the early centuries of our era, there was a revival, in a modified form, of the philosophy of the sect, which is known as Neo-Pythagoreanism.

Empedocles and Democritus. — In the teachings of Empedocles (about 490–430 B.C.) and Democritus (about 460–360 B.C.) we meet with many speculations respecting the constitution of matter and the origin of things which are startlingly similar to some of the doctrines held by modern scientists.

Empedocles has been called “the father of the evolution idea.” He taught that the elements are united by love and separated by hate, an idea somewhat like the modern conception of attraction and repulsion. Through the attraction of love, all organisms are formed. Plants first came into existence and afterwards animals. Progress has taken place through the dying-out of the less perfect forms, and the survival of the species best fitted to live. In this conclusion, which contains the germ of the theory of “natural selection,” Empedocles anticipated modern evolutionists by twenty centuries; but then he failed to point out the laws through the operations of which the transformation takes place, and so his happy guess as to the “origin of species” remained only a guess.

Democritus, in his theory of atoms, made a very close approach in some respects to the views of modern physicists regarding the constitution of matter. He conceived all things, including the soul, to be composed of invisible, uncreated atoms, all alike in

¹ The doctrine of the Pythagoreans respecting numbers is too metaphysical a conception for comment here. Those wishing to investigate this matter should consult the books cited at the end of the chapter.

quality but differing in form and combination. Respecting the formation of the world from the original chaos of atoms, he held a theory that had points of resemblance to the modern nebular hypothesis.

Anaxagoras. — Anaxagoras (500–427? B.C.) was the first Greek philosopher who made *Mind* (*νοῦς*), instead of necessity or chance, the arranging and harmonizing force of the universe.¹ “Reason rules the world” was his first maxim.² This proposition, which practically made mind and matter two distinct things, and mind the fashioner of matter, marks a turning-point in Greek philosophy. It based it upon the same fundamental conception as that upon which the Hebrew philosophy of the world rested, and prepared the way for the union, four centuries later, of these two systems of thought, at Alexandria (p. 535).

Anaxagoras was the teacher in philosophy of Pericles, and it is certain that that statesman was greatly influenced by the liberal views of the philosopher; for in his general conceptions of the universe, Anaxagoras was far in advance of his age. He ventured to believe that the moon was somewhat like the earth, and inhabited; and taught that the sun was not a god, but a glowing rock, as large, probably, as the Peloponnesus.

But, for his temerity, the philosopher suffered the fate of Galileo in a later age; he was charged with impiety and exiled. Yet this did not disturb his composure. In banishment he said, “It is not I who have lost the Athenians, but the Athenians who have lost me.”

The Sophists. — The philosophers of whom we have thus far spoken were in general men who made the physical universe the

¹ The Empedoclean forces of love and hate acted fortuitously. In producing animal forms, for instance, the attractive potency of love was as apt to produce monstrosities, such as the chimæra, the centaurs, and the like, as to bring into existence perfect forms.

² This world-ordering Mind or Reason of Anaxagoras was not quite the same as the Supreme Ruler or Divine Wisdom of the later philosophers. There was lacking in the conception, in some degree, the idea of intelligent design or moral purpose.

subject of their speculations. Their systems of thought possessed little or no practical value. They did not supply motives for right living, having no word for the citizen in regard to his duties godward or manward. About the middle of the fifth century, however, there appeared in Greece a new class of philosophers, or rather teachers, called Sophists. They abandoned in despair the attempt of their predecessors to solve the problems of the physical world, and devoted themselves particularly to the inculcation of civic duties. As the earlier philosophers had made truth the object of pursuit, so the Sophists made virtue the goal of effort. The beginning of this movement which thus turned men's thought from the pursuit of physical science to that of civic excellence, may be traced to Anaxagoras (p. 526), who, in declaring mind to be the thing of chief import and the disposing force in the universe, introduced into Greek philosophy a new and transforming element. From the time of the appearance of the Sophists forward, we find man as an individual and a citizen, rather than the physical world, the chief subject of Greek study and reflection. Not until the rise of modern science in the sixteenth century were physical phenomena again to absorb so much attention as they did in the earlier schools of Hellas.

The most noted of the Sophists were Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodicus. As a class, the Sophists busied themselves in giving instruction in rhetoric and the art of disputation.

They travelled about from city to city, and, contrary to the usual custom of the Greek philosophers, took fees from their pupils. For about one hundred years after the middle of the fifth century, these men were the most popular and prominent educators in Greece. Notwithstanding their professions, they were in general teachers of superficial knowledge, who cared more for the dress in which the thought was arrayed than for the thought itself, more for victory than for truth; and some of them inculcated a selfish morality, placing expediency before right. The better philosophers of the time despised them, and applied to them many harsh epithets, taunting them with selling wisdom

and accusing them of boasting that they could "make the worse appear the better reason."

But this latter accusation was unjust. What the Sophists, among other things conducive to success in civic life, really taught the people was the art of conducting their own cases before the great citizen-juries, where every man was forced to be his own advocate. That their pupils often employed the art in making the unjust appear the just cause, there is no doubt; but the Sophists should hardly be held responsible for this abuse of the art they taught. The lawyer's profession of the present day is often perverted, but not for that reason should the whole art of pleading and of forensic oratory be left untaught.

Socrates.—Volumes would not contain all that would be both instructive and interesting respecting the teachings and speculations of the three great philosophers—Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. We can, however, accord to each only a few words. Of these three eminent thinkers, Socrates (469–399 B.C.), though surpassed in grasp and power of intellect by both Plato and Aristotle, has the firmest hold upon the affections of the world.

Nature, while generous to the philosopher in the gifts of soul, was unkind to him in the matter of his person. His face was ugly as a satyr's, so that he invited the shafts of the comic poets of his time. His figure is said to have been the most ungainly, and therefore the most familiar, of any upon the streets of Athens. He loved to gather a little circle about him in the Agora or in the streets, and then to draw out his listeners by a series of ingenious questions. His method was so peculiar to himself that it has received the designation of the "Socratic dialogue." He has very happily been called an *educator*, as opposed to an *instructor*. In the young men of his time Socrates found many devoted pupils. The youthful Alcibiades declared that "he was forced to stop his ears and flee away, that he might not sit down by the side of Socrates and grow old in listening."¹

¹ Socrates was unfortunate in his domestic relations. Xanthippe, his wife, seems to have been of a practical turn of mind, and unable to sympathize with the

This great philosopher believed that the proper study of mankind is man, his favorite maxim being "Know thyself"; hence he is said to have brought philosophy from the heavens and introduced it to the homes of men.

Socrates held the Sophists in aversion, and in opposition to their selfish expediency taught the purest system of morals that the world had yet known, and which has been surpassed only by the precepts of the Great Teacher. He thought himself to be restrained from entering upon what was inexpedient or wrong, by a tutelary spirit (demon). He believed in the immortality of the soul and in a Supreme Ruler of the universe, but sometimes spoke slightly of the temples and the popular deities. This led to his prosecution on the double charge of blasphemy and of corrupting the Athenian youth. Of his demeanor at his trial, of his condemnation, and of his last hours with his devoted disciples, we have already spoken (p. 400).




Fig. 71. SOCRATES.

Plato. — Plato (427–347 B.C.), "the broad-browed," was a philosopher of noble birth, before whom in youth opened a brilliant career in the world of Greek affairs; but, coming under the influence of Socrates, he resolved to give up all his prospects in politics and devote himself to philosophy. Upon the condemnation and death of his master he went into voluntary exile. In foreign lands he gathered knowledge and met with varied experiences.¹ He

abstracted ways of her husband, whose life at home she at times made very uncomfortable. Her name has been handed down as "the synonym of the typical scold."

¹ See above, pp. 423 and 425.

finally returned to Athens and established a school of philosophy in the Academy. Here, amid the disciples that thronged to his lectures, he passed the greater part of his long life — he died 347 B.C., at the age of eighty-one years — laboring incessantly upon the great works that bear his name.

Plato imitated in his writings Socrates' method in conversation. The discourse is carried on by questions and answers, hence the



Fig. 72. PLATO.

term *Dialogues* that attaches to his works. He attributes to his master, Socrates, much of the philosophy that he teaches: yet his writings are all deeply tinged with his own genius and thought. In the *Republic* Plato portrays his conception of an ideal state. He was opposed to the extreme democracy of the Athenians, and his system, in some of its main features, was singularly like the feudal system of Mediæval Europe. Especially is this true as to his military aristocracy.

The *Phædo* is a record of the last conversation of Socrates with his disciples — an immortal argument for the immortality of the soul.

Plato believed not only in a future life (post-existence), but also in pre-existence; teaching that the ideas of reason, or our intuitions, are reminiscences of a past experience.¹ Plato's doctrines

¹ In the following lines from Wordsworth we catch a glimpse of Plato's doctrine of pre-existence: —

“ Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
Nor yet in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory, do we come
From God, who is our home.” — *Ode on Immortality*.

And again: “ And but for our surface and distracted lives — lived here for the most

have exerted a profound influence upon all schools of thought and philosophies since his day. In some of his precepts he made a close approach to the teachings of Christianity. "We ought to become like God," he said, "as far as this is possible; and to become like Him is to become holy and just and wise."

Aristotle.—As Socrates was surpassed by his pupil Plato, so in turn was Plato excelled by his disciple Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), "the master of those who know." In him the philosophical genius of the Hellenic intellect reached its culmination. It may be doubted whether all the ages since his time have produced so profound and powerful an intellect as his. He was born in the Macedonian city of Stagira, and hence is frequently called the "Stagirite." As in the case of Socrates, his personal appearance gave no promise of the philosopher. He had a small and contemptible body, the defects of




Fig. 73. ARISTOTLE.

part in the senses—we should have never lost the consciousness of our descent into immortality, nor have questioned our resurrection and longevity. But as in descending all drink of oblivion—some more, some less—it happens that while all are conscious of life, by defect of memory our recollections are various concerning it; those discerning most vividly who have drunk least of oblivion, they more easily recalling the memory of their past existence. Ancient of days, we hardly are persuaded to believe that our souls are no older than our bodies, and to date our nativity from our family registers, as if time and space could chronicle the periods of the immortal mind by its advent into the flesh and decess out of it."—ALCOTT'S *Tablets*, p. 203.

which were made more noticeable by his over-scrupulous care of his dress and by the finery he wore. His teacher Plato, however, recognized the genius of his pupil, and called him the "Mind of the school." He also called him "the Reader," because he devoured so eagerly the works of the masters.

After studying for twenty years in the school of Plato, Aristotle became the preceptor of Alexander the Great (p. 440). When Philip invited him to become the tutor of his son, he gracefully complimented the philosopher by saying in his letter that he was grateful to the gods that the prince was born in the same age with him. The royal pupil loved his great teacher with an affectionate devotion. He said, "I owe great love to my father and to my teacher Aristotle; to one for living, and to the other for living well." Alexander became the liberal patron of his tutor, and, besides giving him large sums of money, aided him in his scientific studies by sending him large collections of plants and animals, gathered on his distant expeditions.

At Athens the great philosopher delivered his lectures while walking about beneath the trees and porticos of the Lyceum; hence the term "peripatetic" (from the Greek *peripatein*, "to walk about") applied to his philosophy. He died 322 B.C., the same year that marks the death of Demosthenes.

Among the productions of his fertile intellect are works on rhetoric, logic, poetry, morals and politics, physics and metaphysics. For centuries his works were studied and copied and commented upon by both European and Asiatic scholars, in the schools of Athens and Rome, of Alexandria and Constantinople. Until the time of Bacon in England, for nearly two thousand years, Aristotle ruled over the realm of mind with a despotic sway. All teachers and philosophers acknowledged him as their guide and master.

Zeno and the Stoics.—We are now approaching the period when the political life of Hellas was failing, and was being fast overshadowed by the greatness of Rome. But the intellectual life of the Greek race was by no means eclipsed by the calamity that

ended its political existence. For centuries after that event the poets, scholars, and philosophers of this intellectual people led a brilliant career in the schools and universities of the Roman world.

From among all the philosophers of this long period, we can select for brief mention only a few. And first we shall speak of Zeno and Epicurus, who are noted as founders of schools of philosophy that exerted a vast influence upon both the thought and the conduct of many centuries.

Zeno, founder of the celebrated school of the Stoics, lived in the third century before our era (about 340-265). He taught at Athens in a public porch (in Greek *stoa*), from which circumstance comes the name applied to his disciples.

The Stoical philosophy was the outgrowth, in part at least, of that of the Cynics, a sect of most rigid and austere morals. The typical representative of this sect is found in Diogenes, who lived, so the story goes, in a tub, and went about Athens by daylight with a lantern, in search, as he said, of a *man*. The Cynics were simply a race of pagan hermits: Diogenes was the Simon Stylites¹ of the sect.

Zeno adopted all that was good in the code of the Cynics, and, adding to this everything that he found of value in the systems of other philosophers, formed therefrom his new philosophy. It became a favorite system of thought with certain classes of the Romans, and under its teachings and doctrines were nourished some of the purest and loftiest characters produced by the pagan world. It numbered among its representatives, in later times, the illustrious Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, and the scarcely less renowned and equally virtuous slave Epictetus. In many of its teachings it anticipated Christian doctrines, and was, in the philosophical world, a very important preparation for Christianity.

The Stoics inculcated virtue for the sake of itself. They believed — and it would be very difficult to frame a better creed — that “man’s chief business here is to do his duty.” Bodily pain,

¹ A noted Christian ascetic.

they taught, was a matter of no moment ; and they schooled themselves to bear with composure any lot that destiny might appoint. Any sign of emotion on account of calamity was considered unmanly and unphilosophical. Thus, a certain Stoic, when told of the sudden death of his son, is said merely to have remarked, "Well, I never imagined that I had given life to an immortal."

Epicurus and the Epicureans.—Epicurus (341–270 B.C.) who was a contemporary of Zeno, taught, in opposition to the Stoics, that *pleasure* is the highest good. He recommended virtue, indeed, but only as a means for the attainment of pleasure ; whereas the Stoics made virtue an end in itself. In other words, Epicurus said, "Be virtuous, because virtue will bring you the greatest amount of happiness" ; Zeno said, "Be virtuous, because you ought to be."




Fig. 74. EPICURUS.

Epicurus had many followers in Greece, and his doctrines were eagerly embraced by many among the Romans during the corrupt and licentious period of the Roman empire. Many of these disciples carried the doctrines of their master to an excess that he himself would have been the first to condemn. (There is often more of good or evil in a philosophy than its founder ever dreams of.) Allowing full indulgence to every appetite and passion, their whole philosophy was expressed in the proverb, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." No pure or exalted life could be nourished in the unwholesome atmosphere of such a philosophy. Epicureanism never produced a single great character.

The Sceptics: Pyrrho.—About the beginning of the third century B.C. scepticism became wide-spread in Greece. It seemed as though men were losing faith in everything. Many circumstances had worked together to bring about this state of universal unbelief. A wider knowledge of the world had caused many to

lose their faith in the myths and legends of the old mythologies. The existence of so many systems of philosophy caused men to doubt the truth of any of them. The conquests of Alexander, by bringing the Greek mind in contact with the strange Asiatic systems of belief, tended powerfully to deepen and confirm this feeling of bewilderment and uncertainty. Many thoughtful minds were hopelessly asking, "What is truth?"

Pyrrho (about 365-275 B.C.) was the "doubting Thomas" of the Greeks. He doubted everything, and declared that the great problems of the universe could not be solved. It was the duty of man, and the part of wisdom, to entertain no positive judgment on any matter, and thus to ensure serenity and peace of mind.

The disciples of Pyrrho went to absurd lengths in their scepticism, some of them even saying that they asserted nothing, not even that they asserted nothing. They doubted whether they doubted.

The Neo-Platonists. — Neo-Platonism was a blending of Greek philosophy and Oriental mysticism. It has been well called the "despair of reason," because it abandoned all hope of man's ever being able to attain the *highest* knowledge through the intellect, and held that the human soul, when in an ecstatic state or prophet-like trance, receives, through a higher faculty than reason, in a sort of vision, revelations of divine and eternal truth. It was chiefly a theological philosophy; that is, it dealt with the nature of God and his relations to man. Its representatives were at once Greek thinkers and Hebrew seers. The centre of this last movement in Greek philosophical thought was Alexandria in Egypt, the meeting-place, in the closing centuries of the ancient world, of the East and the West.

Philo the Jew (b. about 39 B.C.), who labored to harmonize Hebrew doctrines with the teachings of Plato, was the forerunner of the Neo-Platonists. But the greatest of the school was Plotinus (A.D. 204-269), who spent the last years of his life at Rome, where he was a great favorite. Four times in six years, according to one of his disciples, was he freed from the body, and being absorbed in the Infinite, saw God, in ecstatic vision

Conflict between Neo-Platonism and Christianity. — While the Neo-Platonists were laboring to restore, in modified form, the ancient Greek philosophy and worship, the teachers of Christianity were fast winning the world over to a new faith. The two systems came into deadly antagonism. For a time the issue of the contention between the Hellenic philosophers and the Christian Fathers may have seemed doubtful. But by the close of the third century A.D. it was plain that the majority of the people of the Roman empire, which now virtually embraced the world, were already, or at least soon would be, disciples of the Christian teachers. It was doubtless his persuasion of this fact that led the Roman emperor Constantine the Great (A.D. 306–337) to throw his influence on the side of the Christian Fathers, and proclaim Christianity as the favored religion of the empire.

Under Julian the Apostate (Roman emperor A.D. 361–363), who was an ardent Neo-Platonist, the Hellenic philosophy was restored, and every effort made to discredit and destroy the Christian faith. With his death, however, passed away the last good hope of the restoration of the renovated philosophy of ancient Greece. The gifted and beautiful Hypatia, almost the last representative of the old system of speculation and belief, was torn to pieces in the streets of Alexandria by a mob of fanatic Christian monks (A.D. 415). Finally the Roman emperor Justinian forbade the pagan philosophers to teach their doctrines (A.D. 529).¹ This imperial edict closed forever the Greek schools, in which for more than a thousand years the world had received instruction upon the loftiest themes that can engage the human mind. The Greek philosophers, as living, personal teachers, had finished their work ; but their systems of thought will never cease to attract and influence the best minds of the race.

Science among the Greeks.

In ancient times no single people or race excelled in all departments of knowledge or human endeavor. Having, then, seen the

¹ See *Mediæval and Modern History*, pp. 68, 69.

wonderful genius of the Greek race for art, literature, and philosophy, we are prepared to learn that they never evinced great aptitude for the more practical sciences. In art and literature the Greeks are still our teachers; in science we are immeasurably their superiors. Still, while this is true, the contributions to the physical sciences of the Greek observers have laid us under no small obligation to them. Especially did the later Greeks do much good and lasting work in the mathematical sciences.

Some of those whom we have classed as philosophers, Thales and Anaxagoras for instance, were careful students of nature, and might be called scientists. The great philosopher Aristotle wrote some valuable works on anatomy and natural history, his observations being held in the highest esteem by naturalists of the present day for their accuracy. From his time onward the sciences were pursued with much zeal and success.

Mathematics : Euclid and Archimedes. – Alexandria, in Egypt, became the seat of the most celebrated school of mathematics of antiquity. Here, under Ptolemy Soter, flourished Euclid, the great geometer, whose work forms the basis of the science of geometry as taught in our schools at the present time. Ptolemy himself was his pupil. The royal student, however, seems to have disliked the severe application required to master the problems of Euclid, and asked his teacher if there was not some easier way. Euclid replied, “There is no royal road to geometry.”

In the third century B.C., Syracuse, in Sicily, was the home of Archimedes, the greatest mathematician that the Grecian world produced. He had a marvellous genius for figures, and investigated the abstrusest problems in geometry, mechanics, and the allied sciences. The range and productiveness of his genius are shown by the following titles to some of his works: *On Bodies Floating in Fluids; On Centres of Gravity; On the Sphere and the Cylinder.*

His acquaintance with the first subject is illustrated by the familiar story that is told of the manner in which he detected the impurity of the gold in the crown of Hiero, king of Syracuse.

The king, suspecting that the gold had been alloyed, submitted the article to Archimedes, who detected the fraud by means of the principle of specific gravities, which was suggested to him while bathing. Leaping from the bath, he ran through the corridors, exclaiming, "*Eureka! Eureka!*"—"I have found it! I have found it!"

His knowledge of the second subject and of the laws of the lever is indicated by the oft-quoted boast that he made to Hiero: "Give me a place to stand, and I will move the world." His elucidation of the properties of the sphere and cylinder were, even in his own estimation, so important that he requested that a figure of these should be placed, as the fittest memorial of his life, upon his tomb. More than one hundred years afterwards Cicero discovered and identified the monument by means of these emblems.

During the siege of Syracuse by the Romans, Archimedes rendered his native city valuable service by driving off or destroying the enemy's vessels by means of ingenious and powerful engines. The story of his setting fire to the Roman ships by means of mirrors reflecting the sun's rays, is, after much discussion, allowed to be not only possible, but probable. Archimedes perished in the sack of the city (212 B.C.), but in what way he met his death is not known with certainty.

Astronomy and Geography.—Among ancient Greek astronomers and geographers, the names of Aristarchus, Eratosthenes, Hipparchus, Strabo, Pausanias, and Claudius Ptolemy are distinguished.

Aristarchus of Samos, who lived in the third century B.C., held that the earth revolves about the sun as a fixed centre, and rotates on its own axis. He was the Greek Copernicus. But his theory was rejected by his contemporaries and successors.

Eratosthenes (b. about 276 B.C.) might be called an astronomical geographer. His greatest achievement was the fairly accurate determination of the circumference of the earth by means of the different lengths of the shadow cast by the midday sun in Upper and in Lower Egypt at the time of the summer solstice

Hipparchus, who flourished about the middle of the second century B.C., was, through his careful observations, the real founder of scientific astronomy. He calculated eclipses, observed the precession of the equinoxes, catalogued the stars, and wrote several astronomical works of a really scientific character.

Strabo was born about half a century before our era. He travelled over a large part of the world, and describes, as an eye-witness, the scenery, the productions, and the peoples of all the countries known to the ancients.

About two centuries after Strabo's time, Pausanias wrote his *Tour of Greece*, a sort of guide-book, which is crowded with invaluable little items of interest respecting all the places best worth visiting in Greece.

Claudius Ptolemy, the most noted of ancient astronomers, lived in Egypt about the middle of the second century after Christ. His great reputation is due not so much to his superior genius as to the fortunate circumstance that a vast work¹ compiled by him, preserved and transmitted to later times almost all the knowledge of the ancient world on astronomical and geographical subjects. In this way it has happened that his name has become attached to various doctrines and views respecting the universe, though these probably were not originated by him. The phrase "Ptolemaic System," however, links his name inseparably, whether the honor be fairly his or not, with that conception of the solar system set forth in his works, which continued to be the received theory from his time until Copernicus—fourteen centuries later.

Ptolemy combated the theory of Aristarchus in regard to the rotation and revolution of the earth; yet he believed the earth to be a globe, and supported this view by exactly the same arguments that we to-day use to prove the doctrine.

Medicine and Anatomy.—Hippocrates (b. about 460 B.C.), the founder of a school of medicine at Cos, did so much to emancipate the art of healing from superstition and ignorance, and to

¹ Known to Mediæval Europe by its Arabian title *Almagest*, meaning "the greatest."

make it a scientific study, that he is called the "Father of Medicine."¹ His central doctrine was that there are laws of disease as well as laws of healthy life. The works ascribed to him form the basis of modern medical science.

The most noted Greek physician after Hippocrates was Galenus Claudius, or simply Galen (about A.D. 130-193). He wrote a multitude of books, which gathered up all the medical and anatomical knowledge of his time, and which were greatly prized and carefully studied by the medical students of the Middle Ages.

The advance of the science of anatomy among the ancient Greeks was hindered by their feelings respecting the body, which caused them to look with horror upon its deliberate mutilation. Surprising as the statement may appear, it is nevertheless true that Aristotle, "the greatest of all thinkers in antiquity, the son of a physician, especially educated in physical science, and well acquainted for the time with the dissection of animals, regarded the brain as a lump of cold substance, quite unfit to be the seat and organ of the *sensus communis*."² This important office he ascribed rather to the heart. The brain he considered to be chiefly useful as the source of fluids for lubricating the eyes, etc."³ At Alexandria, however, in the later period, under the influence doubtless of Egyptian practices in embalming, the Greek physicians greatly promoted the knowledge of anatomy not only by the dissection of dead bodies, but even by the vivisection of criminals condemned to death.⁴

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¹ The patron god of medicine was Æsculapius.

² The thinking faculty, the mind.

³ Ladd's *Elements of Physiological Psychology* (1887), p. 240.

⁴ Some practices among the Greek physicians strike us as peculiar. The following is too characteristically Greek to be omitted. Plato, in the *Gorgias*, tells us that sometimes the doctor took a Sophist along with him to persuade the patient to take his prescription. Professor Mahaffy comments thus upon this practice: "This was done because it was the fashion to discuss everything in Greece, and people were not satisfied to submit silently to anybody's prescription, either in law politics, religion, or medicine."

Pythagoras; *ib.* (ten volume ed.), vol. vii. pp. 32-172; (twelve volume ed.), vol. viii. pp. 350-496; the Sophists and Socrates. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*, pp. 29-68; traces the development of the idea of evolution among the Greek Philosophers. Burt, *A Brief History of Greek Philosophy*. Davidson, *The Education of the Greek People*, ch. v., on the teaching of Socrates. Lewes, *Biographical History of Philosophy*, first part. Pater, *Plato and Platonism*. Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics* (from the German).



Fig. 75. A GREEK SCHOOL. (After a vase painting.)

CHAPTER XXXI.

SOCIAL LIFE OF THE GREEKS.

Education.— Education at Sparta, where it was chiefly gymnastic, as we have seen, was a state affair (p. 68) ; but at Athens and throughout Greece generally, the youth were trained in private schools. These schools were of all grades, ranging from those kept by the most obscure teachers, who gathered their pupils in some recess of the street, to those established in the Athenian Academy and Lyceum by such philosophers as Plato and Aristotle.

It was only the boys who received education. These Grecian boys, Professor Mahaffy imagines, were “the most attractive the world has ever seen.” At all events, we may believe that they were trained more carefully and delicately than the youth among any other people before or since the days of Hellenic culture.

In the nursery, the boy was taught the beautiful myths and stories of the national mythology and religion.¹ At about seven

¹ At the birth of a child, many customs of a significant character were carefully observed. Thus at Sparta the new-born infant was first cradled on a shield, which

he entered school, being led to and from the place of training by an old slave, who bore the name of "pedagogue," which in Greek means a guide or leader of boys—not a teacher. His studies were grammar, music, and gymnastics, the aim of the course being to secure a symmetrical development of mind and body alike.



Fig. 76. GYMNASTIC EXERCISES.

Grammar included reading, writing, and arithmetic; music, which embraced a wide range of mental accomplishments, trained the boy to appreciate the masterpieces of the great poets, to contribute his part to the musical diversions of private entertain-

symbolized the martial life of the Spartan citizen; while at Athens the child was laid upon a mantle in which was wrought the agis of Athena, by which act was emblemized and invoked the protection of that patron goddess. Infanticide was almost universally practised throughout Greece. (At Thebes, however, the exposure of children was prohibited by severe laws.) Such philosophers as Plato and Aristotle saw nothing in the custom to condemn. Among the Spartans, as we have already learned (p. 68), the state determined what infants might be preserved, condemning the weakly or ill-formed to be cast out to die. At Athens and in other states the right to expose his child was given to the father. The infant was abandoned in some desert place, or left in some frequented spot in the hope that it might be picked up and cared for. Greek literature, like that of every other people of antiquity, is filled with stories and dramas, all turning upon points afforded by this common practice. The career of Sargon of Agadê, of Cyrus the Great of Persia, of the Hebrew Moses, of (Edipus of Thebes, of Romulus and Remus of Roman legend, and a hundred others, are all prefaced by the same story of exposure and fortunate rescue

ments, and to join in the sacred choruses and in the pæan of the battle-field. The exercises of the palestræ and the gymnasia trained him for the Olympic contests, or for those sterner hand-to-hand battle-struggles, in which so much depended upon personal strength and dexterity.

Upon reaching maturity, the youth was enrolled in the list of citizens. But his graduation from school was his "commencement" in a much more real sense than with the average modern graduate. Never was there a people besides the Greeks whose daily life was so emphatically a discipline in liberal culture. The schools of the philosophers, the debates of the popular assembly, the practice of the law-courts, the masterpieces of a divine art, the religious processions, the representations of an unrivalled stage, the Panhellenic games—all these were splendid and efficient educational agencies, which produced and maintained a standard of average intelligence and culture among the citizens of the Greek cities that probably has never been attained among any other people on the earth.¹ Freeman, quoted approvingly by Mahaffy, says that "the average intelligence of the assembled Athenian citizens was higher than that of our [the English] House of Commons."

Social Position of Woman.—Although there are in Greek literature some exquisitely beautiful portraiture of ideal womanhood, still the general tone of the literature betrays a deep contempt for woman, which Symonds regards as "the greatest social blot upon the brilliant but imperfect civilization of the Greeks." The poets are particularly sarcastic. Simonides winds up a bitter invective against women in general, in which he compares different classes of them to various despicable animals, by saying, "Zeus made this supreme evil—women: even though they seem to be of good, when one has got one, she becomes a plague." And another poet (Hipponax) says, "A woman gives two days of happiness to man—the day of her bridal and that of her burial." Plato does not entertain a high opinion of the sex,

¹ See above, p. 267, n.

while Thucydides quotes with seeming approval the Greek proverb, — "That woman is best who is least spoken of among men, whether for good or for evil."

The myth of Pandora seems to have sprung up out of just such sentiments as the above. This fable evidently reacted upon the feelings and practices of the Greeks, just as the Oriental story of the Fall of Man through the temptation of Eve contributed to the giving of woman a position of inferiority and subjection in the early Christian Church.

This unworthy conception of woman of course consigned her to a narrow and inferior place in the Greek home. Her position may be defined as being about half-way between Oriental seclusion and modern or Western freedom. Her main duties were to cook and spin, and to oversee the domestic slaves, of whom she herself was practically one. In the fashionable society of Ionian cities, she was seldom allowed to appear in public, or to meet, even in her own house, the male friends of her husband. In Sparta, however, and in Dorian states generally she was accorded unusual freedom, and was a really important factor in society.

The great liberty enjoyed by the women of Dorian cities, in contrast with the seclusion and neglect to which they were condemned in Ionian communities, is doubtless to be attributed, in part at least, to the influence upon the latter of Asiatic custom, entering Greece through Ionia.

The low position generally assigned the wife in the home had a most disastrous effect upon Greek morals. She could exert no such elevating or refining influence as she exercises in the modern home. The men were led to seek social and intellectual sympathy and companionship outside the family circle, among a class of talented and often highly cultured women, known as *Hetærae*. As the most noted and brilliant representative of this class stands Aspasia, the friend of Pericles. Her conversation possessed attraction for the most prominent and accomplished men of Athens, such persons as Socrates and Anaxagoras often assembling at her house. Yet the influence of this class was most harmful to social

morality, so that to the degradation of woman in the home may be traced the source of the most serious stain that rests upon Greek civilization.

Friendship among the Greeks. — From speaking of the inferior rank assigned woman in the Greek home, we are led by a natural transition to speak of Greek friendship between men. While it seems quite certain that that romantic sentiment to which we give distinctively the name of love, was not the same universal and absorbing passion among the Greeks that it is among modern civilized peoples, it is equally certain that the ancient Greeks possessed a capacity for friendship between man and man such as is rarely or never seen among the men of modern times. It would scarcely be incorrect to say that the Greek men "fell in love" with each other. An ardent and romantic attachment sprang up between companions, which possessed all the higher elements of that chivalrous sentiment which the modern man seems capable of entertaining only for one of the opposite sex. "The chivalry of Hellas found its motive force," writes Symonds, "in friendship rather than in the love of woman. . . . Fraternity in arms played for the Greek race the same part as the idealization of woman for the knighthood of Feudal Europe."

Greek literature and history afford innumerable instances of this wonderful and happy capacity of the Greeks for friendship. The memory easily recalls the Homeric picture of the friendship between Achilles and Patroclus; the attachment, stronger than death, between Damon and Pythias; the friendship of the patriot heroes Pelopidas and Epaminondas, of Alexander and Hephæstion; and the attachments that united, in bonds dissolvable only by death, the members of the Sacred Band of Thebes.

Theatrical Entertainments. — Among the ancient Greeks the theatre was a state establishment, "a part of the constitution." This arose from the religious origin and character of the drama (p. 506), all matters pertaining to the popular worship being the care and concern of the state. Theatrical performances,

being religious acts, were presented only during religious festivals, — certain festivals observed in honor of Dionysus, — and were attended by all classes, rich and poor, men, women, and children. The women, however, except the *Hetæraë*, were, it would seem, permitted to witness tragedies only; the comic stage was too gross to allow of their presence.

The upper ranges of seats in the theatre were reserved for the women; the chairs bordering the orchestra were for the officers of the state and other persons of distinction; while the intervening tiers of seats were occupied by the general audience. The spectators sat under the open sky; and the pieces followed one after the other in close succession from early morning till nightfall.

While the better class of actors were highly honored, ordinary players were held in very low esteem, in which matter the Greek stage presents a parallel to that of England in the sixteenth century. And as in the Elizabethan age the writers of plays were frequently also the performers, so in Greece, particularly during the early period of the drama, the author often became an actor, and assisted in the presentation of his own pieces. Still another parallel is found in the fact that the female parts in the Greek dramas, as in the early English theatre, were taken by men.

The stage machinery of the Greek theatre and the costumes of the actors were ingenious and elaborate. There were movable scenes; trap-doors and various machines for introducing the infernal and celestial divinities and swinging them through the air; contrivances for imitating all the familiar sounds of the country, the roar and crash of storm and thunder, and all the



Fig. 77. GREEK TRAGIC FIGURE.

noises that are counterfeited on the modern stage. The tragic actor increased his height and size by wearing thick-soled buskins, an enormous mask, and padded garments. The actor in comedy wore thin-soled slippers, or socks. The *sock* being thus a characteristic part of the make-up of the ancient comic actor, and the *buskin* that of the tragic actor, these foot-coverings have come to be used as the symbols respectively of comedy and tragedy, as in the familiar lines of Dryden : —

“Great Fletcher never treads in buskins here,
Nor greater Jonson dares in socks appear.”

The chorus were often gorgeously and fantastically costumed. Thus in the play of the *Birds* by Aristophanes, they were arrayed each to represent some gay-plumaged bird ; while in the *Clouds*, by the same poet, to counterfeit clouds they appeared in the midst of fleecy drapery, and enveloped in the smoke of incense. By similar devices of drapery and masks, all the divinities and monsters known to Greek mythology were brought before the spectators.

The expenses of the choruses were defrayed by rich citizens, who at Athens were chosen by the different tribes in turn. The person elected to provide the chorus was known as the “choragus.” He often spent large sums in competition with other leaders. The choragus who presented the best chorus was awarded a prize, and was allowed the privilege of erecting, at his own expense, a monument in commemoration of his victory.¹

The theatre exerted a great influence upon Greek life. It performed for ancient Greek society somewhat the same service as that rendered to modern society by the pulpit and the press. During the best days of Hellas the frequent rehearsal upon the stage of the chief incidents in the lives of the gods and the heroes served to deepen and strengthen the religious faith of the people ; and later, when with the Macedonian the days of decline came, the stage was one of the chief agents in the diffusion of Greek literary

¹ See cut of “Choragic Monument of Lysicrates,” p. 482.

culture over the world. Theatres arose everywhere, and it was chiefly through the popular representations of the stage that a knowledge of the best productions of Greek literature was imparted to the mixed population of the Hellenistic cities of Egypt and Western Asia, and to the inhabitants of the cities of Italy as well.

Banquets and Symposia. — Banquets and drinking-parties among the Greeks possessed some features which set them apart from similar entertainment among other people.



Fig. 78. A BANQUET SCENE.

The banquet proper was partaken, in later times, by the guests in a reclining position, upon couches or divans, arranged about the table in the Oriental manner. After the usual courses, a libation was poured out and a hymn sung in honor of the gods, and then followed that characteristic part of the entertainment known as the "symposium."

The symposium was "the intellectual side of the feast." It consisted of general conversation, riddles, and convivial songs rendered to the accompaniment of the lyre passed from hand to hand. Generally professional singers and musicians, dancing-girls, jugglers, and jesters, were called in to contribute to the

merry-making. All the while the wine-bowl circulated freely, the rule being that a man might drink "as much as he could carry home without a guide, — unless he were far gone in years." Here also the Greeks applied their maxim, "Never too much." Besotted drunkenness, though by no means unknown in Greece, was always regarded as a most disgraceful thing.

The banqueters usually consumed the night in merry-making, sometimes being broken in upon from the street by other bands of revellers, who made themselves self-invited guests.

The symposium must at times, when the conversation was sustained by such persons as Socrates and Aristophanes, have been "a feast of reason and a flow of soul" indeed. Xenophon in his *Banquet* and Plato in his *Symposium* have each left us a striking report of such an entertainment.

Occupations. — The enormous body of slaves in ancient Greece (see next paragraph) relieved the free population from most of those forms of labor classed as drudgery. The æsthetic Greek regarded as degrading any kind of manual labor that marred the symmetry or beauty of the body.

At Sparta, and in other states where oligarchical constitutions prevailed, the citizens formed a sort of military caste, strikingly similar to the military aristocracy of Feudal Europe. Their chief occupation, as has already appeared, was martial and gymnastic exercises and the administration of public affairs. The Spartans, it will be recalled, were forbidden by law to engage in trade. In other aristocratic states, as at Thebes, a man by engaging in trade disqualified himself for full citizenship.

In the democratic states, however, speaking generally, labor and trade were regarded with less contempt. A considerable portion of the citizens were traders, artisans, and farmers.

Life at Athens presented some peculiar features. All Attica being included in what we should term the corporate limits of the city, the roll of Athenian citizens included a large body of well-to-do farmers, whose residence was outside the city walls.¹ The Attic

¹ See above, p. 284.

plains, and the slopes of the encircling hills, were dotted with beautiful villas and inviting farmhouses. "It is probable," says a well-known student of Greek life, in speaking of the appearance of the country about Athens just before the Peloponnesian War, "that as a scene of unambitious affluence, taste, high cultivation, and rustic contentment, nothing was ever beheld to compare with Attica."¹

And then Athens being the head of a great empire of subject cities, a large number of Athenian citizens were necessarily employed as salaried officials in the minor positions of the public service, and thus politics became a profession. In any event, the meetings of the popular assembly and the discussion of matters of state engrossed more or less of the time and attention of every citizen.

Again, the great Athenian jury-courts (p. 262), which were busied with cases from all parts of the empire, gave constant employment to nearly one-fourth of the citizens, the fee that the jurymen received enabling him to live without other business. It is said that, in the early morning, when the jurymen were passing through the streets to the different courts, Athens appeared like a city wholly given up to the single business of law. Furthermore, the great public works, such as temples and commemorative monuments, which were in constant process of erection, afforded employment for a vast number of artists and skilled workmen of every class.²

In the Agora, again, at any time of the day, a numerous class might have been found, whose sole occupation, as in the case of Socrates, was to talk. The writer of the "Acts of the Apostles" was so impressed with this feature of life at Athens that he summarized the habits of the people by saying, "All the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing."

¹ St. John, *History of the Manners and Customs of Ancient Greece*.

² For an enumeration of the different classes at Athens that received pay from the state treasury, see above, p. 262, n. 2.

Slavery. — There is a dark side to Greek life. Hellenic art, culture, refinement — “these good things were planted, like exquisite exotic flowers, upon the black, rank soil of slavery.”

Slaves were very numerous in Greece. No exact estimate can be made of their number, but it is believed that they greatly outnumbered the free population. Almost every freeman was a slave owner. It was accounted a real hardship to have to get along with less than half a dozen slaves.

This large class of slaves was formed in various ways. In the prehistoric period, the fortunes of war had brought the entire population of whole provinces into a servile condition, as in certain parts of the Peloponnesus. During later times, the ordinary captives of war still further augmented the ranks of these unfortunates. Their number was also largely added to by the slave traffic carried on with the barbarian peoples of Asia. Criminals and debtors, too, were often condemned to servitude; while foundlings were usually brought up as slaves.

The relation of master and slave was regarded by the Greek as being, not only a legal, but a natural one. A free community, in his view, could not exist without slavery. It formed the natural basis of both the family and the state, — the relation of master and slave being regarded as “strictly analogous to the relation of soul and body.” Even Aristotle and other Greek philosophers approved the maxim that “slaves were simply domestic animals possessed of intelligence.”¹ They were considered just as necessary in the economy of the family as cooking utensils.

In general, Greek slaves were not treated harshly — judging

¹ This harsh, selfish theory, it should be noted, was somewhat modified and relaxed, when the slave class, through the numerous captives of the unfortunate civil wars, came to be made up in considerable part of cultured Greeks, instead of being, as was the case in earlier times, composed almost exclusively of barbarians, or of inferior branches of the Hellenic race, between whom and their cultured masters there was the same difference in mental qualities as existed between the negro slaves and their masters in our own country. The sentiment that a slave was an unfortunate person, rather than an inferior being, came to prevail — a sentiment which aided powerfully in preparing the way for the Christian doctrine of the universal brotherhood of man.

their treatment by the standard of humanity that prevailed in antiquity. Some held places of honor in the family, and enjoyed the confidence and even the friendship of their master. Yet at Sparta, where slavery assumed the form of serfdom, the lot of the slave was peculiarly hard and unendurable. Even at Athens we hear much, in connection with the state silver mines at Laurium, of a labor contract-system which certainly was characterized by much callousness of feeling towards the slave, if we may judge from the conditions of the usual agreement, which bound the contractor to pay an annual rental equal to one-half the value of the slave (which implies that the poor creatures were worn out rapidly), and at the expiration of the contract to return to the owner simply *the same number* of slaves as had been hired.

If ever slavery was justified by its fruits, it was in Greece. The brilliant civilization of the Greeks was its product, and could never have existed without it. As one truthfully says, "Without the slaves the Attic democracy would have been an impossibility, for they alone enabled the poor, as well as the rich, to take a part in public affairs." Relieving the citizen of all drudgery, the system created a class characterized by elegant leisure, refinement, and culture.

We find an almost exact historical parallel to all this in the feudal aristocracy of Mediæval Europe. Such a society has been well likened to a great pyramid, whose top may be gilded with light, while its base lies in dark shadows. The civilization of ancient Hellas was splendid and attractive, but it rested with a crushing weight upon all the lower orders of Greek society.

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Extended Histories. — Grote, *History of Greece* (ed. of 1888), 10 vols.; the best extended history, sympathies strongly democratic. Thirlwall, *History of Greece* (ed. of 1845), 8 vols.; written from the aristocratic point of view. Mitford, *History of Greece* (seventh ed.), 8 vols.; old, and deformed by Tory prejudices. Read Macaulay's essay entitled "On Mitford's History of Greece." Curtius, *History of Greece* (from the German), 5 vols.; the large and comprehensive surveys of the author make his work the most suggestive of all the histories on Greece; the author's views, however, on the earlier history of Hellas can hardly be accepted without considerable reserve. Duncker, *History of Greece* (Abbott's trans.), 4 vols. Abbott, *History of Greece*; only vols. i. and ii. have yet appeared, which carry the narrative to the Thirty Years' Peace, 445 B.C. Victor Duruy, *History of Greece and of the Greek People* (from the French), 4 vols.; profusely illustrated. Holm, *History of Greece* (from the German); only the first volume has yet appeared in English.

Special Periods of the Historical Age. — Cox, *The Greek and the Persian*, and *The Athenian Empire*; Sankey, *The Spartan and Theban Supremacies*; Curteis, *The Macedonian Empire*, are found in the Epochs of Ancient History; they afford good summaries of the periods that they respectively cover. Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History*, ch. iv. on the Tyrants, and ch. vii. on practical politics in the fourth century B.C. Cox, George W., *History of Greece*, 2 vols. (new ed., 1878); carries the narrative to the end of the Peloponnesian War. Lloyd, *The Age of Pericles*, 2 vols.; a scholarly work. Abbott, *Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens* (Heroes of the Nations); a popular sketch by a master. Grant, *Greece in the Age of Pericles* (University Series). Mahaffy, *The Story of Alexander's Empire*; special chapters possess great interest. Dodge, *Alexander* (Great Captain Series); deals chiefly with the campaigns of Alexander. Torr, *Rhodes in Ancient Times*.

Finley, *Greece under the Romans*; carries on the story of Greece from 140 B.C. to 717 A.D. Freeman, *The History of Sicily from the Earliest Times*, 4 vols. This great work was left unfinished through the untimely death of the author. The last volume brings the story down to the death of Agathocles, 289 B.C.

Finance and Politics. — Boeckh, *The Public Economy of the Athenians* (from the German); the acknowledged authority on the financial history of Athens. Coulanges, *The Ancient City* (from the French); a standard work on the institutions of primitive classical society. Fowler, *The City-State of the Greeks and Romans*; should be read along with the preceding; also Hearn, *The Aryan Household, its Structure and its Development*. Müller, *History and Antiquities of the Doric Race* (from the German), 2 vols.; indispensable for the study of Dorian institutions. Freeman, *History of Federal Government* (new ed., 1893); deals with the attempts at federation among the Greeks—is the best authority on the subject. Wilson, *The State*, pp. 33-94; these few pages on the government of Greece give an excellent *résumé* of Greek political institutions. Schömann, *The Antiquities of Greece* (from the German), vol. i. on "The State," and "The Athenian Constitution." Botsford, *The Development of the Earlier Athenian Constitution*; an admirable monograph. Heeren, *Historical Researches*, vol. vi. Hart, *Introduction to the Study of Federal Government*; on p. 28 will be found a good bibliography on Greek confederations.

Architecture, Sculpture, and Painting. — A few of the best books on this subject have already been mentioned above, p. 499. For a more extended study the following works may be added to the list there given. We give simply the titles without special references to volume and chapter. Fergusson, *History of Architecture*, and *Handbook of Architecture*. Pater, *Greek Studies*; the essays on sculpture and architecture. Harrison, *Introductory Studies in Greek Art*. Von Reber, *History of Ancient Art* (from the German). Winckelmann, *History of Ancient Art* (from the German). Woltmann and Woermann, *History of Painting* (from the German). Lübke, *History of Art* (from the German). Waldstein, *Essays on the Art of Pheidias*. Lessing, *The Laocoön* (from the German).

Literature. — See list of books given on p. 520. In addition to the works there named, the advanced student will consult the following: Müller and Donaldson, *History of the Literature of Ancient Greece*, 3 vols. Mure, *A Critical History of the Language and Literature of Ancient Greece*, 5 vols.; for minute and critical study. Moulton, *The Ancient Classical Drama*.

Philosophy. — See references above, p. 540. Note also the following: Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy* (from the German), vol. i. pp. 18-259; for critical study. Newmann, *The Politics of Aristotle*, vol. i., Introduction; for

advanced students. Plato's Works (translated by Jowett). Aristotle's *Politics* (Jowett's translation). Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, and *Socrates and the Socratic Schools* (from the German). Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*. Davidson, *Aristotle* (Great Educators), Part III.

Social Life and Religious System. — Mahaffy, *Rambles and Studies in Greece*, *Social Life in Greece*, *Greek Life and Thought*, and *The Greek World under Roman Sway*; all these works are as scholarly as they are inspiring and entertaining. Dyer, *Studies of the Gods in Greece*; gives the results of the most recent explorations on the sites of old Greek temples. Becker, *Charicles*; an historical novel — the notes are the most valuable part of the work. Felton, *Lectures on Ancient and Modern Greece*, 2d course, "Life of Greece." St. John, *The Hellenes: The History of the Manners of the Ancient Greeks*, 3 vols. Guhl and Koner, *The Life of the Greeks and Romans* (from the German). Abbott, *Hellenica*; a collection of scholarly monographs on different subjects. Davidson, *The Education of the Greek People* (International Education Series). Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*; an interesting and authoritative summary of the contribution made by recent archæological discoveries to our knowledge of the arts, home life, and religion of the ancient Greeks. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* (published by the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies); contains valuable articles on a wide range of classical subjects. In the *Forum* for May, 1895, will be found an article by Professor Paul Shorey, entitled "Can We Revive the Olympic Games?" This is a paper of rare interest and a timely protest against the introduction of the commercial and professional spirit into modern athleticism. For a few additional references, see above, p. 58.

INDEX AND PRONOUNCING VOCABULARY.

NOTE.—In the case of words whose correct pronunciation has not seemed clearly indicated by their accentuation and syllabication, the sounds of the letters have been denoted thus: *ā*, like *a* in *gray*; *ā̃* like *ā*, only less prolonged; *ǣ*, like *a* in *hæve*; *ä*, like *a* in *fär*; *ē*, like *ee* in *fēet*; *ĕ*, like *e* in *ĕnd*; *e* and *eh*, like *ē*; *ç*, like *s*; *ġ*, like *j*; *ſ*, like *z*.

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